


NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE



TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

THE ARMIES
OF THE
FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC

Already published

THE ARMIES OF THE FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE RISE OF THE MARSHALS OF NAPOLEON I. By the late COLONEL RAMSAY WESTON PHIPPS.

VOLUME I. THE ARMÉE DU NORD. With an Introduction to the whole subject by the author. Edited by the late COLONEL CHARLES PHIPPS, D.S.O. 1926.

VOLUME II. THE ARMÉES DE LA MOSELLE, DU RHIN, DE SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE, DE RHIN-ET-MOSELLE. Edited by the late COLONEL CHARLES PHIPPS, D.S.O. 1929.

VOLUME III. THE ARMIES IN THE WEST 1793 to 1797, AND THE ARMIES IN THE SOUTH 1792 to March 1796. Edited by the late COLONEL CHARLES PHIPPS, D.S.O. 1931.

VOLUME IV. THE ARMY OF ITALY 1796 to 1797, PARIS AND THE ARMY OF THE INTERIOR 1792 to 1797, AND THE *COUP D'ÉTAT* OF FRUCTIDOR September 1797. Edited by ELIZABETH SANDARS. 1935.

THE ARMIES
OF THE
FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC
AND THE RISE OF THE MARSHALS
OF NAPOLEON I

THE ARMIES ON THE RHINE
IN SWITZERLAND, HOLLAND, ITALY
EGYPT, AND THE *COUP D'ÉTAT* OF BRUMAIRE
1797 TO 1799

By the late
COLONEL RAMSAY WESTON PHIPPS
Formerly of the Royal Artillery

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD

1939

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4
London Edinburgh Glasgow New York
Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay
Calcutta Madras
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

ONULP

PREFACE

THE first five volumes of this series have appeared at rather long intervals and this new one may find readers who have not seen the earlier prefaces. So it will be convenient now to repeat very shortly the explanation of the plan of the work given by its first editor, my uncle. Its title, which links 'the Armies' with 'the Rise of the Marshals', derives from the author's conception of a study of the armies as the 'Schools of the Marshals', in which they learned their business. My grandfather wished to show how the training that the future Marshals received in the early years of these wars varied with the theatre in which they served and with the character of the particular army to which they belonged. To him the importance of a campaign depended on the number of future Marshals to whose education it may be said to have contributed. Working by armies instead of by persons, he could avoid covering the same ground several times over. For such reasons he left unfinished the individual 'Lives of the Marshals' which he had composed and wrote a detailed history of the armies and of the several *coups d'état* in Paris. To these he added the 'Introduction' to the whole subject which begins Volume I and includes his account of the transformation of the army of the Monarchy into that of the Republic and a 'classification' of the Marshals under various heads. There is a difficulty in working by armies instead of persons in that the campaigns of different armies may overlap and an officer transferred from one army to another may have his later doings told before his earlier. In his arrangement of the several armies within each volume, my uncle generally avoided this difficulty with great skill, and he could say in the Preface to Volume III, which dealt with armies in La Vendée, Italy, and two theatres in Spain, that most of the future Marshals . . . 'leave these pages with scarcely a stain on their chronology'. But I have found this fifth volume unexpectedly hard to arrange chronologically. I tried for a long time to work the histories of the armies in with each other so that everybody's

career ran straightforwardly from January to December, from 1797 to 1799, but in the end I was defeated. There were too many changes of position amongst the men with whom we are dealing, and it meant too many phrases like 'Turning now to the army of Italy' and 'To return to the Rhine armies', so that it seemed better to take each frontier, if not quite each army, separately, even if it did mean finding Suchet in Italy at an earlier period than that at which we had just been dealing with him in Switzerland. I realize the disadvantages of this method and the occasional confusion it may cause, but it seems unavoidable here.

In the period covered by this volume we are back in conditions more like those of Volume II of my grandfather's work, and, except in the chapters on Egypt and Brumaire, there is no Bonaparte to dominate his future Marshals. We meet again Saint-Cyr, often having his careful advice unasked or ignored but enjoying his scientific successes; Ney, dashing and valued as a cavalry leader but arbitrary and difficult to deal with personally and as a temporary Commander-in-Chief; Jourdan, full of excellent sentiments and with some ability but unlucky as usual. Above all there is Masséna, standing out as the one victorious General in years when defeats and retreats were daily announcements. The period ends, however, with the return of Bonaparte: interest and action are concentrated in Paris, and with the *coup d'état* of Brumaire the focus changes and is fixed on Bonaparte instead of ranging widely about Europe.

There is plenty of material for more volumes on the Marshals as my grandfather's manuscripts go straight on from where this volume ends, with histories of the armies of the Consulate. The campaigns from 1800 are, of course, better known, and it has been suggested that the next volume or volumes might deal with the fighting in Spain from 1808 to 1814, which, though also well known, is of particular interest to English people, and which shows us the Marshals as they 'turned out' after their apprenticeship in the Republican armies. In the original consideration of this work the fact that for most of

the campaigns no account existed in English was felt to encourage the venture. With regard to Spain, there is not only Napier but Sir Charles Oman. My grandfather's treatment of the subject is naturally different, in aim and method, and I have reason to know that Sir Charles Oman would welcome his contribution. Advice or views on the choice of subject for the next volume would be very helpful.

In the general arrangement of this volume I have followed that of the last two, especially in omitting the references to authorities on each page, except where they seem to be essential. There are two lists of authorities, one for all the armies on the Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Holland, and the other for those in Italy and Egypt and for the *coup d'état* of Brumaire. All the future Marshals and many of the Generals mentioned in this volume have appeared in earlier ones, where often their characters have been described with the history of their early lives and fighting experience: I have tried not to refer back to these volumes more than seemed necessary, but I hope that no reference has been omitted that would have proved helpful.

Means are not lacking, from the provision made by my grandfather and the return from the first four volumes, to publish one more at least, but I would like to point out that, the more copies that are sold, the more new volumes we might hope to be able to bring out. The value of my grandfather's researches and the interest of his presentation of them have been acknowledged by many reviewers and other authorities, and I hope that value and interest are still apparent in spite of what I feel to be very inadequate editing for this volume.

Sir Charles Oman has again courteously allowed me to have access to the Codrington Library, where my grandfather's books form the 'Phipps Donation', and I am most grateful to him, as also to Mr. Algernon Whitaker of that Library, who has very kindly helped me on many occasions.

ELIZABETH SANDARS.

The Manor House
Little Tew

NOTE

WITH regard to the 'classification' of the Marshals attempted in Volume I of this series and referred to on page v above, it may be helpful to new readers to mention here that fuller biographical details are given in the appropriate volume as soon as a future Marshal begins to be prominent. Of course remarks on their characters and progress occur all through the text, but, roughly speaking and with this caution, the individual Marshals are most fully dealt with in the following volumes (excluding this volume).

Augereau iii, iv	Lannes iii, iv	Oudinot ii
Bernadotte i, ii, iv	Lefebvre ii	Pérignon iii
Berthier i, iv	Macdonald i	Saint-Cyr ii
Bessières iii, iv	Marmont iii, iv	Sérurier iii, iv
Brune i, iv	Masséna iii, iv	Soult ii
Davout i, ii	Moncey iii	Suchet iii, iv
Grouchy i, iv	Mortier i, ii	Victor iii, iv
Jourdan i, ii	Murat i, iv	
Kellermann i, ii, iii	Ney i, ii	

CONTENTS

THE ARMIES ON THE RHINE and IN HOLLAND

LIST OF AUTHORITIES QUOTED.	3
I. INTERLUDE OF PEACE (September 1797 to November 1798). Formation of 'Mayence'. L'Armée d'Angleterre. Jourdan takes command. Plans for the campaign	7
II. FIRST PHASE OF CAMPAIGN OF 1799 (December 1798 to March 1799). L'Armée d'Observation under Bernadotte. Advance over the Rhine. Weakness of the armies. Battle of Ostrach	26
III. RETREAT (March to April 1799). Battle of Stockach. Saint-Cyr's part. Jourdan's retreat. Ernouf's retreat	39
IV. FIRST OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND (January 1798 to April 1799). Invasion of Switzerland by Brune. Plundering and policy of the French. Masséna in command. Operations in Grisons and Engadine	67
V. FIRST ZÜRICH CAMPAIGN (April to August 1799). Masséna's position. Lecourbe's success. First battle of Zürich. St. Gotthard taken	86
VI. LULL IN THE SWISS CAMPAIGN (July to August 1799). The army of the Rhine. Archduke Charles withdrawn from Switzerland. The Russians under Korsakoff	112
VII. SECOND ZÜRICH CAMPAIGN (September to October 1799). Second battle of Zürich. Suvárof advances from Italy. Lecourbe's mountain warfare	130
VIII. END OF SWISS OPERATIONS (September to November 1799). Russians and French in the mountains. Suvárof's retreat. Ney and Lecourbe on the Rhine. News of Brumaire. Masséna and his Generals	153
IX. HOLLAND (December 1797 to November 1799). First commanders of the French troops in Holland. Brune. Composition of allied army. Landing of the English. Battle of Bergen. Convention of Alkmaar. Brune's conduct of the campaign.	194

*THE ARMIES OF ITALY and OF THE ORIENT, and the
COUP D'ÉTAT OF BRUMAIRE*

LIST OF AUTHORITIES QUOTED	211
X. THE ARMY OF ITALY IN PEACE (December 1797 to February 1799). Masséna and Saint-Cyr at Rome. French organization and extortion in Italy. Brune and Joubert in command. Schérer's appointment	215
XI. FIRST PHASE OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (November 1798 to April 1799). War against Naples. Macdonald and Championnet. Schérer's retreat to the Adda	239
XII. SUCCESS OF SUVÁROF (April to June 1799). Moreau against Suvárof. Sérurier captured. Macdonald's march north. French and Russian strategy	262
XIII. THE TREBBIA (June to August 1799). The battle of the Trebbia. Moreau's inaction. Retreat of l'Armée de Naples. Macdonald and his Generals	285
XIV. NOVI (August to September 1799). Joubert and the politicians in Paris. Formation of l'Armée des Alpes under Championnet. Battle of Novi and death of Joubert	310
XV. LAST PHASE OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN (September to December 1799). Championnet as Commander-in-Chief. Saint-Cyr's opera- tions round Genoa. Distress and desertion in the army. News of Brumaire. Reflections on Generals of 'Italie'	335
XVI. EGYPT (April to July 1798). Composition of l'Armée de l'Orient. Malta. Landing at Alexandria. Desert marches. Battle of the Pyramids	352
XVII. CONSOLIDATION IN EGYPT (July 1798 to February 1799). Destruction of the fleet. Organization of the country. Dumas and Davout. Desaix in Upper Egypt. Prepara- tions for Syrian expedition	374
XVIII. SYRIA (February to May 1799). El-Arish and Jaffa. Siege of Acre. Kléber and Bonaparte. Retreat from Acre	390
XIX. EGYPT ABANDONED (June 1799 to September 1801). Battle of Aboukir. Bonaparte returns to France. Kléber in command. Convention of El-Arish. Capitulation of Cairo and Alexandria. Effect of Egyptian campaign on future Marshals	410
XX. BRUMAIRE (November to December 1799). Government of the Directory. Generals in Paris. Prepara- tions for a <i>coup</i> . Bonaparte on the 18th and 19th Bru- maire. Attitude of armies and future Marshals	444
INDEX	471

LIST OF MAPS

I. Rhine: Campaigns 1798-9	<i>facing p. 1</i>
II. Switzerland 1798-9	„ 67
III. East Switzerland: Operations 1799	„ 86
IV. Operations round Zürich 1799	„ 130
V. Holland: Operations 1799	„ 194
VI. Italy: Campaigns 1798-9	„ 215
VII. North Italy	„ 262
VIII. The campaign of Egypt and Syria 1798-1801	„ 352

THE ARMIES ON THE RHINE AND
IN HOLLAND

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

WORKS APPLYING TO THE ARMIES ON THE RHINE, ETC.

- Alison, Sir Archibald, *History of Europe from 1789 to 1815*, 9th edition, 12 vols., Edinburgh and London, Blackwood, 1853-5.
- Amic, Auguste, *Histoire de Masséna*, Paris, Dentu, 1864.
- Barras, *Mémoires de*, 4 vols., Paris, Hachette, 1895.
- Bittard des Portes, René, *Histoire de l'armée de Condé pendant la Révolution française, 1791-1801*, Paris, Dentu, 1896.
- Blennerhasset, Lady, *Madame de Staël*, 3 vols., London, Chapman & Hall, 1889.
- Bonnal, Le Général H., *La Vie militaire du Maréchal Ney*, 2 vols., Paris, Chapelot, 1910-11.
- Bruce, H. A., *Life of General Sir William Napier, K.C.B.*, 2 vols., London, Murray, 1864.
- Bunbury, Sir Henry, *Narrative of some passages in the Great War with France*, London, Bentley, 1854.
- *Narrative of the Campaign in North Holland in 1799*, London, Boone, 1849. (Same text as above but differently paged.)
- Carnot, *Mémoires sur, par son fils*, Paris, Hachette, 1893.
- Carnot, L. M. N., Citoyen français, *Réponse au rapport fait sur la conjuration du 18^{me} Fructidor au Conseil des Cinq-Cents*, par J. Bailleul, Londres, Wright, 1799.
- Charles, Archduke, *Campagne de 1799 en Allemagne et en Suisse*, 2 vols. and Atlas, Vienne, 1819-20.
- Chassin, Ch. L., *Les Pacifications de l'Ouest, 1794-1801 (1815)*, 3 vols., Paris, Félix Juven, 1896-9.
- Chuquet, Arthur, *La Jeunesse de Napoléon*, 3 vols., Paris, Colin, 1897-9.
- *Les Guerres de la Révolution*, 3^{me} Série, IX, *Hoche, 1793-4*, Plon-Nourrit.
- Croker Papers, *The Correspondence and Diaries of J. W. Croker* (edited by L. T. Jennings), 3 vols., London, Murray, 1884.
- Curély, Le Général, *Itinéraire d'un cavalier léger, 1793-1815*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1887.
- Daudet, Ernest, *Histoire de l'Émigration pendant la Révolution française*, 3 vols., Paris: vol. i, Poussielgue, 1904; ii and iii, Hachette, 1905, 1907.
- Decaen, Le Général Charles, *Mémoires et Journaux*, 2 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1910-11.
- Dellard, *Mémoires du Général Baron*, Paris, Librairie Illustrée, n.d.
- De Rison, *Souvenirs d'un Officier Royaliste. . .*, 3 vols., Paris, Anon., 1824-9.
- Derrecagaix, Le Général, *Nos Campagnes en Tyrol*, Paris, Chapelot, 1910.
- Desbrière, Le Capitaine E., *Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux Îles Britanniques, 1793-1805*, 4 vols., Paris, Chapelot, 1900-2.
- Despreaux, Frignet, *Le Maréchal Mortier, duc de Treviso*, 2 vols., Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1913-14.

- Drouet, Le Maréchal, Comte d'Erlon, *Vie militaire*, Paris, Barba, 1844.
- Dry, *Soldats-ambassadeurs sous le Directoire (An iv-viii)*, 2 vols., Paris Plon-Nourrit, 1906.
- Dumas, Général Comte Mathieu, *Précis des événements militaires, 1799-1814*, Paris, Trentel et Wurtz, 1817.
- Ernouf, Le Baron, *Souvenirs militaires d'un jeune Abbé*, Paris, Didier, 1881.
- Fage, René, *Le Général Souham*, Paris, Picard, 1897.
- Fastes de la Légion d'Honneur, Biographie de tous les Décorés*, 5 vols., Paris, Saint-Edmé, 1843-7.
- Fricasse, Le Sergent, *Journal de marche d'un volontaire de 1792*, Paris, Librairie 13 Quai Voltaire.
- Gachot, E., *Les Campagnes de 1799: Jourdan en Allemagne et Brune en Hollande*, Paris, Perrin, 1906.
- *Histoire militaire de Masséna: La Campagne d'Helvétie, 1799*, Paris, Perrin, 1904.
- Grouchy, Le Marquis de, *Mémoires du Maréchal*, 5 vols., Paris, Dentu, 1873-4.
- Guiot, Florent, *La Réunion des Grisons à la Suisse*, Paris, Alcan, 1889.
- Hanet-Cléry, *Mémoires de, Ancien Valet de Madame Royale*, 2 vols., Paris, A. Eymery, 1825.
- Hardy, Général Jean, *Correspondance intime, 1797-1802*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1901.
- James, William, *The Naval History of Great Britain from the declaration of war by France in 1793 to the accession of George IV*, 6 vols., London, Bentley, 1878.
- Jomini, Le Lieutenant-Général, *Histoire des Guerres de la Révolution*, 15 vols., Paris, Anselin et Pochard, 1820.
- Jung, Lieutenant-Colonel Th., *Bonaparte et son temps, 1769-99*, 3 vols., Paris, Charpentier, 1880-1.
- *Dubois-Crancé, 1747-1814*, 2 vols., Paris, Charpentier, 1884.
- Koch, Le Général, *Mémoires de Masséna, avec un Atlas*, 7 vols., Paris, Paulin et Lechevalier, 1848-50.
- Larévellière-Lépeaux, O., *Mémoires de*, 3 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1895.
- Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, 10 Novembre 1816*, Paris, L'Auteur, Rue du Bac No 59, 1823.
- Lottin, Le Lieutenant, *Un Chef d'état-major sous la Révolution; Le Général de Billy*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1901.
- Mahon, Patrice, *Étude sur les armées du Directoire*, Paris, Chapelot, 1905.
- Marès, Louis, *Papiers de: Précis de la guerre en Suisse*, Paris, Fournier, n.d.
- Marmont, *Mémoires*, 9 vols., Paris, Perrotin, 1856-7.
- Martens, G. von, *Nouveau Recueil de traités d'alliance et de paix . . .*, 1808-39, 16 vols., Göttingue, Dieterich, 1817.
- Martin, *Histoire de France depuis 1789 jusqu'à nos jours*, 2^{me} Édition, 8 vols., Paris, Furne-Juvet et Cie, 1878.

- Michaud, *Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne*, 52 vols., chez Michaud Frères, 1811-28; Supplément, vols. 55-85, Paris, chez Michaud Frères, 1832-62.
- Miot de Mérito, Le Comte, *Mémoires*, 3^{me} Édition, 3 vols., Paris, Calmann Lévy, 1880.
- Moore, Sir John, *Diary of*, 2 vols., London, Arnold, 1904.
- Napoléon I, *Correspondance de*, publiée par l'ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III, 32 vols., Paris, H. Plon, J. Dumaine, 1858-70. (See vols. xi, xxx.)
- Ney, *Mémoires du Maréchal*, publiés par sa famille, 2 vols., Paris, Fournes, and also 2 vols., Londres, E. Bull, 1823.
- Nollet, Jules, *Histoire de Nicolas-Charles Oudinot, Maréchal de l'Empire et Duc de Reggio*, Paris, Dumaine; Bar-le-Duc, Robin; Nancy, Grimblot et Raybois; et Gouet, 1850.
- Paget Papers, *The Diplomatic and other Correspondence of Sir Arthur Paget*, 2 vols., London, Heinemann, 1896.
- Pajol, *Général-en-chef*, par le Général Comte Pajol, son fils aîné, 3 vols., Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1874.
- Percy, Le Baron, *Journal des Campagnes, 1754-1825*, 2^{me} Édition, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1904.
- Philebert, Le Général, *Le Général Lecourbe*, Paris, Lavauzelle, 1895.
- Picard, Ernest, *Bonaparte et Moreau*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1905.
- Puymaigre, Comte A. de, *Souvenirs sur l'Émigration, l'Empire et la Restauration*, Paris, Plon, 1884.
- Rambaud, Alfred, *Les Français sur le Rhin, 1792-1804*, 3^{me} Édition, Paris, Didier, 1883.
- Raoul-Rochette, Désiré, *Histoire de la Révolution helvétique de 1797 à 1803*, Paris, Lepven, 1823.
- Révéréd, Le Vicomte, *Armorial du Premier Empire, Titres, Majorats et Armoiries concédés par Napoleon I*, 4 vols.: vol. i, Paris, Bureau de l'Annuaire de la Noblesse de France, et chez Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1894; vols. ii, iii, iv, Paris, Dentu, 1894-7.
- Révolution française en Hollande: La République Batave*, par L. Legrand, Paris, Hachette, 1894.
- Revue Générale, Biographique et Littéraire*, Galerie Militaire, 1876.
- Rousseau, François, *La Carrière du Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albuféra*, Documents inédits, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1898.
- Saint-Cyr, Le Maréchal Gouvion, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire militaire sous le Directoire, le Consulat et l'Empire*, 4 vols., Paris, Anselin, 1831.
- Schaller, H. de, *Histoire des Troupes Suisses au service de la France sous le règne de Napoléon*, 2^{me} Édition, Lausanne, Imer et Pajot, 1883.
- Schauenbourg, Balthazar de, *La Tactique et la Discipline dans les Armées de la Révolution: Correspondance du Général Schauenbourg*, Paris, Chapelot, 1902.
- Schuermans, Albert, *Itinéraire général de Napoléon*, Paris, Picard, 1908.
- Sciout, L., *Le Directoire*, 4 vols., Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1895-7.
- Seruzier, Baron, *Mémoires militaires*, Paris, Anselin et Pochard, 1823.

- Shadwell, Major-General, *Mountain Warfare*, London, King, 1875.
- Soult, *Mémoires du Maréchal-Général, Duc de Dalmatie*, publiés par son fils, 3 vols., Paris, D'Amyot, 1854.
- Spalding, Lieut.-Colonel, *Suvóroff*, London, Chapman & Hall, 1890.
- Susane, Le Général, *Histoire de l'Infanterie française*, 5 vols., Paris, Dumaine, 1876.
- Tchitchagoff, L'Amiral Paul, *Mémoires*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1909.
- Thiébault, Général Baron, *Mémoires*, 5 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1893-5.
- Thiers, L. A., *Histoire de la Révolution française*, 4 vols., Bruxelles, Meline Caus et Cie, 1888.
- Thoumas, Général, *Les Grands Cavaliers du Premier Empire* (two series), Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1892.
- Victoires et Conquêtes, Désastres, Revers et Guerres Civiles des Français, 1791-1815*, par une Société de Militaires et de Gens de Lettres, 27 vols., Paris, Panckoucke, 1817-22.
- Walsh, E., *Narrative of the Expedition to Holland in 1799*, London, Robinson, 1800.
- Wickham, Rt. Hon. W., *Correspondence of, from the year 1794*, edited by his grandson, Wm. Wickham, 2 vols., London, Bentley, 1870.
- Wirth, Joseph, *Le Maréchal Lefebvre, Duc de Dantzig*, Paris, Perrin, 1904.
- Wouters, Félix, *Histoire chronologique de la République et de l'Empire, 1789-1815*, Bruxelles, Wouters Frères, 1847.

I

INTERLUDE OF PEACE

(September 1797 to November 1798)

Formation of the Armée de Mayence. L'armée d'Angleterre. Jourdan takes command on the Rhine. Plans for the campaign.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

- 1798 January. French invasion of Switzerland.
February. Proclamation of Roman Republic.
12th April. Proclamation of Swiss Republic.
May. Armée d'Orient sails.
21st July. Battle of the Pyramids.
1st August. Destruction of French fleet off Egypt.

'HERE then, in September 1797, ends the history of two great schools of the Marshals.' With these words we left the armies of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' and 'Rhin-et-Moselle' after Fructidor when Augereau took them over as a combined command, the Armée d'Allemagne.¹ In returning to this theatre we find again many of the men who made the annals of the two Rhine armies glorious, but there is less homogeneity: men come and go to and from different armies and theatres of war, and the campaigns of 1797-9 on the Rhine are but shadows of the earlier ones. However, we are once more back with armies that have never known Bonaparte, and following campaigns where he has no influence and makes no appearance.

Under Augereau, from September to December 1797, the armies, though linked, were not amalgamated, and there was no fighting. In December the left wing of 'Allemagne'—the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' really—was named the Armée de Mayence, and it is with this army that I now deal. The right of 'Allemagne'—late 'Rhin-et-Moselle'—continued under Augereau for a time as the Armée du Rhin ('Rhin B' in my tables), but did no fighting, and ceased to exist in January 1798 when it sent a division up to Switzerland and the rest of its troops to the newly created 'Angleterre'. Before this break-up, while it lay in the Palatinate, the Duchy of Zweibrücken, and the Hunsrück as far as Coblenz, the following future Marshals were serving

¹ Phipps, ii.

there. Saint-Cyr led a division, Oudinot and Lecourbe were Generals of Brigade in Ambert's division; Desaix had gone temporarily to Italy, while General Davout, formerly under him, stayed with the army, presumably on the right bank with the centre. Lieut.-Colonel and A.D.C. Savary also remained, perhaps for lack of money, and General Vandamme. By the 24th October Desaix was back at Offenbourg commanding his division.

With the history of the Armée de Mayence we really begin that of a single force which figures under different names. Originally it was a mere garrison force, only intended to gain possession of Mayence and to hold territory on the Rhine. Then at the end of 1798 it was called on to act on the offensive against the Austrians, and, advancing to the Danube, on the 8th March 1799 it took the title of the Armée du Danube. It fought at Stockach under Jourdan and then retired to the Rhine, where in May 1799 it was amalgamated with the Armée d'Helvétie. However, it retained its own title till the 24th November 1799, when the remaining part of it was amalgamated with the Armée du Rhin ('Rhin C' in my tables), to become the Armée du Rhin ('Rhin D' in my tables) which fought at Hohenlinden under Moreau. Nominally, then, it had the same title, Armée du Danube, when it fought under Jourdan from March till April 1799 and then under Masséna till November 1799, but as in this last phase it had other troops added to it and fought in a different theatre, and as the same future Marshals did not serve in it during both phases, I distinguish the force under Jourdan as 'Danube A' and that under Masséna as 'Danube B'.

The first commander of the Armée de Mayence was Hatry, a General of some distinction. He had been a Lieutenant in the old army in 1758 and had won his division with the Armée du Rhin on the 1st December 1793. In 1794-6 he served with the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', acting as what I call a wing commander: indeed, in Jourdan's absence he had commanded the army temporarily.¹ 'Il a de bonnes mœurs et il est bon républicain', wrote Jourdan. Still, he was not a good enough republican for the Directory, and having been put in command of the Armée de l'Intérieur, that is, of Paris, on the 10th March 1796,

¹ Général Joseph-Maurice Hatry (1742-1802). Senator under the Consulate. Phipps, ii. 92; Chuquet, *Hoche*, note i, 115; Wouters, 242, really 258.

he was removed on 8th August 1797 for the command to be given to Augereau, come from Italy to carry out the *coup d'état* of Fructidor. Put in command of the Armée de Mayence on the 9th December 1797, in July 1798 he was replaced by Joubert, whom he succeeded as commander in Holland. When Brune came to command in Holland in January 1799, Hatry went to the Armée d'Italie. He died in Holland, where he was again commanding the French troops, I suppose under Victor, on the 30th November 1802, otherwise he might have risen high.

The future Marshals who served under Hatry in the Armée de Mayence when that force was formed were Lefebvre, General of Division, Soult, who had a brigade in the division of Championnet, and Ney, a General of Brigade but commanding the Hussar division. Colonel Mortier, having refused the rank of General of Brigade, was at the head of the 23rd Cavalry Regiment, but he acted on the staff of Hatry at first, so this posting may have been made later and he may at first have continued on the staff as Adjutant-General with the rank of Colonel. General of Division Vandamme, who had fought under Saint-Cyr, remained here.¹ Four other future Marshals had a short connexion with this army. On the 29th September 1798 Grouchy from Rennes, where he had been commanding one of the divisions of 'Angleterre', came to command the then 2nd division of 'Mayence' at Giessen; but on the 21st October he was ordered to Italy and was replaced by Bernadotte, who came from Paris. This was Bernadotte's first employment after his embassy to Vienna,² but he was looking for higher things, and apparently on the 25th January 1799 he returned to the Capital. General of Brigade Suchet, coming from Paris, whither he had been recalled from his post as Chief of the Staff to Joubert in Italy,³ joined head-quarters on the 3rd January 1799 and witnessed the battles which ended Jourdan's campaign, but he only followed 'en amateur', not really becoming part of the army till it passed under Masséna. On the 19th October 1798 Saint-Cyr, after relieving Masséna in Rome, followed him back to 'Mayence' again, where he took command of the 1st division, hitherto under General of Brigade Oudinot. Drouet, the future Comte d'Erlon, whose movements during Quatre-Bras were so

¹ For these Generals, Phipps, ii, especially pp. 436, 444-5.

² See Phipps, iv, 220-1.

³ See pp. 233-4.

remarkable, also served here as Lieut.-Colonel, becoming Chief of the Staff to Lefebvre's *avant-garde* division as an Adjutant-General on the 17th February 1798.

When Hatry took command on the 16th December 1797, the army, consisting of five divisions, had its right much where Hoche had halted the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' in 1797 on getting the news of the armistice of Leoben.¹ The *avant-garde*, under Lefebvre, was at Homburg with Ney's Hussar division on the right of the Nidda; the divisions of Grenier and Championnet stretched north to Giessen, Soult having a brigade in Championnet's division, whilst the divisions of Hardy and Olivier were on the left of the Rhine at Coblenz and Cologne. Colonel Mortier was, I presume, with the head-quarter staff at Wiesbaden. The first task of Hatry was to get possession of the fortress from which the army took its title. The French had obtained it by capitulation on the 21st October 1792 but had had to surrender it to the Allies on the 23rd July 1793. When their armies again reached the Rhine in 1794 they aimed at Mayence; we have seen it besieged by the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' in 1795, when the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' also had appeared before it, and it had been struggled for on the Rhine as Mantua had been in Italy.² It belonged to its own Elector, but Austria, by the secret articles of the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, had agreed to its cession to France, together with the territory on the left of the Rhine. A military convention at Rastadt on the 1st December 1797 settled the details. The Emperor was to declare to the Holy Roman Empire his intention of evacuating the fortress, and the French were to occupy it, using force if necessary against the Elector and the Empire. On the 9th December 1797 the Directory ordered Hatry to invest Mayence, and to summon the Elector to give it up. Hatry closed on the place, and on the 20th December Colonel Mortier was sent to Aschaffenburg to request the Elector to order the commander of Mayence to surrender it. The Elector at once answered that he would order the Commandant to prepare a capitulation, but a second summons had to be taken by Mortier before the place was given up on the 30th December, to be held by the French till 1814. These extraordinary transactions completed, the army

¹ See Phipps, ii, pp. 427-8; iv. 173, 174.

² See Phipps, ii, chap. viii and others.

retook much its former position. Lefebvre now had his right at Mayence, as, according to the French, the secret articles of the Treaty of Campo Formio authorized their holding their positions on the right of the Main and of the Nidda, a claim bitterly contested by the Empire.

The formation of a new force, the *Armée d'Angleterre*, on the 26th October 1797, gradually weakened the *Armée de Mayence*, which had to send officers and troops to it. Hardy's division and Ney's Hussars went there, Ney leaving Homburg on the 15th February 1798 and reaching Abbeville on the 8th March. Soult also left in the beginning of March for Ostend and Bruges. Generals of Brigade Lecourbe and Oudinot went to the division at Coutances which Saint-Cyr should have commanded but which he did not join. Mortier also joined '*Angleterre*', and Kléber, who was at St. Briec with the *Armée des Côtes du Nord*, on the 10th March 1798 applied to have Colonel Mortier of the 23rd Cavalry and Lieut.-Colonel Dubois-Crancé of the 1st Chasseurs attached to his staff as Adjutant-Generals, stipulating that they should not be replaced in their regiments, to which they would return after the expected campaign. 'These two officers will be the more necessary to me as, apart from the confidence with which their talents, their zeal, and their *civisme* have inspired me, they know the English language and one of them' (Mortier, I take it) 'has lived long in England.'¹ This request must have been granted, for on the 2nd April 1798 Kléber ordered these two officers to join him at St. Briec. It will be remembered that Mortier had served for long with Kléber in the '*Sambre-et-Meuse*'. However, he did not accompany Kléber to Egypt but returned to '*Mayence*', probably when Kléber went to Paris and Toulon in April 1798.

This *Armée d'Angleterre*, which had been decreed in 1797, but which was really formed in January 1798 under Bonaparte with Desaix as second-in-command, was to be formed from troops to be drawn from the armies of '*Mayence*', '*Helvétie*', '*Italie*', and the '*Quatre Divisions Réunies*', the force left in the north-west after Hoche's expedition to Ireland in 1796.² Almost all the future Marshals were appointed to serve under

¹ See Phipps, i. 180-1.

² I think this force still existed: otherwise its troops formed part of the *Armée de l'Intérieur*.

Bonaparte in this new army: certainly Bernadotte, Berthier, Bessières, Brune, Davout, Grouchy, Lannes, Lefebvre, Marmont, Masséna, Mortier, Murat, Ney, Oudinot, Saint-Cyr, Sérurier, Soult, and Victor were nominated to it, although Bernadotte, Brune, Masséna, and Murat never actually joined. The subordination of all these men, of such very varied antecedents, to the future Emperor should be noted. It was equally significant that two other officers, Desaix, who had been prominent as a wing leader with the 'Rhin-et-Moselle', and Kléber, the chief lieutenant of Jourdan with the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', also served under Bonaparte here. The omission of certain names can as a rule be easily explained. Jourdan, who was a member of the Council of the *Cinq-Cents*; Kellermann, an inspecting General; Moncey, who was in disgrace; and Pérignon, returned from Spain, had all been themselves Commanders-in-Chief, and were too senior to be placed under the young General, who, however, was so rapidly passing them by. Augereau was supposed to be about to lead an expedition to Portugal; he had already in 1797 protested against being subordinated to Bonaparte, who at this moment was very unlikely to wish to have him. As for Macdonald and Suchet, whose names do not appear, I think, in any list, one can but guess at reasons for their exclusion. Macdonald may not have returned from Holland in time for the first lists,¹ and, as he was certainly relieved when he found that he was not to go to Egypt, he must have disliked this expedition. He had a tongue, and used it, often to his own disadvantage. Still, one would have thought an invasion of England might be tempting to one of a family who had followed the Stuarts into exile. It is still harder to account for the absence of Suchet's name. He had been serving under Brune in Switzerland, and in March he had come to Paris to present to the Directors the flags taken in freeing the Swiss, so that he must have been in favour. Although he was already General of Brigade, yet he had asked to remain with his late regiment, and as that was to form part of the army he may really have been included with it. We shall probably be safe in counting him and Macdonald as part of 'Angleterre'. As for those appointed to 'Angleterre' but who did not join it, their absence is easily accounted for. Bernadotte, after much uncertainty,

¹ Phipps, ii and iv.

went as Ambassador to Vienna, and Brune was employed in command first in Switzerland and then in Italy. Masséna was sent to command at Rome and was at one time intended for the command in Italy, but his disgrace removed him from active employment. Murat, leaving Bonaparte at Rastadt, had rejoined his cavalry brigade in Italy: a perfectly natural proceeding and not necessarily showing that he was in disgrace, as described by Bourrienne, who makes more than his ordinary number of errors about this period. Only one prominent name remains. Moreau, as a former Commander-in-Chief, was too senior for service under Bonaparte: besides, he was in disgrace, and was distrusted by the Directory, whilst Bonaparte probably still resented his long inaction in 1797 on the Rhine, which had affected the campaign in Italy.¹ Of the troops for this army, besides those furnished from the Rhine frontier and the Interior, the Armée d'Italie sent four infantry divisions, a Dragoon division, and a brigade of Chasseurs: some 35,000 men, not including Masséna's late division, 11,351 strong, which nominally marched for 'Angleterre', but which really was diverted to Switzerland. In February 1798 'Angleterre' was for the moment formed of twenty-eight infantry and twenty-eight cavalry regiments, but the intention was to make it forty-one regiments, or 123 battalions, in fourteen divisions, with 134 squadrons of cavalry.

Although it would be tedious to follow the changes in detail, one distribution of the Armée d'Angleterre is significant as showing how Bonaparte left in it those Generals who had not served under him in Italy and took to Egypt the 'Italie' group. In this distribution, with Desaix second-in-command, Championnet, a former General of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', had the right wing, in which Soult led an infantry brigade and Ney one of Hussars. In the centre under Kilmaine, Alexandre Dumas led the cavalry, in which Davout had a brigade. Kléber had the left wing, in which Lefebvre and Victor led divisions, and Colonel Mortier, for whom we have seen he had applied, joined his staff in April as an Adjutant-General. It will be seen that, of the future Marshals named here, only Davout went to Egypt, and at one time Bonaparte even offered to leave Kléber and Desaix

¹ Phipps, ii. 435.

behind. 'Angleterre' was left with Victor as the only General in it who came from the Armée d'Italie.

To avoid repetition, I will deal with the comings and goings of the future Marshals appointed to 'Angleterre' as they work in with the histories of the more effective armies from which they were only briefly detached, for 'Angleterre' had no real corporate existence and after September 1798 none of the future Marshals remained with it. At this date it had shrunk to some 30,000 men, from an at any rate nominal strength of 100,000. Excluding those who had sailed with Bonaparte, most of them had returned to their former spheres, Sérurier and Victor going back to Italy, and Lefebvre, Mortier, Ney, Oudinot, and Soult once more being on the Rhine, as well as Grouchy, who had not already been there. Of those who had gone to Egypt, Davout alone had served on the Rhine frontier: the rest had really been supplied by the Armée d'Italie. Macdonald and Saint-Cyr, both for the first time in Italy, alone of the future Marshals were in an entirely novel theatre. The re-transfer of so many officers to the eastern frontier came, of course, from the large drafts made from 'Angleterre' to strengthen the two armies, 'Mayence' and 'Helvétie', which might soon have to fight the Austrians. 'Angleterre' had done no harm to England, and I think the only time worth speaking of when it met English troops was when in May 1798 a force of 1,310 English was landed near Ostend and succeeded in destroying the locks and sluices at Slykens, hoping thus to block the canals from Ostend to Dunkirk, through which the French intended to pass vessels of shallow draught. Bad weather prevented this force re-embarking, and it had to surrender to part of Championnet's division. Soult, then leading a brigade under Championnet, gives himself much of the credit of this capture, especially as amongst the officers taken was Moore, whom he was to meet again in 1808. Oddly enough, Soult's name does not appear in the French official account.

It was in its reduced state that the Armée d'Angleterre turned its attention to Ireland, and it sent out three expeditions worth mentioning. General Humbert's column, 1,099 strong, conveyed by the squadron of Commodore Savary, sailed on the 6th August 1798 but, after succeeding in landing at Killala, had to surrender on the 8th September. What was to have been the main

expedition, General Hardy's division, 2,844 strong, conveyed by Bompard, which did not sail till the 16th September, was less fortunate, Hardy and most of his men being captured at sea, when Wolfe Tone fell into the hands of the English. On the 27th October Commodore Savary managed again to reach Ireland, with 1,090 men under Cortez, but finding that Humbert had surrendered he returned to France. In reading the details of these expeditions in Captain Desbrière's excellent work, it is to be remembered that the Savary mentioned is not the future Police Minister, who was then in Egypt as A.D.C. to Desaix, and that General Bessières is not the future Marshal, who like Savary was in Egypt, as a Colonel. As for 'Angleterre', passing most of its time under Kilmaine and then under General Hédouville, and being mainly occupied in suppressing Royalist insurrections in the West, it dragged out an existence becoming more and more inconsistent with its title until in 1800 under the Consulate it became the Armée de l'Ouest under Brune. It was a curious forerunner of the camps of Boulogne, and had its existence not been so short it might have had something of the same effect as had Napoleon's collection of his troops along the Channel, in breaking up the former rivalries of the armies of the Republic.¹ As it was, it tended to weaken the effect of the former grouping of the future Marshals. The success of Humbert, whose wisdom his commander, Hardy, had distrusted, may show that much might have been done in Ireland, were one sure that the very smallness of his force did not make it easier for him to elude his opponents.

By the 21st March 1798 the detachments to 'Angleterre' had left Hatry with 58,000 men in 'Mayence', formed in four divisions under Freytag, Lapoype, Hacquin, and Turreau. Everything seemed so peaceful—indeed the Directory had thought it safe to send an army to Egypt—that on the 29th December 1797 old Lefebvre had applied to retire on a pension. His letter is very typical of himself: his character would ruin him if he were given a territorial division; he did not want horses or a carriage, only his food. Although the Directory must know all his services very well, still, his frankness forced him to say that he did not reckon any defeats amongst his work, and the inhabitants of the conquered districts he had occupied (and whom he had

¹ This is considered in further writings of Colonel Phipps, still in MS.

threatened to shoot if they stirred!) would bear witness to his scrupulous probity. He did not profess to have wasted his fortune, for he had never had any. Then he asked for certain promotions for his Staff, amongst them the confirmation of the appointments of two Adjutant-Generals nominated by Augereau before the Armée d'Allemagne had been broken up: Mortier to be Colonel of the 23rd Cavalry and Drouet of the 25th. 'You will yourselves be able to judge the capacity of the citizen Mortier, whom I charge to present this. Both are pronounced Republicans and have rendered signal services during this war.' Also he wanted a captaincy for his brother, a Lieutenant in the 35th Infantry. Fear of jealousy had prevented him from making such a request hitherto, but as one brother was dead and another killed on the field, he ought to care for the only one left when he himself was quitting the service. No horse, no carriage! Who was to tell him that, instead of living on his small pay in France, he was to see Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, and Moscow, and to enjoy well-deserved comforts as Senator, Marshal, and Duke? On the 8th January the Directory answered properly and civilly enough: Mortier's appointment would be confirmed and the brother promoted, but the time for Lefebvre to lay down his arms had not arrived. He was to go to the Armée d'Angleterre and win other laurels. But Lefebvre does not seem to have got beyond Paris. I suppose it was to this period that Napoleon alludes when he says, speaking of his own residence in the Capital before he left for Egypt on the 4th May 1798 (the words in italics are those he inserted in the manuscript of Las Cases at St. Helena): 'Il ne reçut d'habitude que quelques savans . . . *peu* de généraux, *seulement* Kléber, Desaix, Lefebvre, Caffarelli, Dugua, et un petit nombre de députés.'¹ There were, of course, few Generals in Paris at this time. On the 2nd June 1798 we find General Hardy, then at Colmar, where Lefebvre was to form a *Corps du Haut-Rhin*, writing that Lefebvre was retained in Paris for reasons known only to the Government. However, on the 9th June he was with the Armée de Mayence again at Colmar. Lefebvre therefore did not meet Napoleon as a stranger when he returned from Egypt. His Chief of the Staff nominally passed to the Armée d'Angleterre on the 18th March, and was intended for the expedition to Egypt,

¹ Las Cases, *Mémorial*, ii, 4^{me} partie, 81: Retour de Rastadt,

but as that had sailed before he reached Paris he returned to Lefebvre.

To anticipate matters a little, on the 9th September 1798 Lefebvre was again writing to the Directory, to ask for the command of their Guard. He had two reasons. The first was 'une maladie dartreuse', but the second was the real one. He had for long commanded the *avant-garde* of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' and expected to retain the command of the striking division in the Armée de Mayence, but now the title had been given to the division of Championnet. During all his campaigns, he said, he had never lost a gun, a colour, or a company. Once again the Directory were complimentary: Championnet had only been given the *avant-garde* division because Lefebvre was to have a still more important post, the command of a wing of the army. As all prospect of any action on the part of 'Angleterre' died away, the forces on the Rhine were increased. On the 4th May 'Mayence' received the troops that were at Kehl and in the 5th Military Division, which contained the Departments of Haut- and Bas-Rhin and Strasbourg. As the chance of hostilities with Austria increased it was reinforced by 10,000 men, and Joubert, commanding in Holland since November 1797, came to exchange posts with Hatry. He arrived at Mulheim on the 29th July. The army now had five divisions, commanded by Freytag, Gratien, Turreau, Hacquin, and Châteauneuf-Randon, with a cavalry division under d'Hautpoul; it was posted much as before, but it now covered the 5th Military Division and had a *Corps du Haut-Rhin* under Lefebvre at Colmar. Head-quarters were placed at Friedberg. General of Brigade Ney, arriving back from 'Angleterre' on the 2nd September, was given command of the cavalry of the *avant-garde*, formed under Championnet, whilst Soult, also re-joining in September, soon had the temporary command of the 3rd division, which was brought on to the upper Ruhr. On the 29th September 1798 General of Division Grouchy arrived from 'Angleterre' and took command of the 2nd division.

Now, however, 'Mayence' had another change in command, as Joubert was selected to relieve Brune in Italy. On the 8th October 1798 he started for Paris, leaving the command of the army to Lefebvre. Lefebvre's health, however, was so bad that on the 26th he handed over the temporary command to the

old General Ferino,¹ telling the Minister of War that he was going to get cured of the ring-worm and to get himself fit to enter into campaign with Jourdan, who, it was known, would come to command the army. He went first to Colmar, near his birth-place, Rufach, in Alsace, asking leave to finish his cure at Arcueil, near Paris. Other changes took place amongst the commanders of divisions as the possibilities of war increased. Saint-Cyr, recalled in disgrace from Rome, was met on his way by dispatches reinstating him and posting him to 'Mayence'. On the 19th October 1798 he arrived at Friedberg and took command at Homburg of the division of Championnet, who went to command the Armée de Rome. Then Masséna, not employed after his disgrace in Rome in February 1798, and left behind when Bonaparte sailed for Egypt in May, was appointed on the 16th August to a division here, where he would have been under Joubert, so much his junior in Italy. It is a little difficult to make the dates given for his movements agree, but the following are probably right. On the 21st August he received the order at Antibes, and he went to Paris, staying there, it is stated, till the 21st September but more probably till the 21st October. He reached the head-quarters of 'Mayence' at Friedberg three days after the new commander Jourdan, say the 4th November,² and, after passing three days there conferring with Jourdan, he went to Strasbourg, where he was employed to inspect the troops and to visit the fortresses. However, he was informed by the Minister that he was to be appointed to command the Armée d'Helvétie, in Switzerland, and he was requested to send an A.D.C. to reconnoitre the positions for his future command. Reille, so long to be connected with him, was sent on this mission.³ On the 7th December Masséna received, through the telegraph,⁴ orders to proceed to Switzerland, although the formal appointment was only made on the 10th December 1798. Without waiting for directions from

¹ Général-Comte Pierre-Marie-Barthélemy Ferino (1747-1816). Michaud, *lxiv.* 94; *Fastes*, iii. 213-15; Thiebault, i. 476; Phipps, ii. 104-5.

² Gachot, *Helvétie*, 24. Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 51, says he arrived three days after Jourdan, who reached the army 1st November.

³ Général-Comte Honoré-Charles-Michel-Joseph Reille (1775-1860). Grenadier 1791; Maréchal de France, 17th September 1847; Senator of Second Empire 1852. Married 1814 Victoire, daughter of Masséna. *Fastes*, iii. 512-14; Phipps, iv.

⁴ The semaphore or Chiappe system.

Jourdan, he started at once, receiving Jourdan's dispatch at Bâle, and reaching Zürich on the 11th December 1798. Thus he never belonged to the Armée de Mayence in more than a nominal sense.

When in the autumn of 1798 it became certain that hostilities with Austria would soon recommence, Jourdan almost inevitably had been chosen for the chief command on the Rhine. The departure of Bonaparte with his group of Generals had left few commanders available. Moreau, the former comrade or rival of Jourdan on the Rhine, was in disgrace with the Directory for his conduct at Fructidor, and indeed was soon sent to a subordinate post in Italy. Of the two distinguished lieutenants of his own that Bonaparte had left, Joubert, whom he had looked on as his substitute, was intended to command in Italy, whilst Masséna was in disgrace and had hitherto not commanded an army. Jourdan had attained the position of Commander-in-Chief of the 'Nord' in September 1793, and until his retreat in 1796 he had had a distinguished career, having won the battles of Wattignies, Fleurus, and Aldenhoven, and having carried his army to the borders of Bohemia. At the moment he occupied a prominent position at Paris, being President of the Council of the *Cinq-Cents*, where he had introduced and carried the law establishing conscription in its permanent form; and he had also succeeded in giving soldiers the right to a sum of money to be received at the advent of that ever-fleeting vision, the general peace. In other matters he had been rather a thorn in the side of the Directory, who may not have been sorry to see him start for the frontier.¹ Four of the Directors, Barras, Rewbell, Merlin de Douai, and Treilhard, were unanimous in selecting him for the command on the Rhine. The fifth, Larévellière-Lépeaux, says he opposed the selection, and though his description of Jourdan's character is influenced by the later conduct of that General, who on the 8th June 1799 (sore at his defeat, which he attributed to the Directory) assisted at the *coup d'état* of the 30^{me} Prairial which sent the hostile Director into obscurity, still it must be owned there was some truth in it. 'I have never had the least confidence in the talents or in the character of General Jourdan. I do not question the glory of his first

¹ Phipps, i and ii, for his previous career with the armies, and iv for his part at Fructidor, &c.

commands, although I am much inclined to believe his victories to be due less to his skill than to those lucky accidents, as common in war as unlucky ones, which are independent of the ability of a General. Jourdan is a man of small ability, incapable of putting unity into his operations, were it only from that weakness in his character which always prevents him making himself obeyed by his Generals of Division, who more often than not pursue their operations separately. A fumbler, irresolute, losing his head at the first check and not knowing what to do except draw back, or rather fly in disorder without stopping until he had put the Rhine between himself and the enemy. Never did he know how to frame a retreat. If I am not mistaken, he is the only one of our Generals who has been beaten by the Archduke Charles. I therefore made the strongest opposition to his nomination and he remembered this, as will be seen. My four colleagues were unanimous in his favour.¹ This cannot be called a fair account, for in Jourdan's retreat in 1796 his great fault was turning to fight at Würzburg, and in that of this campaign he had to bear the blame due really to his Chief of the Staff, who retired unnecessarily in his absence. If he failed to make Kléber submissive, who, except Bonaparte, ever did that?—and he had retained his lieutenant's affection for long. As for his being defeated by the Archduke Charles, that Prince had hunted Moreau over the Rhine in 1796; this year, though hampered by his Government, he was to force Masséna from Zürich; at Essling he was to make head against Napoleon, and Wellington put him above 'all of us'.² In fact, had the Austrian Government employed and trusted him more, their wars with France might have been very different. Still, it is well to see what an enemy can say, while remembering that Jourdan's failure in this campaign came mainly from the fault of the Directory in keeping troops in France, to save themselves at the elections, who might have won success in the field.

Jourdan had a certain modest confidence in himself, and he had prepared a scheme for the whole of the operations on the Rhine and in Italy, which he laid before the Directory, offering his own services to carry it out. His proposed distribution of the forces of the Republic is worth giving as it has some interest, if only as characteristic of the man. Austria, he thought, had aban-

¹ Larévellière-Lépeaux, ii. 373-4.

² Croker, i. 338.

doned all hope of recovering her possessions in Belgium and would seek to recoup herself in Italy, if not in Switzerland. He therefore assumed she would direct her main strength on Italy and Switzerland and would defend but feebly her territory on the left of the Danube. He further assumed that the Kings of Naples and Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany would support her.¹ It is true that we shall find the Austrians under the Archduke Charles advancing over the Danube and striking for Switzerland, but this does not seem to have been the policy of the Austrian Court, which disapproved of the Prince advancing beyond the Lech, and indeed did not like any of his strategy, successful as it was.² Jourdan proposed that there should be six armies, with a total force of 320,000 men. One army, of 40,000, was to protect Holland and to besiege Mannheim and other Rhine towns. If this force seems large, it must be remembered that Kléber, who had much experience, had assigned the same numbers for these sieges alone, although Mayence was now in the possession of the French. Relieved of all care for the Rhine fortresses, an army of the Danube, 80,000 strong, was to stretch from the Tyrol to the Danube. This was to represent the two armies of 1796, the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' and the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'. In 1796, however, Switzerland had been neutral: now, thanks to Brune, it was occupied by the French and could be utilized as a base.³ Whilst an army of 20,000 men held Switzerland, another of 40,000 was to advance from that country, penetrate into the Tyrol, and follow the movements of the army of the Danube on its left and the army of Italy on its right. This army of Italy, 80,000 strong, was to attack the Austrians in Venetian territory and to move on Klagenfurt. Then these three armies, from the Danube, Tyrol, and Italy, were to unite under one commander and advance on Vienna. Jourdan put first the worst part of his plan, which was that an army of 60,000 men was to conquer Piedmont, Tuscany, and Naples, convert those Kingdoms into Republics, and keep order in Italy.⁴

Jourdan, it will be seen, drew his sketch on grand lines, and the Directory were not far behind. In their plan five armies, with 149,733 men and well supplied, were to be formed. The

¹ Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 1799, 4-5.

² Wickham, ii. 124-5, 185. This is discussed at more length later on, pp. 188-9.

³ See p. 67 for 'Helvétie'.

⁴ Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 3-7.

army in Holland was to remain there, but it might furnish 15,000 to 20,000 men to an *Armée d'Observation* which was to be under Bernadotte, who was to have 48,000 men, including the Rhine garrisons, and was to blockade Ehrenbreitstein (which in fact surrendered on the 24th January 1799) and to support the left of the *Armée de Mayence* by movements on the Main, the Neckar, and the Enz. The *Armée de Mayence*, 46,000 men under Jourdan, taking the name of the *Armée du Danube* when it reached that river, was to advance across the Black Mountains to the sources of the Danube and then move between that river and the Lake of Constance, or Boden See, going on to the Lech and facilitating the march of the *Armée d'Helvétie* into the Grisons and the Tyrol. On the right of the *Armée du Danube*, this *Armée d'Helvétie*, 30,000 men under Masséna, had rather a complicated task. Its right, at Bellinzona, supported by a force from the *Armée d'Italie*, was to march by Glarens and the Valtelline to Botzen and Brixen, while the left and centre, taking Bregenz and Coire, or Chur, were to force their way to Innsbruck and Botzen. When it had taken Bregenz, that is, had cleared its front to the east of Lake Constance, it was to take the title of the army of the Tyrol. Actually this force did neither of these two things. Both Bernadotte (commanding the *Armée d'Observation*) and Masséna (commanding 'Helvétie') were to be subordinated to Jourdan, who might draw off to his right and employ part of 'Helvétie', but it was necessary that 'Helvétie' should get possession of the Inn valley and of Innsbruck. The army of Italy, 50,000 strong without counting Italian contingents, was to cross the Adige towards Verona and drive the enemy behind the Brenta and the Piave, detaching a corps on its left to co-operate with the *Armée d'Helvétie*, as just described. This army was also to take Tuscany on receipt of orders. The army of Rome (strength not given) was to conquer Naples, taking the title of *Armée de Naples* when it reached that town; it was also to succour the islands of Corfu and Malta. As a matter of fact, the Directory used 116,000 men in Italy, the active army, 'Italie', being 62,000, with 20,000 in the fortresses and 34,000 in Rome, Ancona, and Naples. The folly of both Jourdan and the Directory in intending to bury such a large body of troops at the farthest end of Italy whilst the fate of that country was to be decided in the north requires

no comment. Still, the performance of the Directory in Italy was not so out of proportion with their promises as it was on the Rhine. For in all these figures lay the tragedy of the campaign on the Rhine. Jourdan, in high feather, believed that he himself would be at the head of 46,000 men, 'provided with a park of artillery, magazines of provisions, carriages, equipment and commissaries, proportioned to its strength', while on his flanks would be two armies, one of 48,000 and the other of 30,000 under men unlikely to follow the selfish course of Moreau in 1796: Bernadotte, one of his former Generals of Division, and Masséna, the skilled lieutenant of Bonaparte. With such forces he believed that he would restore the prestige he had lost in 1796, and he told his officers: 'If the Minister keeps his word, I shall be at Vienna.' As the Archduke Charles had only some 78,000 men, there was nothing unreasonable in Jourdan's confidence. In reality, what the Directory did furnish was 38,000 for the Armée de Mayence and 24,000 for 'Helvétie', whilst the Armée d'Observation had some 10,000 and could only make demonstrations. Too credulous, or too sanguine, Jourdan, whilst complaining bitterly to the Directory, yet seems to have been unable to realize his weakness, and still attempted the advance which could have been made with the imaginary force attributed to him. Not only were the troops few, but raw battalions were sent to the frontier whilst old ones were kept in the interior, the Minister explaining that what he called the few battalions in France, really a large force, were 'absolutely indispensable, not only to preserve good order on the eve of the elections, but likewise to line the coasts', threatened by the English.

Jourdan left his chair as President of the *Cinq-Cents* amidst the warm congratulations of his colleagues. 'We lose', said Lucien Bonaparte, 'an estimable colleague; our first feeling is regret, but to this regret soon succeeds a sublime sentiment. It is for the camp that Jourdan leaves the tribune; the author of the law on military conscription has to make place for the General of Fleurus. Well, let him leave bearing the esteem of his colleagues and followed by the confidence of the Republic. From your midst, Representatives of the people, goes one of those who is about to lead to victory—not for the first time—the children of France.'¹ The last ray of Glory

¹ Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, note 2, p. 26.

followed him as he left the Capital. Equally flattering was his reception by the army, which he reached on the 1st November, taking command on the 4th. He would seem never to have lost the confidence of the main body of the troops he had commanded for so long, and for all practical purposes this army may be taken to represent the old 'Sambre-et-Meuse', which he had led from the banks of the Sambre across the Rhine. Probably many of those who had turned on their leader under the sting of unexpected defeat in 1796 now understood how little really he had been responsible for the disaster of that campaign. He himself, in writing of his reception, does not exaggerate the feelings of the army. In it was also a large contingent from the former 'Rhin-et-Moselle', once the army of Moreau, and the most prominent officer from that army, the future Marshal Saint-Cyr, then leading a division under Jourdan, says of the army he now served in: 'The troops which composed it had long belonged to this former army' (the 'Rhin-et-Moselle'), 'or to that of the "Sambre-et-Meuse"; they received with joy the nomination of the new Commander-in-Chief: to long experience he joined a fine character and a patriotism beyond need of proof.' Few honest men ever disliked Jourdan, and the friendly sentiments with which the cold-blooded Saint-Cyr now met him withstood the trials of the campaign. The 'tacticien raisonneur' of the 'Rhin-et-Moselle', whilst criticizing the General of the rival force placed over him, still does justice to the difficulties of his task, and mixes with his blame a sympathy he never shows towards Moreau. The feelings of most of the officers who had served before under Jourdan probably were well represented by that straightforward fighter Lefebvre. When he heard of the coming nomination of his old chief, he wrote to the Minister that he was going to get cured 'to put myself in a fit state to enter into campaign with our brave and estimable Jourdan. The satisfaction of all the soldiers at the prospect of soon seeing at their head this great General, who has so many times led them to victory, is a sure guarantee that Fortune will not cease to be favourable to him.' Lefebvre, it must be noted, had not only served during the fortunate part of Jourdan's command of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', but also through the retreat which had destroyed the former devotion of Kléber. This is good testimony from such a fighting General.

When Jourdan joined his army it lay partly on the left, partly on the right of the Rhine, with its head-quarters at Friedberg on the right bank. It was stronger than when the campaign began, having now some 47,304 men. Ferino, who had been in temporary command, took a division. Saint-Cyr, as I have already said, had joined from Italy on the 19th October 1798. Bernadotte came from Paris on the 21st November and took command of Grouchy's late division, the 2nd, but he soon returned to the Capital—I think on the 25th January. Ney had a light cavalry brigade which Jourdan attached to Bernadotte's division. Lefebvre rejoined from the cure he had undergone and was given command of the *avant-garde*, whose light troops were commanded by General of Brigade Soult. Soult had returned from the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein, where he says he had been in command, though Jourdan gives the credit to Dallemagne and Drouet asserts that he himself superintended it. Unfortunately for Jourdan, he took as Chief of the Staff Ernouf, who had served him in that capacity in 1796 and who, having been employed at the War Office, was now here doubtless at Jourdan's instance.¹

¹ Phipps, ii, especially 386, where Beurnonville is disgusted with Ernouf.

II

FIRST PHASE OF CAMPAIGN OF 1799

(December 1798 to March 1799)

L'Armée d'Observation under Bernadotte. Advance over the Rhine. Weakness of the French armies. Battle of Ostrach.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

- 1798 7th December. Charles Emmanuel III of Piedmont abdicates.
1799 January. Naples taken by the French.
February. Start of Syrian expedition.
18th March. Siege of Acre starts.

IN the middle of December 1798 Jourdan drew all his army to the left of the Rhine. He found it wretchedly supplied, with one exception, a curious one for an army of the Republic: the men had their pay, that being supplied by the provinces they occupied. His proposals for improving the supply system were rejected in favour of the contractors, a great disappointment to him. How badly supplied the Medical Department of the army was can be seen by the memoirs of the celebrated surgeon Percy, who was Surgeon-in-Chief here, and who mentions Saint-Cyr and Lefebvre as full of care for the medical staff. The latter, worthy old soldier that he was, was especially indignant at the order by which the surgeons of the regiments had their horses taken from them, and longed to have the powers of Ashtaroth to fly to the Medical Council and say, 'See, wretches, if a surgeon after having done eighteen miles on foot with his knapsack on his back can succour the wounded with ease and adequacy.'

Another annoyance to Jourdan was the formation of the Armée d'Observation. His own army had been organized in six divisions, Ferino, Souham, Saint-Cyr, Lefebvre, Dallemagne, and Laborde,¹ with a cavalry reserve under d'Hautpoul, but in February 1799 the two left divisions, Dallemagne and Laborde, went to form the Armée d'Observation under Bernadotte. This army, often miscalled the Armée du Rhin, was supposed to have flanked the left of the Armée du Danube. It

¹ Général-Comte Joseph Souham (1767-1837); Phipps, i. For Dallemagne, Phipps, iv. Général-Comte Henri-François Delaborde, or Laborde (1764-1833). *Fastes*, iii. 164-5; Phipps, iii.

only existed from February to April 1799, its personnel being mainly drawn from the Armée de Mayence and then being absorbed back into that army, which had meanwhile become 'Danube'. Its objects were to blockade Mannheim and Philippsburg, to furnish the garrisons for other places on the Rhine, and to support the operations of Jourdan and his army by demonstrations on the Main and the Neckar. It was to have had, including garrisons, some 48,000 men, but it was actually very weak; the divisions of Dallemagne and Laborde formed its cadre. Bernadotte came from Paris in February to command it. This appointment of Bernadotte was made in a curious way. On the morning of the 5th February 1799 he was nominated, the appointment being cancelled at noon and made again that evening. Next, on the 10th February he was nominated to succeed Joubert in the command of the Armée d'Italie, and Schauenbourg, the former commander of 'Helvétie', now, I think, with the Armée de Mayence as Inspector-General of the *Corps du Haut-Rhin*,¹ was posted to 'Observation'. Finally on the 27th February Bernadotte was again appointed. These changes were caused by difficulties about the command in Italy, which Bernadotte refused and which had better be explained under that army. He had been longing for an independent command, and now took this army although he was to act under Jourdan, thus occupying a lower position than if he had gone to Italy. Perhaps we may see one of Bernadotte's characteristics in this: wishing for a command but drawing back from what must be arduous, he takes one on which the main stress of war is not likely to fall.

Having been in Paris while the formation of the new army was being settled, Bernadotte no doubt had pleaded his own cause with effect: for example, one may suspect that it was at his instigation that General of Brigade Ney, then at Strasbourg, was ordered to join the Armée d'Observation, to command the cavalry of Laborde's division. Now Ney, a dashing leader of an advanced guard, surely would have been better placed with Jourdan's army, which was to be the striking force on this frontier, than with that of Bernadotte, meant only to demonstrate. This was a mere straw, but Jourdan became disgusted with the whole situation; he suspected a design to ruin him,

¹ Mahon, *Les Armées du Directoire*, i, note 3, p. 158.

and he would have resigned had he not shrunk from taking such a step so soon after coming to the army. The Minister also gave him fresh assurances that he would have 100,000 men, and, though he believed the Austrians would have 120,000 to face the three armies he nominally controlled, 'Mayence', 'Helvétie', and 'Observation', he let himself be lulled into remaining at his post. Although Jourdan does not complain of Bernadotte—indeed, approved of him as a 'true republican and sincere friend'—still, he was annoyed by having another Commander-in-Chief on the Rhine: he would have preferred a simple General of Division. Indeed, Jourdan looked on all this army as so much deducted from his own strength.

Urged on by the Directory, Jourdan's army had begun crossing the Rhine on the 1st March 1799, Ferino's division first at Bâle, and the rest from Strasbourg by Kehl. Jourdan himself left Strasbourg in the afternoon with twenty Guides. Then the army moved in four columns through the Black Mountains in a south-easterly direction, halting on the 8th March with its right at Blumberg, where it communicated with the left of Masséna's Armée d'Helvétie at Schaffhausen, and Jourdan used Ruby's brigade of that force, much to Masséna's disgust. Headquarters were at Villingen and the left at Rottweil, so that the army held the ground between the sources of the Neckar and the Danube. One advantage Jourdan possessed: a Convention, signed the 26th July 1796 by Moreau and the Margrave of Baden, authorized this passage of his troops through the Black Forest. So far, the orders of the Directory had been fulfilled, and on the 8th March the army took the title of Armée du Danube, which, it will be remembered, I call 'Danube A' to distinguish it from what later was much the same force but under Masséna, and called by me 'Danube B'. Saint-Cyr on the left knew this ground well from his work in 1796, and, believing that Jourdan would not advance beyond this point, he began preparing field works at Freudenstadt, considering that the French troops could make good use of the mountain defiles against the heavy Austrians. At first Jourdan agreed, but on the 11th March he ordered a fresh advance. During this month Lefebvre had rejoined from sick leave, and on the 5th March had retaken command of his old division, the *avant-garde*, Vandamme going for a short time to the staff under

Jourdan. This *avant-garde* was almost entirely composed of regiments which had served in the old 'Sambre-et-Meuse'. Soult had a brigade here; Mortier soon joined, and it would have still more represented that army had not Ney left it for the Armée d'Observation. Jourdan took care to keep in touch with his old troops, and, remarking how well Pajol, the Colonel of the 4th Hussars, then with Soult's brigade, was covering the advance, in praising him he reminded him of their former acquaintance in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'.

The position was a curious one, for hostilities were not formally begun and Jourdan had no orders to attack; but he considered that he was bound to support the Armée d'Helvétie, and, hearing that Masséna had successfully attacked on the 6th March¹ on the right of Lake Constance, on the 13th he himself crossed the Danube. There was a strange doubt whether the Austrians would fight. On the 15th March 1797, probably misled by some papers found amongst those left by the dead Marceau, Hoche, then commanding the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', had informed the Directory that the Austrians had made secret overtures for peace to Marceau just before he was killed, and that the Archduke, furious against the Bourbons since they had married the daughter of Louis XVI to the Duc d'Angoulême,² wished for peace at any price, and had only forced the French to retreat in 1796 against his own desire, hoping to meet more resistance. There was a strange vein of folly in Hoche; but now the Directory also do not seem to have believed in war until the Austrians had crossed the Lech, and the Minister of War would not admit the possibility of the enemy concentrating more than from 40,000 to 50,000 men in one position. The Directory were not well informed. Bacher, their Minister at Ratisbon, or Regensburg, himself not always correctly informed, reported to Jourdan that 40,000 Austrians from Bohemia were to march on Ulm, with other troops reinforcing them. Soult says that on the 17th March, when at Pfullendorf, that is, when soon to meet the enemy, he heard the French Minister from

¹ See pp. 75-6. Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 1799, 118, and Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 106.

² Phipps, ii. 364-5. It was reported that the Austrian Court had wished a marriage between the Archduke Charles and the Princess; Daudet, *Hist. de l'émigration*, ii. 135, 145-6, 151, 158, 362. The marriage with the Duc d'Angoulême only took place on the 10th June 1799.

Ratisbon—Bacher, I assume—say that when passing through the Austrian army he had observed, as the Directory had informed Jourdan, that their troops did not want war and would not fight. The assurances of the Directory are styled by Soult abominable lies which would have ruined the army had not Jourdan been better informed. Saint-Cyr, as a General of Division more likely to know the truth of the matter than Soult, says Alquier, the French Minister sent back from Munich, knew well the real strength of the Austrians and had informed the Directory. Having passed through Jourdan's army, Alquier found it so weak that he could not help showing the Generals his great anxiety over the military events about to take place.¹

The weakness of the army and the bad state of its supplies were no mere excuses put forward to cover defeat. Dubois-Crancé² had been appointed on the 24th September 1798 Inspector-General of Infantry to 'Mayence' and he had visited it in October–December that year and had gone through the administration with Daru, the future Minister of the 'Administration de la Guerre' to Napoleon, now 'Commissaire ordonnateur' to this army. Dubois-Crancé was soon to be Minister of War for a short time before Brumaire, and, though not the great administrator his friends believed him to be, he had seen war and knew a good deal about the proper state for troops to be in. He found everything lacking and the departments disorganized. 'The regiments are naked, badly armed, and, especially, are shoe-less.' As for peculation and robbery, the troops had no part in that, but there must be thieves amongst the commissariat officers and the contractors. Dubois-Crancé understood the situation most thoroughly, and when Jourdan resolved to advance he wrote: 'It is your own wish, my dear General. You will be beaten; your thirty thousand men will not distinguish themselves against the sixty thousand picked troops commanded by Prince Charles, who realizes the advantage of beginning the campaign by a brilliant action; you will not be long in returning to Strasbourg, crestfallen, after having cracked your whip so much, having sacrificed yourself by your obstinacy in

¹ For these views see Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, 39; Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 5; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 111; Jourdan, *Mémoires*, note, p. 80.

² Général Edmond-Louis-Alexis Dubois-Crancé (1747–1814). Phipps. ii. 212–13; iii. Minister of War 23rd Sept.–10th Nov. 1799. Jung, *Dubois-Crancé*, ii. 262–92.

refusing all incorporation of our old officers and experienced soldiers—and we shall be cooped up for the rest of the year. I hope I may be a false prophet.’ He was only too good a prophet, although the Prince cannot be said to have begun by a brilliant action; but I do not know what he meant by Jourdan refusing the incorporation of old soldiers. In reality Jourdan, naturally, was anxious to have old regiments with him. Perhaps Dubois-Crancé referred to some plan of his for stiffening new regiments with old soldiers, for he assured the Directory the conscripts were so eager that ‘if they were armed and clothed, in three months they would equal veterans’. Jourdan had seen what such raw troops did at the beginning of the war; and besides, three months’ delay would have brought the Austrians to the Rhine. Apparently he wished to get through the Black Mountains before the enemy could seize the passes.

Moving south-east, by the 17th March the right division, Ferino, had its leading troops at Markdorf, to the north of Lake Constance, with which Ruby’s brigade of the Armée d’Helvétie linked it. The rest of the army lay to the north, with its left, Saint-Cyr, at Messkirch. Jourdan placed himself in the centre at Pfullendorf, with Lefebvre’s division, the *avant-garde*. Jourdan knew that the Archduke had crossed the Lech on the 8th March, and he became uneasy about his left. General Châteauneuf-Randon,¹ who commanded at Strasbourg, suddenly became panic-stricken and imagined that 30,000 Austrians were marching on Philippsburg; he declared that he could not answer for Kehl, the suburb of Strasbourg. Jourdan, hearing from Châteauneuf-Randon, became alarmed lest the Archduke should try to turn his left, which was unprotected, for Bernadotte’s Armée d’Observation was too weak to advance far enough to cover it, and the Austrians, moving on Stuttgart, might seize the communications of the army. He consulted Saint-Cyr, who thought such an operation quite possible a little later, but who, wisely enough, did not believe the Archduke would so weaken his army until he had beaten Jourdan in an action.

Here for a moment we must turn to the Armée d’Observation.

¹ Le Comte de Châteauneuf-Randon, a member of the Convention, and a Regicide. Suspended by Jourdan, he became Préfet of the Alpes-Maritimes under the Consulate, but had to resign, and was not employed again. *Biog. des Cont.* i. 931–2.

The first thing for Bernadotte after he took up his command had been to cross the Rhine, and this was managed by Ney. The French held the *tête-de-pont* of Mannheim on the left bank, and, according to the account in Ney's memoirs, not mentioned by General Bonnal in his life of the Marshal, Ney, dressed as a peasant, with a basket on his arm, crossed over and found the garrison, a very weak one, off their guard. As he was leaving he observed a woman far gone in pregnancy, leaning on the arm of one of the guards. Talking to the man on the difficulty of getting an *accoucheur* in the night, he was told that whenever the woman's pains began the Commandant would allow the drawbridge to be lowered to enable help to be obtained. Ney had some cavalry and two companies of infantry, though they were without cartridges. He sent a party across at night, the drawbridge fell, and as the messenger came out to seek the *accoucheur*, Ney's men won the outworks. Some shots from his artillery, firing across the river, so frightened the garrison that they surrendered. Swinging round to his right, Ney then marched up the right bank of the Rhine for Philippsburg and induced the Commandant there to agree only to maintain a line of small posts round the place, and not to make any sallies until he had warned the French that hostilities were to begin, for at this moment, as we have seen, it was doubtful whether they were at peace or war. This saved the French from keeping a force before the place, a most important gain, for, as Bernadotte told Ney: 'It is really cruel, my dear Ney, that I cannot dispose of a corps of troops sufficient to invest Philippsburg.' Indeed, one cannot see how he would have advanced had he been obliged to blockade the place.

Ney, whilst agreeing with Bernadotte that they might be attacked by the Austrians, and indeed saying it was a marvel they were not thrown back on Mannheim, still hoped to get Philippsburg, and as Bernadotte could not give him even the small force he wanted, he tried to corrupt the Palatinate troops inside. Bernadotte encouraged this plan, assuring Ney that it was 'permissible to employ every means when it is a question of serving one's country and contributing to the glory of its arms'. He was ready to pay 500,000, or even 600,000 francs, intending to get it back by levying contributions. Unfortunately the Governor had the same idea, and, employing the same

means, nearly got the best of it. An insurrection of the peasantry was prepared and Ney only got wind of it just in time to stop it, though he had the poor satisfaction of making the 'noble émigré', the Baron who was at the head of the plot, fly in his shirt. After this Philippsburg was 'severely' invested. An attempt was made to corrupt the Governor himself, but this let him into the secret and he arrested and shot Ney's tools: 'tout fut manqué'. However, in one thing Ney succeeded: he got recruits, and horses to mount them, so that his three cavalry regiments, originally only 600 strong, now were double that number. After the crossing place at Mannheim had been won, and the bridge of boats having been reconstructed on the 3rd March, Bernadotte advanced with Laborde's division south-east up the Neckar for Heilbronn, which his troops entered and where we must leave him.¹

Meanwhile unfortunately Jourdan at first believed the report from Châteauneuf-Randon about the danger to Kehl, and he diminished his striking force by forming a *corps de flanqueurs* of two infantry regiments and three cavalry squadrons under Vandamme, who had been unemployed since Lefebvre had joined. One regiment, the 1st Light, was taken from Saint-Cyr, and the other, the 8th of the Line, from d'Hautpoul's reserve. Saint-Cyr was weakened not only by this loss of a regiment but also by having to detach troops from his left to link with the *flanqueurs*. This body must not be confused with the small force of *flanqueurs de gauche* which Saint-Cyr had hitherto used, under de Billy,² his Chief of the Staff, to cover his left. Vandamme was thrown far north by Hechingen to push parties to Esslingen, close to Stuttgart, which was reached by one of his brigades under Compère. There was some confusion in his orders from head-quarters; but he did not rejoin the army till after the first heavy engagement at Ostrach on the 21st March, when he himself was near Friedingen on the left of the Danube. His detachment had been utterly useless and deprived the army of some 3,000 troops at the struggle at Ostrach.

While this whole advance of Jourdan's against a superior

¹ *Vict. et Conq.* x. 40 makes this date the 4th March, but that must be far too soon. See Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 50; Bonnal, *Ney*, i. 139. Bernadotte himself was at Mayence on the 9th March; Bonnal, *Ney*, 133.

² Général Jean-Louis de Billy (1763-1806). Killed at Jena. *Fastes*, iii. 161; Lottin, *Le Général de Billy*, especially 146-7.

force, urged by the Directory and necessitated, as he believed, by the duty of supporting Masséna, was tragic enough, there was a very comical side to the matter. The doubt, however absurd, about the Austrians adopting any hostile attitude, still existed, and was confirmed by their behaviour. As the French advanced guard came on Austrian outposts, these did not fire but only offered a passive resistance, refusing to retire until the French, losing patience, threatened to charge them. On the 13th March, Ernouf, Jourdan's Chief of Staff, making a reconnaissance of Stockach, found two Austrian vedettes outside the town, and asked for permission to enter to bait his horses. This was given and Ernouf dined there, the Sergeant of the Austrian party assuring him, with 'une politesse exquise', that they were forbidden under pain of death to fire a shot, and that his orders were to retire with his men if the French wished to occupy Stockach. For some time this continued, and the 'Pirates of Penzance' could not have been more obliging. As the Archduke drew near this attitude changed: for instance, Ernouf, after returning from his reconnaissance, sent on his *fourgon* and an officer to establish head-quarters in Stockach, but now 200 Austrians occupied the town and refused to retire. On the 19th March, the day before the two forces engaged, Saint-Cyr, moving on Mengen, found some Austrian squadrons there, who, according to the style of the moment, were requested to retire. They refused, saying, 'Take us prisoners if you like, but we will not retire.' Even the cold-blooded Saint-Cyr took an hour to discuss the matter before charging them. Ludicrous as all this was, it seems almost like broad farce to find Jourdan on the 18th March, after advancing from the Rhine to and across the Danube, gravely sending to ask the Archduke whether he had not received from the Austrian Government dispatches for the Directory and orders not to engage hostilities! Prince Schwarzenberg came to Soult's outposts to discuss this matter, and to give verbally a negative answer. As Soult knew that hostilities had begun on the side of the Armée d'Helvétie on the 6th March and that Auffenberg's division had been captured, one can easily understand his saying how puzzled he was to reconcile his question with the march of the army. Jourdan had for long no instructions to begin hostilities: indeed, when the first shots were fired it was feared that this would displease the Directory, and it

was only on the 17th March, on arrival at Pfullendorf, that he learnt that a message had been sent to the *Corps Législatif* to propose war against the Emperor, and that Schérer in Italy had been ordered to begin hostilities. On the 20th March, the day real fighting began, Jourdan informed his army that the Directory had declared war. Strange as all this seems, even in 1805, under the summary Napoleon, the Austrian cavalry greeted the French with jokes and salutes, a state of things which Napoleon ordered to be ended by taking prisoner 200 of these misguided troopers.

Meantime the Archduke, adopting an offensive strategy disapproved of by his Government, had begun crossing the Lech on the 3rd March. The total Austrian strength to be used against Jourdan on the Danube and Masséna in Switzerland was 165,400, of whom 70,000 were to deal with Masséna and to link with the Austrian forces in Italy, Hotze with 20,000 being in the Vorarlberg, Auffenberg with 3,400 in the Grisons, and Bellegarde with 46,600 in the Tyrol. An army of Russians under Suvárof was coming up, and Suvárof himself reached Vienna on the 23rd March; but this force, the approach of which the Directory had treated as involving war, was sent into Italy. From the remainder of his force the Archduke, believing Bernadotte's Armée d'Observation to be stronger than it was, sent Sztaray with 14,500 from Neumarkt by Nuremberg to the Regnitz to oppose him. The Archduke himself, with some 53,900 infantry and 23,000 cavalry, besides artillery, say 80,000 men, moved on Jourdan's 38,000 men, one body of 6,600 going up the Danube for Ulm. The plan of the Archduke was to march against Jourdan with his whole strength and to open the campaign by a decisive battle, his first operation being to throw his advanced guard forward to protect Hotze in the Vorarlberg. Jourdan's movements seemed to offer the Prince every advantage, for he intended to move by the east of Lake Constance towards Masséna, and thus would present his left flank to the Austrian commander. Seeing the danger of this, he would have liked to wait till Bernadotte could advance far enough to shield his left, but to all directions to move Bernadotte only pleaded, truly enough, lack of strength. His most advanced division, Laborde's, was spread over a wide front from Pforzheim to Eberbach, Ney with two cavalry regiments being at Bretten and reconnoitring towards Pforzheim.

At the moment the Archduke got into touch with the Armée du Danube it was extended, after another advance, in a long weak line. Ferino was on the right at Siggingen,¹ stretching from Markdorf north-west to Wildorf, along the Aach river. Souham carried on the line to Pfullendorf, with d'Hautpoul's reserve in rear of him. Lefebvre's *avant-garde* was at Ostrach, and Saint-Cyr at Mengen, with his left on the Danube at Scheer. Vandamme, with his *flanqueurs*, equivalent to about half a division, was far away to the north, on the left of the Danube, and, though he was moving quickly, his reports that no attempt was being made to turn the left did not reach Jourdan, who was very anxious as to any movement there. The Archduke, with double Jourdan's strength, on the 19th March brought the main body of his troops, some 41,000 infantry and 2,210 cavalry, to Saulgau, in front of Jourdan's left, while a strong body of 16,360 under Wallis² was on his own left at Altshausen.

On the 21st March the Archduke attacked in force. One column of eleven battalions and twenty squadrons marched on Mengen for Pfullendorf, to deal with Saint-Cyr, while the Archduke himself, with twenty-two battalions and fifty squadrons, moved by the main road from Saulgau to Ostrach, flanked on his left by Wallis from Altshausen, with fifteen battalions and forty-two squadrons. These last two columns, converging on Ostrach, had only to deal with Lefebvre's small *avant-garde* division of six battalions and twelve squadrons, still weakened by the fact that part of it had been cut off by the enemy and had had to make a long circuit to regain him. Now all the faults of the French position were evident, for while the two divisions on the right were not really threatened, Ferino at Siggingen was too far off to be of any use, just as Vandamme, on the left of the Danube, was out of reach. Saint-Cyr, warned to hold his own on his right so as to link with Lefebvre, had to reply that in the absence of Vandamme he had to weaken his division by detachments on the left of the Danube. Thus, to face the mass thrown on Lefebvre, Jourdan could only use Souham, partly to reinforce Lefebvre but mainly to hold the gap between the Aach and the Ostrach, while he ordered d'Hautpoul to form his

¹ North of Markdorf.

² Phipps, iii, where he succeeded De Wins in command of the Austrians in Italy in 1795.

cavalry in rear of Lefebvre in the Pfullendorf plain, ready to support the *avant-garde* if it had to retreat. The country was too unfavourable to allow the cavalry to be employed otherwise.

Soult speaks of the 'sages dispositions' of Lefebvre, who was soon joined by Jourdan at Ostrach. A thick fog covered the first movements of the enemy, whose onslaught grew ever heavier. All that gallantry could do was done by Lefebvre and his men, but the enemy gained ground and threatened to get round in rear. Lefebvre received a bullet which, entering below the thumb and going through his left hand, glided between the skin and the flesh of the forearm, stopping at the elbow. He tried to conceal his wound for some time, but at last loss of blood forced him to leave the field to get attended to, the ball being extracted at Pfullendorf. Jourdan, who was on the field to the last, exposing himself more than his officers and men thought right, was more fortunate, for though he had several horses wounded and one shot dead under him, yet he himself escaped wounds, though the fall hurt him for a long time. With honest pleasure he tells how his fall was lamented by his men, who, as they saw him go down with his horse, exclaimed mournfully: 'The General is killed.' 'I arose and mounted another horse, and joy beamed on every countenance. Brave and affectionate comrades, receive the expression of my most lively gratitude. How dear is the testimony of your attachment to me . . . No, my duty did not instruct me only to direct your ardent courage: it commanded me also to display my own; the more affectionately you regarded me, the more I cherished you; and I ought to render myself the more worthy of you by my zeal, my courage and my devotion to you.'¹

When Lefebvre had to leave the field, Jourdan gave the command of the *avant-garde* to Soult, then General of Brigade. The division still held Ostrach, but now the enemy routed one battalion and a body of fugitives retreated on Soult, who, seizing the flag of the battalion, collected some 2,000 men of many different corps and led them on the enemy under a heavy fire of case. The village was regained and the lost battle restored. The strength of the enemy, however, was too great, and Jourdan ordered Soult to retreat on Pfullendorf. This was done in perfect order, after breaking the bridges over the Ostrach. Meanwhile

¹ Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 1799, 161-2.

on the left Saint-Cyr had held his own, and when Jourdan sent him information of the retreat of the *avant-garde*, and orders to retire on Messkirch, he replied that he considered it wiser to hold his ground till night, when he could draw off with greater safety, whilst meantime he helped to cover the movement of Soult. The enemy in his front, believing he must retire, did not attack, and in due course he drew back to the heights of Krauchenwiesen. On the right, Souham had helped to cover Soult's retreat, and also took post at Pfullendorf. Ferino, on the extreme right, untouched by the enemy, was drawn back in line with and to the south of the army. The French had lost 2,257 killed, wounded, and prisoners: the Austrians 2,160 killed and wounded, 750 prisoners, and 3 guns disabled. Soult considered this action one of the most brilliant his division had had since the beginning of the war, and also one of the most vigorous in his military career.¹ Jourdan declared that, considering the superiority of the enemy's forces, 'It will be regarded as equal in point of honour to the most brilliant victories.' Saint-Cyr, with much truth, decides that for the Archduke it was a total failure. Whilst the country was strange to Jourdan, the Archduke, who had fought over it against the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' in 1796, knew it thoroughly; he had double the numbers of the Armée du Danube, which he found extended far too much; and he had been able to concentrate his attack on the single division of the *avant-garde*, which had at its back the defile and the marsh of Ostrach. How much of the battle had fallen on the *avant-garde* can be seen from the comparative losses, of which it had 1,803, Saint-Cyr about 300, and Souham 150. Yet, with his forty-two battalions and 100 squadrons, all that the Archduke had done was to throw back six weak battalions and twelve squadrons. He had intended to attack the second position by Pfullendorf, but abandoned the plan when he found the bridge over the Andelsbach was broken. One can but imagine that the physical weakness which so often affected the Archduke was the real cause of his not attempting to follow up his advantage. As it was, the French retired practically unmolested.

¹ Soult, *Mémoires*, ii, note 1, p. 19.

III

RETREAT

(March to April 1799)

Battle of Stockach. Saint-Cyr's part. Jourdan's retreat. Ernouf's retreat.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

1799 16th April. Battle of Mount Tabor.

ARRIVED at Pfullendorf, Jourdan considered the position unsatisfactory and early on the 22nd March he again retired, to the Stockach line. This, however, was too favourable to the enemy, and on the 23rd he went farther back westwards, the right, Ferino, being near Hohentwiel,¹ then Souham, Soult's *avant-garde*, and the reserve cavalry at Engen. Saint-Cyr, on the left, was to have been at Tuttlingen, but he thought that post bad and got Jourdan's permission to remain where he stood on the 22nd, between Liptingen and Neuhausen-ob-Eck, thus being farther advanced than the rest of the army. Vandamme's corps of *flanqueurs* now had rejoined the army and was to the left, or north, of Saint-Cyr, near Friedingen but on the left bank of the Danube. It was now, on the 24th March, that Mortier, who had begun the campaign as Colonel of the 23rd Cavalry, part of d'Hautpoul's body of reserve cavalry, and who had been promoted General of Brigade on the 23rd February 1799, joined Soult's *avant-garde*, in which he had a brigade. He is not mentioned in the accounts of the fight at Ostrach, but Soult names him several times in the battle of Stockach on the 24th March. We get a glimpse of him at Offenbourg when Dupuy, then a trooper in the 11th Chasseurs, brought him a dispatch. 'Chasseur,' said Mortier, 'this is the first dispatch I have received as General: dismount, and let us drink some brandy', which the two accordingly did. It was here also that Suchet joined the army. Still only a General of Brigade, he had been employed as Chief of the Staff to Joubert when that General had in November 1798 taken command in Italy. Much to Joubert's annoyance, Suchet had been recalled by the Directory on the 27th

¹ North of Singer, south of Engen.

December. About the 19th February he was replaced on the active list, and was sent from Paris to the Armée du Danube. By the 21st March he was at Schaffhausen on the track of the army, and on his way to head-quarters he met the wounded Lefebvre going home to be cured and learnt from him all the details of the battle of Ostrach, which the old soldier described as most obstinate and bloody. On the 23rd March¹ Suchet reached the head-quarters of Jourdan at Engen. He found Jourdan always with the advanced posts, never having any fixed position for himself, and so busy that for some days Suchet could not speak to him. There was no time to find a brigade for Suchet, who saw the next battle as a spectator only; indeed, he seems not to have been given any post till this army was amalgamated by Masséna with the Armée d'Helvétie. The strain caused by the campaign was telling on Jourdan himself, and the more so as throughout the operations he took a most active part, always on the move, going everywhere, and looking to the least detail. Now, taciturn amongst his staff, he was ill, and alarmed them by refusing to take the food they thought necessary for his support. Probably he had hoped to redeem what prestige he had lost by his retreat in 1796, and the enforced withdrawal told the more on him.

On the 24th March the enemy felt the whole line, but the only heavy engagement was with Saint-Cyr, whom the Austrians tried to drive from his advanced position. They took Neuhausen-ob-Eck and Liptingen, and Emmingen-ob-Egg was fiercely contested, French and Austrians occupying it alternately, until at last Saint-Cyr, finding that Jourdan meant to advance next day, had it taken and held it that night. The fight had been severe, and in the movements of the cavalry one gun was upset and abandoned to the Austrians. On Saint-Cyr's right Soult² with the *avant-garde* sent his light troops on Emmingen to support him, and the fight ended at night, Saint-Cyr having held his main position and having ascertained that the Austrian right was in front of him, in force. Jourdan had passed the day with the *avant-garde*, on the heights to the left of Engen, anxious lest

¹ Suchet is made to say 3^{me} Janvier in Rousseau, *Suchet*, 18, but obviously 3^{me} Germinal, 23rd March, is meant, for in the next few lines he says he was present at the battle of the 5^{me}. Now the 5^{me} Germinal was 25th March.

² Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 26-7, has the wrong date, 23rd March instead of the 24th.

Saint-Cyr should be driven back and the left of the army turned; and he frequently sent staff officers to learn how matters went. Suchet apparently was with Jourdan's staff, and saw but little of the fight.

On the 19th March Jourdan had written to Masséna urging him to attack Feldkirch, and now he received the answer, dated the 21st March, by which he learnt that Masséna would make this attack on the 24th. Jourdan was resolved not to be accused of abandoning Masséna before he had done everything possible to second him, and when, on the evening of the 24th March, he learnt that Saint-Cyr had held his ground he took a very bold—say, rather, a very daring—resolution: to attack the Archduke next day.¹ He hoped, with a prospect of success, as events were to show, to beat the corps which had attacked Saint-Cyr, when he believed the Austrians would retreat. His own army, he thought, in case of defeat had its retreat secure, as the Black Mountains gave every opportunity of contesting the ground. This resolution has a curious resemblance to that which he had taken in 1796, when after retreating he turned back to fight at Würzburg. Then he had disliked abandoning Moreau: now he thought of Masséna and the Armée d'Helvétie. Though Jourdan does not mention the point, one wonders if he was at all influenced by the belief that after the action at Stockach the Archduke had detached part of his army against Masséna. Saint-Cyr had suggested this possibility to him, and apparently had argued that it would be well not to retreat farther before being assured the whole army of the Prince was still before them. Of course, this was a very different thing from taking the offensive.

Jourdan had been forced by the Archduke to concentrate his army, or at least to get it in a much smaller compass than before; and this time he meant to use all four divisions. The first thing was to strike at the Austrians in front of Saint-Cyr, on the left. That General was to command Vandamme's *flanqueurs*, now in touch with his left, as well as his own division. On the 25th, moving from Tuttlingen, he was to advance south-

¹ Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 177-8. I think Gachot forgets in his *Jourdan en Allemagne*, note 1, p. 99, that the appeal of Masséna, to which he attributes the advance, was written after Masséna's failure at Feldkirch on the 24th March, and could not have been known to Jourdan before he attacked.

east on Liptingen, whilst on his left flank Vandamme, moving from Stetten, Mulheim, and Friedingen, on the Danube, was to strike at the right flank of the enemy at Liptingen. Soult's *avant-garde*, from Engen, followed by d'Hautpoul's cavalry, was to move north-east on Liptingen; in other words, the enemy at Liptingen would be struck in their front and on both flanks. When Saint-Cyr and Soult met, presumably after the defeat of the enemy there, Jourdan would direct them to the north-east on Messkirch. On the right Ferino, with Ruby's brigade of Masséna's Armée d'Helvétie, was to move north-east from Hohentwiel on the left of the enemy at Stockach, whilst Souham from Engen would march direct on Stockach, driving back the enemy until, outflanked on both sides, they retired, when he was to occupy Stockach. Ferino was then to take command of both these divisions and to march north-east for Pfullendorf. In plain language, Jourdan intended with his small force to attack both wings of the Archduke, or, as Saint-Cyr puts it, to surround the larger force. It is not quite safe to judge the opinions of men at any given moment by their writings at a later date, but we can easily believe that Jourdan's Generals received his orders with disapproval. Decaen,¹ who thought everybody wrong, especially Soult, was astonished at such an offensive after the retreat, and he considered that the army should await reinforcements in a defensive position. Some one, he says, spoke to the Commander-in-Chief on the subject, when Jourdan replied, 'Then you want the Armée du Danube to pass back over the Rhine without fighting', which sounds much what Jourdan would have said. Soult considered the resolution to attack very bold, as it entailed manœuvring before an enemy double the French strength and inspirited by their success at Ostrach. However, he considered success possible if Jourdan kept to his plan of striking at the Austrian right. Saint-Cyr, with his great experience and his science, thought that Jourdan was giving himself too great a task, but that the plan was a good one for obtaining a success on the left, for which purpose he himself asked to remain at Liptingen, and he hoped that Jourdan would end by restricting himself to that part of the plan. It seems a pity that instead of Soult, a young General

¹ Général-Comte Charles-Mathieu-Isidore Decaen (*alias* De Caen) (1769–1832). *Fastes*, v. 157–9; *Mémoires et Journaux du Général Decaen*.

of Brigade, only lately promoted and commanding a division temporarily, the wise Saint-Cyr was not alongside Jourdan, when his advice might have had weight. As it was, Saint-Cyr seems not to have communicated his ideas to Jourdan till too late.

At the battle of Stockach, or, as the French at the time chose to call it, the battle of Liptingen, on the 25th March 1799, at first all went well for Jourdan. The Austrians at Liptingen could not stand against the attacks concentrated on them. Saint-Cyr, already close to the enemy, held back his division till Vandamme's movement on their right flank and rear was developed; and Soult reached Liptingen, where Mortier, leading a light infantry regiment, attacked with such impetuosity that he penetrated into the village. Saint-Cyr then attacked, and the Austrians, although about equal to the French in number, both having some 14,000, being almost surrounded, gave way. The greater part of them broke and took to the fields. At one moment the artillery of one of Saint-Cyr's brigades had been dismounted, but now the enemy lost heavily, the French taking, according to Soult, 2,000 prisoners, while Saint-Cyr says from 3,000 to 4,000 and Jourdan puts it at 3,000. One of Saint-Cyr's regiments took more prisoners than they themselves had men in their ranks. Only two howitzers were captured. So far Jourdan had done capitally: he had, as Saint-Cyr believed would be practicable, given the Archduke a slap in the face, and he should have been contented with that. At least, before he committed himself further he might have waited till he knew the state of affairs on his right, where he chose to assume that Ferino and Souham had caused the enemy to retreat from Stockach. On the contrary, these two divisions had failed in this object. Ferino had advanced to Orsingen and had driven the enemy on Stockach, where they stood, bringing him to a halt by threatening his right towards Wahlwiess. On his left Souham, from Engen, had driven the enemy through Aach and Eigeltingen. Here Souham halted, near enough to the left of Ferino to know that General's progress was blocked, but apparently not making any great effort to advance, so that, instead of driving back the left of the Archduke, they simply held it. Jourdan, stating that he himself would be with Saint-Cyr and Soult, had appointed no commander to combine these divisions till Stockach should

be taken. This was a mistake, for presumably Ferino, if in charge of both divisions, would have brought up Souham in support of his own column, a movement which Jourdan regretted that Souham had not made. Souham had been injured that morning by a fall from, or with, his horse, which may have had something to do with this failure, for we do not recognize the General of Tourcoing here. Anyhow, the battle, successful on the left, was at best a drawn one on the right.

Jourdan did not—would not—recognize the real situation. He considered he was just beginning a great victory. Soult's *avant-garde* was to advance on Liptingen, whilst Saint-Cyr was to circle round the enemy, marching, with his own division and Vandamme's *flanqueurs*, first eastwards to Messkirch and then southwards, to come on the rear and flank of the enemy corps supposed to be about to retreat before Soult. It was so evident that this beaten corps had retired on the centre of the Austrian army, which would probably now strike in its turn, that Saint-Cyr, especially when he soon heard heavy firing on Soult's front, assumed that Jourdan would renounce this circling march. He sent an A.D.C. to the commander to get information on the point, and apparently now at last to express his fears at moving away from a point at which such resistance was being offered. Jourdan, however, held to his original plan, and only ordered Saint-Cyr to hasten his march. Having won the first part of the day by concentrating two divisions, with the *flanqueurs* and the cavalry, he broke up this force on the mere presumption that the enemy would retreat without attempting to restore the battle. While admitting that 'This movement will appear very daring, if not rash, to military men', Jourdan attempts to justify it by the most astounding arguments. The Austrian army was twice as big as his; his late success was not sufficient to establish an equal balance between them; and even if the enemy retreated, they might have done so quietly by Pfullendorf or behind Ostrach, where he would not have been in a condition to attack them. He assumed that Saint-Cyr's movement on their rear would force the Austrians to retreat, when he would attack them vigorously with the main body of his troops and completely rout them. But supposing the enemy did not retreat while Saint-Cyr was making his sweep round them? And what was this main body he was going to use?

Soult's division, originally 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry! This was the hammer with which he was going to deal his blow at an army twice as large as his. The moment he advanced he found the enemy were not retreating, but all he did was to hurry Saint-Cyr on in his circling march. As far as one can judge, had he kept Saint-Cyr at hand till he knew the situation, all might have been well. What he did was in keeping with all his conduct throughout the campaign: inferior in strength as he knew his army to be, he thought himself obliged to face the enemy in the open field, just as if he had had the strength the Directory had promised him.

In obedience to Jourdan's orders, Soult's *avant-garde* advanced south-east for Stockach, but Mortier, who led it with the 25th Light Infantry, moving through the woods, was soon brought to a stand by a superior force. At the beginning of the day the Archduke had been moving from Pfullendorf on Stockach to reconnoitre Engen, and had reached Aach, when he came on Souham's column, and, having only a small force actually with him, he fell back on his centre. Then he learnt that his right wing, sent to attack the left of the French, was heavily engaged, and for some hours he became what he was in his best hours—'sage, ferme, en un mot, grand homme de guerre', as Saint-Cyr says. At once he determined to ignore the attack of Ferino and Souham, and, leaving Nauendorf to delay them, he went off to his right, to throw all the force he could gather on Soult, a small body being detached to watch Saint-Cyr's encircling movement on Messkirch. Mortier and Leval,¹ leading the two brigades of the *avant-garde*, charged the new first line of the Austrians 'avec une intrépidité héroïque', says Soult, and overthrew it. The Archduke was dissatisfied with the leadership of some of his Generals, and, taking the management into his own hands, he exposed himself so much that his old grenadiers, snatching at his bridle, implored him to draw off to a safe distance. His officers joined in the request, but at first he refused. Then the Prince de Fürstenberg arrived from rallying the troops in rear and cried, 'Whilst I live, I guarantee you this post', and the Archduke went back. Fürstenberg kept his word, but it was only for a minute, for, struck by the case shot which was devastating his men in the clearing

¹ Général-Baron Jean-François Leval (1762-1834), *Fastes*, iii. 349-50.

of the wood through which they were attempting to advance, he fell, and was carried back to Stockach to be buried there.

Still Soult was unable to break through the second line of fresh battalions that the Archduke brought up; notwithstanding the efforts of his men, they were driven back through the wood which they had held, and Soult had to retake his position before Liptingen, whilst the Austrians advanced in full triumph with their bands playing. Jourdan now prepared an attack on the enemy as they came out of the wood into the clearing in front of the *avant-garde*. Messengers had been sent to Saint-Cyr, not to recall his division but to tell him to send a regiment by Neuhausen-ob-Eck to get in touch with the left of Soult and to act on the rear of the enemy. Jourdan intended to throw his cavalry reserve, with the horse of Soult's division, on the enemy as they were issuing from the wood, and when the Austrians were thrown into confusion the *avant-garde* was to be launched on them, whilst the regiment to be sent by Saint-Cyr caught them in rear. Jourdan, though an infantry man, knew how to use his cavalry,¹ but time was of importance, for the charge would tell most if delivered before the enemy could get clear of the wood in front. D'Hautpoul,² who had gone back in rear of Liptingen, could not be found at first, and when he received the order to charge he hesitated. The French at this time were not used to the wielding of large bodies of horse, and d'Hautpoul, who under the Empire was to lead large divisions of Cuirassiers with success, did not realize the value of time at that moment. Perhaps he may have wanted to have his advance prepared and covered by the artillery, which was then in rear, not in front. On his making some remarks, Jourdan replied, 'I do not want to hear any observations: I order you to charge at once.' D'Hautpoul took some twenty minutes to prepare his men and to send for the guns, and even then the charge was badly made. The leading squadrons, Hussars, were repulsed by the enemy's cavalry, and when the two regiments of Carabiniers should have supported them, their front was blocked by a Dragoon regiment of the *avant-garde* and they in turn were beaten off, when the whole of the horse came back in confusion, followed hard by

¹ Phipps, ii. 159-67, especially 166, at Fleurus.

² Général-Comte Jean-Joseph-Ange d'Hautpoul-Salette (1754-1807), mortally wounded at Eylau. *Fastes*, iii. 275-6; Phipps, ii.

a mass of Austrian Cuirassiers. When Jourdan's horse was killed at Ostrach, Gachot represents him as fighting on foot, a sort of thing done with applause during the first years of the war but which Jourdan was too sensible to try that day, mounting a fresh charger instead at once. Now, however, personal example might tell, and he rushed into the midst of the confused mass of friend and foe, holding up his plumed cocked hat as a rallying sign. In the *mêlée* he was unheard, hustled about, and nearly taken prisoner; he was borne back with the crowd until the enemy's horse was driven off by the fire of Soult's infantry and artillery.

In the meantime the 8th Regiment, one of Vandamme's detached from Saint-Cyr's force, was at work on the enemy's rear; but now the Austrians turned against it, sending some 4,000 to 5,000 men against its 1,200, and the survivors, losing heavily as they retreated to Neuhausen, were fortunate in joining the left of Soult. The Archduke, with his far superior strength, ought to have had easy work with Soult's small force, but his attention was called off by a fresh attack on his rear. Further orders had been sent to Saint-Cyr to dispatch a body on the enemy's rear by the main road from Messkirch to Stockach. Saint-Cyr now detached Vandamme himself with the 1st Light Infantry (two battalions), six squadrons of cavalry, and three guns. Moving on Krumbach, Vandamme reached the villages of Mainwangen and Muhlingen, and the first of his skirmishers came so near the rear of the Archduke that he turned on them, and Vandamme, outflanked, drew off through Krumbach to rejoin Saint-Cyr at Messkirch, carrying off some 1,000 prisoners. Meantime Soult, exchanging a vigorous cannonade with the Austrians, had held his ground at Liptingen, and night put an end to the combat. It may be helpful to follow Saint-Cyr's movements from the beginning. Full of forebodings as to what might happen to Jourdan, he had moved away eastwards for Messkirch. While he was on his way, Molitor brought orders from Jourdan to hasten his march, and to tell him to send a regiment to Neuhausen. It was then that Saint-Cyr sent the 8th Regiment, part of Vandamme's *flanqueurs*; and seeing the enemy's fire was drawing near Liptingen, he advised Molitor to return quickly to Jourdan, as the route might be cut. He himself reached Messkirch, where he received the

order to send a body on the enemy's rear, for which Vandamme was detached, as I have said. Saint-Cyr himself was ordered south-east on Pfullendorf.¹ Soon, however, came orders from Jourdan to retire,² and at 10 p.m. Vandamme came back by Krumbach. Saint-Cyr, knowing that Soult had been repulsed, naturally supposed that the Archduke would not stop till he had crushed the *avant-garde*, and he believed his own position, cut off from the army, to be even worse than it really was. At daylight he might be overwhelmed, so, giving his men two hours' rest, he started after midnight for a ford across the Danube near Laiz.³ Leaving Vandamme at first at Sigmaringen, he hurried westwards up the Danube, as an Austrian corps was known to be coming up from Ulm and might cut off his division. However, only a weak advanced guard was met and that was brushed aside. A *détour* to the right had to be made to avoid some mountains, and on the night of the 26th March the division halted at Winterlingen, north-west of Sigmaringen. Next day, the 27th March, moving on Rottweil, it halted at Schomberg, Vandamme being to the north-east at Bahlingen. Saint-Cyr was now in touch with the rest of the army. In withdrawing by the left of the Danube he had anticipated the wish of Jourdan, from whom he had only received the order to retreat. I give details of this march to show how wide a *détour* had to be made.

Saint-Cyr, always annoyed, if one may say so of such a patriotic soldier, from a scientific point of view when the enemy did not make the best of their advantages, does not understand why the Archduke did not follow up his success and crush the small force Soult and Jourdan could oppose to him. 'When a General believes he has gained a victory, he ought to profit by it', and Saint-Cyr balks at the statement that, 'satisfied with having gained the victory, the Prince did not wish to advance in the plain'. Then he goes on to point out the delaying effect, not so much of the 8th Regiment, which was soon beaten off, as of Vandamme. Still, Vandamme only had one regiment, and when one thinks of the overpowering force the Prince had, it seems strange that such a small body should have halted the greater part of an army. This was not the way in which Bona-

¹ Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, 121. He himself does not say so.

² Saint-Cyr in Du Casse, *Vandamme*, i. 449. No direction is stated.

³ Near Sigmaringen.

parte won battles in Italy. It is only fair, in considering the claims of Jourdan to a victory, to remember this halt—say, this check—of the Archduke's. One is tempted to refer it to the lethargy which used to fall on the Archduke after some hours of exertion, and it will be seen that Wellington's description exactly suits the Prince's behaviour this day. 'We are none of us worthy to fasten the latchet of his shoes, if I am to judge from his books and his plans of campaign. But his mind, or his health, has, they tell me, a very peculiar defect. He is admirable for five or six hours, and whatever can be done in that time will be done perfectly; but after that he falls into a kind of epileptic stupor, does not know what he is about, has no opinion of his own, and does whatever the man at his elbow tells him.'¹ In 1805 we find Sir Arthur Paget, then our Minister at Vienna, reporting an intrigue for removing the Prince from the head of the War Department, an intrigue founded on 'the weak and uncertain state of health of the Archduke Charles, which at times obliged His Royal Highness to absent himself altogether from affairs, and, generally speaking, rendered him unfit to move under the load of business to be transacted in his Department'.² It might be thought that the Prince's staff would have taken the responsibility of completing the success; but we know that the disaster to the English force at Tourcoing in April 1794 was due to his staff not venturing to awaken him after one of these attacks, and not acting themselves on the orders which would have saved the Duke of York from the peril into which he was being thrust.³

Jourdan, with 26,164 infantry, 7,010 cavalry, and 1,649 artillery, making a total of 34,823 men, with 62 guns, had fought the Archduke, who had 53,870 infantry, 14,900 cavalry, and 3,565 artillery, making a total of 72,335 men, with 114 guns. The total loss of the French, killed, wounded, and prisoners, was 3,654 officers and men. The heaviest loss, of course, fell on the *avant-garde*, which had 1,983 casualties. Saint-Cyr and Vandamme lost 630, of whom 416 were prisoners, most of these, probably, being from the regiment sent on the Archduke's rear. Ferino and Ruby lost 476, Souham 453, and d'Hautpoul's reserve cavalry 112. The Austrian loss was 5,921, of whom

¹ Croker, i. 338; Phipps, ii, iv, for the Archduke in other campaigns.

² Paget Papers, ii. 164.

³ Phipps, i. 298-9.

2,953 were prisoners, presumably taken in the first attack by Soult and Saint-Cyr.

In his account of the campaign Jourdan took the simple course of claiming a victory, saying: 'Such is the result of this battle, which, whatever may be said to the contrary by my base detractors, was in reality gained by the French army.' He was not quite so certain on the evening of the fight, but even then he told Saint-Cyr to fall back to Neuhausen, 'if the enemy make their retreat to Pfullendorf'. If they remained at Stockach, Saint-Cyr was to fall back by the left of the Danube for Rottweil, as we have seen that General do though he did not know of this order. It is strange that Jourdan had then not heard anything all day from Souham and Ferino, and did not know what had become of them. Still he did remain all the next day on his ground, unpressed by the enemy. Of course, really he had been definitely checked. He ought not to have expected a great success, but he had done wonderfully well with an army half the size of that of the Archduke, whom he had kept fully employed. His own mistake about Saint-Cyr had destroyed the effect of his first success: Bonaparte at Marengo recalled Desaix, whilst Jourdan had persisted in pushing out Saint-Cyr. Still, had his cavalry been well led he would have retired with but little loss, leaving the cheek of the Archduke tingling. Jourdan asserted that with 10,000 more men he would have beaten the enemy decisively. Suchet too, after discussing Ostrach with the wounded Lefebvre, says: 'Ten thousand soldiers more, and it was all up with Xerxes Charles.' This certainly seems true, but it points to Jourdan having always in his mind not his real but his phantom army. In 1796 Lefebvre's division was 12,549 strong, of whom 10,305 were infantry. In this campaign Lefebvre was only 8,953 strong, of whom 6,292 were infantry. It appears as if the *avant-garde*, if it had had the same strength as in 1796, would have been able to resist until Saint-Cyr's turning movement told. This, however, is not the slightest excuse for letting success depend on such a small force as the *avant-garde* was in reality. Also Saint-Cyr's turning force, his division and Vandamme's *flanqueurs*, which I make together 8,177, seems large compared with the *avant-garde*, which had to bear the main stress.¹

¹ Vandamme had two regiments, the 1st Light, taken from Saint-Cyr, and

Saint-Cyr was sometimes considered as not a good comrade, and not careful to support other divisions.¹ Here the future Restoration Marshal Drouet, then Chief of the Staff to the *avant-garde*, writes: 'I have always thought that if the division of General Saint-Cyr had arrived in time on the enemy's rear, as it had received orders to do, Prince Charles would have been thrown back into Germany, although he had much superior numbers.'² Now no one felt more than Saint-Cyr did that he ought to have been attacking the Prince at Liptingen, but his orders were to go on much farther east, towards Messkirch; and though apparently on hearing the sound of the engagement he would have marched to the cannon, we know, not merely by his own statement but also by that of Jourdan, that during the fight Jourdan sent repeated orders to him to hasten his march on Messkirch, whence he was to detach troops on the rear of the Prince. That this did not mean any *immediate* action by Saint-Cyr's main force is proved by the order to detach first a regiment, then Vandamme's *flanqueurs*, on the enemy's rear. One wonders what would have been the effect had Saint-Cyr's whole division been thrown on the Prince at the time when the one regiment was detached. Either the Prince or Saint-Cyr must have been crushed, and it seems likely that it was the Prince who would have suffered. Anyhow, here Saint-Cyr was blameless.

The whole of the day after the battle, the 26th March 1799, whilst Saint-Cyr was making his solitary march, the rest of the army remained in its position; Soult had been urgent to be permitted to hold his ground in order to cover whatever movement Saint-Cyr might be making, Jourdan only hearing this day from that General. The enemy demonstrated before the *avant-garde*, but Soult had formed all his artillery into one battery, and its reception of the first advance of the Austrians was so warm that it sufficed to send them back to their camp. Then on the 27th March³ Jourdan drew back across the Danube

the 8th Regiment, taken from d'Hautpoul (Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 108), so I add the strength of the 8th Regiment to that of Saint-Cyr to get the total strength of the turning party. Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 92-3.

¹ Phipps, ii. 66-9, for Saint-Cyr's character.

² Drouet, *Vie militaire*, 10.

³ Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 47, gives rightly 7^{me} Germinal, which was the 27th March. See Jourdan, *Mémoires*, i. 202.

for the Black Mountains, where, Saint-Cyr having rejoined, by the 28th March the army was in much the same positions which it had occupied on the 8th March. The enemy followed in small force. Mortier, who covered the retreat, crossed the Danube at Tuttlingen, burning the bridge there and then taking post to shield the rest of the *avant-garde*, which was making for Rottweil. A regiment of Austrian Dragoons pursued him, and coming on the remains of the bridge at Tuttlingen, with the aid of the inhabitants they repaired it, and, crossing at 11 a.m. on the 27th, they galloped to their left to cut off the last parties of the French. Mortier was watching, and, sending his infantry to guard a bridge over a torrent at Wurmlingen, he launched a Hussar regiment on the flank of the Dragoons, who broke and fled over the bridge at Tuttlingen, this lesson completely checking any ardour in the pursuit. Jourdan, to Saint-Cyr's regret, soon drew farther back into the hills, and Saint-Cyr, on the left, went to Freudenstadt, well known to him from former campaigns. Vandamme, to the south, was defending the pass leading to Schiltach, which linked Saint-Cyr with Soult at Benz-Ebene, in rear of Krummenschiltach. Souham had his left with Soult's *avant-garde*, and his right was at Triberg, covering the roads to Hornberg, where Jourdan had his head-quarters, and to Elzach. Ferino, on the right, took post at Neustadt. The reserve cavalry were sent back to Offenburg, in the Rhine valley, as there was no forage in the mountains. Thus Ferino covered the Val d'Enfer or the Höllenthal; Souham, Soult, and Vandamme covered the Kinzig valley; and Saint-Cyr the road from Freudenstadt to Oberkirch, Kehl, and Strasbourg. Jourdan meant to stand here, and the Generals were ordered to strengthen their positions by breaking the bridges in their front and by making cuttings and *abatis*. Ruby's brigade of the Armée d'Helvétie had been sent back to its own army in Switzerland.

Jourdan has been much blamed for the direction given to his retreat—to the base of the mountains of the Black Forest—the Archduke declaring that he should have fallen back on Switzerland and taken up a position behind the Rhine, between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, thus maintaining his communication with Masséna and the Armée d'Helvétie. Saint-Cyr undertakes his justification, pointing out that even then the Archduke acknowledges he could have shut him in. Saint-Cyr

urges that the army, once in Switzerland, would have been blockaded and destroyed by famine; and though Masséna did manage to exist there later, we shall find Lecourbe and him both assuming that a large army would starve if it remained in that country. Saint-Cyr considers that in drawing the Archduke towards the Black Forest, and away from Masséna, Jourdan manœuvred better than his adversary, who never took a decided part, except when Jourdan attacked him. Even the scattering of the divisions in the defiles of the Black Forest is defended by Saint-Cyr as inevitable, and only dangerous on account of the relative weakness of the army, this argument being rather in the style of Jourdan. It is true that Saint-Cyr did not approve of Jourdan withdrawing so far. He considered that it would have been better to have prepared another battle of Stockach, not attempting so much but only falling with part of his troops on one wing of the Austrians, whilst the rest of the army remained on the defensive in a good position. This would best have been carried out with the army on the left of the Neckar and near the sources of the Danube, the position it had originally occupied. When Jourdan drew back so far and sent his cavalry to the rear, he seemed to commit himself to a purely defensive war, and this sort of war Saint-Cyr considered more difficult, and less suited to the French, than the sort of quick, single stroke, the thrust of the rapier, so dear to him. Still, even allowing for the extraordinary courage and tenacity of the troops of the *avant-garde*, the way in which Jourdan struck at the superior army, and carried off his small force unmaimed, would go far to show that he was a much better General, and the Archduke a much worse one, than is usually supposed.

Bernadotte's share in this campaign—if it can be called a share—had been abortive, for he had entirely failed to cover Jourdan's left. Still Jourdan entirely exonerates Bernadotte from any blame, saying he 'did all he could to support me, but what succour could he afford?' And he goes on to specify what Bernadotte did on the Rhine, and how he begged for the reinforcements which would have enabled him to act. Sault, who obviously did not know the whole situation, represents Bernadotte as refusing to draw near Jourdan although earnestly pressed by that commander to do so. Having only a weak Austrian corps before him, could he not have avoided it, or, at

the worst, have recrossed the Rhine and then, coming up the left bank, crossed again and joined the Armée du Danube? Soult acknowledges that Bernadotte's course was determined by orders from the Minister, but he does not understand that Bernadotte, like Jourdan, had been making war on credit. Both commanders' plans really were based on the hope that the promised reinforcements would arrive at any moment, and certainly Bernadotte could not have withdrawn from his allotted field without instructions. As it was, Bernadotte actually only had 8,000 men available after supplying the garrisons, and his force was but what Saint-Cyr calls it, 'une espèce de corps de flanqueurs', placed outside the theatre of military operations. The best and the complete defence of Bernadotte is to be found in the letter of the 22nd March 1799 in which the Minister urges Jourdan to attack, 'notwithstanding the non-existence of the army of Observation'. One reason why the existence of Bernadotte's army had been no real support to Jourdan was not merely that he was so weak, but that his weakness was known to the enemy. Sir Arthur Paget reports to Lord Grenville that when he saw the Archduke Charles at Munich early in March, the Prince 'was in very good spirits. He said that he felt himself a full match for the French if Bernadotte were not reinforced, which he was fearful of.' This was said by the Prince on his way to meet Jourdan and the Armée du Danube. When he advanced to cross the Lech on the 3rd March, believing Bernadotte stronger than he actually was, he formed a corps of 11,000 infantry and 3,500 horse, under Sztaray, to move from Neumarkt by Nuremberg, on the Regnitz, to prevent any advance of the Armée d'Observation on Würzburg or Bamberg; but hearing that Bernadotte clung to the Rhine he recalled Sztaray from Neumarkt and sent him to guard Ulm, whilst his light cavalry watched the valley of the Neckar. Later, after the battle of Ostrach, one plan considered by the Archduke but not adopted was to throw back Jourdan on Strasbourg and then to march rapidly down the Rhine on Mannheim, with 40,000 Austrians and 25,000 militia from the Rhine provinces. It was news that Bernadotte was not advancing that made the Prince adopt the plan of throwing Jourdan back and then advancing on Masséna. It was not the way in which the army had been used but the fact that it had been formed at all that was the

mistake: this was Jourdan's fault, though he saw too late that it should not have had a separate Commander-in-Chief.

Jourdan now took a most unfortunate step. On the 2nd April the movements of the enemy made him expect an attack on the 3rd, and he warned his Generals to be on their guard. That night he was seized with the same complaint which before had forced him to leave other commands for a few days.¹ He waited till the morning of the 3rd April, and when the reports showed all was quiet he started from Hornberg at 7.30 a.m.² for Strasbourg, leaving the command, for the few days he intended to be absent, to his Chief of the Staff, Ernouf.

Jourdan had known Ernouf³ since the advance on Dunkirk, before Hondschoote, in August 1793, and had used him as his Chief of the Staff with the Armée du Nord at Wattignies, and then with the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'. Ernouf was junior to Ferino and to Souham,⁴ so there must have been some special reason for his appointment. It is said that the Generals at the head of divisions were quarrelling, Saint-Cyr, Vandamme, and Soult reproaching Ferino and Souham with letting themselves be held in check during the battle of Stockach by a small force of Austrians. Souham, disgusted with the state of his division, had obtained leave for ten days on the 2nd April, pleading illness. The moment must have seemed a critical one, something like the end of the 1796 campaign, when the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' had been driven back on the Lahn. Either the Archduke would make a determined attack on the army, to force it right back on the Rhine, or else, leaving a mere *corps d'observation*, he would throw himself on Masséna in Switzerland just as in 1796 he had turned on Moreau, in which case Jourdan should have advanced to recall him and to save Masséna. Yet, just at this moment, the Commander-in-Chief and one of the Generals of Division went off ill, whilst the cavalry leader, d'Hautpoul, with his Chief of the Staff Ormancey, were sent to the rear by

¹ Phipps, ii. 309. It was colic.

² Jourdan, *Mémoires*, 204-5; Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, 129. Pajol, ii. 67, says Jourdan left at 10 a.m.; Percy, *Journal*, 38.

³ Général-Baron Jean-Augustin Ernouf (1753-1827). See Phipps, i. 217; ii. 340, 386; *Fastes*, v. 282-3.

⁴ All three were promoted General of Division in 1793: Ferino 23rd August, Souham 13th September, and Ernouf 13th December. *Fastes*, iii. 213 and 560; v. 282.

Jourdan to be tried for their conduct at Stockach. All one can say is that Jourdan took a different view of Ernouf from that of most of his officers, and believed that his own absence would be but momentary. Worn and ill, he did not know how he was damaging his own prestige. No choice could have been worse, and as soon as the appointment was announced a groan went up from the army, where, especially amongst the officers who had served with Ernouf in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', the belief existed that on the approach of the first patrol of the enemy the new commander would order a retreat to the Rhine. That evening Ernouf showed the truth of this belief.

A few hours after Jourdan's departure on the 3rd April, to follow the account of Decaen, one column of the enemy, covered by a thick mist, advanced from Villingen by St. Georgen on Triberg, whilst another body, moving by the crest of the hills, slipped unobserved between Furtwangen and Triberg and also came down on Triberg. Decaen was there with a small force, and being unable to hold the place, which was in a hollow, he fell back and prepared to collect a force at Hornberg, to the north, in order to come down and retake Triberg. He had no news from Furtwangen, the orderly sent from there by Pajol having been captured, so he assumed that post had retired. He does not seem to have attached much importance to the loss of Triberg, and oddly enough no report seems to have been made to the head-quarters of the army at Hornberg, where nothing was known of it till a staff officer sent there returned, probably about 3 p.m., with news that it was occupied by the enemy. About 5.30 p.m. Decaen arrived at Hornberg to report to Jourdan, but he found Ernouf in command. Ernouf declared that Triberg must be retaken, to which Decaen agreed, adding sensibly enough that the important point was the plateau of Benz-Ebene. Decaen then went off to prepare for the attack on Triberg. The troops for this were that evening close to the place and passed the night there. On the morning of the 4th April came orders from Ernouf to retire.

There are minor points, not much affecting the result but showing that there was some carelessness in the arrangements of the army, especially in the 2nd division. On the 2nd April Souham, its commander, was given ten days' leave, as we have seen, to recover from the injuries received by his fall on the

25th March, the command in his absence being given to Decaen (a thing Jourdan forgot, sending instructions to Souham that day). Then, on the same day the senior General of Brigade, Goullus, who knew the ground held by the division, was also given leave for sixty days, no reason being stated. He was replaced by another General, Desenfans,¹ who of course came as a stranger to all the dispositions of the troops. Then it may have been right, but it certainly was unfortunate, that just before the attack on the 2nd division Jourdan should have moved one of Soult's regiments from the important plateau of Benz-Ebene to Schiltach, much farther north, leaving Benz-Ebene to be guarded by the 2nd division alone. Benz-Ebene, not Triberg, was the important point, as we have seen Decaen point out to Ernouf. Other faults are pointed out by Decaen, who perhaps was too severe a critic.² Ernouf's report naturally was very different. Having to justify himself for a most pusillanimous retreat, he preferred to represent himself as the saviour of the army. According to him Decaen, arriving late, had declared that the enemy seemed to have come in a balloon, which does sound something like Decaen, and then, urged to retake Triberg, had represented his troops as unwilling to fight, which seems incredible. The weak point with Ernouf is that, having ordered an attack on Triberg, he went off without waiting to know the result. As Comte Pajol says, 'If the enemy were very numerous they could move on Elzach.' But that was the very point to be ascertained. Decaen's division had been not so much turned on its right as simply penetrated by a small force of the enemy: for instance, Pajol, forgotten at Furtwangen, held his post till next day and then cut himself clear. Such penetration might happen at any moment when Decaen's division, some 4,500 strong, had to hold a line of five leagues. Was the army to bolt the moment its long line was pierced at any point, without attempting to ascertain whether the enemy within the lines was in force or not? Ernouf destroys his own case when he acknowledges that after telling Decaen at 6 p.m. to retake Triberg, he wrote that night³ to tell him that, 'The enemy having forced your right, and after seeing

¹ Murat had served in his brigade with the Armée du Nord. Phipps, i.

² Decaen, i. 226, 235, 242, 246-8.

³ Decaen received the letter at 11.30 p.m. Decaen, i. 253.

your report, I have decided that the retreat of the army is necessary'.

Decaen seems to have been a man of strong opinions, apt to criticize and not over-careful as to his utterances. He had taken a dislike to Soult—'This ambitious man, who knows well how to make adulation and intrigue tell'—and already he had offended Jourdan, who on the 27th March wrote to him that he had been informed that Decaen had strongly criticized his orders and had used improper terms to describe his staff, no doubt referring to Ernouf. Decaen also was reported often to have said he would resign if he thought that things would remain as they were, and to have shown little confidence in Jourdan's military talents. On this, Jourdan, weakly enough, wrote that, instead of such disloyal conduct, Decaen ought to have had the frankness to offer his resignation and go to Paris to prove to the Government that they were wrong in confiding in him, Jourdan. He declared that if he believed Decaen had spoken in such a manner, he would not hesitate to send him to the Directory. As he wanted only to have in his army men who trusted him, and who would otherwise leave his command, he expected that evening a frank explanation. Decaen, accompanied by the commander of his division, Souham, saw Jourdan that evening, when, according to his own account, he only acknowledged that he had complained of Jourdan's staff, and refused to resign, leaving under the impression that Jourdan was satisfied. The day before, however, Jourdan had written to the Minister that he had asked the Directory to send Decaen to another army. This certainly shows much weakness on the part of Jourdan. The weak point of Decaen's case was that General Daultanne and Ernouf's A.D.C. Lefebvre supported Ernouf's statement that Decaen had said his troops would not fight; but then they admit that Decaen was ready to attack next morning, the only really important thing. The strong point for Decaen is that Ernouf did not resolve to retreat on receiving his report, as he rather implies:¹ it was only after receiving a dispatch from Soult, informing him that the movement of the enemy showed that the *avant-garde* would be attacked next day, that he went off. Also he wrote to Decaen when the retreat was ordered: 'Enfin, je me confie en vous, persuadé que vous

¹ See *ante*, p. 57, for exact words.

prendrez toutes les mesures de précaution pour assurer votre retraite, qui se fera sur Offenbourg.' It was a curious thing to put any trust in a General if he had just refused to fight and had announced the unwillingness of his troops to do so. Soult treats the whole withdrawal as necessary because Decaen's division, turned on its right, had retreated, obliging the army to follow its movement. Now Decaen had not retreated: indeed, when the army did retire, Decaen covered the retreat of Soult, grumbling that it was customary for the *avant-garde* to do such work.

Decaen is the only man I know of to make an attack on the personal character of Jourdan, whom he describes as dressing in the uniform of an A.D.C. a 'catin', a 'maussade créature', so that she might be always with him; in the contemplation of whose charms he passed several days at Donaueschingen and whom he took back with him to Strasbourg, conduct with which, Decaen declares, the army was dissatisfied, as not being that of a father of a family, a legislator, and a Commander-in-Chief. The halt Decaen places at Donaueschingen was, I presume, that from the 8th to the 11th March, which Saint-Cyr, who puts the army head-quarters at Villingen, some eight miles north of Donaueschingen, quite approved of. As we have seen, Suchet, who joined head-quarters on the 23rd March, describes Jourdan as 'always with the advanced-guard and having hardly ever any fixed post', so that for several days he could not even speak to him. There seem to have been few men in these campaigns of whom Decaen thought well; but, even if he be right about Jourdan, such things seem not to have shocked the armies at this time, although in the days of the Empire Masséna disgusted the new generation by bringing a mistress to the army of Portugal.

The end of the matter so far as Decaen was concerned was that, having gone with his brigade in Vandamme's division to Switzerland, on the 9th May 1799 he was called to Zürich, where the Commander-in-Chief, Masséna, informed him that the Directory had ordered his trial by a court martial, the same course being ordered for d'Hautpoul for his conduct at Stockach. It is to be noted that Masséna seems to have assumed Decaen's innocence, for after this announcement he asked him to dinner and in parting with him he expressed his interest, and the

pleasure with which he would see him return under his orders, whilst Vandamme regretted his loss. He was sent to Strasbourg, where Bernadotte, now Minister of War, communicated to him and to d'Hautpoul an order of the Directory of the 7th July, saying that as the Generals required to form the courts martial for their trial could not leave their divisions, and as the explanations given by the two Generals altered the nature of the deeds attributed to them, no courts martial were to be held, but they were to go to Paris to lay their defence before the Minister. On the 9th August Bernadotte informed Decaen that the order for his trial was cancelled and that he was replaced on the active list. (He wished to return to the Armée du Danube, but Bernadotte sent him to the Armée du Rhin as knowing the ground it worked over.) D'Hautpoul was treated in the same manner and afterwards served with distinction, falling at the head of a Cuirassier division at Eylau. We may note that Oudinot wrote to congratulate Decaen on his freedom from this 'inculpation bizarre'. Thus we may take Decaen as fully acquitted.

As for the army, it now made for the Rhine valley as hard as it could march, Ernouf urging on Saint-Cyr by repeated messages. Although really hardly touched by the enemy, the retreat was made so precipitately that the wings might have been compromised had the Archduke seriously pursued. When Ernouf saw the spires of Strasbourg he seemed to take heart a little, and he asked for Saint-Cyr's advice as to remaining on the right bank of the Rhine. Still he did not feel himself safe and he transported the divisions of Ferino and Vandamme (late Souham) over to the left bank to Bâle and Huningue, to form the right under Ferino. The divisions of Soult and Saint-Cyr, forming the centre under Saint-Cyr, were in front of Kehl, while 7,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry from the late Armée d'Observation, now absorbed in this force, were at Mannheim and formed the left, continuing as such when 'Danube A' became 'Danube B'. Apparently this left wing was composed of the divisions of Delaborde and Dufour,¹ 6,520 infantry and 2,932 cavalry with fifteen guns. On the 14th April these were

¹ Général-Comte Henri-François Delaborde, or De La Borde (1764-1833). He commanded the Emperor's Guard; Phipps, iii; *Fastes*, iii. 164-5. Général Dufour had had a division in the 'Rhin-et-Moselle'; Phipps, ii.

reinforced from Belgium and Holland by 3,500 infantry and 548 horse. It would be interesting to know why these troops were kept back till the campaign was ended.

There had been some curious changes during the retreat. Souham's division, at first led by Decaen, had been put under the superior command of Sault, who also had the *avant-garde*. Then on the 5th April the division was put under Vandamme, with his *corps de flanqueurs* added. Souham, however, was now ready to resume his command, but Jourdan, who was at Strasbourg, on the 6th April informed him that he could not withdraw from Vandamme the command given him in such circumstances; but that when the two divisions of the left wing of the army (the late Armée d'Observation, I presume) were formed, he would employ Souham in his proper rank. Considering that we have seen Souham as one of the leading Generals of the 'Nord' in 1793-4, when Vandamme was only a General of Brigade, this seems strange.

I have gone into details of what may seem a petty incident, in the last days of the campaign, but in reality this retreat of Ernouf's affected all Jourdan's subsequent career. Had the army retained its position, holding the Archduke in front of it, the campaign could not have been described as an utter failure. As it was, the Archduke, considering 'Danube' as out of action, merely left a *corps d'observation* of 18 battalions and 64 squadrons under Sztaray before it, and prepared to throw the mass of his army on the Armée d'Helvétie. He would have overpowered Masséna, but his Government refused to sanction such a step until Russian reinforcements had come up, and then he himself, partly from annoyance, fell ill, which delayed operations. In Paris the retreat was considered inexcusable. Jourdan was judged as if he had led an army of the same strength as in 1796.

An army is too often considered as a fixed quantity by the multitude, and the Directory and the public thought only of the enormous strength on paper of the armies on the frontier. Jourdan lost all his former prestige: no longer the Jourdan of Wattignies and Fleurus, Stockach only was remembered. Sarcasms were hurled at him, and a caricature represented him as mounted on a crab, with an inscription borrowed from the 114th Psalm, 'Vidit et fugit, Jordanis conversus est retrorsum', 'The sea saw that and fled, Jordan was driven back.' Having left

Hornberg for Strasbourg on the morning of the 3rd April, on his way Jourdan met the courier bringing the authority for his going to Paris, and giving his command temporarily to Masséna, who was to hold it with that of his own Armée d'Helvétie. Reaching Strasbourg at 2 p.m. that day, Jourdan went to bed, giving directions that as he was ill and suffering he could see no one; but his rest was broken into by the news of Ernouf's retreat, of the necessity for which he gives no opinion. On the 8th April Masséna arrived from Switzerland at Strasbourg, and next day Jourdan was sufficiently recovered to leave for Paris, which he reached on the 14th April, learning next day that the permanent command of the Armée du Danube had been transferred from him to Masséna. On the 26th April he was appointed Inspector-General of the Armée d'Italie. If this appointment were seriously made it was a very strange one, for about November 1798 his former colleague, Moreau, not employed since Fructidor, had gone to Italy to fill this post, so very inferior to the commands he had held, and just now, on the 4th April 1799, the Directory had authorized Schérer, commanding in Italy, to employ Moreau in his proper rank, say, wing commander at least. It would have been too absurd for Jourdan, not disgraced as Moreau was, to have been his successor; and, anyhow, on the 27th April Moreau became the commander of 'Italie', and Jourdan could not have served under him. Jourdan retook his seat in the Council of the *Cinq-Cents*, full of anger against the Directory. We shall find him in Paris just before Brumaire.

When the new commander, Masséna, at first only appointed temporarily, reached 'Danube' from Switzerland, it had been strengthened by some reinforcements, besides the 7,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry which Jourdan had ordered up from the late Armée d'Observation, so that, including 9,308 troops in the 5th Military Division,¹ it was now 56,588 strong. The panic-stricken retreat made by Ernouf, coming after the hardships and trials of the campaign, had demoralized the army, and most of the leading Generals had left their posts. Masséna told the Minister on the 18th April that only Ferino, Souham, Vandamme, and Klein,² remained of the Generals of Division who were there

¹ The Departments of Haut- and Bas-Rhin.

² He served in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' in 1796-7, where he was a friend of Championnet.

before he arrived, and many of the other Generals had left their posts, some going he did not know where. Lefebvre, wounded, had left after Ostrach; Jourdan had gone to Paris; Saint-Cyr on the 9th April had handed over the command of the two centre divisions to Soult, then only a General of Brigade, and had gone to Strasbourg to look after his health. Unwilling to serve under Masséna, whom he had relieved at Rome in 1798 under unpleasant circumstances, he passed to Italy, where we shall find him. D'Hautpoul, the cavalry commander, and Decaen, were under arrest. Two Generals of Brigade, Goullus, and Hardy,¹ who after his expedition to Ireland in 1798 had joined during the march to the Danube but had always been too ill to serve, had disappeared. Bernadotte, finding his own Armée d'Observation dissolved and himself attached to 'Danube', had declared himself ill and gone off. He could have had no kindly feelings towards Masséna, whose troops had quarrelled with his division in Italy,² and he was too ambitious to serve except as a Commander-in-Chief; so on the 9th April 1799 he wrote to Masséna from Mannheim, saying that an attack of spitting of blood occasioned by the weakness of his chest determined him to make use of the permission given by Jourdan to take some rest. As soon as he were a little better he would be eager to rejoin his post: 'I shall come to perish gloriously with my brothers in arms or to conquer with them the enemies of the Republic.' He gave Colaud the command of the remnant of his army, now to be the left wing of 'Danube B', and to Chérin the command of the four united Departments. In reality he was disgusted, with good reason, with the way in which he had been deprived of reinforcements, and Delaborde, writing to Ney a few days before, said that Bernadotte, full of certain annoyances, had for some time asked to be replaced in his command. Then, following the example of Jourdan, he left Mannheim on the 10th April, and, after staying at Simmern, in the Hunsrück, he went to Paris in the middle of May 1799, ready to join in the attack on the Directory. He may have hoped for the command on the Rhine if Masséna failed; certainly

¹ Général Jean Hardy de Perini (1762-1802). See Desbrière, *Projets et tentatives de débarquement aux Îles Britanniques*, ii. 69-82, 159-71; *Corr. intime du Général Jean Hardy*, 52-106. See *ante*, pp. 10, 11, 16.

² See Phipps, iv. 185; Barras, iii. 325.

he never tried to rejoin his comrades, except perhaps to replace Masséna.

Masséna was horrified at the state in which he found the Armée du Danube. 'The troops have retired in the greatest disorder, and have lost that spirit of obedience and that confidence in their officers which makes their strength.'¹ It was the disunion amongst the officers and their mutual accusations which disgusted him especially. So many Generals had gone off, even ahead of the retiring army, that the commanders of regiments had followed their example. It is amusing to find General Colaud, lately belonging to the Armée d'Observation and a regular 'frondeur', writing to Ernouf that 'Il est ridicule et même indécent', for Masséna, to whom he had never done any harm, to put him in command of the line from Huningue to Düsseldorf, though Masséna got him into the collar by threat of dismissal. 'What a difference', wrote Masséna 'between this army and that of Helvétie, where every one, devoted to his duties, fulfils them with zeal and affection, and where feelings of esteem and confidence unite all the Generals.' No doubt he had forgotten the unpleasantness between Lecourbe and Dessoles.²

Although it was not till May that Masséna was made permanent commander of the Armée du Danube and was permitted to amalgamate it with his Armée d'Helvétie, still on the 10th April he had begun moving the troops of 'Danube A' up the Rhine. The pressing danger was that the Archduke, having paralysed the Armée du Danube, might throw the mass of his troops on the Armée d'Helvétie, an obvious step, which he would have taken had not his Government stopped him, as we have seen. Of future Marshals in this Armée du Danube, Jourdan, Lefebvre, and Saint-Cyr having gone, there were only left to Masséna, besides himself, three Generals of Brigade, Soult, who was to be promoted General of Division on the 21st April 1799, Mortier, and Suchet, the latter at last taking his place in the ranks after having followed the army for some time. All these, except, I think, Mortier, were sent up to Switzerland, as were the Generals of Division Ferino, Souham, and Vandamme. One wise thing Masséna did: telling Ernouf how his colleagues would regret him, he dropped him from his post as Chief of the Staff

¹ Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, 134.

² See pp. 78, 83.

when the armies were amalgamated, and Chérin¹ was appointed to the post from his command of the United Departments on the Rhine. On the 13th April Masséna himself left Strasbourg for Switzerland.

This campaign, short as it was, had a very marked effect on the fortunes of several of the future Marshals. Jourdan, however undeservedly, lost all his former prestige. The stout old Lefebvre was prevented by his wound from appearing in the field during the rest of the year: indeed he did not do so again till 1806. On the other hand, the chance of his being in Paris brought him the command there, and gave him the good fortune of rendering services at Brumaire that Napoleon never forgot. I imagine that Saint-Cyr here lost the chance of his life. Had he, not Ernouf, received the command when Jourdan first left the army, he would have delighted in holding ground he knew so well against an adversary also well known to him. If he could have kept the Archduke in play, he, and not Masséna, might have been the hero of the rest of the year on this frontier. It will have been seen that Mortier had proved himself a capable and brave leader of a brigade. It was Soult, however, who had made the most advance. The chance given him by the departure of Lefebvre found him well fitted for the post of commander of the most important division in the army. We shall find Masséna, who could have known nothing of him before, at once selecting him to command a division, even before he had the proper rank,² and then soon using him as a wing commander. This is the time when Soult steps to the front rank.

As for Ney, the only future Marshal to have served in 'Observation', save Bernadotte, on the 28th March 1799 the Directory had promoted him to be General of Division in reward for the capture of Mannheim. We have already seen Mortier refuse the rank of General of Brigade in 1797,³ and the dislike of high command, so general in the first years of the Revolution, had not yet passed away. Ney sent back the commission, saying that no doubt the Directory had only consulted

¹ Général Louis-Nicholas-Hyacinthe Chérin (1762-99). He had been Chief of the Staff to Hoche in La Vendée and took part in the *coup d'état* of Fructidor. Phipps, iii. 46, 55-9; iv.

² Soult was promoted General of Division on the 21st April 1799. On the 11th April Masséna had called him to Bâle to command a division.

³ Phipps, ii. 436.

the favourable reports of him they had seen ; he would have submitted to their decision had his talents been equal to the goodwill of the Government. He hoped his refusal would be taken as a full proof of his 'civisme désintéressé'. It is curious to compare this with the ardour with which in later years Ney and others sought high rank and rebelled at any control over them. The Minister on the 4th May wrote that the Directory only saw in his modesty a fresh title to reward ; and Bernadotte, whom he had consulted, also wrote, assuring him that he was attached to him 'par les liens de la plus vive amitié et de la plus parfaite estime', and advising him not to indispose the Directory by refusing this rank. Describing how to lead French armies—it was necessary to have burning souls, hearts inaccessible to fear as to seduction, and, finally, a noble ambition—Bernadotte went on, 'Who is better endowed than you with these virtues and these qualities?' Ney ended by accepting his new rank. Meantime, on the 12th April, he had been ordered to Strasbourg to join Masséna.

IV

FIRST OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND

(January 1798 to April 1799)

Invasion of Switzerland by Brune. Plundering and policy of the French. Masséna in command. Operations in Grisons and Engadine.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See Chapters I, II, III.

I MUST now go back to give the history of the Armée d'Helvétie, which under Masséna had been acting on the right flank of 'Danube A'. This we may take in two different phases—first when, under Brune, it invaded and took possession of Switzerland during 1798, and second when, under Masséna, it professed to defend Switzerland against the Austrians, really using that country in the interests of France. In 1798 the only future Marshal serving with 'Helvétie' was Brune, who went on to command in Italy; Masséna and Oudinot did join before the end of 1798, but no fighting occurred then and we may take them as only concerned in the severe campaign of 1799. I shall therefore deal very briefly with this first phase of the Armée d'Helvétie.

The Directory had a mania for révolutionizing every State on which they could lay hands. The provinces conquered in Italy had become republics after the French style, as had Holland and Genoa, and even the venerable Swiss Confederation was not sufficiently republican for the Directory. Reasons for a strong State interfering with a smaller one are never wanting: the Pays de Vaud and other portions of Switzerland were treated by the Confederation as subject lands, and nothing was plainer than the duty of the French to see such injustice rectified. Such reasons could be proclaimed loudly, but the Directory did not mention others. Its treasury required refilling, and this want became the more urgent when money was required for the projected expedition to Egypt. Millions lay in the treasury of Berne, and this money was the real objective of the Directory. Larévellière-Lépeaux gives a long denial of this, but his arguments are not convincing. The argument that Berne might

have sent its treasure away two months before the French arrived assumes that the Senate ought to have foreseen this robbery on the part of a Power which professed to be friendly: 'Ils devaient connaître cette loi de la guerre, qui rend le vainqueur maître de toutes les propriétés publiques; pourquoi l'ont-ils oubliée?' The fact was that the French kept their warlike intentions secret to the last.

Some of the territory claimed by Switzerland had been seized by Saint-Cyr with troops of the Armée d'Allemagne in December 1797.¹ Now, Brune was chosen to carry out the invasion of Switzerland. On the 11th January 1798 he had been nominated special ambassador to Naples, but he preferred this command. Masséna's late division with the Armée d'Italie, now given to Brune, started from Italy on the 1st January 1798, Brune himself apparently going to Paris to receive instructions, and Menard leading the division.² At Geneva, on their way, Colonel Suchet, commanding the 18th Regiment, made his men take the oath of hatred to Royalty, a ceremony fallen into disuse which was now much disapproved of by his officers, who remembered the incident later under the Restoration. Suchet himself was soon promoted General of Brigade, but he obtained special permission to remain with his regiment, which, however, he soon quitted to become Chief of the Staff to Brune. The 18th Regiment, so one of its officers said, 'had been poor when we entered Italy: we came away well clothed and fully equipped'. During its Italian campaigns it had lost 22 officers and 755 men killed, 49 officers and 1,389 men wounded, and 17 officers and 277 men taken prisoner. So secret had the Directory kept their plan for the invasion of Switzerland that even the Minister of War, Schérer, did not know the real destination of the division. While Menard entered Switzerland from the south, Schauenbourg³ with a division of 15,000 men from Augereau's Armée du Rhin⁴ came

¹ I can find no reference to this in R. W. P.'s writing. Several battalions of this army occupied Münster and Saint-Imier on the 15th December 1797. Sciout, iii. 353-4.—E. A. S.

² Phipps, i, ii, iii, and iv, for Brune's previous career.

³ Général-Baron Balthazard-Alexis-Henri-Antoine Schauenbourg (1748-1831); Phipps, ii. 56, and his *Correspondance*. For one of his inspections see *Dellard*, 188-9. He had commanded the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' in 1793; Phipps, ii. 56.

⁴ This army did no fighting: it existed from December 1797 to January 1798. See *ante*, p. 7.

down from the north, both divisions making for Berne. The resistance of the Swiss had been delayed and weakened by the negotiations they had kept up with the Directory through Brune at Paverne,¹ each attempt at satisfying the Directory being met by increased demands. At last matters came to a head. On the 4th February 1798 Brune arrived at Lausanne, where Menard had halted; there he took command of both divisions, separated as they were, the whole having been decreed by the Directory on the 5th February to be the Armée d'Helvétie. Brune at once occupied Fribourg. Erlach, the Swiss commander, had taken post on the Saane River and his men fought well, throwing back Rampon's brigade: indeed, Brune described the fight as like that at Lodi (which he had not been at), while Pelleport, with his long experience in Italy, said the affair did honour to the Berne militia. To the north Schauenbourg with a stronger force made better way. He took Soleure on the Aar on the 2nd March and he entered Berne on the 4th March, a few hours before the arrival of Brune's advanced guard. Brune himself arrived next day and took active command of the whole body.

When the French entered Switzerland, Neckar, the former Minister of Louis XVI, was living at Coppet, near Geneva, which was then part of the French territory, and he, nominally an *émigré*, was officially not allowed to remain there; but he did not want to leave the place, nor the tomb of his wife. As the troops came in, his daughter, the future Madame de Staël, stood on the balcony of the house watching the march, and was alarmed when she saw an officer leave the column and come to the house carrying a letter. The officer was Suchet, and the letter was to assure Neckar of the protection of the Directory.² As the 18th Regiment passed by Coppet, Pelleport was of some small service to Neckar, who in return gave him Volney's *Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte*, saying: 'Lisez, cette lecture pourra vous être utile.' Hardly any one then dreamt of the expedition to Egypt, and the incident is curious.³

Brune professed to Bonaparte, then in Paris preparing for Egypt, that, 'It always seemed to me as if you saw me act

¹ Between the lake of Neuchâtel and Fribourg.

² Lady Blennerhasset, *Madame de Staël*, ii. 363-4; Larévellière-Lépeaux, ii. 203-4.

³ Pelleport, i. 103-4.

and command'. For some reason he seemed proud of having destroyed the Chapel at Morat, and he planted a Tree of Liberty on its ruins. Suchet, as representing the troops from Italy, and Ruby those from the Rhine, were sent to Paris with the colours taken by both divisions. On the 20th March they were presented to the Directory by the Minister of War, when Suchet spoke of the Berne Government as 'tyrans aveugles', and congratulated the Directory on having saved the country at Fructidor. Like Brune he also boasted of the destruction of the Morat monument, of the bones of the soldiers of Charles the Bold. He received from the Directory a pair of pistols, and about the 2nd April he left Paris with a letter from Bonaparte to Brune. He had seen Bonaparte and apparently had shown no wish to accompany his former commander to Egypt, perhaps resenting his slow promotion.¹ The division with which he had come from Italy soon left Switzerland, nominally for the Armée d'Angleterre but really for Egypt. At Toulon, when placing Boyer at the head of the 18th Regiment, Bonaparte was reminded that the position belonged to Suchet, but he replied: 'I saw Suchet at Paris; he considers himself well off where he is, and I do not think he will return to us.' Suchet either now became Chief of the Staff to Brune, or returned to that post.

Directly Berne was taken, on the 8th March Brune had been given the command in Italy, but the Directory instructed him to organize Switzerland before he left. His first duty was to seize the treasure in Berne. Part of this had been sent off, Brune, it is said, promising not to make a real pursuit if he were given 200,000 francs; but the roads were so covered with disbanded soldiers that the conductors of the convoy thought it wiser to return to Berne, Brune keeping his money. Nearly seven millions in cash was seized, besides more than three millions in ingots, and some four millions was obtained by selling title-deeds, which were sent to Paris but returned on payment. A very large sum was also raised by requisitions. Three millions was sent down the Rhône for Bonaparte and the Armée d'Angleterre, that is, really for the expedition to Egypt. On the 17th April Bonaparte was writing to Lannes at Lyons that this sum should arrive at Lyons on the 19th April, and must only stop there twelve hours to be checked, going on then for Toulon.

¹ Phipps, iv. 215-16.

Besides treasure, 293 guns, thirty-eight howitzers, and thirty-two mortars were seized, and sent to Huningue and Carouge.¹

No doubt Switzerland was thoroughly plundered, one of the principal agents being a relation of Brune's, Rapinat, who earned an evil reputation:

Un pauvre Suisse qu'on rapine
Voudrait bien qu'on décidât,
Si Rapinat vient de rapine,
Ou rapine de Rapinat.

Indeed there were jokes enough, it being said that Brune, Schauenbourg, and the Commissioners had taken possession of the treasure 'à la brune', i.e. in the dark. Still, it is only fair to remark that Hanet Cléry speaks well of Rapinat, and it is often hard to discriminate between the greed of the Directory and that of their agents. One is glad to know that though the people of Berne saw their treasure removed with outward indifference, they showed real despair when their famous bears were taken away. The troops had to be under arms and an escort had to watch the animals to the French frontier. This seizure of the jolly bears was a pure piece of foolish Republican brutality.² Larévellière-Lépeaux, then a Director, writing on this subject, calls Brune 'l'un des plus déterminés voleurs'. If Brune really plundered, at least he tried to prevent others doing so, and wrote to Bonaparte: 'I have observed you in your conduct in negotiating in Italy; I follow your work as best I can. Like you, I am surrounded by astute thieves, whose nails I cut as you did, and to whom I close the chests. They will complain, I am sure of it, but, as I write to Barras, I shall act so that the way in which things are done shall not be more important than what is to be done.'³ Unlike Augereau, he had no wish to break away from the ascendancy of Bonaparte: 'Call me near you. A division under your orders is the form of ambition dictated to me by my love for my country and my friendship for you.'

The work of reorganizing the country was much more difficult. The Directory had intended to form it into one Republic,

¹ For all the plundering see Sciout, *Directoire*, iii. 388, 396-7, 476-9, 501-15, 641-7; Raoul-Rochette, *Hist. Rév. helvétique*, 137.

² Hanet-Cléry, ii. 31. One of them was still alive in the Jardin des Plantes, Paris, in 1823. Raoul-Rochette, *Hist. Rév. helvétique*, 137.

³ *Corr. Nap. inéd.* ii. 533-4: '... je ferai en sorte que la forme n'emporte pas le fond.'

but Brune found this to be unpopular and he proposed to form three Republics. The first was to be the République Rhodienne, in the west along the Rhône with Lausanne as Capital. The small democratic Cantons, as Brune called Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, and Glarus, in the centre of the country, were not to be asked to change their federative form, but were to become the Republic of Tellgovie or Tellgau. The rest of Switzerland, the largest part, was to form the République d'Helvétie, with Lucerne or Zürich as Capital. This arrangement pleased no one, and Brune's position became most difficult, for not only did the Directory change their minds from time to time, but they also negotiated without reference to Brune through their agent Mengaud and through Ochs, the President of the Canton of Bâle, who professed to know their real intentions. Brune complained that copies of the letters and instructions sent to him from the Directory were circulated in the country. On the 29th March 1798 he left for Italy, no doubt glad to get away. Before starting he demanded to be paid 200,000 francs for his personal expenses; only part of this was handed over, the rest was to be sent after him to Milan. As it was, his carriage was so heavily laden—with gold, said his enemies—that it broke down a short time after quitting Berne. Still, when the Swiss had experience of Masséna they regretted Brune.

After the departure of Brune, Schauenbourg took command of the Armée d'Helvétie. Menard, who had led the troops from Italy, had been promoted General of Division on the 7th February 1798 and had been sent to command in Corsica. On the 12th April 1798 the representatives of ten Cantons, assembled at Aarau under the protection of French troops, proclaimed 'La République Helvétique, une, indivisible, et démocratique', Geneva being forced to seek annexation to France a little later. Still, Switzerland was far from pacified. At the end of April the minor Cantons rose, and Schauenbourg had to crush their forces and also to put down an insurrection in the Valais. Indeed, we shall find that throughout the campaign of 1799 the French had constant trouble with the Swiss, as with the people of so many countries which would not accept Republican freedom. Outwardly, however, the two Republics, France and Switzerland, were allied; and on the 19th August 1798 an offensive and defensive treaty was signed at Paris, by which each

was to furnish a corps of troops to the other if attacked, whilst France promised to evacuate Switzerland within three months.

Schauenbourg had asked for General of Brigade Oudinot, temporarily commanding a division of the *Armée de Mayence*, and that officer joined at the end of December 1798, having a brigade, the reserve of the army, at Winterthur. Schauenbourg was a capital organizer and trainer of troops, but, as far at least as we know, he was not a General of the first class, and had he remained here the strain of the command would probably have been too much for him. On the 2nd October 1798 he was nominated Inspector-General of the *Corps du Haut-Rhin*, part of the *Armée de Mayence*, but the choice of his successor took some time, and he never actually filled this post. Good luck more than good selection now sent here the one General who was able to save France from invasion. Masséna, disgraced on account of the military revolt in Rome in February 1798, remained unemployed at Antibes until on the 16th August of that year the Directory appointed him to a division in the *Armée de Mayence*.¹ We have dealt with his movements there till he left for Switzerland. Though the formal appointment was only made on the 10th December, on the 9th the Minister, Schérer, telegraphed to Jourdan that he was to move his head-quarters to Strasbourg and that Masséna had been given the command of the *Armée d'Helvétie*, to which he was to go. On the 11th December, in the Reichberg house at Zürich, Schauenbourg handed over the command.

The *Armée d'Helvétie* when Masséna joined had its head-quarters at Zürich. Its strength was 24,000 old and experienced troops, 1,600 of these being cavalry.² Schauenbourg after all remained, as Inspector-General of Infantry, and the only Generals we are concerned with are the two future Marshals, Masséna, the Commander-in-Chief, and Oudinot, a General of Brigade since 1794.³ Masséna believed he was an independent commander, and when Jourdan asked for a return of his army he refused to furnish it, referring the matter angrily to the Directory: 'Am I simply chief of a corps detached from the *Armée de Mayence*? The theatre of its operations makes

¹ See pp. 18-19.

² Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 72-7; Gachot, *Helvétie*, 500-2, gives the detail and the nominal strength as 33, 792.

³ Phipps, ii.

that situation absurd. If it is so, accept my resignation.' The Directory had from the first intended that Masséna, like the commander of the *Armée d'Observation*, should be under the direction of Jourdan, but by some blunder Masséna had not been informed of this. Indeed, before he left Strasbourg, Schérer, the Minister of War, had promised him complete independence, and, naturally enough after his services in Italy, he did not consider himself inferior to Jourdan. However, for the moment the question was passed over, and it was not settled till the 9th March 1799. Although there were complaints of some of the regiments which had been brought up from Holland and from the Interior, who were said to be wanting in zeal, the army was good in many ways. Switzerland had agreed to raise six regiments of 3,000 men each, to be paid and clothed by France, but these were formed very slowly and with little goodwill on the part of the Helvetian Republic; many deserted, especially when in June 1799 Masséna evacuated Zürich. Still, we shall find some rendering inestimable service in stopping the attempt of the Archduke Charles to pass the Aar on the 17th August 1799, and others did good work under Molitor in opposing Suvárof at Glarus. Switzerland, however, had been stripped by Rapinat and his brood of plunderers; the army was destitute of transport and of hospitals, and the Minister of War had warned the Directory that it could not begin operations before the spring, which was corroborated by Schauenbourg.

I pass as rapidly as I can over this hard-fought but indecisive campaign. Masséna's army had its right, under Lecourbe, promoted General of Division on the 5th February 1799, in the St. Gotthard Pass, stretching down to Bellinzona to link with the army of Italy, then under Joubert. Schauenbourg had protested against this extension of his right. The centre, under Menard, held the gorges of Glarus and Schwyz, with its outposts on the Lake of Constance; and the left, under Xaintrilles, where Oudinot had a brigade, held the Rhine from Lake Constance to Bâle. At first Masséna was told to act so as to flank the *Armée d'Italie* on his right and the *Armée de Mayence* on his left, but on his observations this was changed and he was ordered to occupy the Grisons, a perilous task as the Austrians were approaching. Bellegarde, in the Tyrol, had 46,000 men, while Masséna, though reinforced from Italy by the brigade of Dessoles,

was weakened by having to detach Ruby's brigade from his left to support Jourdan, so that he was outnumbered. Here, as with the Armée de Mayence, there was some difficulty about beginning open hostilities, as war had not been declared.¹

As Jourdan informed Masséna that his army would cross the Rhine on the 1st March, and would be to the north of the Lake of Constance on the 6th, Masséna prepared to cross the Rhine himself on the latter date between Maienfeld and Sargans, and to enter the Grisons, which France wished to annex to Switzerland. At Bregenz, at the eastern end of the lake, was Hotze with 20,000 men, holding also the strong position of Feldkirch. Auffenberg with some 4,500 men was at Coire, or Chur, holding the Grisons. For his point of passage Masséna chose the fords of Azmooz, Maienfeld, and Flasch, between the positions of the two Austrian Generals. On the 6th he forced the passage and took the strong position of the Luziensteig² against every possible difficulty, for the river had risen and the works were so strong that the French only succeeded as night fell, when the enemy retired up the river to Maienfeld. On the right, Desmont's brigade, coming through the mountains by Vettis, reached Reichenau, where the Upper and Lower Rhine join, and halted on the right bank. As for the left wing, Ruby's brigade was sent to Schaffhausen to link with Jourdan, while Oudinot's brigade was meant to support the assault of the Luziensteig, but, forced to pass the Rhine below that position on a bridge of wagons, it took post at Schann, about half-way to Feldkirch. Including Desmont's trophies, Masséna had taken five guns and some 1,100 prisoners. Next day, the 7th March, Masséna marched up the right bank against Auffenberg, who retired to Coire, where Masséna attacked him, first sending his light companies round the enemy's right to close his retreat by the Plessur valley. The Austrians were crushed and Masséna got sixteen guns and 3,000 prisoners, besides the stores in the magazine at Coire. While Masséna had thus been moving southwards up the river, Oudinot, turning to the north, had marched down the right bank for Feldkirch. Attacked by Hotze with about

¹ For the distribution of the armies at this period see Mahon, *Armées du Directoire*, i. 154. For the instructions of the Directory, the remarks of Masséna, &c., see Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 447-60; Gachot, *Helvétie*, 502-13.

² For a description of the Luziensteig see Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 100-1; Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 9.

equal numbers, Oudinot carried on a hard struggle until he was reinforced by Lorge, sent by Masséna with a regiment, when, putting himself at the head of his cavalry, he threw the Austrians back on Feldkirch, the combat lasting till late at night. With more troops Oudinot would have followed up the enemy and probably would have taken Feldkirch itself. He captured four guns and 1,000 prisoners. All this made up for the check to Loison's brigade, which, 3,000 strong, coming by the St. Gotthard and making for Coire by Urseren and Dissentis on the Lower Rhine, had to meet the opposition of an Austrian force, with a band of armed peasants, which threw back the brigade with a heavy loss from Dissentis, Loison regaining Urseren with 500 men. Three companies, taken almost complete, suffered from the rage of the peasants. 'They submitted the prisoners to the most fearful torments; they cut off their noses and ears, they gouged out their eyes, and not one would have escaped these ruffians had not the Austrian officers threatened to use force to stop this horrible massacre.' The French, believing themselves the Apostles of Liberty, felt such treatment the more. Desmont, sent up the Rhine from Reichenau, put down the peasants.

Masséna's invasion of the Grisons had a political object. 'Les trois ligues grises' had only been slightly linked with Switzerland. In 1798 Bonaparte had taken the Valtelline from them and had permitted its annexation to the République Cisalpine.¹ Now the Directory wished to get the Grisons, or Rhétie, to join Switzerland, which figured as the République Helvétique. Once in possession of Coire, Masséna on the 12th March 1799 formed a 'Gouvernement provisoire de la Rhétie', on whose advice he deported several individuals into Switzerland. On the 21st April this Government voted the union of the Grisons with the République Helvétique, as the Canton de la Rhétie, a union soon broken when the French were forced out of the country in May 1799, but restored later.² It is fair to Masséna to say that Guiot, the Minister of the French Directory, praised the order and discipline he had maintained as far as possible, whilst his civil, frank, and fraternal manner conciliated all hearts.³

¹ Phipps, iv. 212-13.

² See under the Armée du Danube (B).

³ Guiot, *La Réunion des Grisons*, 386-481; Sciout, *Directoire*, iv. 222-5; Raoul-Rochette, *Hist. Rév. helvétique*, 253-66, 304-11.

While Masséna's centre and left had been employed in this work in the Grisons, his right, under Lecourbe, had made a wide movement into the Engadine. Going down the St. Gotthard with 10,000 men to Bellinzona, on the Italian side, Lecourbe then went northwards and climbed over the San Bernardino Pass, and by the 8th March he reached Andeer on the Upper Rhine. Then, going on to Thusis and turning south-east, he sent one column under Mainoni down by the Julier Pass and Silvaplana to the Inn valley, while he himself came by the Albula Pass to Ponte on the Inn, which he reached on the 11th March. Here on the 12th he was attacked by Loudon from Zernetz, but he beat off the enemy with small loss to himself, taking 2,000 prisoners and—what was most valuable to him—a number of cartridges. His left column, under Loison, sent to act in the Rhine valley and then after reaching Reichenau to join him in the Engadine, I have already treated in describing Masséna's operations. On the 14th March Lecourbe, believing Dessoles, from the *Armée d'Italie*, would be on the march from Bormio by the St. Maria over the Wormser Joch for Glurns, moved down the Inn to support his right and attacked Martinsbrück unsuccessfully. Next day Loudon, who had retired to the Münsterthal to get between Lecourbe and Dessoles, came down on Lecourbe's right flank and rear at Zernetz and at Schuls, while the head of the French column was attacked at Martinsbrück. Lecourbe beat off this dangerous stroke, but the incident is worth giving because General Mainoni was taken by the Austrians at Schuls, and Lecourbe, believing this was due to the carelessness of that General, refused to make the exchange for which Mainoni was anxious. This stroke of Loudon's might have been more telling had that General taken the daring course of concentrating first against Lecourbe, leaving Dessoles, coming up from Italy, to be dealt with later. On the 17th March Lecourbe again attacked Martinsbrück, but here his successes ended. His men had gained the village when a panic occasioned by the sight of four horsemen sent them flying, and the Austrians then fell on a battalion sent round in their rear and captured most of it. Masséna now sent Loison to rejoin Lecourbe with five companies of grenadiers, and Desmont to replace Mainoni. On the 25th March Lecourbe had his revenge. Sending Loison round on his right to come down on Nauders by the Glurns

road, he attacked again and obtained a full victory, capturing twelve guns and 2,000 prisoners. Occupying Nauders and the Finstermünz gorge beyond it, he was now in communication with Dessoles to the south in the Etsch valley.

Dessoles's¹ march had been as follows. Some 4,500 strong, his division had fought its way up from Italy and had come from Bormio over the Wormser Joch to St. Maria in the Münsterthal, which it reached on the 19th March. On the 25th Dessoles, advancing northwards by the Manoterthal, attacked Loudon in front of Tauffers, and, skilfully using the dry bed of the Rambach, he turned and crushed the Austrians, who lost 5,700 killed or prisoners and all their guns, Loudon himself escaping with a handful of men to Landeck. Next day Dessoles entered Glurns, thus reaching the Etsch or Adige valley and at last linking with Lecourbe, who was at Nauders to the north of him. His advance had been a painful one, his troops, like those of Lecourbe, suffering from hunger, and Lecourbe, anxious for support for his right, believed he had been slow in his movements and had been too much daunted by the difficulties of the route. The consequent ill feeling between the two Generals came to a head when Lecourbe accused the troops from Italy of having plundered in their march. Dessoles sent a letter rather of defiance to Lecourbe, informing him and Masséna that he was requesting his own real commander, Schérer, to transfer him to another division or to accept his resignation, while Lecourbe requested Masséna to get either Dessoles or himself changed to another division. Such a quarrel between two Generals operating on different lines was natural enough, but here the fact that they came from different armies aggravated the matter.

The Directory, with their usual happy tact, chose this moment when Masséna, in possession of the Grisons, was priding himself on his success, to administer to him a slight of the sort certain to be felt most severely by any General believing he held a separate command. Although it had been understood that the Armée d'Helvétie should be subordinated to Jourdan, the commander of 'Danube', the matter, as we have seen, had not

¹ Général Jean-Joseph-Paul-Augustin Dessoles (1767-1828). Marquis, the 31st August 1817. *Fastes*, ii. 282-4; Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxii. 430-6; Phipps, iv.

been settled officially. Masséna had protested against such an arrangement: indeed, as he was to act in connexion with the Armée d'Italie under Schérer, which was to reinforce him, he might fairly consider he was independent to some extent of both 'Danube' and 'Italie'. The Directory, however, had at last found out that the plan of having a number of separate and independent armies—'Mayence' in Germany, flanked by 'Helvétie' and 'Observation', and the Armée d'Italie with that of 'Naples' detached from it—if it saved them from the risk of any one General becoming too powerful for them, still exposed the Republic to dangers too great to be continued. Accordingly, on the 9th March 1799 they withdrew the title of Commander-in-Chief from Masséna, putting him under Jourdan, and also from Macdonald, with 'Naples', putting him under Schérer, now commander of 'Italie'. The Directory tried to soften the blow, asserting that Masséna himself must applaud such a sagacious and useful arrangement. He knew Jourdan and realized the confidence that General deserved; both would get on together, and the laurels won in Italy would flourish again in Switzerland. Masséna replied on the 18th March by sending in his resignation. Probably he had no great confidence in Jourdan, and, besides the loss of rank, he might well dislike having to be responsible for his army whilst his movements were to be directed by a General far away. Why, he asked, had the Minister promised him entire independence before he left Strasbourg? Once before, he said, he had offered his resignation, which had not been accepted, and the title of Commander-in-Chief had still been given him.¹ Already Jourdan had seized on one of his brigades, that of Ruby: what further demands might not be made on him? 'I prefer to resign rather than have the certainty of dishonour.' The Directory answered civilly but firmly. If Masséna persisted, they would accept his resignation, and they sent him a letter which he was to forward to Jourdan, who would send him a successor, Lefebvre. If, on the other hand, he thought that a soldier could not resign on the field of battle (Barras put it, 'to resign at this moment is to desert'), then he was to return the letter to the Directory and continue to command. It was a hard test to put to a General. On the 27th March Masséna replied. When he had sent in his resignation

¹ I presume he means in his correspondence when first appointed.

the state of his army had been different, and he could have retired. 'As it now is, I believe I should betray my duty and fail my country and my Government if I did not remain at my post until it be otherwise ordered.' This was well, for the worthy Lefebvre was not the man to face the difficulties in Switzerland. Masséna was soon to gain his reward: indeed, this incident probably showed the Directory that, Jourdan gone, Masséna could not be kept in any place except the first.

This controversy may have over-excited Masséna and so have made him take a more adventurous course than otherwise he would have followed. Jourdan, with his *Armée du Danube*, was drawing near 'Helvétie' on the east of the Lake of Constance, intending on the 20th March to have his army on a line from Mengen on the Danube to the Lake of Constance, by Ravensburg. On the 19th he wrote from Pfullendorf, telling Masséna that his march must be assisted by a diversion to be made by a division of the *Armée d'Helvétie*, which should move by Bregenz and link with his right division under Ferino, which was to act in that direction. Thus the critical moment now came when the two French armies, 'Danube' and 'Helvétie', were about to join, while the Austrians under the Archduke Charles were in front of them and able to concentrate on one or the other. Indeed, on the 19th March, Hotze, at Bregenz, hearing that Ferino had his advanced guard at Markdorf, on the lake, withdrew part of his force from Bregenz and Feldkirch to oppose him. The nominal strength of 'Helvétie' now was 34,992 men, but the right, under Lecourbe, was far away, and Ruby's brigade, on the left, had been seized on by Jourdan, who looked on Masséna's attempts to use it as a demand on his resources. Masséna, using his centre and that part of his left which was still with him, determined that Xaintrilles should make a false attack on Bregenz while he himself assaulted Feldkirch, a position which the Austrians had entrenched and which was very strong by nature and by art. He had reconnoitred it several times and probably would have planned a turning movement, but on the 22nd March a formal order for the attack reached him from Jourdan, and also he wished to take advantage of the partial withdrawal of Hotze. Oudinot all this time had been watching Feldkirch, and on the 15th he had written to Masséna proposing an attack, being answered,

'My dear General, if circumstances permit us to attack the enemy again, your military talents, your wise dispositions, and your bravery are too well known for the 14th Regiment and the other troops led by you not to be sure of conquering.' Now, perhaps to cover the withdrawal of part of their force, the Austrians attacked Oudinot on the 22nd March and drove him back until he met reinforcements.

On the 23rd March 1799, anticipating his plan by a day, and not waiting for the effect of the proposed feint on Bregenz, Masséna attacked Feldkirch in four columns, one led by Oudinot and the main one by himself in person. Some first advantages gave the French 500 prisoners, but the flanking columns were beaten off, notwithstanding the gallantry of Oudinot; and though Masséna, leading on his grenadiers, kept up a fierce struggle until night, his troops, at one time all but victorious, at last gave way, overwhelmed by the fire and by the rocks hurled on them, and he took post at Nendeln with a loss of 1,500 men. This defeat was the more bitter as the attack had been useless: next morning came the news that Jourdan, checked at Ostrach on the 21st March, was in retreat for the Black Mountains. Masséna wrote to Jourdan to complain of this movement, which, he said, completely uncovered his left and would make it difficult for him to guard Schaffhausen and Constance, by which the Austrians doubtless would penetrate into Switzerland. 'Here am I, then, in presence of the three armies of the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and Prince Charles. If you have not been able to resist this last, how can I do so?' Then came worse news. Jourdan, always unselfish, having received intimation from Masséna that the attack on Feldkirch would be made, as he then intended, on the 24th March, and anxious not to be accused of abandoning the Armée d'Helvétie, had fought at Stockach on the 25th March and had been defeated.

Whilst the Armée du Danube withdrew to and beyond the Black Mountains, Masséna remained exposed to the Archduke Charles, who could easily reach Zürich. Appreciating the situation, Masséna called in Lecourbe, who fell back to Bellinzona. Oudinot was placed on the east of Lake Constance at Rheineck or Rheinegg, his troops guarding the left of the Rhine and the south of the lake to Schaffhausen, where he joined Ruby, who linked with the Armée du Danube. Masséna, still holding the

Luziensteig, went back to Coire, but on the 5th April 1799, learning at St. Gallen that he had been nominated Commander-in-Chief of the Armée du Danube, whilst retaining 'Helvétie', he handed over the latter force to Menard and started for Strasbourg. Menard was soon replaced in the temporary command by Ferino, a General who had come from the Armée du Danube, where we have seen him. Although the Armée d'Helvétie nominally existed until suppressed by a decree of the Directory of the 29th April 1799, in reality it soon became absorbed in the Armée du Danube, or, as the troops of 'Danube A' were brought up to Switzerland, it might be said that 'Helvétie', absorbing the troops of 'Danube', became another army, which in my tables I distinguish as 'Danube B'. The Armée d'Helvétie had provided the first independent command of Brune and then of Masséna. Soult criticizes the operations of the latter General, saying that he would have done better if, instead of keeping at some distance between the two armies he had to support, 'Danube' and 'Helvétie', he had carried all his forces to his left to support Jourdan; and then, when the Archduke had been thrown back, he could have turned to support 'Italie'.¹ Masséna, however, had his instructions; but no doubt Soult is right in thinking that it would have been better if the Directory had trusted to his insight and experience. It certainly seems as if Lecourbe would have been much more useful in turning the enemy at Feldkirch than in his long diversion far to the right, in country which had to be abandoned as soon as the centre had to retreat. Of course Masséna, like Jourdan, had to base his plans on a strength which the Directory promised but never gave, so that the Armée du Danube he had to support was but a shadow of what he expected. As for Oudinot, as usual he had distinguished himself by splendid courage, and on the 12th April 1799 the Directory promoted him General of Division.

It may be well now to give briefly the next movements of Lecourbe and Dessoles, although they ought strictly to come under Masséna's new command, the Armée du Danube 'B'. On receiving Masséna's orders to draw back, Dessoles went back to Tauffers, Lecourbe ordering him to retain that post and St. Maria and himself going for Zernetz, hoping to retain hold over the valley leading south-east to St. Maria. On the 22nd April

¹ Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 1-13.

Bellegarde advanced with a far superior force. Dessoles was thrown back on St. Maria, losing the little artillery he had. Consequently he told Lecourbe he must retire and a fresh quarrel began between the two Generals. Lecourbe ordered him to fall back on Bormio, from where he had started, but Dessoles, wishing to avoid fighting on the narrow paths he would have had to use, marched north-west to the Schöntal and the Val de Forno to Zernetz, whence he went up the Inn to Samaden and then south-east by Pontresina and the Val Poschiavo to Tirano. Here he joined the Armée d'Italie, under Schérer, who took him as his Chief of the Staff and called in his brigade, only leaving two regiments under Lecchi in the Valtelline. For this campaign Dessoles was promoted General of Division.

As Dessoles in his retreat had passed right through what we may call Lecourbe's own country at a moment when that General much wanted troops, it seems fair to believe that the complete separation of the two divisions was the result of the mutual animosity of their commanders. Lecourbe had just had to send back to Masséna five grenadier companies and a battalion, sent to reinforce him after his check of the 17th March, but Dessoles had left a temporary battalion of 500 or 600 men.¹ On the 30th April, standing at Remus on the Inn, Lecourbe was attacked by Bellegarde with the Austrian army of the Tyrol, whilst an attempt was made by flanking columns to fall on his rear at Schuls and Zernetz. Lecourbe beat off the frontal attack and the other attempts on him failed, the enemy losing some 2,000 men against 300 of the French. Now he could have withdrawn safely, but he had detached Loison's brigade far south into the Valtelline to replace Dessoles, and he believed that Loison was marching north-west for Samaden to rejoin him by the Val Poschiavo, the line by which Dessoles had retired. In reality Loison, pressed by the Austrians, was moving westwards down the Adda for Morbegno,² whence eventually he came north by Chiavenna and the Splügen into the Rhine valley. That night of the 30th April Lecourbe fell farther back, up the Inn to Süss,³ dropping Desmont with a rear-guard at Lavin to break the bridges; the delay being, as I have said,

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 249, 253, a 'bataillon d'expédition', apparently Swiss. See Marès, *Guerre en Suisse*, note 2, p. 136.

² East of Como.

³ A little north of Zernetz.

in order to await Loison. On the 2nd May Bellegarde attacked and forced Desmont from Lavin back on Süss, taking him prisoner. Lecourbe fell back through Zernetz, where he was wounded in the arm,¹ but he reached Ponte without leaving any wounded or carriages behind. Sending a battalion south-west to Chiavenna, where Loison was now expected, on the night of the 3rd May he went north by the Albula Pass and reached Thusis in the Rhine valley on the 6th May, where he linked with Menard's division which was guarding the Splügen. By this time Loison had come over the Splügen. Lecourbe sent him south with three regiments by the San Bernardino Pass and the Mesocco valley to Bellinzona, to re-establish communication by the St. Gotthard; two regiments were sent down the Rhine to Coire; and, leaving the mouths of the Albula and Splügen Passes to be guarded by Chabran's brigade of Menard's division, Lecourbe himself went down to Bellinzona, where he arrived on the 13th May. The Engadine had now been definitely abandoned. I have given in detail these operations of Lecourbe, for the future fame of that General has drawn attention to them and they are hard to follow without references; but even in reading the account one forestalls the criticism of Napoleon, which I will deal with later, at the end of the campaign of 'Danube B'.²

It seems to me to be useless to criticize this campaign of the three armies, 'Danube', 'Helvétie', and 'Observation', for, as I have already said, the commanders had acted in anticipation of the forces they were to have received, but which never joined them; and further, the whole campaign in Germany and Italy was almost certain to fail for want of a Generalissimo. It took all Napoleon's power, with the influence of Carnot added, to get the campaign of 1800 carried out to some extent as planned. Even then the first plan had to be modified, for Moreau succeeded in retaining his right wing, under Lecourbe, which was originally to have assisted him in his entry into Germany and then to have been thrown into Italy to support Napoleon, instead of which only Moncey was detached by Moreau. In 1800, had Napoleon, Moncey, and Moreau been commanding three separate forces, each General mainly anxious

¹ This wound is not given in the official list of his injuries. Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 570.

² See pp. 95-6.

for his own success, we may be sure that neither Marengo nor Hohenlinden would have been won. The plan for this 1799 campaign was too vast for the separate army system, and when one considers the manner in which 'Danube' and 'Helvétie' were to advance, separated by the Lake of Constance, giving the Austrians an opportunity of striking at each in succession, it seems fortunate for the French that the results were no worse. Still, this campaign furnished a most valuable lesson for Masséna, and the defeat at Feldkirch in March 1799 may have caused the victory at Zürich in September of the same year.

V

FIRST ZÜRICH CAMPAIGN

(April to August 1799)

Masséna's position. Lecourbe's success. First battle of Zürich. St. Gotthard taken.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

- 1799 16th May. First battle of Marengo.
 " " Siege of Acre abandoned.
17th-19th June. Battle of the Trebbia.
25th July. Battle of Aboukir.
30th July. Capitulation of Mantua.
15th August. Battle of Novi.
22nd August. Bonaparte embarks for France.

As I have said, the army formed by the amalgamation of 'Helvétie' and Jourdan's 'Danube' I count as a new army, 'Danube B' in my Tables, for there were great changes in its Generals. Oudinot, now General of Division, and Lecourbe were already with the army of 'Helvétie', on which the troops of 'Danube A' were forming, and Soult came with the men from 'Danube'. Ney, just forced on the 28th March to accept the rank of General of Division, came to the Armée du Danube on the dissolution of the Armée d'Observation, in which he had been serving. He arrived at Bâle on the 16th April, where he soon commanded the Light Cavalry, six regiments, of the centre and the right wing. On the 8th May he was sent to command part of the troops of Lecourbe's division at Bellinzona. Next, on the 21st May Ney was given the command of the *avant-garde* of the army at Winterthur, which he reached on the 24th May. Wounded on the 27th, next day he left the army for Colmar to recover, going on to Plombières at the end of June and rejoining the army at Bâle on the 22nd July. Next day he was given the command of the 6th division in the left wing, under Ferino. On the 16th August he took command of the 5th division. Here, after beating off the attempt of the Archduke to cross the Aar at Dettingen on the 17th August, he left on the 22nd for Mannheim to join the Armée du Rhin 'C', where we shall find him in command till Lecourbe joined. This, of course,

is to anticipate matters, but it is difficult to follow such changes in the history of the campaign. General of Brigade Suchet was posted to this army in a brigade of Menard's (later Chabran's) division on the right, though Koch shows him as with Lorge, which was perhaps his first position.¹ Distinguishing himself in the war in the Grisons at the end of May, he was called to Zürich by Masséna, who soon made him his Chief of the Staff to replace Chérin, dead from wounds. On the 10th July Suchet was promoted General of Division, and some time after the 14th July he again went to Italy as Chief of the Staff to Joubert, whom he saw killed at Novi. Mortier, recently promoted General of Brigade, also came from Jourdan's Armée du Danube, first having a brigade in Legrand's division of the left wing, the Mannheim force. Then he came to Zürich to command a division of the centre, and on the 25th September Masséna promoted him to General of Division on the field of battle at Zürich. Vandamme came up the river from 'Danube A', but he soon experienced one of his numerous eclipses. On the 7th May 1799 the Directory ordered him to be tried by court martial for imposing contributions for his own profit and for permitting speculation, no doubt one of the many unjust accusations he so often suffered from. The proceedings in his case were exactly the same as in those of Decaen and d'Hautpoul, which I have described, except that his court was actually named. On the 14th May he was called to Zürich, and from there was sent to Strasbourg. On the 12th July, when Bernadotte was Minister, he was ordered to Paris, and on the 19th August the order for his trial was cancelled and he went to his home at Cassel. He was such a fine fighter, and got so near the bâton, that his history is worth following, and we shall meet him again in the Armée de Batavie.²

Masséna now was in full command of a great army, and never before or afterwards was he so completely master of the situation. None of his Generals was likely to give him trouble. The older ones, Ferino, who at first had the right wing, Souham, and Vandamme, seem to have been subordinate enough; and Colaud, a grumbler, and one of the men who had vexed Jourdan in 1796, had a stationary force only, the *division du Bas-Rhin*. Ney,

¹ Rousseau, *Suchet*, 20; Koch, *Masséna*, iii, Pièces justificatives, No VI.

² Du Casse, *Vandamme*, i. 452-516; ii. 2-6. See p. 194.

Oudinot, and Soult had only gained their divisions in March–April of 1799, whilst Masséna had reached that rank in December 1793; and though Ney in this army, and later in that of the ‘Rhin’, was to give a foretaste of his behaviour in Spain, still to Masséna himself this year he was submissive enough. It was, however, with reference to the Directory that Masséna’s position was most altered. He had been taken from disgrace to command the *Armée d’Helvétie*, a subordinate post; and when he had threatened to resign the Directory had been ready to let him go. In the campaign of 1799, so far as it had gone, he had been as successful as could have been expected, for, Feldkirch taken or not, he could not have debouched from the east of Lake Constance until Jourdan had got farther than he ever did. He held his ground, whilst the other armies, ‘Danube’, ‘Observation’, and ‘Italie’, were in full retreat after defeats; and whilst Jourdan, Bernadotte, and Schérer abandoned their posts, he now undertook the perilous work of defending the eastern frontier against what seemed to be the overpowering mass of the enemy, a behaviour the more striking as both Bernadotte and Joubert, over-careful of their prestige, after mature deliberation had refused a similar task in Italy.¹ He seems always to have despised the Directory, and now he paid small attention to their instructions and orders, offering to resign when too hard pressed, an offer which, even if the Directory were ready to accept, their Minister Bernadotte was too cautious to let them agree to. Firm in his seat, daring to strike, but also with the courage to disregard the clamour behind him till the auspicious moment came, Masséna was to save France from invasion and to show himself a commander of the first class.

Like all the Commanders-in-Chief, Masséna had his personal escort of *Guides-à-cheval*, dressed as Napoleon had his Hussars in 1805: leather shako covered with blue cloth and having a yellow plume, blue dolman with white lace and a high red collar, blue pantaloons with white stripes, and long boots. There were four companies, besides one of light artillery, with only twenty-one gunners, say two guns. The total strength was 330 officers and men. We shall find them losing heavily by the side of their General. The amalgamation of the two armies gave Masséna

¹ Barras, iii. 311–14, 467; Larévellière-Lépeaux, ii. 374.

79,634 men and 146 guns.¹ Of these he left 33,939 (late 'Observation') under Colaud by Mannheim to guard the Rhine there, while 10,000 recruits were in rear, maintaining order in the interior of Switzerland. In this first formation of the army, which lasted too short a time to be worth giving in detail, the divisions of Lecourbe, Menard, and Lorge held the Grisons and the Engadine, and the Rhine valley to the shores of the Lake of Constance. Oudinot, linking with Lorge, carried on the line to Stein at the western end of Lake Constance. Vandamme, who soon left the army, continued to Eglisau, and Tharreau to the mouth of the Aar, whence Soult and then the left wing stretched as far down as Coblenz. The army covered Zürich, where Masséna had his head-quarters. At first Colaud, placed in command of the left wing, two divisions, Delaborde and Dufour, 9,452 strong, with which he was to guard the Rhine from Huningue to Düsseldorf, besides the different garrisons, rather naturally wailed that it was 'ridicule et même indécent' for Masséna, whom he had never harmed, to give him such a command. He had not the wand of Moses and could not perform miracles. Masséna proposed to reinforce him from Belgium and Holland, and on the 5th April 5,048 men reached Mannheim from there. When Masséna reorganized what was practically his new army, his left wing came down the Rhine to Kehl, opposite Strasbourg; Delaroche at Strasbourg had the 5th Military Division, 7,057 strong; Colaud had the *division du Bas-Rhin*, 9,564, round Mannheim; and Dufour at Coblenz had the 14,857 troops, mainly garrison, say *depôt* battalions, stationed in the *Quatre divisions réunies*.² Masséna suggested to the Minister that an Armée du Rhin should be formed from this district to cover his left and he also suggested Sainte-Susanne for the command, but that General declined on account of ill health. Nothing was done about forming such an army till Bernadotte became Minister of War on the 2nd July 1799.

At this time the Armée d'Italie, now under Moreau, was being driven back to the Ticino, and Moreau complained to the Directory of want of support from the Armée du Danube. On the 6th May 1799 the Directory, true to the system carried on during the wars of the Revolution, of continual detachments

¹ For the distribution of the army see Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 465.

² Districts of Sarre, Mont-Tonnerre, Rhin-et-Moselle, and Roer.

from one army to another, ordered Masséna to send 15,000 men to Italy. The men were to start on the day on which the order was received, and Masséna did select a smaller body, three cavalry and six infantry regiments, or, rather, fourteen battalions, under Xaintrailles, the first column of which reached Lausanne six days later. But Masséna, trained in the school of Bonaparte, was not a mere machine in the hands of the Directory: no route had been named by which the force was to cross the Alps, and the enemy held the southern mouths of the St. Bernard and the St. Gotthard, so, asking for instructions, he kept back the force till an insurrection in the Valais and the increasing pressure of the enemy gave him reasons for retaining its troops, which became the *division du Valais*, so often referred to in this campaign.¹ Xaintrailles was accused of exactions and removed for trial by court martial, being replaced by Tharreau, who after being in command of several divisions had been reduced to the command of one. Tharreau, who seems to have been a man of difficult temper, thought himself ill treated by Masséna, and was replaced by Turreau,² whom we have seen in La Vendée commanding the Armée de l'Ouest from the end of December 1793 to May 1794. He had borne a bad name there, but we shall find him selected by Masséna to accompany him to Italy for the 1800 campaign. In some histories he is confused with Tharreau for this command in the Valais. The strength of this *division du Valais* was 4,824 on the 19th June 1799, rising to 9,462 on the 23rd September. After suppressing the insurrection at the end of May it held the lower Valais, pushing troops up the Simplon, but it was unable to communicate with Lecourbe by the upper part of the Valais, which was held by the enemy, as were the Simplon and the St. Gotthard. When in August 1799 Lecourbe retook the St. Gotthard, this division, then under Turreau, cleared the Simplon to Domodossola, and, forcing its way up the Valais, linked with Lecourbe by the Furca, the connexion being again broken when Suvárof came over the St. Gotthard from Italy. There are constant references to this division in the histories and it may be convenient to have this summary of its existence.

¹ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 195-6, 205; Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 91-2.

² Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 305-6; Phipps, iii. 31-2, note 2. Général-Baron Louis-Marie Turreau de Linières (1765-1816).

An insurrection, breaking out at the end of April in the Cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, endangered Masséna's right and cut the communication with Lecourbe in the Grisons, so Soult, who was in the Frickthal on the left of the army, guarding the left bank of the Rhine from the mouth of the Aar to Bâle, was sent by Masséna to suppress it. Soult acted with vigour and rapidity but with commendable moderation towards the peasants, excited although his men were by the massacre which had been committed on the troops occupying the Cantons when the people rose. Schwyz gave him little trouble, for, moving by the east of the Egerisee, he issued proclamations promising clemency, and, meeting some leaders at Rothenthurm, he got the assembly in Schwyz to disperse without bloodshed. Then, finding that Masséna, bent on severe measures, was sending Swiss regiments, vowing vengeance on their countrymen, to occupy the country in his rear as he advanced, he induced Masséna to withdraw these men and to approve of his own milder methods. The insurgents, however, had taken up a strong position at the mouth of the Reuss in the Urnersee, and Soult, sending small columns on each shore of the lake, himself landed with a column near Fluelen and stormed the entrenchments. The insurgents retired, one body going east up the Schächenthal and the other ascending the Reuss and fortifying themselves at Wasen.¹ It was important to give these men no time, as they threatened to break down the Devil's Bridge, and early on the 11th May Soult stormed their position and drove them up the valley. At one time his men were terrified by the rocks hurled on them from the sides of the defile, but flanking parties drove off the peasants engaged in this work; the Devil's Bridge was saved, and the insurgents retired, those from the Valais making for their country by Realp, but the others going up the St. Gotthard. Soult followed hard on their tracks, and, turning their flanks, drove them from two strong positions, one half-way between Hospenthal and the Hospice, and the other on the St. Gotthard itself. The Swiss had used bales of cotton and silk, found at the Hospice or brought over from Airolo, to strengthen their works, and heavy snow made the French advance difficult. Still Soult burst through, and pushed his troops south as far as Faïdo, where on the 15th May

¹ North of Andèrmatt.

they met a company sent up the Ticino by Ney, then commanding a brigade of Lecourbe's at Claro and Biasco, on the Ticino above Bellinzona.¹ On the 16th May Soult was able to report to Masséna that his work was finished; the communication with Lecourbe was freed, and he had closed the Rhône valley by holding Realp, though the Swiss still had Leuk. As Swiss boatmen at their own suggestion rowed him back across the lake from Fluelen, they spoke of the past glories of their country, and invited him to land and visit Tell's Chapel, which he did, whilst they lamented their own inferiority to their forefathers: 'If we had been like them, never would you have penetrated our mountains.' Disembarking at Brunnen, he passed several days at Zürich with Masséna, who was well satisfied with the results of the expedition and who granted all the rewards which Soult claimed for his troops. Soult then returned to his division on the left in the Frickthal.

The division of Chabran, who had replaced Menard, held the Grisons, Chabran himself with four battalions blocked the Rhine valley, holding the Luziensteig, Ragatz, and the Zollbrücke, while under him Suchet with seven battalions held the Landquart and the Plessur valleys to Davos and the Albula or Domlesch valley, thus closing the mouth of the Splügen besides holding the Lower Rhine from Reichenau to Ilanz. This position was far too extended, especially after the abandonment of the Engadine by Lecourbe, but Masséna unavailingly applied to the Directory for leave to abandon it. The Austrians had been beaten off in one assault on the Luziensteig on the 1st May, but now Hotze from Bregenz and Bellegarde from the Engadine planned a joint advance. Hotze on the 14th May took the Luziensteig and drove Chabran with loss to the left of the Rhine at Sargans, whence he retired to the eastern end of the Walensee. Meantime Bellegarde with a far superior force threw a network of columns on Suchet, who drew back his men rapidly and skilfully from the side or eastern valleys on Reichenau, at the junction of the Upper and the Lower Rhine. Thence he meant to have marched down the Rhine to join Chabran, but, finding himself cut off by the retreat of that General, he turned up the Lower Rhine for Ilanz; then, after throwing his guns into the river, he eventually gained the Reuss

¹ See next page.

valley, marching by fearful roads and contending with famine and the armed peasantry. He lost some 400 men. On the 19th May he was at Altdorf, reporting to Masséna that he had some 2,470 men, of whom fifty had no muskets. However, he had extricated himself from great danger and Masséna was much pleased. 'I knew', he said, 'that Suchet would bring me back his brigade', and he called him to Zürich and gave him a brigade at Rapperschwyl.

The position of Lecourbe at Bellinzona was endangered by this defeat of Chabran. It will be remembered that, driven from the Engadine in May, he had passed from the Inn valley to that of the Rhine, then going south by the San Bernardino Pass to Bellinzona.¹ Here he was joined on the 9th May by Ney, really promoted General of Division but still protesting against the step. Ney was first employed in suppressing an insurrection of the peasants, part of the large movement in the Grisons and in the smaller Cantons. Given a mixed force of French and Swiss troops, he attacked the insurgents, who, driven from Roveredo by Menard, had taken refuge in the Mesocco valley, which runs north from Roveredo to the foot of the San Bernardino. This work done, Ney was placed at Claro, on the Ticino above Bellinzona, where he covered the debouches to the north, linking with Menard's (later Chabran's) division on the Lower Rhine. One of his parties on the 15th May communicated with the troops pushed down the St. Gotthard by Soult to Faido, as we have seen. On the 15th May we find Ney accompanying Lecourbe in a reconnaissance of Lugano.

Lecourbe, wishing to communicate with the Armée d'Italie, pushed out a party westwards to Lugano and fell on the enemy there, calling the attention of Suvárof, now commanding the Allies in Italy, to that point, but Moreau and the Armée d'Italie had retired too far westwards, and Suvárof, having crossed the Po, was marching on Turin. Behind Lecourbe, as it were, the French had been driven from the Grisons and the Austrians were showing themselves on the Splügen, so Masséna, who was drawing back on Zürich, recalled Lecourbe, putting under him Ruby's brigade, which occupied the smaller Cantons, Uri, Schwyz, and Glarus. Accordingly, on the 21st May Lecourbe began his retreat up the St. Gotthard, leaving a rear-guard for

¹ See pp. 82-4.

a time at Bellinzona. Fortunately for him, Bellegarde with his army of the Tyrol, which had been operating in the Grisons against Chabran, when ordered by Suvárof to join him in Italy, came down the Splügen to Chiavenna, whence, marching south, part of his troops, his artillery and train, were embarked at Riva and Novate at the head of Lake Mezzola on the 27th May; the rest of the column marched by Gera at the head of Lake Como down the west coast of the lake, and passing through Como reached Alessandria on the 8th June. This march was an important one, for had Bellegarde moved by the Rhine valley, and had he seized the St. Gotthard, it would have gone hard with Lecourbe. The column might also have joined Suvárof by going down the Valais and crossing the Alps by the Simplon or the St. Bernard. Bellegarde had done but little with his force, originally so large, and the Archduke bitterly regretted the eighteen battalions, which, he said, Bellegarde had actually delivered to the French, that is, had lost in the fighting in the Engadine in March. With them, and with Haddick, had that General remained in the Valais, the Prince in July had no doubt that he would long since have driven the French entirely out of Switzerland.¹ Climbing up the St. Gotthard, Lecourbe went down the Reuss valley to Altdorf, which he reached by the 24th May, Loison being left at Urseren to guard the passes from the Rhine and the Rhône valleys. At first his rear-guard had been formed by Ney, busy with the problem of reducing the number of women present with each battalion down to the proper establishment of six, but when Ney reached Biasco on the Ticino, he received orders from Masséna to proceed to Winterthur, to take command of the *avant-garde* of the army, and he left Lecourbe's division, where he had acted as General of Brigade. It was during his short service under Lecourbe that he received the answer of the Minister to his refusal of the rank of General of Division, to which I have already referred, and henceforward he acted with that rank. Lecourbe on the 22nd May had forwarded to him Masséna's letter, with a flattering message, 'I am sorry not to have the advantage of keeping you here longer. Receive the assurances of the esteem and friendship I bear for you.'

I have just referred to Haddick's force as part of the support

¹ Wickham, ii. 122-3.

the Archduke had counted on. After Bellegarde had come down by Lake Como, Suvárof saw the importance of holding the St. Gotthard, and he sent Haddick there with sixteen battalions. On the 27th May Haddick's troops began their advance up the St. Gotthard whilst another Austrian brigade under St. Julien moved from Dissentis to Urseren and drove back Loison, who instead of passing over the Furca into the Valais, as Lecourbe had intended, went down the Reuss to Altdorf, which he reached on the 29th May. Meanwhile Ruby's troops in the Muottathal had been driven back on Schwyz. On the 28th May Lecourbe restored matters at Schwyz and then went to Altdorf, where he found everything in disorder; but he soon attacked the enemy in the Reuss valley and drove them up it. On the 2nd June he attacked St. Julien's brigade at Göschenen, but his leading troops were routed. Galloping back amidst the sneers of the soldiers, who declared their General would not be the last man in camp, Lecourbe reached his reserve at Wasen; dismounting and taking a musket from a fugitive he led them up; the others rallied on this body and they drove the enemy back on Göschenen. Here he gave his men two days' rest, to prepare an attack, but he received orders from Masséna to draw back on Altdorf and Schwyz. The opportunity, however, was too good to be lost: St. Julien was not supported and was driven back over the Devil's Bridge, which he cut, leaving two battalions to surrender. Now came fresh orders from Masséna, and Lecourbe drew off, evacuating the Reuss valley, and established himself at Lucerne, holding Engelberg in the Aar valley and protecting Masséna's right, or right rear.

This we may take as the end of the invasion of the Grisons and the Engadine by the French, a far-reaching and dangerous operation. As Napoleon says: 'The passage of the Splügen by General Lecourbe, and all the operations which took place in the Engadine and in the Valtelline, are objectless. The right of the army could not have found better positions than those of the St. Gotthard and the Splügen. Was there a plan to conquer the Tyrol? But that operation could not have been made by 15,000 men, by a single division of the army, when the other divisions remained thirty leagues in rear and separated by high mountains. If Lecourbe had had the misfortune to reach Innsbruck, he would have been surrounded.' This, however, throws

no blame on Masséna, for, as Napoleon goes on to say, 'This war in the Engadine had been conceived at Paris by men without experience, who only had obscure and false ideas on war'.¹ While all this, of course, is perfectly true, still the results of this bad strategy seem to have been better than was to be expected, for the Austrians took no advantage of the extension of the French line, and suffered heavily, losing on the fields of battle and in the marches troops who might have turned Masséna's right. That the expedition did not end in great disaster was due to Lecourbe, one of the gifts of the old army, for he had been a Corporal in a regular regiment of infantry, 'Aquitaine'. He had enlisted in 1777, but, disgusted with the career, he left in 1785. The formation of the Volunteers brought him forward and in 1791 he became Lieut.-Colonel of the 7th Jura.¹ We have seen him serving in the Armée du Nord, where Moreau had prophesied that he would go far, and also in the Rhine armies. Tall and imposing, he had a rough but good-tempered manner which made the soldiers call him 'Bourru bienfaisant'. 'He judged the field of battle well and improvised his plans according to circumstances, not fearing to modify the instructions of his commanders, without ever giving them cause for complaint.' 'The principal qualities of Lecourbe were spontaneity, vivacity, and energy', says Masséna. Indeed it is his energy which one most remarks, and several times one finds him leading to victory men who had been discouraged before. One would have thought him a man sure to please Napoleon, but his unfortunate affection for Moreau, which led him to decline to go to Italy for the Marengo campaign, and then made him take his chief's side at the trial in 1804, ruined his chance of the bâton which he so well deserved. It is true that we shall find him showing a certain weakness in dealing with Suvárof, and also when in command of the Armée du Rhin a little later.

This withdrawal of Lecourbe from the St. Gotthard was part of a general movement of the army. After some fighting, Masséna, pressed by the Archduke, on the 19th May 1799 had begun his retreat on Zürich, meaning to fight on the way.

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 262.

² Général-Comte Claude-Jacques Lecourbe (1759-1816). See Susane, *Infanterie française*, iii. 388-410. Philebert, *Lecourbe*, vii, makes him serve at Gibraltar, where the regiment does not seem to have been; Phipps, i, ii.

A fresh formation was given to the army, which now had seven active divisions, Lecourbe, Chabran, replacing Menard, Soult, Paillard (temporarily for Oudinot), Lorge, Souham, and Legrand, besides the *avant-garde*, intended for Ney but at the moment led by Oudinot. Klein had the cavalry, 2,010 strong, and Boivin the *division de l'intérieur de l'Helvétie*. Altogether the force was 60,398 infantry, 9,438 cavalry, and 2,290 artillery, a total of 72,126 men, not including 34,025 in the divisions under Laroche and Colaud on the Lower Rhine and in the Departments attached to the army. Altogether Masséna had 106,151 men under him against some 115,000 under the Archduke. The selection of Ney for the important post of the *avant-garde* was probably due to his work in 1796 when leading the columns of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'.¹ Rather unfortunately, Tharreau was given the superior command of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions (Chabran, Soult, Paillard), and soon also of the *avant-garde*, Ferino having the 5th and 6th divisions (Lorge and Souham). Tharreau was not happy in his relations with the Generals under him, and we shall find this arrangement doing harm. Suchet, I think, still had a brigade in the 2nd division, Chabran's, and Mortier one in that of Legrand.

On the 20th May 1799 the Archduke began crossing the Rhine above and below Lake Constance, and Masséna, as Lecourbe had advised, took advantage of the moment when the two wings, Hotze above and Nauendorf below, were within striking distance, but far separated from one another, to deal a blow at them, although his own columns were not given sufficient strength. Oudinot, in temporary command of the *avant-garde*, had met the first attack at Winterthur, but on the evening of the 24th May Ney arrived and took command of this division. Next day, the 25th May, Masséna struck. On the left Paillard, acting against Nauendorf, marched north, gained Andelfingen, and threw the head of Nauendorf's column back over the Thur with great loss; but the bridge was burnt, and Paillard halted without attempting to restore it. In the centre Ney, moving on Paillard's right on Altikon, did much the same with another column of Nauendorf's, and after passing the Thur and restoring the bridge he wheeled to his right and went up the right bank eastwards to Pfyn.² On the right, Oudinot, with part of the

¹ See Phipps, ii.

² North-east of Frauenfeld.

avant-garde, had a hard contest for Frauenfeld with the head of Hotze's column. At 6 p.m. Masséna himself came up with Soult's division, which was acting as reserve. 'Take a regiment', he told Soult, 'and drive off these fellows.' When Soult represented some difficulty, 'Pas un mot. Au feu', replied Masséna, and the place was captured. Oudinot advanced, but before the Thur was reached Hotze brought up his reserve, and the struggle only ended at night, on the left bank of the Thur. This left Ney alone and unsupported on the right bank, and Nauendorf, realizing the situation, brought fresh troops against him, throwing him back across the river so that the Austrians were able to make their junction. Still, the Austrians had lost 2,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 prisoners, against a French loss of 771. Meanwhile Chabran from Glarus had demonstrated northwards against Hotze's left, with small effect.

Although severe loss had been inflicted on the heads of the enemy's columns, this attack had not been a real success and Masséna determined to draw back. To cover the movement, Ney was placed at Ober-Winterthur, in a position protected by marshes, with a reserve in rear at Winterthur. The retirement was not well managed. Tharreau, in chief command of the divisions here, had written to Ney telling him to go to Winterthur to take command of the whole *avant-garde*, Oudinot returning to his own division. Ney, however, rode forward to Altikon, where he found Roget's brigade still in position, knowing nothing of the retreat, although Oudinot and Paillard had already moved off. On the 27th May the enemy attacked Ney, who had Oudinot on his left and Soult in rear as reserve. He held till his right was threatened by the far superior forces of the enemy, when he prepared to retreat. Tharreau now rode up and ordered him, in Masséna's name, to take the offensive, promising him the support of Soult. None of the reserve, however, appeared, and Ney had to fight on, with troops he described as dispirited by the retirement from the Thur, although they seem to have behaved well. Driven back on Winterthur, he received a shot in his knee and his horse was killed under him. Giving the command temporarily to Gazan, he went off to be bandaged, and, returning, ordered the retreat to the Toss river, which he defended for an hour and a half. Charging an Hungarian squadron, as he cut down an Hussar an infantry soldier

attacked him, and though Ney succeeded in partially turning the bayonet, still the man pierced the sole of his foot, and then, just as Ney laid him low, also broke his wrist. His second horse also was killed. Gazan then took command again and the *avant-garde* drew back with the rest of the army for the line of the Glatt, where at Kloten Oudinot retook command of it. One incident of this engagement gives a curious characteristic of the period. Ney, just before retiring to be bandaged, had been leading on the 4th Hussars in person. After he left, the retreat of Gazan was covered by the same regiment, and in the *mêlée* Lieut.-Colonel Pajol, having his horse killed under him, was made prisoner by the Austrians, who at once stripped him to his shirt. Noticing the loss of Pajol, Captain Gérard¹ brought back his squadron and rescued him before the enemy could carry him off. Jumping on a horse, Pajol rejoined his comrades and, seeing them amused at his 'undress', incited them to another charge to seek his clothes. Napoleon allowed an orderly officer to lose everything except his dispatches, his sword, and his breeches, but if Pajol lost his breeches he retained his reputation. The incident, indeed, rather justifies Murat, who undressed at night when before Acre, assuring Miot that if he had to mount as he was his men would see him all the better. Pajol might have claimed the same praise as was accorded to the wife of Savary, of whom, escaping lightly clad from a fire, it was said by the wits of Paris that 'la personne qui s'était la mieux montrée, c'était la Duchesse de Rovigo'. This stripping of prisoners was common enough. In 1812 Colonel Seruzier was captured and stripped naked by the Cossacks. In this state he was brought before Platow, who questioned him carefully to ascertain what had been taken from him. Recovering all the property from his Cossacks, Platow sent off the Frenchman, naked, in the bitter cold, retaining the articles and only remarking that it was all right.

Tharreau formally accused Soult of disobedience for not having supported Ney, and attributed to him the loss of the line of the Toss. Had Masséna believed that Soult had intentionally disobeyed an order from himself, he would not have passed the matter over, but we find no trace of any reprimand

¹ Général-Baron François-Joseph Gérard (1772-1832). Not the future Marshal of Louis-Philippe. Pajol, ii. 82.

to Soult, who does not mention the incident, and simply describes himself as defending the line of the Toss.¹ The order to take the offensive seems motiveless and contrary to Masséna's intention to retire, and, as I have said, Tharreau was not on good terms with his Generals. On the previous evening, Ney, offended by a letter in which Tharreau attributed a panic in Winterthur to his division—really caused, Ney said, by some drunken men—wrote to Masséna that he had received from Tharreau 'une lettre insignifiante', and he warned Masséna that he would not correspond with Tharreau, as 'an *avant-garde* [of an army] should only communicate with the Commander-in-Chief',² a pretty cool statement from a General definitely put under Tharreau by Masséna. It will be seen that Ney, once General of Division, soon took the bit between his teeth, and now showed the temper which was to have such deplorable effects in Spain. No doubt one result of this incident was to increase the ill feeling between Ney and Soult, which seems to have begun when they both were in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'.³ As Tharreau soon reverted to the command of a division, whilst Soult was employed first in important work before Zürich and then in command at the passage of the Linth, no blame can have been attached to Soult. Ney, forced by his wounds to give up his command, asked for leave to go to Colmar, and to take with him his Staff officer Lorcet, who had a rib broken. This was granted on the 1st June, Chérin, the Chief of the Staff, sending a flattering letter; but Ney had already started on the 28th May, on his road having a quarrel with the municipal officer at Sissac about the post-horses he required. Leaving Colmar, on the 19th June he arrived at Plombières to complete his cure, and, this being done, on the 22nd July he was at Bâle, whence he was ordered to take the command of the 6th division at Nieder Frick.⁴ Now, at the end of May, Masséna drew back on Zürich itself, and the position of the army deserves some description, as most writers, apparently for the sake of brevity, write as if what was only the centre of the force deserves consideration, whilst—though when we come to the fighting I must follow the

¹ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 223; Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 99.

² Bonnal, *Ney*, i. 161, 167.

³ Phipps, ii. 261.

⁴ On the Sisseln river, which joins the Rhine between Laufenburg and Rheinfelden.

same course—in many operations we have to think not only of the actual combatants but also of corps which may never have fired a shot. Soult's division, supported by Oudinot on its left, was to hold the Zürich Berg,¹ the centre of the great entrenched camp prepared by Andréossi under Masséna, as the lines of Torres Vedras were to be by Wellington. Gazan's brigade of Oudinot's division was in Zürich itself with a reserve for Soult of a battalion of grenadiers taken from Chabran on the right. To the left of Oudinot, Tharreau, placed astride the Aar, carried on the line; and the troops of Lorge guarded the left of the Rhine to Bâle, where Ferino was. On Soult's right Chabran guarded the south of the Zürich lake, stretching posts eastwards to link with Lecourbe, who was now at Lucerne holding Engelberg, but with most of his division thrown back *en potence* holding the Andermatt valley. The works of the Zürich camp stretched in a great semicircle, the chord of which was some five miles long, from Riesbach, on the lake above Zürich, following the crest of the hills to Honng, on the Limmat below the town. Partly covered by marshes and strong from the nature of the ground, the camp would have been very formidable had Masséna succeeded in getting all the works completed, but that he had been unable to do. The whole French line, forty-seven leagues long from Andermatt to Bâle, was defended by 52,000 French and Swiss troops. On the 2nd June 1799 Jellachich attacked the right of Soult at Wytikon and drove it back.² Next day the attack was renewed with greater vigour, and at about 6 p.m. Soult's troops were suffering when Masséna appeared. Taking a musket, he placed himself at the head of the reserve of grenadiers and led them on, whilst Soult led his own men. The action was sanguinary, and 500 men were killed or wounded, the Chief of the Staff, Chérin, being mortally wounded; but by 7 p.m. the Austrians were beaten back and the camp was safe. Soult in his account does not do himself justice, but Masséna in his report gave him the greatest praise for his skilful dispositions, which had rendered all the efforts of the enemy vain, and for his valour and calmness, which had filled his men with confidence and courage. Masséna himself had been as active

¹ The hill to the east of Zürich.

² Gachot, *Helvétie*, 102, makes the 2nd pass without fighting, but this must be wrong; see in Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 102.

as in Italy. Now, issuing orders for the details of the retreat if that became necessary, he was working with his staff in the house at Reichberg when the guns announced the battle of the next day. Mounting, he rode to Honng, on the left of his fighting line, where Oudinot was attacked.¹

On the 4th June 1799 came the first battle of Zürich, or the battle of the Zürich Berg. Passing the Glatt, the Archduke attacked Zürich in five columns. On the French right one Austrian column even gained the Rapperschwyl gate, but it was driven off by Gazan's brigade of Oudinot's division and suffered too much to do more. On the left, another column, crossing the Glatt, took Seebach from Oudinot and then detached Rosenberg with a force to its left on Orlikon, to join the body attacking Zürich itself. As Gazan's brigade was in Zürich, Oudinot only had with him half his infantry, and his cavalry, placed below the Honng hill, but he seized the opportunity to strike Rosenberg and to try to cut him off. Placing himself at the head of eight squadrons, the 4th and 7th Hussars, he attacked the flank of Rosenberg, who, however, was reinforced from the troops in front of Zürich and beat off the French cavalry. Oudinot's infantry now came up, but after a fierce struggle, in which Masséna himself is said to have joined, Oudinot was driven back, and, whilst retreating in the rear of his grenadiers, he was wounded by a ball which struck him full in the chest, placing him *hors de combat* for some time. Walther took temporary command of the division. The battle, however, was to be decided at the Zürich Berg, where Soult had to withstand four columns of the enemy. One column, as I have already described, had been dealt with by Gazan's brigade early in the day. The others came on in succession and drove the French into their works, but were always brought to a stand. At last, about 2 p.m., the Archduke formed a column of fresh troops, including his own Guard of Honour, to storm the entrenchments, whilst the rest of his force stood ready to profit by their success. The steady fire of the infantry, mixed with the ceaseless roar of the guns, told of the coming onslaught. In the heat the gunners worked in their shirt-sleeves, and as the fire spread on every

¹ For the Reichberg house, the head-quarters first of Masséna, then of Korsakoff, and later of the Emperor Francis, see Gachot, *Helvétie*, 179-80. It is nowadays the Polytechnic.

side, the whole hill seemed to Soult like an enormous volcano vomiting flames. Struggling up the hill, the storming column reached the *abatis*, where a hand-to-hand combat took place, the men using the butts of their muskets, till at last the Austrians passed the *abatis* and began to spread in the camp. In such attacks the moment of apparent success is often that of the greatest danger to the assailants. It was eight in the evening, and Soult believed a flanking attack would rout the enemy. He and his staff, sword in hand, placed themselves at the head of some companies, and, rushing on the foe, drove the rear of the column down the hill, where they carried back also the Guard of the Archduke. Masséna himself, ordering the artillery of his works to redouble its fire, led on a reserve of grenadiers, and the enemy troops left in the camp scattered. The day was won. The Austrian Generals Hotze, Wallis, and Hiller were seriously wounded, and the enemy lost 2,000 killed and wounded, besides 1,200 prisoners. The French had more than 1,200 *hors de combat*.¹

In these struggles the Generals had to risk their own lives. We have seen Ney, who 'fought like a lion', amongst the enemy when he was wounded,² and Oudinot was in the rear of his retiring division when he met the same fate. Soult, who a later military generation believed kept too far from his troops when they were engaged, now had led them in the closest of struggles, and Masséna had been activity itself. First flying to his left and leading the cavalry of Oudinot, he then passed through the works, ordering the issue of brandy to exhausted men, shaking the hands of some of the bravest, and helping to repair the damage done to the ramparts by the shot of the enemy. At the end of the day he had launched the reserve in the final struggle. Even so, it was not all wild activity. 'Motionless for an hour on a mound, whilst the balls whistled round him, thinning his party of Guides, the General observed the enemy, and ordered offensive movements each time he surprised the Austrians in a false manœuvre. Without affectation or swagger, he acted like a hero, and the example he gave the Armée du

¹ Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 102-8; Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 259-63; Gachot, *Helvétie*, 105-13; Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 121-5. The loss admitted by the French seems too small compared with that given by Soult in his own command, 1,250.

² *Ante*, pp. 98-9, and Pajol, ii. 82.

Danube rendered it invincible.¹ This was the real Masséna, not the shade which figured in Spain.

I cannot fix the exact post of Mortier at this moment: he was still General of Brigade, though he must have been gaining in importance, for Masséna now placed a Lieut.-Colonel to command the 67th Regiment on his recommendation, that corps having served with him in Legrand's division on the left. He was soon brought up to command a division in the centre, although not promoted to divisional rank till the second battle of Zürich. Suchet, called in as I have said from the Reuss valley, had a brigade at Rapperschwyl in Chabran's division, then operating at the eastern end of the lake. Chérin, the Chief of the Staff of the army, died of his wounds on the 8th June, being succeeded for the moment by Adjutant-General Hastrel and then by Rheinwald, who had held the post in Masséna's Armée d'Helvétie. Later Suchet was given the appointment, very naturally after his service in that capacity in Italy. Indeed, Masséna may have had it in his mind when he called him to Zürich originally, as Chérin had given signs of mental disturbance. On the 10th July 1799 Suchet was promoted General of Division and appointed once more Chief of the Staff to Joubert, who was going to Italy for the disastrous Novi campaign. This transfer of the Chief of the Staff when a great battle was imminent seems strange, and a commander would be loth to have several changes in such an important post if he were satisfied with its occupant. Gachot treats the change as intended to annoy or damage Masséna, but that seems far-fetched, and it is more probable, as stated in the introduction to the memoirs of Suchet, that Joubert made Suchet's promotion and appointment to his former post a condition of his own acceptance of the command in Italy, Suchet's removal from the same post in 1798 having been one of his reasons for resigning the command. Masséna may have made no attempt to retain Suchet, who left this army some time after the 14th July 1799.² As for Oudinot, wounded once more, on the 22nd August he was writing from Limburg to General Decaen, saying that his

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, 113.

² *Ibid.* 105, 154, 158-9; Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 210-12; Suchet, *Mémoires*, i, p. xvii. He was still acting as Chief of the Staff on the 14th July; Marès, note 4, p. 152.

'last wound' (he had so many to think of) was doing well and was healing: he hoped not to leave the army, unless he were forced to take a season at Luchon, a thing he always put off. However, he seems to have gone to Paris, where we shall find him wounded again, probably only slightly, in a scuffle in a café where he chanced to be when it was invaded by the partisans of the Director Barras. He returned to the army in time to succeed Suchet as Chief of the Staff to Masséna; but the dates are hard to understand, unless this visit to Paris was before the letter to Decaen, or unless there was an interval between the departure of Suchet for Italy and the appointment of Oudinot to succeed him. Oudinot sometimes is said to have succeeded Chérin, but, while that officer was killed on the 2nd June, Oudinot was fighting at the head of his division on the 3rd June and was wounded and incapacitated on the 4th.

The Austrians had only drawn off for a little way; the Archduke was preparing for a fresh assault, and his left wing was threatening an advance on the east of the lake, but he gave his men a day of rest. Masséna took advantage of this to retire for a short distance on the night of the 5th June, occupying in front of Zürich a strong position which he soon made even more formidable. Here he had the fighting part of his army more concentrated, whilst the lake cut the enemy in two. I give the strength of the divisions, although this varies even in the same authorities.¹ Lecourbe on the right at Lucerne, with his own division, the 1st, 11,279, and that of Chabran, the 2nd, held Engelberg in the Aar valley, Chabran's left being on the Albis.² Soult, with the 3rd division, 6,986, in which Mortier now had a brigade, was in the post of danger, on the line of the Albis between Uitikon and Urdorf. On his left Lorge, replacing the wounded Oudinot with the 4th division, 9,040, carried on the line westwards to the right of the 5th division, 9,046 strong, of which Tharreau was in command; this division guarded the Limmat and the lower Aar, its right at Baden and its left at Bottstein, whence Goullus, the 6th division, 5,753, stretched down the Aar to the Rhine. Souham with the 7th division, 10,059, of which 2,059 were cavalry, guarded the Rhine down to Bâle and Huningue, these two left divisions, the 6th and 7th, being

¹ Compare Koch, *Masséna*, ii. 267-8, which refers to 476.

² Dellard's battalion joined Chabran about this time; Dellard, 8.

under Ferino. Oddly enough Souham's command in this army is not even mentioned in his life.¹ Humbert had the infantry reserve, 4,527, at Mellingen on the lower Reuss and on the left of the Rhine. Klein had the cavalry reserve, whose strength is not stated, in rear at Geneva and in the surrounding districts. Montchoisy, with the *division de l'Intérieur*, 3,170, held Berne, Lausanne, &c., and the *division du Valais*, 7,561, now commanded by Turreau, held Brieg and the mouths of the Simplon and the St. Bernard Passes. All these divisions would give Masséna some 76,781 men, not including the cavalry reserve; but he is taken as having some 59,000 combatants, besides what I call the Mannheim force, the divisions of Legrand, 6,186, and Colaud, 5,106, the real left wing, which guarded the Rhine by Strasbourg down to Düsseldorf. These troops need not be considered in this part of the campaign, except that they kept a body of the Austrian force occupied watching them. I have given the names of the commanders of the French divisions, as some of them have an interest for us.

As for the Archduke, his strength seems doubtful. It is put at 61,000 combatants a little later, he himself telling the Russian General Korsakoff that he had 85,000 effective men, of whom Wickham thought that not more than 20,000 or 25,000 were down the Rhine watching the Mannheim force. Gachot gives him 54,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry, say 72,000 men. Wickham thought the Prince had put his force at too low a figure.² Part of his strength now was in the Reuss valley, where the Austrian, Bey, had replaced Lecourbe up to the Devil's Bridge; Strauch, still higher up on the St. Gotthard, held the upper part of the Valais, the Furca, and the Grimsel, blocked below in the Valais by Turreau, whilst to his north Lecourbe held the lower Aar, to which the Grimsel led. The Archduke had a strong flotilla on the Lake of Zürich, commanded by an Englishman, Williams, whom we have seen at Mayence in 1795.³

It must always be remembered that both sides had Swiss troops in their ranks, recruited from the Cantons or from the

¹ René Fage, *Le Général Souham*.

² Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 165, 171; Wickham, ii. 151, 197, and in his note to Marès, 146. His estimate of 66 battalions agrees pretty closely with that of Koch, *Masséna*, iii, who gives 77 battalions, if we add Strauch's 8 battalions, apparently not counted by Wickham.

³ Phipps, ii. 236-7.

party which sided with it, the country being divided in its political ideas. With the Archduke were the three Swiss regiments, Bachmann, Roverea or Rovereáz, and Salis, all in the pay of England, besides other troops raised by some of the Cantons. Roverea's regiment fought well and lost no men by desertion in the retreat from Zürich in October. Bachmann was unpopular himself, at least in Glarus, from having been in the French service. Many men of his regiment deserted in the retreat from Zürich, having been enlisted in the north-eastern part of Switzerland.¹ These regiments were dissolved after the peace of Lunéville in 1801 and were formed into a new corps, the regiment of Watteville, which embarked for Canada at Trieste on the 3rd June 1801 with the *émigré* regiment of Dillon. Many of the men, however, returned to Switzerland, where most of them were eventually incorporated in the 'Demi-brigades helvétiques' stipulated for by Napoleon.² It is amusing to find Napoleon in July 1803 complaining that England had disbanded the regiments of Watteville and Dillon, at Gibraltar, and, with the consent of Spain, was sending them in squads of from thirty to forty men across Spain. What right, he asked, had Spain to do this?—and he had them watched lest they should get into La Vendée.

The day after his arrival in the new position before Zürich Soult was attacked by a force from the town which drove his troops from Albisrieden, from the wood in rear, and from the *abatis* which had been constructed. Soult's only reserve was a battalion formed of 800 conscripts, who had only arrived the day before and whom he had kept in rear, fearing to engage them. Now, knowing they had good officers and seeing their ardour, he ordered them to charge with their bayonets without firing a shot. Crowding in to keep in massed formation, they advanced in silence, throwing back the enemy and taking their guns, and gave time for the division to restore the fight. By nightfall the enemy were driven back to the Sihl river, where their batteries covered them. Masséna wished to continue such engagements to keep the enemy's centre employed, and on the 15th June Soult attacked in front of Zürich, taking the villages

¹ Wickham, ii. 114, 123-4, 131, note p. 133, 134, 145, 201, 241-2.

² Schaller, *Hist. des Troupes Suisses au service de France sous le règne de Napoléon*.

of Wiedikon and Altstetten and driving the enemy back on Zürich under cover of their batteries again. At 9 p.m. Soult called off his men, but he retained possession of Altstetten, the plateau in rear of which became the principal part of his line. This was extended, as, besides his own 3rd division, Masséna gave him the command of the 4th division, now commanded by Gazan,¹ replacing Goullus. The enemy in Masséna's front seemed to have thrown away all anxiety about the campaign, and only to have thought of whiling away the time in balls and other amusements till Suvárof should arrive to crush the French. So extraordinarily reckless were they that, as Mr. Lullin wrote, 'The usual concomitants of war seemed forgotten, the forms of courtesy were carried so far during this sort of truce, that French musicians were occasionally invited over to complete any deficiency there might happen to be in the Austrian bands which enlivened the ball-room'.² Masséna must have chuckled as he was given such means of obtaining information. So civil were the Austrians that when they were about to fire a salute in honour of the fall of Mantua, they sent an officer to warn the French 'de ne pas se déranger', and not to imagine this meant any hostile movement. While the Archduke was enjoying the spectacle presented by his splendid battalions, his wary foe was planning a stroke which was to decide the campaign, and to spur the Prince for a moment out of his lethargy.

We must now return to the important part played by Lecourbe, who, after returning from the Italian side of the Alps, had hung for a time at Altdorf and in the valley of the Reuss. But, as we have seen, after some fighting which met with varied success, on the 5th July he evacuated the Schächenthal and Altdorf and drew back to Lucerne, so that the Austrians held the St. Gotthard, the upper Rhône valley to the Simplon (Turreau being lower down), the Grimsel, and the Reuss valley to Altdorf, even threatening Stanz on the way to Lucerne. It was important for Masséna to regain the St. Gotthard, to make his rear safe and to be able to communicate with the Armée

¹ Général-Comte Honoré-Théodore-Maxime Gazan, created Comte de la Peyrière in 1808 (1765-1845); *Fastes*, iii. 238-40. One of Davout's Generals of Division in the 3rd Corps of the Grande Armée; Pair de France during the *Cent-Jours* and in the July Monarchy. We have seen him in the 'Rhin-et-Moselle', Phipps, ii. 128.

² Wickham, ii. 145-6.

d'Italie, if that force ever advanced. I do not think he expected Suvárof to come over the Alps, but it was always possible that a force from Italy, were it only Bellegarde, might move over the St. Gotthard and fall on his rear, or might deal a bolder and more telling blow by climbing the St. Gotthard, and then, turning to the left at Hospenthal, crossing the Furca, and, swinging northwards again, come down the Aar on Lucerne and on his centre. For many reasons, the possession of the St. Gotthard was important, and Lecourbe was ordered to strike for it.

Lecourbe, who had 10,000 men, did his splendid work in three days, the 14th, 15th, and 16th August 1799: toil which can be but summarized here. Six columns were to act together. Lecourbe himself, with the centre, landed from a small flotilla at Fluelen, by the mouth of the Reuss, and marched up the valley of that river, whilst Boivin with the left brigade made for Schwyz and the Muottathal by Steinen and Seewen, to the east of the Lowerzersee. As Lecourbe fought his way up the Reuss valley, he was joined by his flanking columns in succession, coming over the most formidable passes, one by the Surenen mountain to Erstfeld, another from Gadenen by the Susten Pass and the Meienthal to Wasen, and yet another by the west coast of the Urnersee by Bauen, the Isenthal, and Seedorf, the growing mass forcing its way up the valley till it reached the Devil's Bridge, where, breaking the arch, the Austrians stood firm. Meantime, to the west, Gudin, with the sixth column, was going up the Aar valley and forcing the Austrians from the Grimsel. At the southern foot of that pass he met Turreau coming up the Rhône valley, driving before him the body of Austrians under Strauch who had been holding the upper Valais and who now were caught between two bodies of the French, but made their escape to Italy by the Nufenen Pass to Bellinzona. Leaving Turreau to guard the Grimsel and the Simplon, which that General had cleared, Gudin ascended the Furca Pass and went down the Urserenthal into the Reuss valley. He was drawing near the Devil's Bridge from above, coming on the rear of Simbschen's Austrians who were facing Lecourbe there, when Simbschen, slipping from between the two bodies of French, drew off to the slopes of the Crispatt mountain. Lecourbe and Gudin at last met at 7 a.m. on the

16th August, and Lecourbe now threw his whole force on Simbschen, who after a severe struggle was driven off into the Rhine valley, retreating by Dissentis to Chur. The Austrians lost 775 killed and wounded, 526 prisoners, and twelve guns, whilst the French lost only 600 altogether, and now held the St. Gotthard, the upper Valais, and the Simplon.

Masterly as Lecourbe's operation was, much of its success depended on the Archduke at Zürich and Jellachich on the east of the lake being kept fully employed and unable to dispatch reinforcements to Simbschen. This work was most ably done by Soult and Chabran. The night of the 13th August was boisterous and rainy, the sudden break in the fine weather proving of great assistance to Soult, who attacked the enemy in front of Zürich early on the 14th. His right, under General Mortier, forced the passage of the Sihl at Adlischwyl and marched on Wollishofen, on the lake, whilst his left, under Brunet, supported by Gazan's brigade from the next division, attacked Wiedikon. The Austrians were driven right on to the town and nearly lost the gate there: 'There is no doubt', says Wickham, an anxious spectator, 'that if the attack had been serious, the enemy' (French) 'would have surprised and carried the town.' The Archduke brought up reinforcements, a large battery took the French in flank, and as the fog which had covered their movements cleared away they retired. That unsatisfactory traitor, General Pichegru, who had arrived the night before from Brunswick, came on the field to see his former comrades fighting, and then had a conference with the Archduke. His presence was not a mere accident. The Archduke had a high opinion of him, corresponded with him on the subject of this campaign in Switzerland, invited him to Zürich, and seems to have wished to have him appointed to the command of the 'Swiss army', that is, the Swiss who fought for the Allies.¹ During the rest of this campaign he was busy in intrigues. Many *émigrés* were in Switzerland, attempting to induce the Swiss in the French ranks to desert to the Swiss regiments in the pay of England. On the 1st June 1799 General Ferino had written to Masséna to report that Pichegru, Carnot, and General Willot were with the Archduke, in charge of everything—Carnot acting as general adviser while Willot was to raise

¹ Wickham, ii. 141-2.

the south of France, and Pichegru to collect his adherents in the north. Of course, he was wrong about Carnot, who was in Germany, apparently at Nuremberg, and it was not in the north but in Franche-Comté that Pichegru hoped to act;¹ but we shall see at the end of the campaign that the two Generals, Pichegru and Willot, really had their plans for an insurrection in France. Had Pichegru been given a command now, no doubt he would have shown his incapacity, and it would have been pleasant if Masséna, from 'Italie', had been the man to give a lesson in war to the shiftless traitor, the former commander of the 'Nord' and 'Rhin-et-Moselle', a fugitive since Fructidor.

Farther on the right, Chabran on the second day had attacked Jellachich, who was to the east of the lake, and had driven him over the Linth, separating him from the Austrians in the Reuss valley and so making Lecourbe's work there the easier. The cannonade here had been heard at Zürich and had made the Archduke uneasy, as he considered Jellachich to be in great danger. The Prince also 'was much affected by the attack on the camp before Zürich, which he considered, as it really was, a very disgraceful sight for an army such as that which he commands to witness'. Thus the main body of the enemy had been kept quiet: indeed, six Hungarian battalions on the march down the Limmat for Baden had been recalled to Zürich, an advantage for Masséna, who thought of crossing the Aar on his left.

¹ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 279-80, 479; *Carnot, par son fils*, ii. 193. Phipps, iv. 297-300, &c., for these three at Fructidor.

VI

LULL IN THE SWISS CAMPAIGN

(July to August 1799)

The army of the Rhine. The Archduke Charles withdrawn from Switzerland. Korsakoff and the Russians.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

- 1799 25th July. Battle of Aboukir.
30th July. Surrender of Mantua.
15th August. Battle of Novi.
22nd August. Bonaparte embarks for France.

I now turn to the force which was to operate on Masséna's left flank, the *Armée du Rhin*, called in my tables 'Rhin C', which in the list of armies of that title comes between the *Armée du Rhin* formed under Augereau on the 9th December 1797, and the one commanded by Moreau in 1800. Although the force we are now dealing with was technically the same as that which Moreau led, still it was so increased at the end of 1799 for him that it is best to consider his army, that of Hohenlinden, as a new force, 'Rhin D'. There is much confusion about this 'Rhin C', as its title is frequently used for what really was Bernadotte's *Armée d'Observation*. Soult, for instance, treats the two forces as the same body. There is the more cause for confusion as, nominally, Moreau was the first commander of 'Rhin C', although he never joined it, being then in Italy, whence he came at the end of 1799, first to Paris for Brumaire and then to command 'Rhin D'. Napoleon calls this body the *Armée du Bas-Rhin*.¹

On the 5th July 1799 Bernadotte, now Minister of War, retook the scheme on which his own army had been planned on paper, and the *Armée du Rhin* was organized to operate on the Neckar. Its district was to be along the Rhine from Neu Breisach to Düsseldorf, so that it had the fortresses of Breisach, Kehl, Strasbourg, Landau, Mannheim, Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, and Luxembourg, besides occupying Cologne and Coblenz. Masséna, who lost four infantry regiments and other troops and all his strong places, complained, and got back Belfort

¹ Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 161; *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 273.

in the 5th Military Division, all the 6th Military Division,¹ and the garrison battalions in the fortresses belonging to corps in his command.

It is difficult to get the real fighting strength of 'Rhin C', which differed very much from its whole strength as it had to hold so many fortresses. Nominally it was to have been from 40,000 to 60,000 men, this being announced to deceive the enemy. Ney, on the 10th October 1799, spoke of having collected from 16,000 to 18,000 men near Mayence, which might be increased in eight days to 25,000, but I think he must have included part of the Mayence garrison, and I doubt his ever having had 18,000 men. When Lecourbe came to command in October, he reported that he only had a total force of ten infantry regiments stretched on the line from Alt Breisach to Düsseldorf, or an active force of six infantry regiments and 4,000 horse, extended from Breisach to Mannheim. In November he reported that he had with him in the field at most 10,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. This we may take as its fighting strength. The organization of the army changed so often, especially when it was under Ney, that it is useless to give it here: it can be followed in Bonnal's life of Ney. I presume that the large proportion of horse was caused by the little need of that arm in Masséna's army in Switzerland. The army only had one future Marshal, Ney, with it, but it gave him, now General of Division, the first opportunity of showing certain points of his character. Lecourbe, who might have risen so high, commanded it for a time, and several men to be distinguished later belonged to it. Baraguey d'Hilliers, its first Chief of the Staff, sent back from Malta by Bonaparte and captured by the English, had been dismissed by the Directory, who believed he had stopped all resistance to his captors, but he had been reinstated. Lacombe-Saint-Michel, the General of artillery, who when in the *Comité de Salut Public* had proposed that Bonaparte should be given the command of the artillery of the Armée de l'Ouest, in La Vendée, commanded the artillery here. Ambassador at Naples, in leaving that place to avoid Nelson he had fallen into the hands of the Bey of Tunis and had not long been released. Delaborde, who fought under Junot in Portugal, Leval, who led a division under Victor in Spain,

¹ Jura, Ain, Doubs, Mont-Terrible, Haute-Saône; Pajol, ii. 111.

Legrand, and Lorcet, wounded with Ney in May, all later became well-known Generals, as did Gudin, who came as Chief of the Staff with Lecourbe.¹ Decaen, who was to lead a division at Hohenlinden, and whom we have seen with 'Danube A', now had a brigade here. The presence of one General of Division, Colaud, calls for some remark. When Pichegru came in February 1794 to command the Armée du Nord, in which Ney then was a Lieutenant, he handed over the control of the army to the senior General, Colaud, whilst he himself inspected the positions. In 1796 Ney, then a Colonel Adjutant-General, led the advanced guard of Colaud's division. Now Ney, coming to this army, where Colaud was serving, soon had the command of it. Colaud was commanding in a fortress whilst Ney led the army, but when Lecourbe came, and both Colaud and Ney had divisions in the field, they seem to have acted without the least friction, something of the old topsey-turveydom of the early armies of the Republic still existing, as we shall see. Colaud, be it remembered, was, like Ney, of the Kléber school, who objected to high command whilst apt to sneer at their superiors. Later Ney threw off the dislike to command, but I speak of his attitude at this time. The object of this army can be seen in any atlas, the simpler the better. The Archduke Charles was facing Masséna in Switzerland, his line of communication being along the Danube, which ran rather north-east behind him. Starting from Mannheim, well down the Rhine to the north, and moving south-east up the Neckar, the army could make a point by Ludwigsburg and Stuttgart for Ulm on the Danube, that is, it could threaten to tread on the tail of the Austrian snake whose head was menacing Masséna. Too weak to do more than threaten, the history of the army therefore consists in advances until it drew the attention of the Austrians on it, followed by retreats more or less precipitate, until, in the end, having mainly by good luck drawn or helped to draw the Arch-

¹ Général-Comte Louis Baraguey d'Hilliers (1764-1813). *Fastes*, iii. 67-9; James, *Naval History*, ii. 234-5; Phipps, iv. Général Jean-Pierre Lacombe-Saint-Michel (1753-1812). *Fastes*, iii. 296-7; Jung, *Bonaparte et son temps*, iii. 31-2; Dry, *Soldats-ambassadeurs*, ii. 247-329; Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* xxiii. 58-60. Général-Comte Henri-François Delaborde (1764-1833). *Fastes*, iii. 164-5; Phipps, iii. Général-Baron Jean-François Leval (1762-1834). *Fastes*, iii. 349-50. Général-Comte Claude-Just-Alexandre Legrand (1762-1815). *Fastes*, iii. 342-5. Général-Baron Jean-Baptiste Latrille de Lorcet (1768-1822). *Fastes*, iii. 355-6.

duke from Masséna, and so enabled that commander to win his victories over the enemy in his front and in his rear, it was driven right across the Rhine.

The weakness of this army must always be kept in mind when considering its operations. As I have said, some 10,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry seem to have been its real fighting strength. Now in 1805 Soult's 4th Corps of the Grande Armée had four infantry divisions, each nearly 9,000 strong, while Ney's 6th Corps had a total strength of 22,720. Except for the honour and glory of the thing, and for the deception of the enemy, this army might be said to consist of a strong infantry division, with an exceptionally strong cavalry division. But here, as with Jourdan's Armée du Danube for the Stockach campaign, one cannot but believe that certainly the Minister, and perhaps even its commander, was misled by what was to have been its strength, from 40,000 to 60,000. Lecourbe, when he commanded it, like Jourdan, was always hoping for reinforcements, although he was wise enough, as were his predecessors, not to risk his small force in a pitched battle. In 1800 the Armée Gallo-Batave had much the same strength as this army, 17,000 men, but then it was operating on the flank of Moreau's army of 126,000, while this army only had Masséna's nominal 82,000. Bernadotte may have professed, when it suited his purpose, to have intentionally created a paper force here, but one must believe that this army really was weak because of the drain caused by the creation of Brune's Armée de Batavie, to oppose the Duke of York in Holland. When the expedition of the English and Russians was repulsed, part of Brune's force was ordered up here.

There were also several men to be well known as cavalry leaders with this force. D'Hautpoul commanded the cavalry, having just been honourably acquitted by a court martial at Strasbourg on his conduct at Stockach. Nansouty, a well-known cavalry leader under the Empire, served under him. Montbrun was one of the officers specially recommended for promotion by Ney, who made him *chef d'escadron* on the field on the 5th October. He became commander of the cavalry of the army of Portugal when Ney was in Spain in 1810. Lahoussaye, another future cavalry leader, served as Colonel of the 3rd Hussars.¹

¹ Général-Comte Étienne-Antoine-Marie Champion de Nansouty (1768–1815). *Fastes*, iii. 452–3; Thoumas, *Grands Cavaliers*, ii. 1–58. Général-Baron

We shall find Ney, when in command here, placing his three divisions under Generals coming like himself from the cavalry, notwithstanding their want of seniority. It will be seen that the tiny army, though only possessing one future Marshal, still had its full share of great names. With Colaud and Ney it did not want for a critic, but it also had the sharp-tongued Decaen.

Nominally, the first commander of this army was Moreau. About November 1798 he had his first employment since Fructidor, but then only as Inspector in Italy, and it was not until April 1799 that Joubert, commanding there, was authorized to employ him in his proper rank. Now, on the 5th July 1799, he was nominated to this command, which, however, he never took up, as the dispatch found him in command of the Armée d'Italie. On the 25th July he wrote that he was expecting every moment the arrival of the new commander, Joubert, and that as soon as he had handed over the army to him he would start at once. Actually Moreau, who for some reason liked at this time being in Italy, remained with Joubert and on his death once more took charge of the Armée d'Italie.¹ However, the appearance of his name for this command made it believed that the army was a more formidable force than it really was—indeed, Wickham, the very able English Minister in Switzerland, in his letters always treats Moreau as in command of this army, which caused him some anxiety. The confusion about Moreau is increased by his also having been nominated, for a time, to replace Masséna in command of the Armée du Danube, as we shall see.

The first actual commander was General Jacques-Léonard Muller,² a man of some distinction. He was a soldier of the old army who had gained the rank of Lieutenant in 1779 and had then advanced under the Revolution. Placed in command of the Armée des Pyrénées Occidentales on the 8th October 1793, he had acted quite skilfully till Moncey had been given the command on the 17th August 1794, after which he had been employed as Inspector-General of Infantry. He is not to

Louis-Pierre de Montbrun (1770–1812). Killed at the Moskowa. *Fastes*, iii. 416–17; Thoumas, *Grands Cavaliers*, i. 117–75. Général-Comte Armand Le Brun La Houssaye (1768, died after 1833). *Fastes*, iii. 305–6; Thoumas, *Grands Cavaliers*, i. 124.

¹ See on pp. 324–5.

² Général-Baron Jacques-Léonard Muller (1749–1824). Baron de Gaterat under the Empire; *Fastes*, iii. 448–50; Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxxv. 5–6; Chassin, *Pacif. de l'Ouest*, iii, note 2, p. 163; Phipps, iii. 147, 187–8.

be confused with the General François Müller who served at Jemappes and Neerwinden and in La Vendée and Italy.¹ He was now to organize this army and to command it temporarily, his Chief of the Staff being General Baraguey d'Hilliers. He is sharply criticized by the biographers of Ney, by Decaen, and even by his own Chief of the Staff, but, though making one serious mistake, he seems to have done well with limited and rather misty means. His orders were to draw off the enemy from Masséna in Switzerland by demonstrations, awkward work for a small force which might draw the enemy on itself only too effectually.

Partly on account of the progress of the *Armée du Rhin* down the river, and undoubtedly stung by the slight which had been thrown on the force at Zürich, partly to call pressure off Jellachich on his left, the Archduke now determined to attempt a passage of the Aar at Döttingen, a little above its junction with the Rhine, where the Surb river runs into the Aar and where the river makes a re-entering curve. Had he succeeded, he would have cut Masséna's left from his centre and right and would have forced him to evacuate his position, if not the whole of Switzerland, Lecourbe's advance then making matters worse for the French. The junction with Suvárof also would have been ensured. By day-break on the 17th August the Archduke had 35,000 men ready to cross, while a battery of forty guns opened from the higher ground on the right bank of the Aar, to sweep the left bank clear of troops. This part of Masséna's line was held by the 5th division, under Heudelet for the moment, though Ney from the 6th division at Brugg had just been ordered to join and take command. The first news given him by Heudelet was that the enemy were establishing two bridges at Döttingen.² Both Generals went to the spot and by noon had collected some 10,000 or 12,000 men. The Austrians had made two mistakes: they had not got light boats to take over men to cover the establishment of the bridges and to keep down the fire of the French sharpshooters, and they had not sounded the river properly. They first chose a spot where the bottom really was a moving sandbank, and then one with a rocky bottom. Thus,

¹ Général François Müller (1764-1812). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxxv. 5-6.

² To make Koch's names of places agree with Blatt 3 of the Swiss map, for Dettingen read Döttingen, and for Targerfelden read Dargerfelden, &c.

though at first a fog covered the Austrian movements, the fire of Ney's men told on the engineers, while the anchors dragged. An English officer present, Lord Camelford, urged the Austrians to sacrifice some guns for anchors, but doubtless the pride of the artillery forbade this. At last the enemy had to abandon the attempt, and about 6.30 p.m. they began to withdraw their pontoons, asking the French not to fire and promising to stop the fire of their own battery. Ney was only too happy to decide the fate of the attempt in this manner, and the army was able to retain its position. The negligence and want of order of the Austrian engineers, of which the Archduke complained, can be compared with the care and foresight of the French when on the 25th September they made their crossings of the Rhine and the Linth. The Archduke, afraid of being recognized, had not inspected the place of crossing himself. We shall find Soult showing how a General can do this. The stroke attempted by the Archduke had been the more dangerous to the French as Masséna, leaving the main control to his Chief of the Staff, Oudinot, had gone to his right to superintend the operations there.

Both Masséna and the Archduke praised the small force of Swiss in the French service, who, lining the bank, had hindered the work of the Austrian engineers. As for Ney, really he did not belong to this army, as on the 19th August he informed Masséna that he had received orders direct from the Minister to join the *Armée du Rhin*. He expressed his regret at going and the high esteem and attachment he had vowed for Masséna, who on his part wrote in the most complimentary terms, begging him to remain for some days: 'You are necessary, indispensable to your division, and I shall deeply regret to see you quit it before the arrival of the General who is to replace you. In any case, be persuaded that it is only with pain that I see you taken away from an army to whose success you have so powerfully contributed.' Masséna, looking on the *Armée du Rhin* as much more of a drain on him than a support, naturally wished to retain Ney, who promised to remain till the 22nd August, when he joined 'Rhin', remaining with it till the end of the campaign.

Meanwhile intrigues were going on in Paris. It is difficult to get the exact sequence of events and reference should be made to the account of Bernadotte's Ministry just before Brumaire

to understand the whole situation.¹ The Swiss were complaining of the excessive demands they alleged that Masséna made on them, and his inaction in front of Zürich naturally caused some discontent in France. It seems hardly necessary to defend the abandonment of Zürich, a mere *tête-de-pont*, although it is said that the Kleine Stadt, the part of the town on the left of the Limmat, might have been held, thus retaining the arsenal, an advantage which Masséna, merciful for once, renounced to save the town from the bombardment it otherwise would have received. The new position he took up was very strong, as events were to show, and now his whole line was connected, while that of the enemy was broken in two by the lake. Masséna's course was approved by his antagonist, the Archduke, and by Soult, who had to defend both the first and the second position, while Napoleon passes it by without notice. As for Masséna's inaction now, he was too weak to attack. The Archduke told Wickham that 'he thought it probable that he might, by a desperate attack, be able to drive Masséna from his position, strong as it was, but that it would cost him the flower of the Austrian infantry, already too weak, and leave the army incapable of making any use of its victory'. We have seen the Archduke stung for a moment into an attack, which failed at the outset from want of preparation; but he had only to think of one enemy. The defeats of the army of Italy showed that Masséna might also have to deal with a force from that quarter. Anyhow, the Archduke had no doubt that at least he could hold his own; and we may be satisfied with the agreement of such commanders as Masséna and the Archduke and, apparently, Napoleon. It is true that Napoleon considered the Austrian position better than that of the French, but it must be remembered that he had not seen the ground, and Soult, who knew it and assisted to hold it, says: 'Considering the extent we had to cover with our army, much inferior in number to that of the enemy, it was impossible to occupy a line closer drawn and therefore better to defend'.² However, the complaints and representations of Bernadotte told in the Directory, and on the 17th July Masséna was called to Paris, nominally to confer with them on the operations, though really they intended that Moreau, instead of going to the Armée du Rhin, should succeed

¹ See pp. 446-7.

² *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 254; Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 111.

him with the Armée du Danube. This soon became known and caused discontent, and as Bernadotte was always afraid lest the letter of disgrace might find Masséna in full victory, the order was not sent, although it was not till the 16th August that it was formally cancelled and Moreau, still in Italy, was again ordered to the Armée du Rhin. Masséna was assumed not to know of his proposed recall, but we find him on the 7th August writing to the Director Barras to complain, Barras replying hypocritically that the object had only been to confer with him, and denying any disapproval of him.¹ It is curious to find General Hardy, a friend of Masséna, who, although not then with the army, still knew a good deal of what was going on at its head-quarters, writing on the 9th September that Masséna had been much surprised when he received his confirmation in the command from which he did not know he had been removed.²

Even now Bernadotte insisted on the adoption of his plan. Masséna was to attack at once, or else was to remain on the defensive until he could place a corps of 25,000 men on the summits of the Alps, to command the passes and thus to favour the operations of the Armée d'Italie. But, whatever he decided, he was to send 18,000 men in three echelons to the Armée du Rhin, on the day after the battle if he fought, or immediately if he remained on the defensive. Doubtless the Archduke would have crushed Masséna at once had such a detachment been made, but the letter arrived as the first column of Korsakoff's Russians began to join the Prince, so that any attempt to carry it out was obviously out of the question. Masséna had just been successful in clearing the St. Gotthard with Lecourbe's division, and he treated this matter with a high hand. 'I have fulfilled my task with zeal and devotion, and I have had the good fortune to obtain some advantages in the midst of the disasters which have happened on all sides. But you have fixed the limit where I ought to stop, and I obey. I therefore have the honour to ask you to designate to me, by the return of the courier I send you, the General to whom you wish that I should hand over the command. In case General Moreau has not arrived within six days from now, I shall leave it to the senior

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 1, p. 161, and compare with Barras, iii. 465-71.

² Hardy, *Corr. intime*, 149-50.

General of Division.' Shades of Custine and of Houchard! Fancy such language being addressed to the civilians who ruled at Paris! The Directory withdrew the order for the detachment but renewed that for the attack. Masséna threatened resignation again, and the dispute ended by his sending an A.D.C. to Paris, whose arrival either brought about, or coincided with, the removal of Bernadotte from the Ministry.

We now come to an extraordinary period, which illustrates the folly of Governments giving orders to commanders at a distance, and makes another instance in which the selfish policy of the Allies saved France. In front of Masséna was the Archduke, with an Austrian army which the Prince believed would be able to force Masséna from his position, though with crippling loss to itself. This force was just about to be joined by 28,000 Russians under Korsakoff, a combination which would make the Archduke irresistible, whilst Suvárof, with 21,000 more Russians, was expected from Italy. The very success of Masséna in the St. Gotthard, whilst enabling him to delay the march of Suvárof, still increased his danger from front attack, as it extended his line. An invasion of France seemed certain. It was at this moment that the Archduke received orders from his Government to leave Switzerland and march down the Rhine against the new force, the Armée du Rhin, which was operating from Mannheim. The real object of this order does not concern us. The Austrian Court declared that it was forced on them by the English, whilst the English, acknowledging that the plan had originated with them, protested that they had meant that the Archduke should keep in touch with the right of the Russian army, and should only actually leave Switzerland if a complete Russian army arrived, whilst Korsakoff's troops were not properly furnished as an army. The Russian Court said the plan that Switzerland was to be held by the two Russian armies, those of Korsakoff and Suvárof, had only been intended to operate after Switzerland had been cleared of the French, and they believed the action of Austria was influenced by jealousy of the invasion of Holland in August by the mixed force of English and Russians under the Duke of York. The English Minister at Vienna, more charitably perhaps, considered that although the advance from Mannheim influenced him, the Austrian Minister's expressed wish to save the loss of men

must be his real motive, as his arguments were so bad that they must be true.¹

On the 28th August the Archduke left Kloten and marched for Donaueschingen,² where he remained for a time, able to strike back at Masséna or else to march against the Armée du Rhin. The campaign did not begin well for 'Rhin C', for on the 24th August the troops, then on the right bank of the Rhine round Mannheim, were ordered to cross the river early next day to be reviewed by Muller on a plain beyond Oggersheim; they started in heavy rain, only, as so often happens in reviews, to be told at noon, when they had been well soaked, that they were to return, uninspected, to Mannheim. This attempted review was said to have been ordered by Baraguey d'Hilliers, that he might display the army in one body to Muller, but it was also whispered that really it was meant as a ruse to conceal from the enemy an operation by which Baraguey d'Hilliers, taking 6,000 troops, was to move from Mayence up the Main for Frankfurt, where he was to levy a contribution and then to cross the Main and join Muller at Heidelberg. This was a curious mission for a Chief of the Staff; and as, if a regular division, the left one, had been sent, there would have been difficulties with its commander, the troops for this body were taken from several divisions of the army.

Opposed to Muller was the Austrian, Sztaray, with the extreme right of the army with which the Archduke Charles was then facing Masséna in Switzerland. Legrand's division of Muller's army was first engaged in front of Kehl, the *tête-de-pont* Strasbourg held on the right of the Rhine, but Delaborde was brought down the river to Mannheim, hitherto covered by Colaud's division. The Directory had ordered the demolition of Mannheim, but now it was to be restored, to form the base for this army.³ On the 25th August 1799 Ney joined at Mannheim. He was to have a curious experience, first fighting the Archduke on the west and then on the east of the Rhine. The army had been formed into three infantry divisions, under Leval, Colaud,

¹ Wickham, ii. 152-221. When Wickham or others speak of Moreau in this context, the commander of the Armée du Rhin is meant.

² Kloten is north of Zürich, between it and Bulach; Donaueschingen is on the Danube, south of Villingen and north of Schaffhausen.

³ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 244-7. See Pajol, i, note 1, pp. 242-3, for history of the place.

and Delaroché, with a cavalry reserve under d'Hautpoul. The arrival of Ney, only just promoted General of Division, did not lead to any great change in this organization, which was natural enough, but which, if it did not begin Ney's grievances, still annoys his biographer. Muller seems to have been civil enough, arranging that his new General should have three horses and giving him one himself. As I have often said, one would like to have the history of Ney's stud. Muller also made up a small force for him, two battalions, two squadrons, and three guns, that is, 1,400 infantry and 200 horse.

Altogether Muller had some 18,000 men. On the 26th August 1799 his force began its movement from Mannheim, by Schwetzingen, for his object, Philippsburg, which Leval's division blockaded. Colaud was at Wiesloch and Sinsheim, with Delaroché on his left. D'Hautpoul's cavalry reserve was in rear. Ney, with his small force, to which another cavalry regiment was sent, had gone up the Neckar, and on the 29th August had taken Heilbronn in face of a large body of the enemy's cavalry, his infantry acting, he said, 'divinely'. He dreamt of a bold stroke by the army—12,000 men, he said—to destroy the Austrian magazines at Ulm and thus force the Archduke to come down from Zürich on them, relieving the front of Masséna. He pushed reconnaissances up the Neckar, and on the 30th August they seized Lauffen, some nine miles farther up. On the evening of the 6th September Muller began a bombardment of Philippsburg, which had a garrison of some 2,239 men. This was a measure to attract the Archduke to its relief. The place had been summoned, with a threat of burning if it was not surrendered, to which the commandant, Count Salm, had answered that if the French got the place it would only be in ashes, and the bombardment seems not to have been approved of by all the army.¹ The Archduke, naturally, had always been anxious about any stroke at his communications whilst he was engaged in Switzerland, and we have seen how, when advancing against Jourdan for the Stockach campaign, he had intended to send Sztaray with 14,500 troops from Neumarkt to the Regnitz to guard against any advance by Bernadotte. Now the corps of Sztaray in front of 'Rhin' had been strengthened by a *levée en masse* of the inhabitants of the right bank of the

¹ Decaen, i. 331-4; Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, note 2, p. 174.

Rhine, whose experience of the blessings of Republican principles and of Republican armies had led them to furnish so many men that Baron Albin, placed at their head, after sending many back was still able to organize a body of some 20,000, led by former officers, with a sprinkling of old soldiers in the ranks in the proportion of one to ten. The men kept in the ranks were paid, and those sent home were drilled every week, and were kept ready to fill gaps in the first line, to guard the country, and to come out in force in case of need. Soult, who had had experience of what this organization could do in Jourdan's retreat in 1796, considered it worthy of notice, and its success shows that all the volunteering was not on the part of France. With this sort of force Albin now attacked Baraguey d'Hilliers, re-took Frankfurt, and even menaced Mayence. When the French governor of Mayence threatened to shoot prisoners taken from these armed bands, Albin vowed that, if the governor shot the 'German National Guard', he would use reprisals on any French National Guards he might take. In November 1799 when the army, then under Lecourbe, made a similar advance, this levy again threatened the French left on the right of the Neckar.

Muller, engaged in dangerous work and always looking south for the approach of the Archduke, naturally was timid, and there was a partial retreat on the 1st September; but the army again advanced and Ney's parties, the most advanced of all, went as far south as Ludwigsburg, not very far from Stuttgart. Then the enemy in front became stronger. Whatever mistakes Muller may have made, he had succeeded in his real task and had drawn the Archduke off from the front of Masséna at Zürich. The Archduke apparently did not believe in the great strength the French Government represented this *Armée du Rhin* to have, and it seems certain that he would have hung in the wind, keeping within striking distance of Masséna, unless this army had menaced Philippsburg. Even when he had got as far as Donaueschingen, he delayed marching farther north, and, as we shall see, required further stimulus to bring him down here.

Muller, whose position had some resemblance to that of Moore in the Corunna campaign, now was off. Philippsburg had been bombarded for several days, and although the garrison had only

lost 94 men, the fortifications, the buildings, and most of the casemates were ruined, and the ammunition seems to have been running short. Still, even had Muller delayed in order to take the place, he could not have held it against the Archduke, and already on the 5th September reconnaissances made by d'Hautpoul on the right and Decaen in the centre got reports of the Prince's approach. Wisely enough, Muller broke up the blockade of the place and the army fell back on Mannheim, the mass of it crossing to the left bank on the 13th September. On the 12th September, Ney, then at Heidelberg, on the Neckar, learnt that, on the day before, Muller had formed for him a division of one infantry regiment, six companies of grenadiers and carabiniers, and three cavalry regiments. Once over the Rhine, the army lined the left bank, Colaud going up the river to Speyer, and Leval going down to Worms and Coblenz, whilst Ney, whose head-quarters were at Frankenthal, guarded the line between Speyer and Worms. The unfortunate Delaroche was left on the right bank to hold Mannheim. This leaving Delaroche's division of 5,000 men exposed to the Austrian attack was an extraordinary mistake of Muller's. As Decaen points out, there was no special reason for the army crossing at Mannheim: there were Strasbourg above and Mayence below, with their *têtes-de-pont* on the opposite bank at Kehl and Kastel respectively, and if it had gone down the right bank for Mayence, the Archduke would have been in the dilemma of either having to follow, far away from Masséna, or else having to leave the French free to return if he were called back. If Muller valued Mannheim so much, he might have stood firm there with his whole force, with his flanks protected, and the Archduke might not have thought it worth while to run the risk and losses of a battle. It was as if Moore had embarked, leaving one division to stand before Corunna. Delaroche fully understood his danger and it was characteristic of this army that he applied, not to Muller, but to Ney, for advice. Neckarau, on his right, was flanked by a bend of the Rhine and offered a strong position, but it had no bridge, whilst Mannheim 'ne mérite plus l'honneur d'être cité', but had a bridge. Still, if it were in his power, he would not hesitate a moment to abandon Mannheim and to defend Neckarau. He could only try to resist, and he asked for Ney's help. Ney could only advise shifting the bridge to Neckarau, and so he told

Muller. Delaroche had written on the 16th September 1799: on the 18th the Archduke attacked the 5,200 French in Mannheim with 22,000 Austrians. The fight was hard, and Ney brought up part of his division, but the Austrians forced Neckarau, which was weakly held, and cut in on the right by Mannheim so that they reached the bridge. Delaroche was driven across the Rhine, losing 3,000 or 4,000 men, almost all his division. Ney had received two contusions, one from a case shot on his left leg and another from a musket shot on his breast. 'That will not prevent me from commanding my division. I have a horse wounded.' There had been great difficulty in preventing the enemy from crossing by the bridge, part of which had to be left in their power.

This Armée du Rhin, as we shall see as we follow its history, was a very peculiar force, and we now find the Chief of the Staff, General Baraguey d'Hilliers, sending the Minister on the 10th September a bitter criticism of the operations of his commander, Muller. 'After a campaign of 17 days, in which at first we advanced about ten leagues in the first three days, to fall back afterwards six in the two following days, and not to budge from our positions for the rest of the time; after uselessly bombarding a town without making any vigorous effort to profit from this violent and destructive means, the army retires to the left bank and will recross the Rhine without fighting, on the 12th and 13th of this month. An Austrian corps seems to be advancing on it; if they judge the Armée du Rhin by its conduct, I doubt that they will do it the honour to seek it even with equal strength: however, the army does not even try to find that out, for it decamps without awaiting them. Anxiety, indecision, timidity, preside in the direction of it.'¹ This was written before the crowning mistake made at Mannheim, but it is not fair criticism. Of course, nothing is more trying to troops than retreats without fighting, for reasons which are only apparent to the commander, as in the Corunna campaign. Probably a quick and continued advance at first might have told more on the Archduke and might have brought him down sooner, but it would have involved a very rapid retreat, and also it would have exposed the army much more, especially to a flanking attack, which the Archduke seems to have been prepared to

¹ Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, note 2, p. 174.

deliver. It is for that reason I have given the march he planned, and which, I take it, part of his troops at least followed.¹ Still, it is absurd to say that Muller should have taken the risk of pitting his 18,000 men against the Archduke, who must have had more than 30,000. Once Muller had brought the Prince down the Rhine his work was done, and the critical Decaen, believing that a rapid march forward should have been made, still never seems to consider that the army should have fought, except, perhaps, at and in Mannheim. Baraguey d'Hilliers might have found some cause for complaint in his own department, for we find Ney complaining of the difficulty of getting information of the plans of Muller, though he might plead this was the commander's fault. Besides, tempting as a bold march forwards might seem, Ney, a daring enough leader, on the 8th September, after taking Lauffen, told Muller he would take care not to follow the enemy farther, on Ludwigsburg, as their strength was growing all the time and the least reverse would give him infinite difficulty in retreating.

The Archduke now ruled on the east of the Rhine and the French were alarmed lest he should cross to their side. The anxiety of the campaign had been too much for Muller, whose dispositions disgusted Ney and Delaroche, who was now with Ney's division. The retreat to Corunna must have been nervous work for Moore, but it would have been even more trying had he been informed that his advance was intended to draw Napoleon on him, and if all the time he went forward it had been with the knowledge that it was a mere question of when he would have to race back. Muller had acted the part of the live bait placed to entice a tiger from his lair, except that he had not been tied to a stake; and the bait and the sportsman might well have different views as to the moment for breaking away. Still, however incompetent Muller might seem, he had made his splash with success, and the disaster to Delaroche was nothing to the victory in Switzerland. There the Archduke's place had been taken by Korsakoff with a Russian army of 29,463 men, with sixty guns, which, leaving Russia in May, had reached Stockach in ninety days. The first Russian column, which had been at Schaffhausen on the 15th August, had been ready to support the Archduke in his attempted passage of the Aar on

¹ See *ante*, p. 123.

the 17th,¹ and had then gone for Zürich, where Korsakoff himself was on the 29th. To make up for the loss of his army the Archduke had left Hotze with 23,000 Austrians at Utnach, on the east of the lake, guarding the line from Wesen on the Walensee, where he linked with Jellachich, who stretched to Chur, and holding the right of the Linth, whence he pushed his troops westwards to Rapperschwyl. Korsakoff held Zürich and eastwards the right of the Limmat and of the Aar to Waldshut on the Rhine, whence Nauendorf with 5,400 Austrians stretched to Bâle.² The *émigré* army of Condé, probably some 6,000 strong, which had been in Russia since the 1796 campaign, had left Volhynia at the end of July to join Korsakoff, but it only arrived near Constance on the 1st October.³ A body of some 2,400 Bavarians was also coming up.

Korsakoff's army might be described as a barbarian force trained to fight with civilized weapons, extraordinarily ignorant and careless, formidable to any enemy which it could reach with Suvárof's favourite weapon, the bayonet or cold steel, but liable to suffer much from the fire of the agile French, who slipped away from its charges. Korsakoff⁴ had been with the Austrians at the battle of Fleurus, his account of it winning him the favour of his Empress. He himself and his officers were full of boasts offensive to their allies, the Austrians, whom they told, 'Where you put a battalion, one of our companies will suffice.' Thinking little of his enemy, he gave himself up to revelry, if not to debauch. What made the matter worse, with such a man, was that Tsar Paul had directed him to act under the orders of Suvárof, though that commander was still in Italy, and to warn the Archduke of this, so that the Prince should not imagine he could dispose of him. Indeed, we find him telling Wickham that he considered the Prince as a mere child in leading strings.

Masséna was preparing to attack Korsakoff and Hotze as soon as the Archduke was far enough off and engaged with the Armée du Rhin. The divisions had been renumbered—Turreau, 9,462 combatants, in the Valais, now being the 1st; and

¹ See p. 117.

² Gachot, *Helvétie*, 171-81; Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 336-7. For details of Korsakoff's position see Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 177.

³ Bittard des Portes, *Hist. de l'armée de Condé*, 332-42, with misprint of 20th for 1st, or perhaps 2nd, October.

⁴ General Rimskoi Korsakoff, *Biog. des Cont.* ii. 2244.

Lecourbe, 11,752 at Altdorf, holding the Reuss valley, the St. Gotthard, and Glarus, being the 2nd. Then came the force with which Masséna was about to strike the Austro-Russian army east and west of the lake. Soult, who was to have charge of the attack on the east, had been shifted to the 3rd division, 12,670, and covered the left of the Linth river. Mortier, although still only a General of Brigade, took Soult's place with the 4th division, 11,167, in front of Zürich. On his left Lorge kept his 5th division, 8,017, guarding the left of the Limmat from Alstetten to Baden, and Menard, with the 6th division, 8,565, carried on the line down the Limmat to where the Aar joined the Rhine. Klein, with the 7th division, the cavalry reserve, 3,696, was on the left of the Aar guarding the Frickthal, and Humbert, with the infantry reserve, 3,817 grenadiers, was at Bremgarten¹ on the lower Reuss. Not counting Turreau and Lecourbe, these divisions, with the 1,166 of the park, Guides, *Gendarmerie*, &c., made up 49,098 men, Masséna's striking-force. Besides these, Chabran had the 8th division, 9,310, at Bâle, and Montchoisi had the *division de l'Intérieure de l'Helvétie*, 2,524, at Soleure. I have only included combatants, but with prisoners, sick, absentees, &c., the nominal strength of the whole army was 107,253, besides 7,009 men under Mengaud in the 6th Military Division with head-quarters at Besançon, which belonged to Masséna. Some 5,000 of Masséna's troops were Swiss. Suchet had gone to Italy as Chief of the Staff to Joubert and had been succeeded by Oudinot, recovered from his wounds.

¹ South-west of Zürich.

VII

SECOND ZÜRICH CAMPAIGN

(September to October 1799)

Second battle of Zürich. Soult. Suvárof advances from Italy. Lecourbe's mountain warfare.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

- 1799 19th September. Battle of Bergen.
6th October. Battle of Kastrikum.
9th October. Bonaparte lands in France.
18th October. Convention of Alkmaar.

THE enemy in Masséna's front also intended to take the offensive. Suvárof with a body of some 30,000 Russians was expected by the Allies to arrive from Italy by the St. Gotthard, and a plan of operations was planned by him, Korsakoff, and Hotze, for a general attack on Masséna. Korsakoff, coming out of Zürich on the 26th September, was to throw back Mortier and to march towards Lucerne and Berne, whilst on the east of the lake Hotze crossed the Linth, beat Soult, and then moved on Schwyz. The flotilla of the Englishman, Williams, was first to assist in the attack on Soult by disembarking a regiment on the south shore, opposite Rapperschwyl, between Pfaffikon and Freyenbach, and then go to Zürich to be ready to carry some of Korsakoff's troops across the lake. Meantime Suvárof, coming over the St. Gotthard, was to move down the Reuss to Fluelen, where he would be met by the flotilla, which would take from 8,000 to 10,000 men straight to Lucerne, where he hoped to be on the night of the 25th September, the rest of the army moving on Schwyz to join Hotze.¹ Masséna, learning from a spy that he would be attacked by the enemy in his front on the 26th, determined to forestall them by one day, and he prepared his onslaught for the 25th September 1799. It is sometimes said that he knew of the movement of Suvárof, but this certainly is a mistake.² We shall find that though the march of Suvárof

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, 268; Wickham, ii. 161; Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 173, omits the junction with Hotze, making the whole of Suvárof's army march on Lucerne.

² Gachot, *Helvétie*, 207, contradicting Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 351, and Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 178.

was delayed, still it took Lecourbe quite by surprise, and that General on the 24th September, when his men were driven from the St. Gotthard, was at Altdorf, thinking only of his proposed movement into the Rhine valley; indeed, had Suvárof been still later, he might have found the St. Gotthard and the Reuss valley almost undefended. As for the letter of warning received from Suchet, then Chief of the Staff to the Armée d'Italie, it was only on the 28th September at 8 a.m. that Lecourbe, then driven right down the Reuss valley to Seedorf, wrote to Masséna that he had received this letter, dated from Genoa on the 19th September, confirming the march of Suvárof with 25,000 men on Switzerland and the Grisons. Had any previous news been received from Suchet by Masséna it is obvious that Lecourbe would at once have been informed, but he was completely taken by surprise.

The main force of the Austro-Russian army lay east and west of the lake. Their right wing, on which the attack was to be made by Masséna in person, stretched down the Limmat from Zürich to Baden, opposite Lorge's division—this being the force Masséna would first have to deal with—and thence it was continued to Koblenz.¹ Masséna intended to pierce this line, throwing part of it back on Zürich and cutting off the extreme right down the Rhine. The point of passage of the Limmat, Farh, opposite Schlieren, selected by the Chief of the Staff, Oudinot, was rejected as too near Zürich, which would leave the enemy's right too strong to be dealt with easily. The place finally chosen, at Dietikon, was almost an ideal one, for the Limmat here made a re-entering curve, so that the French batteries, placed on either flank, could sweep the right bank; whilst a small wood on the right bank in the centre of the curve, once held, would give good cover for the establishment of the bridge. Lorge's division was to make the passage, followed in time by Quétard's brigade belonging to Menard on the left. This operation was to be covered on both flanks. The covering force on its right was Mortier's division, which was to attack Wollishofen, on the lake east of Zürich, and to prevent any force advancing from Zürich. If the enemy evacuated the town, Mortier was to occupy it. On the left flank, down the river, Menard, with the rest of his division, was to demonstrate against Brugg, on the Aar, as

¹ Just above the junction of the Aar with the Rhine.

if to pass there, and to spread a rumour that the dispatch of one of his brigades up the river to Dietikon was a mere feint, as these troops were to rejoin him at night. In rear Humbert's infantry and Klein's cavalry reserve, under the immediate command of Masséna, were to support either Lorge or Mortier as required.

At 5 a.m. on the 25th September the passage began. Men to be well known later were engaged here, for Gazan's brigade led the way, Lieut.-Colonel Foy commanded the flanking batteries, and Colonel Dedon directed the pontoon train under the eyes of Masséna. The attack was the easier from a circumstance which may have been unknown to the French. The Archduke had always kept his main reserve, fifteen or sixteen battalions, at Seebach and at Regenstorf,¹ whence in two or three hours it could have been carried to any part of the Limmat above Baden. Korsakoff also had a reserve of some eight or nine battalions there, but on the night of the 24th six of these battalions had been sent east to Rapperschwyl to support the junction with Suvárof. Then a rumour of an attack on Zürich, believed by Wickham to have been fabricated on purpose, made Korsakoff order two more battalions from his reserve to move on Zürich, so that the enemy's line from Zürich to Baden was very weak. Lorge got over at Dietikon, whereupon Quétard's brigade swung to its left to join Menard, who was keeping Durasoff, commanding the enemy right, engaged, while Lorge, under the direction of Oudinot, turned east for Zürich, part of his troops using a side road to gain the Kloten road. Korsakoff, on hearing Lorge's guns, had ridden slowly from Zürich towards Honng, not attempting to get information from the wounded officers he met coming from the passage. Then, hearing the burst of firing behind him from Mortier's attack on Zürich, and believing the passage to be a mere feint and Mortier's attack the real danger, Korsakoff turned and galloped through Zürich to his troops at Wollishofen. Mortier had begun his attack too late, and, making what was really a too obvious feint before Zürich, he had attacked the plateau of Wiedikon and the village of Wollishofen on the lake. The Russians made a stout resistance and, as I have said, Korsakoff himself came to Wollishofen believing that the real struggle lay here, whilst he had better have withdrawn

¹ North and north-west of Zürich respectively.

his troops on Zürich to throw back Lorge. Some of the battalions detached to Rapperschwyl were brought over by what the French call the 'flotilla anglaise' under Williams, and Mortier was forced back, the Russians, says Wickham, taking part of his camp. The Russians fought with their accustomed bravery, but they were not well directed, and it was pathetic to see them charging up the slopes of Albis expecting to see Suvárof at the top and calling on his name. Then Masséna, hearing that Mortier was being driven back, left the direction of the advance from Dietikon to Oudinot and joined Mortier. He brought up the reserve of Humbert and Klein and restored the fight, though nine of his Guides fell round him. At 2 p.m. Korsakoff, at last realizing the importance of the advance of Lorge on Zürich, drew back his troops to the fortifications and returned to the town, which had been left almost undefended. The Zürich Berg also lay open, part of the troops brought back from Rapperschwyl being taken straight through the town to attack Mortier and not guarding it.

At the end of the day the last struggle took place. Korsakoff, instead of holding the Zürich Berg, which commanded the town, chose to fight on the narrow road from where the routes to Kloten and Baden separate, in a space of about two or three hundred yards, where, shut in amidst vineyards, orchards, and country houses, all the magnificent bravery of his troops, acknowledged by the French, was wasted for hours. The French got possession of the Beckenhof country house, which with its grounds filled the angle between the two roads, and the Russians never dislodged them. Indeed, the French pushed their light troops on to the Zürich Berg itself. Twice Korsakoff was persuaded by some Swiss officers to send out a force, by the Winterthur gate, to occupy that important point, but each time he sent an inadequate number of men, and 'instead of gaining the heights, the troops kept fighting before the gate, and charging the enemy with the bayonet among the vines and hedges, in a ground which did not admit of such an operation', says Wickham, an eyewitness. Of the Russian bravery there was no question. 'Without having seen it, it is not possible to have an idea of the manner in which the Russian infantry behaved. In the course of the morning I had an opportunity of conversing with military men of different services,

who all agreed that nothing they had ever seen was at all to be compared with it, either for steadiness under fire or boldness and rapidity of attack.¹ All this was wasted by their commander.

By dusk Korsakoff had withdrawn his troops within Zürich, neither side apparently occupying the Zürich Berg in force, though the French may have had some parties there. Oudinot had summoned the town, but Korsakoff gave no answer and retained the Colonel sent with the message. A Council was held in the Reichberg *château*. One would have thought that honour commanded that every effort be made to hold Zürich until Suvárof could arrive; and there was much to be said for one proposal, made by Gortschakoff, to sally out on Mortier and cut a way to Suvárof by the Albis, a stroke which Masséna feared might be attempted and the possibility of which made him keep his force separated and astride the Limmat. The Russian officers, however, had lost their heads; General Hiller, the Austrian officer left by the Archduke with Korsakoff, had thought matters so confused that he had gone off, and an intrigue had driven Lieut.-General Lord Mulgrave from the army, so that there was no one to give real advice. Still Korsakoff might have remained to await Suvárof had not news come that to the east of the lake Hotze had been defeated and killed, and Soult might be advancing on Zürich. Korsakoff announced that Zürich would be their tomb if they remained, and next morning, on the 26th, the Russians left, reaching Eglisau, on the Rhine north of Zürich, and meeting little resistance, but losing their baggage and most of their artillery. At Eglisau they found Durasoff with their extreme right, which, cut off by Lorge from Zürich, had also made for Eglisau, 'the only place in the country of which the officers had any knowledge', says Wickham. Meantime Oudinot at the head of Lorge's column entered Zürich, which was filled with wounded Russians and the spoils of their army. The French allege that they attacked the retiring Russians, capturing all their artillery and a great part of their army, but, though the loss was heavy, Wickham says that the greater part of their troops reached Eglisau unmolested by the French, who, however, believing one column, with which marched most of the baggage and the military chest, meant to

¹ Wickham, ii. 229-32, 243-6.

attack them, fell on it and took the baggage.¹ Wickham himself, leaving his carriage but taking off his wife, reached Winterthur, where he remained quietly till the evening of the 26th, up to which time no French, he says, had passed the Glatt river. This shows how little pursuit there could have been, and Soult speaks of the impossibility of a vigorous one. The celebrated Lavater,² who was in Zürich, was shot by a Swiss in the French service, dying from the wound much later, on the 2nd January 1801. Oudinot's conduct is praised by Wickham. When he entered the town, Korsakoff had two officers treating for its surrender. Oudinot sent off one to Schaffhausen under escort; the other, a Swiss *émigré*, he told to escape, and he connived at the flight of several Swiss officers left behind by the Russians in the confusion, whilst he protected the inhabitants from pillage and from the insults of the Jacobin party in Zürich. The Russians had been very disorderly in the town and had pillaged the villages through which they passed. 'This contrast', says Wickham, 'in the conduct of the two armies is perhaps the most unpleasant and fatal circumstance attending this disastrous affair.'

While Masséna had been so successful at Zürich to the west of the lake, Soult had been even more fortunate on the east, where he had to force the passage of the Linth. His preparations should be studied in detail on the large-scale Government Map of Switzerland, Sheet IX, remembering that changes made since have altered matters. The lake between Rapperschwyl and Hurden was then unbridged, so that the flotilla the enemy had on the lake, which now lay at Rapperschwyl, could have attacked any boats moving at the mouth of the Linth, and indeed had bombarded the shore some days previously. The formation of the Linth canal has altered the ground, for in 1799 the river spread in several channels, the principal and deepest of which had two fords, at Schänis and Bilten, and two bridges, at the Tuilerie and Grynau. For ten or twelve days Soult himself, in the dress and with the arms of a private soldier, had been placed for an hour as a sentry at each advanced post,

¹ I follow Wickham for the retreat. Compare Wickham, ii. 247-8, with Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 362-5; Gachot, *Helvétie*, 229-40; Marès, *Guerre en Suisse*, 204-8.

² Jean-Gaspar Lavater (1741-1801). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* xxiii. 457-60; Gachot, *Helvétie*, 241; Raoul-Rochette, *Rév. helvétique*, 397-8.

thus gaining valuable information, for though the enemy, suspicious of the French, fired on anybody approaching the banks, by a tacit agreement they respected the sentries. This shows that, although unnecessary 'sniping' should be prohibited, and the example often given in the Peninsula of reserving enmity for the field of battle may well be followed generally, still, where any passage has to be defended, no familiarity with the enemy should be permitted. Oddly enough, in this case Williams on the 9th September apologized to Soult for the fire of his boats on the French sentries. He might with advantage have fired more.

One difficulty was to get through a marsh to the river at Bilten, which lay exposed to the sight of the enemy. On the night before the passage, 2,000 men carrying fascines were brought up, and laid a track nearly 300 yards long, which was covered with strong beams in four hours, ready to carry the material of the bridge. Some boats were brought up from the lake of Zug, and Adjutant-Major Dellard, of the 36th Regiment, proposed another means of crossing. Going to Soult on the 22nd September, he told him he felt certain that a battle was imminent and that they would have to try to cross the river. Soult's resources seemed null to Dellard, who offered to head a passage by all the swimmers of the division, and to surprise the enemy, spike their guns, and throw them into disorder, while in rear a bridge was laid. Soult displayed or affected surprise at his intentions being known, and declared the plan was impracticable: still, if Dellard returned next day in the same mind, he would see what could be done. Dellard came back, and his plan was adopted.¹ Soult also had captured some heavy boats on the Zürich lake, which he armed to make a demonstration against Schmerikon, on the opposite side of the lake, and then to capture Williams's flotilla, which Soult hoped would be kept at Rapperschwyl by a strong battery he had placed at Hurden. One passage, led by Dellard, was to be at Bilten, the other near the Grynau bridge. Dellard had reconnoitred the ground and had already swum the river. On the night of the 24th September 1799 his party, 150 strong, stripped to their shirts and breeches, tying the latter to their ankles. Each man was

¹ Général-Baron Jean-Pierre Dellard (1774-1832). I follow the account of Dellard, *Mémoires*, 109-12. Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 225, takes the credit of the idea to himself.

armed with a lance on his left shoulder, a sabre on his left side, and a pistol and packet of cartridges tied on his head by a handkerchief passing round his chin. The sabre, to be carried in the mouth whilst swimming, was to be used against the sentries on landing, the lance was for the *mêlée*, and the pistol to spread alarm in the dark. The confusion was to be increased by ten drummers and four trumpeters who accompanied the party, which had already given a demonstration in the lake before Soult. At midnight the men received a ration of brandy, and at about 2.30 a.m. they entered the river. Some were drowned—amongst them a drummer, whose drum got under him, preventing his swimming, and then filled and dragged him down—and others turned back, but most got over; the few sentries on the bank were noiselessly killed by sabres, and, wading through the marsh, the party fell on the enemy, who were now absorbed by the fire from the left bank, and who were routed. Dellard then from the bank gave the signal for the boats to cross, and with his party made for the enemy's camp—like Gideon's men, drumming, trumpeting, and firing—whilst some peasants dressed in Austrian uniform shouted out in German, naming the regiments they knew to be there, 'Save yourselves, we are betrayed!'¹

More and more French crossed in rafts and boats, and by a piece of good fortune for Soult the Austrians lost their commander, Hotze, a capable enough General, who rode forward into the firing line and fell dead. His place was taken by the Russian commander Petrasch, an inferior man, who brought up his men in good order but so slowly and with so many formalities that they were swept away by the fire of the guns the French had got over; and after a struggle, fierce at times, Petrasch fell back, though he made a final attack with a body of Austrians, who were captured. He and his troops lost heart, and sending orders to the Russians at Rapperschwyl and to the Swiss troops along the lake to retire by St. Gallen to Rheineck,² he made for that place. The Russians from Rapperschwyl and part of the Swiss retired to St. Gallen, whence the Russians made for Constance and the Swiss for Rheineck. The Austrians retired by Lichtensteig and the Thur valley. Meanwhile Soult's boats had attacked Rapperschwyl, and Williams had to abandon his

¹ Dellard, *Mémoires*, 121, makes these men Alsatians from his party, but says nothing about the uniform.

² South-east end of Lake Constance.

flotilla, retreating with the legion of Roverea to Rheineck also. At Rapperschwyl Soult's troops took possession of the magazines, with stores collected for Suvárof. On the right, part of the enemy had been driven on Wesen, where they were captured. Soult reported to Masséna that he had taken 3,500 prisoners, twenty-five guns, four flags, and the flotilla.

Petrasch asked for the body of Hotze, which had been placed in the abbey of Schänis, and it was given up with all the honour a chivalrous enemy could pay, a company of grenadiers furnishing a guard, and two guns firing every quarter of an hour; but the proceedings show again what care should be taken in any communication with the enemy. Petrasch sent in a Major to receive the body at Schänis, but the French stopped this officer, believing it would be 'imprudent' to let him get so far. Then the corpse was sent off with an escort and an officer, Dellard, who was to ascertain as far as he could the movements of the enemy. Dellard pushed on for St. Gallen, although the enemy's posts, naturally suspicious, tried to stop him and even threatened to fire on him, until, having handed over the body, and, as he says, having fulfilled his double mission, he returned to the French lines. Hotze was buried at Bregenz. He had fallen almost within sight of his birth-place, Richterschwyl, on the Zürich lake. Soult was thanked by the Austrians for his conduct: his behaviour to the grave of Moore will be remembered by Englishmen. One incident seems to have passed unobserved. Wickham reported to Lord Grenville that amongst the correspondence of Korsakoff, which had fallen into the hands of the French, was the most material part of M. Dandré's and General Pichegru's communications and the whole history of the intrigue of the Director Barras, all of which had been sent to M. de Korsakoff, in part from Mitau, in part from St. Petersburg.¹ The correspondence of Pichegru with the enemy was well known, but it was different with Barras, who, later, was only suspected of intriguing with the Royalists and of having been offered a large fortune by Louis XVIII.² It might be suggested that Masséna, seizing this correspondence of Barras,

¹ Antoine-Balthazard-Joseph d'André (1759-1827), an active Royalist agent. Michaud, lxii. 80-3. Louis XVIII had been at Mitau from the 13th March 1798. Wickham, ii. 249.

² See Ernest Daudet, *Hist. de l'Émigration*, ii. 247-55, 285-7, 299-317; Barras, iii. 494-509; iv. xvii-xx, 384-98, 433-4.

used it as an instrument to force the Director to support him, but there seems no trace of anything of the sort, so we must assume that the correspondence never came to the knowledge of the French Generals.

It will be best to consider fully the action of Masséna when we have seen how he dealt with his second foe, Suvárof, but we can now judge the folly of Korsakoff and Petrasch in their rapid retreat to, and over, the Rhine. Suvárof, realizing the importance of their being ready to receive him when he came over the Alps, and also of their holding Masséna engaged, had ordered them to stand like a wall; but instead of doing so they had gone right off, leaving Masséna free to turn on him. Petrasch had been fairly driven from the Linth, and Korsakoff, from his own mistaken tactics, might have been unable to hold Zürich, but each inch of ground between the Lake of Zürich and the Rhine could, and should, have been fought for. Reinforcements were at hand: Nauendorf's Austrian corps, some 5,400 strong, was between Schaffhausen and Bâle, Condé's *émigré* corps and a body of Bavarians were coming up, and the Archduke was sure to return at news of the blow. Also it was certain that the pressure of Masséna must relax at once, as indeed was the case; for on the day of the battle Suvárof, coming down the St. Gotthard, reached Wasen, and all the attention of Masséna was soon directed to his right rear. Only the smallest French force followed Korsakoff, 250 cavalry and two guns reaching Constance, when the Russian battalions abandoned the place, though a squadron of Austrian Hussars, joining them, encouraged them to retake it. Still thinking only of his own safety, Korsakoff made for the east of the Rhine, where, joined by the Bavarians and Condé's army, he placed his right at Schaffhausen and his left at Constance; he guarded the bridge of Busingen and had three cavalry regiments on the left bank at Diessenhofen, but otherwise had only the slightest hold on the west of the Rhine. There Masséna left him, untouched, till Suvárof were dealt with.

Much of Masséna's direction of this battle of Zürich is criticized by distinguished writers, including the Archduke Charles. In the first place, a number of difficulties existed which ought to have been fatal to his crossing, but we may suppose that he took into account the character and unwary attitude of his foe.

Then he is blamed for paying too much attention to the counter-attack on Mortier, which he should have neglected, directing his reserve on Zürich to surround Korsakoff, who would have been forced to surrender. I venture to think that the success and importance of the attack on Mortier are underestimated by these critics. Wickham, who realized at once that Mortier's was only a false attack, describes the Russians as 'actually in possession of the French camp' on Mt. Albis, and had Korsakoff tried the plan of breaking out in that direction, I do not see why we are to suppose that Mortier's division could have stopped him. We shall soon find Mortier thrown back by the Russians in the Muottathal. Then, as for surrounding Korsakoff: stupid as that General was, neither he nor his troops were likely to make such a surrender as that of Ulm, least of all in one day. Certainly he would have tried, as he did, to fight his way out. Had Masséna stood in the way, at the best he would have suffered heavily; and even had he after two or three days' struggle captured most of the enemy, what would Suvárof have been doing meantime? I venture to think that Masséna rightly understood the nature of his foe and also his own dangerous position, and, if he did leave a gap for the enemy to escape, still he did well. Probably while fighting Korsakoff he had kept one eye to his rear. Seldom has anything more foolish been done in war than Korsakoff's rush out of Zürich for the Rhine. As for the care and skill with which Masséna's preparations had been made, there the critics are unanimous in his praise.¹

On the afternoon of the 26th September 1799 Masséna must have believed that a time of comparative rest was before him. He had taken Zürich, and, having cleared his front, all he had to do was to unite his two wings and pursue the enemy to, if not over, the Rhine. Then he opened a dispatch from Lecourbe. Suvárof, with an Austro-Russian army from Italy, was over the St. Gotthard. Writing from Altdorf at 9.30 p.m. on the 25th, Lecourbe told how his troops had been driven back; Gudin's brigade had been thrown on the Furca, his own troops had been driven over the Devil's Bridge, and he expected to be forced into Altdorf next day. He believed Suvárof intended to join Hotze (of whose defeat Lecourbe too was ignorant) and

¹ Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 187-8, 202-3.

then to march on Lucerne or on Glarus. He advised Masséna to throw all his weight on Glarus, '8,000 men at least are required on that point, and then Suvárof is lost'. Suvárof, ranging the north of Italy like a bull, had defeated successively Schérer, Moreau, Macdonald, and Joubert, and now, having lost three valuable days in trying to strike at Championnet and the army of the Alps, he prepared to join and take command of the army confronting Masséna. He left Italy full of confidence, but resenting the action of the Austrians towards him, though he retained as Chief of the Staff an officer of that nation, Colonel Weirother, and he acknowledged that his own officers were so ignorant that he could do nothing with them. 'I have', he said, 'derived such comfort from the skill and military knowledge of the Austrian staff officers', that he could not think of being abandoned by them. Indeed, he said that when the Austrians were well commanded 'they had all the good points of the Russians without their faults, and that were it not for the folly and wickedness of the Austrian Cabinet, their army would have conquered the world'.¹

Suvárof assembled his army at Taverne, a little north of Lugano, and here at a Council on the 20th September it was determined to move by the St. Gotthard. This resolution is hard to understand, for the way was most difficult; it only allowed the lightest guns to be taken and there were none of the mules necessary for the baggage. Had the Splügen been used, a better road would have allowed eight-pounders to have been taken; the Austrian corps of Lincken would have been met at Chur, and the junction with Hotze on the Linth could have been made by the 24th September, two days before the time Hotze had fixed for his own attack. It has been stated that the Russians did not know of this route, but their baggage and their heavy artillery used it. However, it was determined to dismount the cavalry, and, using their horses for the transport of the baggage and stores, to come down by the St. Gotthard on Fluelen, where Williams's flotilla would take from 8,000 to 10,000 men to Lucerne, whilst the rest of the army would make for Schwyz and Stanz.² It was believed that Lucerne would be

¹ Wickham, ii. 274, 277-8.

² I have already mentioned this plan when dealing with Korsakoff's position before the battle of Zürich, on p. 130.

reached by the night of the 25th. Two flanking columns were provided. On the 21st September Rosenberg¹ started from Bellinzona with 6,000 men and ten guns of one and a half pounds, to precede the column up the Ticino to Biasca, and thence up the Brenno river and by the Lukmanier Pass to Dissentis in the Lower Rhine valley, where Auffenberg would be with 3,180 men. Turning up the river on the night of the 23rd, Rosenberg slept at Selva and next day, crossing the Oberalp Pass, he reached the lake, but though in sight of the Urseren valley he did not descend. Auffenberg started on the 24th September and, moving up to Sedrun, crossed by the Kruzli Pass to the north into the Maderanthal, whence he fell on Amsteg, on the Reuss, on the morning of the 25th.² I shall deal with these columns as they meet the main body of the army.

Certain things have to be remembered when considering this marvellous expedition of Suvárof's. Instead of the present magnificent road over the St. Gotthard, a mere mule track led from Taverne, and on this, besides the famous Devil's Bridge³ and other bridges which could be cut or defended, was the Urnerloch, or hole of Uri, a gallery cut in the rock, about seven feet broad and only high enough to permit a laden mule to pass. It was along this track that Suvárof was about to launch his army, troops completely lacking in all the qualities—except obstinacy—required for mountain warfare. Also the season was far advanced and snow hindered the march. Suvárof must have known all the difficulties of the route and that the track ended at Fluelen. Wickham had sent him Lieut.-Colonel Clinton,⁴ and Hotze two *émigrés*, Hanseau and Varicourt; whilst a Swiss officer, apparently Captain Anton Gamma, knowing the route well, guided him throughout. However, in the words with which the Marshal ended the Council at Taverne: 'No difficulty will stop the Grenadiers of His Majesty. Gentlemen, hurrah for the Tsar Paul!' He kept his word, but at enormous cost.

¹ This was a Rosenberg of the Russian branch; another Prince Rosenberg, of the German branch, was with the Archduke Charles. Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 2, p. 109.

² Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 2, pp. 266-7; note 1, pp. 290-1; Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 380.

³ For the then state of the bridge see Gachot, *Helvétie*, 293.

⁴ Lieut-General Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B. Died 1829. Suvárof applied to him in the worst of the hardships in the Alps for 'some English ale: he says it is what keeps him alive'. Wickham, ii, note on p. 206, 223.

On the 21st September 1799 Suvárof himself left Taverne with some 15,000 men and marched up the Ticino, soon coming on Strauch's Austrian brigade, 6,000 strong, which had been watching the St. Gotthard, which made him up to some 21,000. He only had five guns, one-and-a-half-pounders. On the 24th the Marshal reviewed his troops at Faido, the sick and lame men and horses being placed in the rear of the column. At Quinto the French were met, and then began a long fierce struggle for the St. Gotthard with Gudin's brigade of Lecourbe's division. Gudin, with 4,294 men, stretched from Airolo to Amsteg, and Loison, 4,366, from the Oberalp lake to Altdorf and the Schächenthal. On the 24th snow fell, but by that evening the Marshal reached the Hospice, dining there, composing some verses, and then going back to Airolo to sleep. His troops went on, and by ten that night they were in front of Hospenthal. Fires seen high on their right showed a camp, but whether of friends or foes they did not know; the morning of the 25th proved it was Rosenberg's column, and by 7 a.m. the junction was made. Gudin's brigade had been swept from the path and had taken refuge on the Furca. It would have been invaluable in the coming struggle in the Urseren valley, but doubtless, if any choice were left to it, the Furca, the Rhône valley, and the Grimsel had to be guarded. Now it was Loison who faced the Russians; but he had lost a whole regiment and a battalion which had fought under Gudin and had followed him to the Furca.¹ I spare the reader all description of the cruel struggle that had gone on since Quinto. The French fought neither expecting nor asking for quarter from the savage horde which was thrown on them, the head of whose column they swept away time after time, generally extricating themselves when each position was lost. In Campbell's words, the snow was indeed the winding-sheet for dead and wounded: where they fell, there they lay, without hope of succour. Famine-stricken, blasted by musketry and case, crippled by frost and cold, the Russians worked on, knowing nothing that was before them, only caring that it was for the Tsar and by the order of Suvárof, who, merciless to himself and to his troops, ever urged on his men, now with jeers, now with threats, now with

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 293. The brigades seem to have been mixed: compare Lecourbe with Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 1, p. 277.

encouragement: for was not everything possible to the troops of the Tsar?

Lecourbe, whose mountain work is so much praised, had been taken by surprise this time and had not made all possible preparations for resistance. Bridges had been left uncut, entrenchments had not been fully made, and he himself only left Altdorf about 7 a.m. on the 25th September. Going up to the Devil's Bridge, by 9 a.m. he was watching the desperate struggles of the Russians to force the passage, when at 11 a.m. he learnt that a column of the enemy was coming down the Maderanthal on Amsteg in his rear. It is strange that, with his experience, he had not guessed that the advance of the main column of the enemy was almost certain to be flanked by other bodies. He had some 12,721 men, but Molitor's brigade was at Glarus. Now he said: 'This body comes from Dissentis. We must attack it. It is the left wing of Hotze. We are cut.' Then, leaving Loison to defend the Devil's Bridge, he started with part of his force for Amsteg. Here Auffenberg was being stoutly resisted by a small body of the French, and it was only at 1 p.m. that he ordered his men to break the bridge over the Reuss to cut off any retreat up the valley of that part of the French force. At this moment Lecourbe arrived, and charging the Austrians with his customary vigour, he drove them back up the Maderanthal. The bridge was restored, but now arrived the defenders of the Devil's Bridge, which they had had to abandon after an heroic struggle. Lecourbe's position perhaps shows the wisdom of never assuming that the enemy will not do a foolish thing. Masséna, when preparing to attack Korsakoff, had ordered Lecourbe to seize Glarus with Molitor's brigade, which was done. This caused a little jar between Lecourbe and the Chief of the Staff, Oudinot, who, Lecourbe thought, had sent orders direct to Molitor, a complaint which Oudinot met in the most friendly manner, protesting he had only told Molitor to take instructions from Lecourbe. 'Instead of trying for an opportunity of annoying you, I wish to live in agreement with you.' Lecourbe himself believed he was about to be sent on the rear of the enemy at Zürich, down the Lower Rhine by Reichenau, Chur, and Ragatz. This may have made him think less of any danger from the St. Gotthard. It would have been a curious position had he been launched into the

Rhine valley, meeting the flanking columns of Suvárof whilst the Marshal's main body was going down the Reuss.

Here let me explain that General Shadwell is wrong when he makes Lecourbe post himself so far forward as Hospenthal on the night of the 24th September, and blames him for it. On the contrary, Lecourbe only left Altdorf, as I have already said, about 7 a.m. on the 25th, and, passing through Amsteg only a little before the attack of Auffenberg was felt there, he never got farther than the Devil's Bridge. On the 23rd September, not believing in any movement from the St. Gotthard, he was warning Masséna to take care of his left. On the 24th he knew that Austrian and Russian reinforcements had been arriving in the Ticino valley on the 23rd and that his own troops had been attacked at Airolo, whilst Suvárof was supposed to be at Bellinzona, so it surely would only have been natural had he gone up to Hospenthal on the 24th. That would not have prevented him guarding against any attack on his rear, but he thought the attack on Airolo a feint. He knew of a movement towards the Grisons. It is hard to understand the last paragraph of his letter to Masséna on the 24th from Altdorf. 'To-morrow I shall attack the enemy vigorously on both flanks, but think of my position.' Just before, he had said he was going to Urseren and thence would turn back for Dissentis. Apparently he was still thinking more of attack than of defence.¹ He regretted the diminution of his strength by the retreat of Gudin on the Furca, and this is a point of some interest. Had he himself been on the spot (and it is difficult to understand why he was not), and had he been able to bring down all the troops Gudin carried off, this would have given him an additional strength of some 7,000, for, besides his own brigade, Gudin had taken from Loison's brigade a whole regiment, the 109th, whose strength was 1,959 men, and a battalion of grenadiers. Had only Gudin's brigade gone to the Furca, and had the 109th and the grenadiers fallen back down the Reuss, even this would have given Lecourbe some 2,700 more than he actually had on the 25th. Now apparently the Devil's Bridge and the Uri tunnel could have been held, if not altogether, at least for much longer, had not Lecourbe had to take back two battalions to Amsteg. With this addition to

¹ Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 220-2; Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 291. See *ante*, pp. 130-1.

the force already there he completely checked Auffenberg. This detachment would probably be about 1,600 men, so that had the whole of Loison's brigade been available, Lecourbe, after making the detachment, would have had some 1,000 more men at the bridge than he had actually had before he left for Amsteg. This is important, as numbers told in resisting the flanking attacks by which the different positions were carried by the Russians, and even if the resistance could not have been permanently successful, still a valuable delay might have been caused.

Of course, all this depends on whether Lecourbe, if present at the fight before Gudin retired, would and could have brought more troops down the Reuss. As he at once told Gudin to send him, I presume by the Aar valley, 'at least two battalions', it is fair to assume that he would have brought down those troops of Loison's brigade that were with Gudin. The aims of the Russians must have been unknown at the moment to Lecourbe, who of course believed Masséna to be still held in front of Zürich, so that, naturally enough, he was satisfied to know Gudin was holding the Grimsel. It will be remembered that Suvárof had left Strauch's brigade to guard the St. Gotthard, pushing troops to the foot of the Furca. Thus we may assume that Lecourbe would have wished to bring down more men. Could he have done so? It would be presumptuous to give an opinion on the point, which was one for the commander himself. When he told Masséna that their retreat had been cut off by the Urnerloch, he could have had no real information. Left to himself, Gudin, thinking of the Grimsel and the Aar valley, naturally would carry off all the troops with him. It would have been for Lecourbe to judge by the whole situation.¹

Rejoined by the troops which had been defending the Devil's Bridge, Lecourbe burnt the bridge at Amsteg on the night of the 25th, and, falling back to Altdorf, took up his post at Seedorf, on the left of the Reuss, his troops holding Erstfeld to the south and blocking the Surenen and other valleys by which the enemy could have reached Engelberg and Stanz. The odd thing is that he told Masséna he would hold the Schächenthal as long as he could, but he does not seem to have made any attempt to do so. He is blamed by Gachot for not attempting

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 293, 294, 304; Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 381.

to block the advance of the enemy at Erstfeld, but I take it that, not learning of Masséna's victory at Zürich till the 27th September, apparently in the evening, at this time he thought everything ought to give way to preventing the enemy reaching Lucerne and Masséna's rear. Indeed, he sent Loison with part of his troops right over the Surenen Eck, the summit of the Surenen Pass, to Engelberg, so nervous was he about this danger. On the other hand, he saw that Suvárof might move east, and he warned Molitor to guard Schwyz, where he himself had sent troops, the Muottathal, and the Klonthal. Now that we have his dispatches, it is interesting to see how he takes the situation.¹

In the afternoon of the 26th September Suvárof reached Altdorf, a distance of more than eighty miles in five days from the time he left Taverne—good going, especially when we consider the obstacles he met. Here he was surprised not to find Williams's flotilla to take part of his men across the lake. A rather half-hearted attempt was made on Erstfeld, for part of the force to gain Engelberg and Stanz and to threaten Lucerne, but Lecourbe's troops beat this off, Lecourbe himself making a sortie on Altdorf, which he held for a moment though he had to retire on Seedorf. Still the enemy had to abandon all hope of cutting their way in that direction. It had been expected that news would be received from Hotze, but none could be obtained. Suvárof cursed the Austrians who, he believed, had deceived him; and, indeed, Fortune had been cruel to him. As we know, Hotze, whom he was to have met, was lying dead, the army he was to have found attacking Masséna was in retreat over the Rhine, and the flanking columns of Jellachich and Lincken, which ought to have been supporting his right, both failed him.

Believing the situation round Zürich to be the same as when he began his march, Suvárof determined to move into the Muottathal, for Schwyz, where he hoped to meet Hotze. This plan is generally assumed to have been adopted on the spur of the moment, but, as I have before pointed out, the original intention seems to have been to move at least about half the army by land on Schwyz when the Lake of Lucerne was reached. On the 15th August Wickham was presuming that the real plan

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 295, 296, 298, 300.

was for Suvárof to enter the Canton of Uri—say, to come down the Reuss valley, as he did, and to proceed thence to Schwyz.¹ He does not state by what pass the march into the Muottathal was to be made, but all the passes were much easier in August than the Russians found them late in September. Writing before Korsakoff was thrown back from Zürich, Wickham even then pointed out that this march would be dangerous, as Mas-séna might break the Zürich bridge, and, disregarding Korsakoff, who could not cross the Limmat, throw the mass of his army on Schwyz, much as he eventually did with Mortier's division. However, on the 27th September Suvárof's troops began their march. The most natural course would have been to ascend the Schächenthal, cross the Klausen Pass, and gain the Linth and Glarus; but this route was not pointed out to Suvárof, and, if he knew of it, the direction may have seemed to take him too far east. One piece of advice given him was that the pass into the Muottathal was so difficult that it would be better to turn back up the Reuss, gain the Maderanthal, and then cross into the Rhine valley by the route by which Auffenberg's column had joined him. This would have brought him into touch with the Austrians, but it seemed like a retreat and also took him away from Hotze, and he rejected the plan. Turning north, he climbed the difficult Kinzig Pass, and, coming down the Huri-thal,² his first troops reached Muotta at 3 p.m. on the 27th September, the Marshal himself arriving at the Convent at 7 a.m. on the 28th. He had forced his men across, overcoming the greatest difficulties, the least of which came from the small body of French they found in the valley. Lecourbe had attacked his rear-guard but had then drawn back to Seedorf. It was apparently only on the 28th that Lecourbe received Suchet's letter of the 19th September telling him that Suvárof with 25,000 men was marching on Switzerland and the Grisons.³

Now Suvárof got from the Abbess of the Convent his first news that Korsakoff and Hotze had been defeated before Zürich and that the French were marching for the Rhine. On the day before, he had heard a rumour that there had been a battle, in which he assumed that the French had been repulsed, but that night he got fuller particulars of the disaster, and he learnt that

¹ Wickham, ii. 161.

² Running south from the Maderanthal.

³ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 300, and *ante*, p. 131.

Lincken was not at Glarus. On the 29th September he held a Council where Auffenberg was not allowed to appear, so furious was the Marshal at what he considered the treason of the Austrians. Four proposals were considered. The first was to march down the valley on Schwyz, where Masséna was reported to be, a plan which Suvárof had believed in on the previous day. Now, saying that never since he had been on the Pruth had the Russian army been in such a perilous situation, he considered a march on Schwyz or Lucerne too dangerous. A plan to return to Altdorf, and then, going up the Maderanthal, to gain the Lower Rhine, already proposed, was now again rejected, as Lecourbe, who was believed to have been reinforced, could have blocked the way. Then the Archduke Constantine proposed to march north on Einsiedeln, I presume down the Sihl river, and so get within reach of Rapperschwyl, where contact might be made with Korsakoff, after which Berne was to be reached; but this scheme, placing the army amongst the French divisions, was too wild. Finally it was resolved to march north-east on Glarus by the Prugel and the Klonthal, join Lincken and Jellachich, and then move down the Linth and along the Walensee for Sargans.

In the meantime Masséna had been busy. On the 26th September, in the evening, he received Lecourbe's report that Suvárof was over the St. Gotthard and would soon be at Altdorf. At once he sent Mortier, just promoted General of Division, on Schwyz with the 4th division, 7,800 strong, to block the Muottathal. Gazan, with the greater part of the 3rd division (late Soult), 10,600 men, was sent on Schänis and Wesen to block the Linththal. Soult himself was to accompany Masséna, to replace Lecourbe, who on the 25th September had been appointed by the Directory to command the Armée du Rhin. Menard, with the 5th and 6th divisions and all the cavalry, was left to pursue Korsakoff to the Rhine. Masséna left Zürich on the 28th September at 5 p.m. Catching up Mortier at the bridge of Sihlbrugg¹ and giving him instructions, Masséna dined at Zug, and then reached Lucerne, where he consulted Pfyffier's plan of Switzerland. At noon on the 29th he embarked on the lake, and, after a difficult and slow passage, reached Lecourbe at Seedorf by ten at night. That day Suvárof, having held his Council, had begun his march from Muotta for Glarus.

¹ North-east of Zug.

Lecourbe, when Masséna reached him, had been joined by Gudin's brigade, which had been able to capture part of the convoy of the Russians. Now he was waiting for the whole of Loison's brigade to be collected. Masséna blamed him for not having pressed the rear of the Russians on the day before, but he pleaded that he lacked provisions, and also feared he might be caught by a fresh body coming down the St. Gotthard. In reality, his troops had been discouraged and he wanted them relieved.¹ On the 30th, mounted on a Dragoon's horse, Masséna, with Lecourbe, reconnoitred up the Schächenthal, finding all the wreck of Suvárof's force; he left a company to entrench the Kinzig Pass to prevent Suvárof's return. Going back to Altdorf, and receiving further information, he postponed the departure of Lecourbe for his new command till the 3rd October, and ordered him to concentrate 3,000 men ready to pass into the Maderanthal or to go up the Schächenthal over the Klausenberg Pass. He was to prepare Loison to replace him with the division. Then, embarking with the 67th Regiment in a flotilla of twenty-three boats brought from Lucerne, Masséna sailed up the Urnersee for Brunnen. Worn out, he fell asleep, but on arrival, in an hour and a half, he and his staff mounted their horses, brought from Lucerne, and galloped to Schwyz, where they met Soult, who had come from Lichtensteig on the Thur.

Mortier had also arrived at Schwyz, about 8 p.m. on the 28th September, followed by five battalions and some Dragoons. Next day he advanced by Ibach and at 1 p.m. attacked the enemy with one battalion. Masséna came up with Soult from Brunnen and stayed half an hour to give instructions. He feared lest Suvárof, turning north by Illgau couloir, might have marched down the Sihl for Lachen, on the Zürich lake, and fallen on the tired troops of Gazan who were making for Schänis and Wesen. Mortier, who would be reinforced later by the 67th, brought to Brunnen by Masséna, was to attack, and if the enemy turned on him and made for the lake, he was to entrench himself and cover the roads to Zug and Lucerne. Lecourbe next day was to send Loison's brigade into the Linththal, to join and support Molitor, who was holding Glarus; and Humbert, who had the reserve of grenadiers at Rapperschwyl, was to advance

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 301.

to Utnach at the eastern end of the lake to support Gazan. Then Masséna went back to Seewen,¹ where he was at about 6.30 p.m. Here he found Brunet with two regiments, a force which he ordered to march next day northwards on Einsiedeln by a cut between the Hohe-Stock and the Rossberg. After this he went back to the troops acting against Korsakoff, leaving Soult to command the three divisions, under Mortier, Gazan, and Loison, engaged against Suvárof.

Lecourbe now ceased to belong to this army. He seems to have left Seedorf on the 2nd October, and on the 3rd he started from Lucerne for his new post, expressing to Masséna his regret at leaving an army whose leader had lavished such great marks of esteem and friendship on him. 'Let us act in such a manner that there may be only one army in that of the Danube and of the Rhine.'² This was honourable enough, but circumstances were too much for him, and, as was but natural, we shall find the two commanders, pressed by their varying interests, complaining of one another. He was soon to wish himself back: indeed, the Directory, finding that Masséna's success at Zürich had recalled the Archduke from before the Armée du Rhin, proposed on the 7th October that he should remain with his division. It had been intended that Masséna should detach 24,000 troops to the new army, to go with Lecourbe, but the appearance of Suvárof enabled him to avoid doing this.³ Lecourbe got Gudin from this army as his Chief of the Staff and Loison succeeded to his division.

Mortier was weak, because, afraid his division might be cut if there were any disaster to Gazan's division to the north of him—a possibility which Masséna had foreseen—he had left his reserve far behind at Rothenthurm. Attacking as he had been ordered at 2 p.m. on the 30th, he soon had to stand and entrench himself; the 67th did not come up and some of his young soldiers cried 'Treason', nearly causing a rout, which was only stopped by his own firmness and by his applying, says Gachot, 'even under a very violent fire, amongst panic-stricken men, the rules

¹ North of Schwyz.

² Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 312-16, with error, at p. 315, of date of Lecourbe's leaving Lucerne. Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 418-20.

³ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 418, says the Directory knew of the capture of Zürich, but the order was given on the 25th September, the first day of the battle; Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 1, 470.

of a severe discipline'. Eventually he had to draw back to Ibach, where he halted at 8 p.m. Next day, the 1st October, joined by the 67th and some other infantry brought up by Brunet, Mortier again attacked with some 3,000 men. At 1 p.m. Rosenberg, who commanded the Russian rear, took the offensive, and, throwing a superior force on Mortier, beat him back. The 67th—part of the troops which Lecourbe had described as disheartened—broke before the Cossacks and ran for the Schonenbuch bridge. Mortier, at the head of two squadrons of Dragoons, checked the enemy, but he had to retreat in disorder, losing 817 men and five guns. He still covered Schwyz, though the Cossacks reached Brunnen behind him, nearly catching Reille, who was bringing up a column. Masséna described these two days as terrible: 'Mêlées during which they fought for whole hours with butts of muskets and bayonets. Guns, colours, prisoners, taken and retaken several times during the same day.' At midnight instructions arrived from Masséna not to engage again until the Russians retreated, and then to follow and harass them.¹

This battle, nominally but a rear-guard action to cover the retreat of Suvárof, had shown how high the temper of the Russians still stood. That night Rosenberg received orders from Suvárof to follow the army on Glarus, and, burying his dead, he prepared to move off, first trying whether the French still held the Kinzig or if part of his force could gain the Linth by the Klausen Pass. Loison's men were soon found, and all that could be done was to try and deceive Mortier by ordering 12,000 rations to be ready at Schwyz for a Russian force which would arrive next afternoon. Then Rosenberg moved off. Mortier had been severely handled, and at first he did not even know which way Rosenberg had gone. Apparently it was only on the 3rd October that he began to pursue the enemy, capturing a hundred and finding on the track all the wreck left by their army, ruined horses and mules, with the carriages of the eight-pounder guns thrown over the precipices. He got a carriage, which he describes as that of Suvárof, a wretched trap not worth a crown, but that, I take it, could only have been seized and used in the Muottathal, for the Marshal had walked or ridden on this part of the route. Mortier halted on the summit of the Klonthal whilst the struggle went on by Glarus.

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, 350-9; Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 386-7. Masséna was not present.

VIII

END OF SWISS OPERATIONS

(September to November 1799)

Russians and French in mountain fighting. Suvárof's retreat. Ney and Lecourbe on the Rhine. News of Brumaire. Masséna and his Generals.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

1799 September and October. See previous chapter.
9th-10th November. *Coup d'état* of Brumaire.

WHILST Mortier had been engaged with the Russian rear-guard, the main body had been moving east and we must now look ahead of Suvárof at the valley of the Linth, towards which he was marching, and which two Austrian columns had tried to clear so as to support him. Molitor, with a brigade of Lecourbe's, 2,599 men, much scattered, was holding Glarus and the Klonthal: during Soult's passage of the Linth on the 25th September his troops had been used at Wesen at the west of the Walensee, as we have seen. Now Jellachich, from Sargans, and Lincken, from Chur, both in the Rhine valley, made what was to have been a joint attack on him. Jellachich, leaving Sargans on the 24th September, moved south of the Walensee and entered Mollis, but was unable to force the passage of the Linth; getting no news of Hotze or of Lincken, and the French chasing the Austrians from Wesen, he fell back on the 26th for Ragatz. Molitor was called off his pursuit of this column from the north by news of Lincken, who, leaving Chur on the 23rd, marched up the Rhine to Trins, and then, turning north by Flims, crossed into the Sernfthal, coming down on Schwanden on the 26th and capturing two French battalions of Loison's brigade. Here he hung in the wind. He had heard from Suvárof on the 26th, and on the evening of the 27th a second letter told him that the Marshal was moving by the Muottathal for Schwyz, where he wished Lincken to join him. On the other side, Molitor received orders from Masséna to close the Sernfthal, to bar the road by the Walensee, to establish troops on the Pragel Pass between the Klonthal and the Muottathal, and to crush Jellachich and Lincken if they advanced on Glarus. On the

29th September Molitor was reinforced, and he attacked at 3 a.m.

Lincken, suffering heavy losses and grumbling against Suvárof, retired on Chur, Molitor being called off by news of a column coming over the Prigel into the Klonthal in his rear. The slackness of Jellachich and Lincken, and the ease with which they abandoned their important operations, are in striking contrast to the tenacity of Molitor. Molitor's next opponent was Auffenberg, with the advanced guard of Austrians who had started from Muotta soon after noon on the 29th September, and, marching quickly, had reached the top of the Prigel Pass, 5,033 feet high, meeting with no resistance till he began to descend the Klonthal. Here he met a battalion of Molitor's which he summoned to surrender, but the French replied with an attack which forced him to halt for the night at Schwellau. On the 30th September a fog prevented all movement till 10 a.m. Molitor now came up from Glarus. This new assault from the west is generally said to have taken him by surprise, but really he had been forewarned, as on the 25th September Lecourbe had written to him from Altdorf, telling him of his own disaster and warning him to watch his right on the Muottathal and on the Schächenthal. On the 26th Lecourbe had written again saying that the Russians were moving by the Schächenthal, and Maséna had been asked to send reinforcements to Glarus. Molitor was to send troops on Muotta and to guard the Klonthal.

The previous attacks on Molitor had been by separate independent columns; now the troops on the Klonthal were Rosenberg's, the advanced division of Suvárof, so that Molitor had an army on his hands. He met the danger cheerfully enough, forced Auffenberg back, and summoned him to surrender. Bagration came up with the Russian troops, and the men, harangued by the Grand Duke Constantine, were about to attack, when Suvárof himself arrived, having left Muotta that day, the 30th. In his turn he summoned Molitor to surrender, and received with surprise the answer that his rendezvous had failed, Molitor having beaten Jellachich and Lincken, who were now far from Glarus: it was for Suvárof himself to surrender. Then began a fierce struggle which lasted till midnight; Molitor was driven down the Lontsch some way, but the enemy had to halt in the valley. On the morning of the 1st October Molitor, who had

six battalions, seeing his right about to be turned, abandoned Glarus and fell back down the Linth to hold Nettstall, Mollis, and Nafels, and thus prevent any junction with Jellachich. The enemy followed and forced him from them each in turn. The valley was nearly clear, but Molitor, bringing up a Swiss battalion, retook Nafels and Mollis. Gazan arrived from Schänis with his leading battalion at sunset, and at 9 p.m. the Russians fell back to Nettstall. Molitor had been successful: he had blocked Suvárof's march down the Linth to meet Jellachich, and Gazan, the new commander of his division, had joined him.

On the 2nd October Suvárof, who was in a house at Riedern,¹ heard how in his rear Rosenberg had thrown back Mortier, and he himself prepared a fresh attack on Molitor, to force the passage. In this he was supported by his Austrian staff, those Swiss officers who were with him, and by Lieut.-Colonel Clinton. The course was also approved later by the Archduke Charles. (This, it must be remembered, was on the 2nd October: there was to be an attack by Soult, as will be seen later, on the 5th October. It is not clear what troops Gazan had up this day to oppose Suvárof. On the 3rd October he said he had ten battalions at Mollis and Nafels, besides three in the Thur valley and three at Schänis in reserve, but on the 4th we find Soult complaining that his troops at Nied Urnen had not gone on to Glarus as he had ordered.) However, the Grand Duke Constantine and the Russian Generals insisted so strongly on making for the Rhine valley and Chur, to join Lincken, that the Marshal gave way, and it was determined to march eastwards by the cruel route of the Sernfthal and the Panixer Pass, 7,881 feet high. Had Suvárof been able to trample his way over Molitor the gain would have been great, for as the valley widened he could have dealt better with any troops Soult could have brought against him; he would have separated Lecourbe and Mortier from Masséna; and would have been able either to affect Masséna's right or to join Jellachich and Lincken in the Rhine valley. Molitor and Gazan had beaten off the attack on the 1st October: could they have stopped Suvárof if he had attacked again next day with the greater force he then had at Glarus? Mortier, in the Klonthal, does not seem to have pressed on his rear, and Soult only advanced with Gazan and Molitor on the

¹ Between Glarus and Nettstall.

5th October. The Archduke Charles is a good authority that the attack should have been tried, and the opinion that it would have been successful had, as I have just said, good support in the officers present, except the Russians. Also the apparent reluctance of both Gazan and Soult to begin fighting until the 5th October looks as if they doubted the result of an engagement with the troops they then had. It was so important to keep Suvárof at Glarus until Loison, if not Mortier, could be brought up, that an attack seemed called for, unless the same result as that of Mortier's in the Muottathal were feared.

Gachot, following Molitor, makes that General beat off 7,000 Russians with 3,150 men. I do not understand this calculation. Molitor had his 84th Regiment, which on the 10th September had been 2,599 men and which we may take as 2,000. He had been joined by a battalion of the 25th Light and one of the 44th from Soult's late division, now Gazan's: yet another battalion had been brought up at the end of the fight by Gazan. If we give each of these three battalions 800 men and add another 300 for the Swiss battalion, we get some 4,700 men, who held a strong position against 7,000 Russians. Gazan's division on the 28th September had been four infantry regiments, say twelve battalions, and two cavalry regiments. On the 3rd October he says he had sixteen battalions, which seem to be those of his own division, three of Molitor's 84th, and the Swiss battalion. I cannot see that Soult had a stronger force than this on the 5th October, so I doubt the whole being up on the 2nd October, when Suvárof's force had grown largely.¹

It is true that the great majority of the Russian Generals agreed with the Grand Duke in abandoning the attempt to force Molitor. No doubt the wreck of the projected campaign had weakened the hold of Suvárof on his army, and an unopposed march eastwards, over a pass whose difficulties probably were unknown to them, must have been most tempting in comparison with a long fight down the Linth valley. They knew nothing of the country, and Wickham, who met them a little later, says they were 'as ignorant of its points and bearings as

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 1, p. 277, 380; note 3, p. 343, 400. Molitor in Dumas, *Précis*, ii. 392-3; Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 323 and 329-31, where Soult breaks up the Glarus force; and compare with Mortier's division (Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 2, p. 343), all of which, I think, did not come over the Klonthal.

if they had been all the time in Persia. They had not even the least notion of the nature and value of the respective positions which the enemy had occupied during their march. In one word, they seemed to me to have left all these matters to their guides, and to the Swiss and Austrian officers who accompanied them, as beneath the attention of a Russian General.' 'In Italy . . . the Marshal never consulted his Russian Generals at all, making no scruple of saying to them openly before the Austrians, if ever they came to offer their opinion, that they were too ignorant to be consulted upon anything.'¹ This was only changed after he left Italy. In the Muottathal Suvárof had overborne the Grand Duke: now he gave way. It was a pity, for his bull-like rush might have succeeded once more. However, all this is conjecture. I return to his army, jammed in Glarus and preparing for a movement which could only be called a retreat, although Suvárof hated that word.

On the 2nd October the movement began, and Auffenberg with his Austrian brigade moved into the Sernfthal; but it took time for the army to close up from the Klonthal, and it was only at 8 p.m. on the 4th October that Rosenberg's division came up from the Muottathal, demanding three hours' rest. At 2 a.m. on the 5th October Suvárof left, followed by Rosenberg, and at 4 a.m. Bagration, with the rear-guard, evacuated Glarus and marched up the Linth to Schwanden, then turning off to the left into the Sernfthal. Molitor followed in pursuit. Having been warned of the retreat by men from Glarus, he had sent on a battalion which posted itself in ambush about half a mile beyond Schwanden and, when the rear-guard passed, fired on them, causing great disorder and loss until driven off. The Russian column toiled on for Elm, at the foot of the formidable range it had to cross. Suvárof meant to have slept in Elm, but an alarm given by a few French sent him into the woods. Next day, the 6th October, the fearful Panixer Pass was overcome, with what pains it is not for me to tell; the Rhine valley was reached, and by 10 p.m. Suvárof met Lincken in Ilanz. The rear-guard arrived on the 7th October.

Suvárof only just got away from Glarus in time to escape from the concentration Soutt was ordering on that place. Put in command, as I have said, of the three divisions, the 2nd,

¹ Wickham, ii. 281, 282-3.

3rd, and 4th, acting against the Russians, Soult had first placed himself at Rothenthurm, in rear of Mortier, moving on the 3rd October first to Schänis and then to Einsiedeln. On the 4th October he visited Nied Urnen, at the western end of the Walensee, to hurry up Gazan to the relief of Molitor at Glarus, afterwards going back to Schänis. Then, I take it, on the 5th October, he went up to Glarus to watch the combined attack on the Russians he had ordered. He had received his instructions from Masséna and kept a strong reserve at Einsiedeln, on which it will be remembered the Grand Duke Constantine had proposed to march. This force could be used to support Gazan if the enemy made their way past Glarus down the Linth. Part of Soult's own former division had already been sent to reinforce Molitor; the rest, under Gazan, was now also sent to Glarus. Mortier was ordered to pursue Suvárof. On the 4th October he was ordered to send part of his troops from the Muottathal by the Bisithal¹ to join Loison, but I think this was not done. Loison was to move up the Schächenthal and over the Klausen Pass, to come down the Linth on Glarus, so that Suvárof was to have been struck by Gazan from the north, Mortier from the west, and Loison from the south. Gudin's brigade of Loison's division, after retaking the Urseren valley, was to pass over into the Rhine valley, I suppose by the Maderanthal, and threaten Dissentis.

Gazan's march to join Molitor had been delayed from want of ammunition, but on the 5th October Soult, coming up from Schänis to direct Gazan and Molitor in the joint attack, saw as he got near Glarus the rear-guard of the enemy leaving the place and moving south for Schwanden and the Sernfthal. Molitor was ordered to pursue them, while Soult waited till he saw the junction made between Mortier, coming down the Klonthal, and Loison, coming down the Linth from the Klausen Pass and the Schächenthal. Loison was ordered to send troops up the Linth to Pantenbrücke, and into the Rhine valley for Flims, whilst Gudin's brigade was still to come down on Dissentis, threatening Ilanz. The 3rd and 4th divisions were now called off from Suvárof to act against Korsakoff, and were reformed. Mortier got the two regiments he had brought up and two from Gazan, Molitor being one of his brigadiers; and he

¹ A continuation of the Muottathal.

was ordered to march on the 6th October eastwards for Walenstadt. If possible, he was to take Sargans, and then to guard the valley, his right at Mels and his left at Sargans. Gazan, with the rest of the 3rd and 4th divisions, was sent north to Lichtensteig and then was ordered to march down the Thur to Wyl, whence on the morning of the 7th October he was to attack Constance, whilst Soult, with the rest of the troops he had collected, moved to Rheineck. The chase of Suvárof was over, and once more Soult was joining Masséna in attacking Korsakoff.

On Masséna's front, as we saw, Korsakoff, after his defeat at Zürich, had withdrawn to the camp of Dorflingen, behind Schaffhausen. By the end of September he had rallied his troops and had been reinforced by the *émigré* army of Condé, which had come up from Russia, where it had gone after the cessation of hostilities in 1797, passing from the pay of England on the 16th September to that of Russia on the 1st October, an awkward interval occurring between the two dates in which the troops got nothing. The Bavarian corps, some 2,400 strong, was in rear, and the three Swiss regiments, Bachmann, Roverea, and Salis, some 2,000 strong, were also with him. His right touched the Austrian corps of Nauendorff, which stretched from Waldshut to Bâle, and his left, where Condé served, held Constance. The Archduke, with 25,000 men, was coming up from Mannheim to Donaueschingen.¹ In order to assist Suvárof, Korsakoff determined to attack, too late. Masséna now was ready to do the same, and the two armies met on the 7th October 1799. On Masséna's right Gudin guarded the St. Gotthard and connected with Turreau in the Valais, watching the slopes down to Bellinzona. Mortier, from Glarus, was at Sargans and Mels, guarding the Seez valley. Soult, with Brunet, moved on Rheineck and the mouth of the Rhine in Lake Constance; Gazan made for Constance, followed by Klein's cavalry reserve; Lorge advanced on Stein at the western end of the lake and on Diessenhofen, a little farther down the Rhine. On the extreme left Menard struck at the Convent of Paradies at the head of the *tête-de-pont* of Büsingen. Masséna himself, with his Chief of the Staff Oudinot and the reserve of grenadiers, was in rear at Winterthur and Andelfingen.

Although Soult's and Gazan's troops had gone through such

¹ For his operations against 'Rhin C', see pp. 166-7.

hard work, yet the French had the prestige of victory. The right column, under Brunet, reached the lake without difficulty, but at Constance Gazan had a most curious and confused struggle with the *émigré* troops of Condé and some Russians, in which both sides got mixed together. So near were Gazan's men to cutting off the *émigrés* that they could hear the cries to let the carriages of the Prince of Condé pass, and Condé himself was waiting at the farther end of the bridge, calling on his men to hold firm as his grandson, the Duc d'Enghien, had not passed. At last the *émigrés* and the Russians cut their way through the town and over the bridge of Petershausen, which they then broke, each side, apparently, carrying off a colour from the other. One thing is to be noticed: the *émigrés* captured by Masséna were treated with all civility notwithstanding the sanguinary laws still existing against them. Indeed, Masséna's officers suggested to them that there was no need to give such French names as 'Simon' or 'Julien', and wrote them down as 'Simonsky' and 'Julienoff'. When they reached France the Directory growled, but Masséna pointed out that they wore the Russian uniform and cockade, and eventually they were exchanged, instead of being massacred, as would have happened in earlier years in the Armée du Nord. For some reason the French evacuated Constance, which was re-occupied by Condé on the 10th October, but they again advanced and got possession by a formal negotiation on the 13th October.

On the left the Russians, although not well led, proved themselves, as usual, stern fighters. Korsakoff, coming over the Rhine at Büsingen, advanced southwards to Schlatt and Trüllikon. He had sixteen battalions and three squadrons, Russians and Bavarians, whilst Menard, coming from Bülach,¹ had only four battalions and had got in advance of the other divisions. At Schlatt he met the advanced guard of Korsakoff and was thrown back through Trüllikon. Here Korsakoff should have stopped to see whether his flank was secure, but he pressed on for the Thur. Masséna and Oudinot had reached Frauenfeld on the 5th, and by daybreak on the 7th they were at Andelfingen. Menard still fell back and had reached the wood before the town when Masséna in person led on the reserve of grenadiers, whilst sixty drums beat the charge, and his staff, his Guides,

¹ South of Eglisau.

and some Chasseurs charged a regiment of Cossacks covering the enemy's column and put them to flight. This exposed the Bavarians, who turned, but the mass of the Russians stood firm until Korsakoff learnt that his rear was threatened by Lorge. That General had marched from Herdern northwards on Stein and then along the river for Diessenhofen, where he met the Russian, Woinoff, with four battalions and fifteen squadrons. Lorge seems to have had nine battalions, but the Russian cavalry at first threw him back and took four guns. Then a false retreat of the French drew the Russian cavalry into a marsh, and Lorge retook his guns and threw Woinoff back over the Rhine, the bridge across which was burnt. Korsakoff, having his rear threatened by Lorge, fell back and recrossed at Büsingen, taking up the bridge there though it had a strong *tête-de-pont*, much to the annoyance of the Archduke Charles. The enemy thus abandoned all hold on the left bank of the Rhine.

Masséna had lost 1,116 men. Korsakoff acknowledged a loss of 1,735 killed and wounded, besides the 1,200 prisoners the French say they took. The Archduke now ordered him to join Suvárof at Lindau, at the north-east end of Lake Constance, where he arrived on the 18th October. The Bavarians, I take it, were left to be added to the troops the Archduke sent to replace Korsakoff. The 'Armée de Condé' soon followed Korsakoff to Lindau, where Suvárof, perhaps to annoy the Austrians, praised them for their defence of Constance. They accompanied the Russians in the first part of their march for Russia, but before leaving Austria, in March 1800, they passed into the pay of England again, and after going to Italy for a short time they returned to Germany, where we shall find them in 1800 facing the army of Moreau. Korsakoff's troops became part of Suvárof's army, but he himself, who at St. Petersburg was considered absolutely mad, was dismissed the service, though on the accession of Alexander he was restored to favour. It is strange to think how much he, and, as we shall see later, the Russian Generals in Holland, Hermann and Essen, did for the triumph of the French.

As we have seen, just as Masséna was taking Zürich, the Directory were appointing Lecourbe to command the Armée du Rhin, and were ordering Masséna to send 24,256 men to that army. Masséna wisely had retained Lecourbe for a few days,

and, engaged as he was with Suvárof on the receipt of the order, he sent an A.D.C. to Paris to represent the danger of weakening the army. By the 9th October, just after he had thrown Korsakoff over the Rhine, he received the order repeated. In the early days of the Revolution this would have been carried out, but Masséna, trained in the school of Bonaparte, was now firm in the saddle and he disobeyed, telling the Directory that the enemy in front were still strong enough to be able to act against him. If, under the Ministry of Bernadotte, he had carried out the order to send 25,000 men to the Armée du Rhin without objecting, Switzerland would now have been in the hands of the enemy and the Russians would have been in the heart of France. If his army were weakened, the fruit of its last victories would be lost and the Republic would be in the greatest danger. 'In placing before your eyes these striking truths, I have fulfilled my duty as a citizen and as a General.' He was too strong, too successful, to be overborne, and the Directory cancelled their order.

It only remained to throw the enemy over the upper Rhine, and Soult, who had accompanied Brunet's column to Rheineck, went back to Mels, where Mortier was with the 3rd division, and, apparently on the 27th October,¹ sent him up the Rhine for Ragatz with two battalions and some Chasseurs, whilst Loison, with four battalions, one led by the future General Compère, came down from Dissentis. Auffenberg's troops resisted, especially at the Kunkels Pass west of Chur, but Mortier forced them from their position and by a charge of his cavalry took 200 prisoners. The Austrians higher up the river, abandoning the left bank, passed over to the right and cut their bridges at Felsberg and Reichenau. Mortier and Loison met at Tamins at 5 p.m. on the 31st October. Soult then sent part of Loison's and Mortier's divisions to reinforce Masséna, whom he himself rejoined. Bad weather and want of provisions and stores made the French abandon the valley—Loison's men had been barefooted in the last operation—but they retained the Kunkels Pass and the Tamina valley, whilst the Austrians remained on the right of the Rhine.

¹ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 397, and Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 281, say the 17th, which is obviously wrong. See Gachot, *Helvétie*, 467, and Shadwell, *Mountain Warfare*, 245-6.

From this time we are no longer concerned with Suvárof, but his movements may be told briefly. Whilst Lincken threw back from Panix the French battalion under Loison which had pursued so far, on the 10th October Suvárof marched down the Rhine for Chur, leaving his sick at Ilanz. He now only had about 10,000 efficient infantry. Lincken followed him, and Suvárof on the 11th went on to Balzers, reaching Feldkirch on the 12th. He now entered into correspondence with the Archduke Charles, who, hearing of the fresh disaster which had befallen Korsakoff on the Rhine, had come up from Mannheim for another campaign. These negotiations can be best followed in the correspondence of Wickham; the Austrians, disgusted with Suvárof, did not act with either good faith or civility.¹ One plan was for the Russians to take the place of the Austrians before Mannheim, but this need not detain us. The Russian troops were dispirited by their disasters, whilst Suvárof resented deeply and openly what he considered to be the treachery of the Austrians towards him. Declaring that he would move by the north of Lake Constance to Schaffhausen and join Korsakoff there, he reached Dornbirn on the 15th October and Lindau on the 16th October, leaving Rosenberg's division at Bregenz till the 4th November. At Lindau Korsakoff joined him on the 18th October, his troops becoming part of the Marshal's army. Then, always furious at the mention of the word 'retreat', he proceeded to put his army into winter quarters, and on the 30th October he began his march north-east for Memmingen, where he himself was on the 2nd and 3rd November. Thence about the 6th November he moved to Augsburg, his army, including the troops of Condé, being quartered between the Iller and the Lech. His artillery, left in Italy and sent round, had now rejoined him.

Half savage as Suvárof was, playing ludicrous tricks and feigning insanity to embarrass persons pressing him in negotiations, his habits were a trial to the unfortunate men trying to get him and the Archduke Charles to combine their forces. He dined, when he could, at 8 a.m. 'After dinner, which lasted three hours, he went immediately to bed and did not get up till four, nor see anybody till five in the afternoon, and it is in this manner that the best part of the day is constantly lost', writes Wickham

¹ Wickham, ii. 307-9, 311.

of the Marshal at Lindau; though on one occasion Wickham kept the dinner waiting till half-past twelve while he argued with him. Never himself reading or writing a letter, never visiting a post or reconnoitring a position,¹ he was most difficult to deal with. All this time, too, the Grand Duke Constantine's influence over him was growing, and it was believed he was aiming at the command. As the army plundered unrestrained, it was a great relief to the country when the Tsar, furious with the Austrians, recalled his troops. On the 25th November 1799 they began their march home.² Suvárof, who had been enjoying himself as the popular hero at Augsburg, went on to Prague in the same mood, finding a likeness in face between Nelson and himself, and corresponding with the Admiral. He left Prague with his troops on the 26th January 1800 to take up the great command of Western Russia, but he meant first to visit St. Petersburg. He fell ill on the way, and he was stricken down by a letter from the mad Tsar Paul, taking offence at his having, when in Italy, appointed a General of the day, which was an Imperial right. He did reach the Capital on the 1st May 1800, but in a feeble state, and he was met by no triumphal procession. On the 18th May 1800 he died, and was buried in the Monastery of St. Alexander Nevski.

Before considering some more general aspects of this campaign we must turn back to the *Armée du Rhin*. We have seen that the Directory, discontented with Muller, on the 25th September gave the command of this army to Lecourbe, at the moment when he was in the St. Gotthard about to be attacked by Suvárof, so that Masséna would not let him start till the 3rd October. Masséna also refused to send at all the 30,000 men whom the Directory ordered to accompany Lecourbe. Muller wished to leave at once; Colaud, the senior General, would not take the temporary command, and the Directory gave it to Ney. This was probably done by the advice of Muller, who three days before had been consulting him on the situation of the army. Also Muller may have known of some of the criticisms Ney had made, and, calling him to head-quarters at

¹ He did, however, inspect the French position before Novi.

² 'The Marshal has at last left us, carrying with him (I do not use too strong an expression) the execration of the whole country'—Augsburg, 13th Dec. 1799, Wickham, ii. 362.

Landau and overcoming his resistance, it may have been with some mild though secret satisfaction that he handed over the command to him on the 24th September 1799. Ney accepted the command unwillingly, announcing to the Directory, and unwisely enough to the army, that he would only hold the post for ten days. Then he proceeded to reorganize the army and to enter into a quarrel with the staff and with the Generals of Division. At the head of his divisions he preferred Generals of Brigade who came, as he did, from the cavalry. Delaroche, finding himself removed to an inactive division, complained that he was placed 'sous la remise', and he expressed his surprise at this being done by an officer of the same rank as himself who had declared he would only command for ten days. Then the real head-quarter staff of the army was packed away in fortresses in rear of the fighting divisions, whilst junior men took their places alongside the Commander-in-Chief. Ney had no experience at the head of a regiment, and he seems, or at least his biographers seem, astonished that his disregard of all seniority raised an outcry on the part of those passed over for younger men. Ney, like the Duke of Wellington, was scandalized when he found that the artillery, a stubborn lot on questions of rank, thought their senior General should command their arm. When General Lacombe-Saint-Michel, commanding the artillery and a year senior to Ney as General of Division, complained that he was left in rear as a storekeeper whilst Sorbier, a General of Brigade, accompanied the commander, Ney replied that he could not compromise his operations 'pour satisfaire une vaniteuse hiérarchie'.¹

In some way not easy to understand Ney pacified Delaroche and Lacombe-Saint-Michel, the latter, who boasted that he had possessed the confidence of the whole of France, being satisfied by a hint that he was not active enough to gallop about with the Commander-in-Chief, but the quarrel with the Chief of the Staff, Baraguey d'Hilliers, was more lasting. He wrote that he was not accustomed to being placed in a fortress whilst the commander was in full campaign, and he requested that he might be replaced, renewing his application three times, apparently without obtaining any answer from Ney. In his last letter he told Ney he had informed the Minister of his own course of

¹ Bonnal, *Ney*, i. 214; Ney, *Mémoires*, i. 314-15.

action, and then, ceasing all correspondence with Ney, he went off to Strasbourg, where he joined Lecourbe, now the real commander of the army. Baraguey d'Hilliers was nearly two years senior as General of Division to Ney, and it seems an extraordinary thing to shelve the Chief of the Staff of an army in this manner. This, as we shall see, had consequences later, but it must also have produced confusion at the time, and we find Delaroché writing a little later to Lecourbe from Düsseldorf that he was 'comme un homme abandonné', not receiving 'mots d'ordre, ni ordres généraux, ni bulletins, de l'armée'.

The moment was a critical one, for Prussia had assembled a corps of some 18,000 men and had announced that she was about to occupy the provinces on the left of the Rhine which the Treaty of Bâle authorized the French to hold till the general peace. Lecourbe was ordered to resist this if all possible conciliatory efforts failed; but Masséna's victories calmed the ardour of Prussia. Now Ney was directed to advance on the right of the Rhine while the Archduke was absent, and to overthrow the troops and armed peasants before him. He was given a free hand as to his further movements: he could invest and bombard Philippsburg, or advance on the Neckar or on the Main or even to Ulm to seize the magazines of the enemy, if he did not prefer to pursue the Archduke and prevent his junction with the force just beaten by Masséna. In fact he might, with his 18,000 men, do anything which could be expected from an army of 60,000 or so. One thing, however, he must do, that is, levy contributions on the countries he might cross. If France called the tune, it was obvious that others must pay the piper.

When Ney took command on the 24th September, the Archduke was still in his front at Durlach,¹ ready, Ney believed, to cross the Rhine a little farther up at Selz, to turn Masséna's left. Then gradually the situation improved: on the 26th September came news that in Holland on the 19th Brune's Armée de Batavie had checked the Duke of York, and on the 30th, more important, a dispatch from Masséna told of his victory at Zürich on the 25th-26th September. Ney, watching, saw signs of this victory of Masséna causing the enemy to send troops up the river to check him, and he regretted that the loss of Mannheim prevented him trying to retain the Archduke by a direct

¹ South-east of Karlsruhe.

attack. Still, on the 5th October he delivered attacks all along his front from Breisach, Kehl, Selz, the canal of Frankenthal, Mayence, and Ehrenbreitstein, on the right bank, using the *têtes-de-pont* he had at Kehl and Mayence, and sending the troops across in boats at the other places. The enemy were surprised and all these attacks were successful, the troops being then withdrawn again. On the 8th October Ney received a letter from Lecourbe announcing his arrival at Strasbourg for the 10th or 11th; but time could not be lost, and Ney, going from Landau to Mayence on the 10th October, next day began crossing the Rhine. Mannheim being lost for the moment, his columns crossed by Frankenthal, just below that place, Oppenheim, lower down, and from Mayence by Kastel, its *tête-de-pont*. This last column crossed the Main and then moved north down the right of the Rhine. By the 14th October Ney had his headquarters at Heppenheim, that is, about abreast of Worms. He reported himself as having from 12,000 to 15,000 men, a force which might be increased in eight days to 25,000. His task of advancing was made easy by the departure of the Archduke, who, hearing of the victories of Masséna at Zürich, left Mannheim, and, moving up the right of the Rhine by Offenburg, reached Donaueschingen on the 4th October,¹ whence he began a correspondence with Suvárof for an attack by that commander on Masséna, a plan which broke down chiefly, it would seem, from the Archduke's unwillingness to commit his main army to such a movement. He had left the Prince de Schwarzenberg with, the French thought, 10,000 men to watch the Armée du Rhin, and apparently he wished to keep himself free to march again on Mannheim if there were a fresh advance thence.² Here again the mere existence of the Armée du Rhin had an important effect on the campaign.

In the meantime Lecourbe had reached Strasbourg on the 9th October, a day earlier than he had announced.³ He had left his division in the Armée du Danube with much regret, and now he was disheartened by all he saw of the Armée du Rhin.

¹ Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, ii. 76. Decaen, i. 356, says the Prince left Mannheim the 29th September. He certainly was at Donaueschingen on the 9th October; Wickham, ii. 252.

² Wickham, ii. 252-338, especially p. 308.

³ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 315-16. Bonnal, *Ney*, i. 224, has the wrong day and month.

Originally the Directory had intended him to make head against the Archduke, and, as we have seen, Masséna was to be ordered to send him from 25,000 to 30,000 men,¹ which reinforcement, by some War Office calculation, was to give him a force of 70,000. Now, not only was the dispatch of these troops countermanded but also Lecourbe was soon told to send two regiments down the river to Brune in Holland; he had hardly 25,000 or 30,000 men to hold the fortresses from Breisach to Düsseldorf. The Directory, indeed, when they knew the Archduke had returned up the Rhine, had intended Lecourbe to return to his division with the Armée du Danube, and, thoroughly disgusted, on the 11th October Lecourbe sent in his resignation, asking for forty days' leave, after which he would rejoin Masséna. The same day he wrote to Ney telling him he had resigned, and that consequently Ney was to retain command. Meantime Lecourbe tried to improve the fortifications of the *têtes-de-pont* of Alt Breisach and Kehl. It was only on the 20th October that, pressed by the Directory, he determined to remain in command.

This state of uncertainty at head-quarters had told on Ney. At first he had been called in to Hagenau, where Lecourbe had meant to go, as he wished to see Ney and did not know that he was ready to advance. But on the 16th October Ney had again advanced to clear the country round Philippsburg. On the 17th Mannheim was reoccupied without a shot being fired; on the 23rd Philippsburg was reinvaded for the second time. The order found Ney in full march, and as Baraguey d'Hilliers and the staff had joined Lecourbe, Ney imagined that Lecourbe was prejudiced by them against him, and saw hostility in the dispatch of the much-harassed commander. Also, naturally enough, he did not like being placed in charge of the fighting force with a shadowy commander on the left of the Rhine. On the 13th October he had written to urge Lecourbe, in the name of the sincere friendship he vowed to him, to cancel his resignation and to come to the army, renewing this appeal after the capture of Mannheim. Now, on the 20th October, losing his temper, he wrote: 'By an inconceivable fatality, your coldness now proves to me that I am far from having your confidence,

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 311-24. Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 418, says 30,000. Perhaps the Minister, Dubois-Crancé, was referring to the draft of 25,000 ordered by his predecessor, Bernadotte.

or rather, that persons who are really unworthy of it have caused this step. You knew, my dear General, that I was master of Mannheim, and it would have cost you almost nothing to encourage my zeal and approve my conduct, since you still leave me the burden of command ; but nothing of all this has occurred. I frankly acknowledge to you that, deeply offended by all these machinations, I have written to the Minister of War to request you definitely to come and fulfil the honourable functions the Executive Directory has conferred on you. I ought not to be used as a dummy under present circumstances, and when you know me more intimately, you will have for me that consideration which distance alone hinders you from granting me.' Like the spoilt child that he was, Ney, not content with writing thus to his commander, poured out his wrath to the Minister. 'I ought to inform you that since the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, Lecourbe, I experience nothing but annoyances. Commissary-General Lamartellière and the Chief of the Staff, General Baraguey d'Hilliers, have joined him at Strasbourg, and do nothing but raise obstacles in my way. Pray, citizen Minister, immediately persuade General Lecourbe to come and fulfil the honourable functions with which the Directory has invested him, and do not leave me any longer a prey to the vexations of men who would do better to join in procuring the safety of the army.' As if to add a greater sting to his disregard of all routine and all respect for his commander, Ney sent a copy of this to Lecourbe.

These outbursts were as unfair as they were ill-tempered and insubordinate. As soon as Lecourbe heard that the advance was actually begun, he had written to Ney to continue it. When Ney had been asked to come to Hagenau to see Lecourbe, it was believed he was quietly preparing for the campaign. If the Chief of the Staff did not know of the advance, that was the result of Ney's own peculiar dispositions ; and as long as the army was inactive he could not well complain of the burden laid on him for a few days longer, to prevent the confusion of an unnecessary change of commanders. A little later Ney was again in flames. Lecourbe sent one of his A.D.C.s to remain with him till a certain movement was made, and then to return with the account of it. This was the plan followed by Napoleon, with such good results. Ney was furious. 'I owe it to my

sensibility, my dear General, to tell you that I am deeply affected by your step in sending one of your A.D.C.s with me, to watch my conduct and my military operations. If I have not got your confidence, I ought to be sent to the rear. I believe the Government have given you power to do this. Believe, my dear General, that I have the ambition to perform my duties. I shall never be coward enough only to serve men. My country is the constant object of my solicitude, and it is for her that I shall sacrifice myself when circumstances require it.¹ Next Ney found, or suspected, that the Chief of the Staff had sent an officer to inquire into the sums raised by Lorcet, one of Ney's brigadiers. Ney wrote to Lecourbe, saying such conduct was characteristic of the Chief of the Staff: 'I assure you, I should have had this officer arrested if I had been on the spot.'

It was excusable for Ney to be at war with the head-quarter staff, the natural and inevitable enemies of all right-thinking officers, and Baraguey d'Hilliers may not have been a good Chief of the Staff: he was soon replaced by Gudin, a comrade of Lecourbe under Masséna;² but Ney's attitude towards Lecourbe, far his senior, is indefensible. It was a pity for Ney, and for France, that this offensive bombast did not draw down on him the anger of Lecourbe, for had he been sent to the rear as he himself suggested, he might thus have learnt early in his career a much-needed lesson and Masséna would have been spared trouble with him in the Peninsula. Lecourbe, a well-trained General, making the personal sacrifices Ney was the first to talk about and the last to perform, soothed his subordinate lieutenant, reinforced him, and, informing him of his intention to advance on Stuttgart, made the best use he could of him, whilst probably he earnestly wished himself back in the St. Gotthard, with friends around him and Suvárof in front. In Paris Ney's letter was disregarded. He wrote on the 20th October but on the 13th the Minister, Dubois-Crancé, had heard of the landing of Bonaparte from Egypt. Other work than that of changing commanders on the Rhine was on hand in the Capital.

¹ Bonnal, *Ney*, i. 245. A rather more violent copy is given in Ney, *Mémoires*, i. 324.

² Général-Comte César-Charles-Étienne Gudin (1768-1812). Killed at Valou-tina. *Fastes*, iii. 261-3.

By the 28th October, when Lecourbe had actually assumed the command, the army, reorganized once more, lay as follows: the 1st division, Delaborde, blockaded Philippsburg; the 2nd, Legrand, was at Bruchsal; the 3rd, now under Ney, was astride the Elsenz, stretching from Waibstadt by Sinsheim to Hilsbach. Ney had four infantry battalions, six grenadier companies, two cavalry regiments, two horse artillery batteries, and two siege guns. A weak 4th division held Mannheim and Heidelberg. The cavalry reserve was under d'Hautpoul. The divisions, by Lecourbe's orders, were now led by Generals of the proper rank instead of the Generals of Brigade employed by Ney. On the 21st October Ney had reported to the Minister that he had 9,600 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and that a regular siege of Philippsburg would take it in six days if 6,000 infantry and a park of sixty guns were employed, covered by a *corps d'observation* of from 20,000 to 25,000 men. He estimated the enemy at 10,000, who would be reinforced immediately. Some of the fighting in Ney's advance had been severe; for instance, at Heidelberg, on the 16th October the French, driving the Austrians back on the bridge, had assaulted six times, twice getting into the town but always being driven back, and only taking the place, apparently by the withdrawal of the outflanked enemy, on the 17th. The Prince de Schwarzenberg had drawn back and was now replaced by Gorger, who placed his headquarters at Knittlingen, south-east of Bruchsal. The Archduke, engaged in watching Masséna, could only send down two Cuirassier regiments.

Lecourbe at last took the field in person. He had strengthened his base by throwing a bridge across the Rhine at Neckarau, a work which had been proposed when Muller had been driven back on Mannheim. Lecourbe took his own strength as 10,000 infantry and 4,000 horse. On the 30th October 1799 he began his advance, Ney on the 1st November taking Heilbronn and Lauffen, and sending his parties nearly to Ludwigsburg, whilst on his right Legrand took Pforzheim. The garrison of Strasbourg also, by Lecourbe's orders, demonstrated from Kehl against the left rear of the Austrians. Then the tide turned, the enemy were reinforced, and when on the 3rd November Ney attacked Besigheim, on the Neckar higher up than Lauffen, his men were beaten back by a superior force. Next day he fell right back on

Sinsheim, complaining of the conduct of his infantry, who had acted very badly; the grenadiers alone had performed prodigies of valour, but two of their companies had been sacrificed. Lecourbe took the affair quietly, writing: 'You have been unfortunate, my dear General, but I am reassured as to your position.' The enemy pressed on the whole front and the army fell back, abandoning the investment of Philippsburg. On the 10th November the army stood with its front forming a right angle, the 1st and 2nd divisions from the Rhine to Wiesloch, and Ney's 3rd division, with the 4th division, from there to Neckargemund, covering Mannheim. All the trains had been sent back to the left bank of the Rhine.

Lecourbe had long been hoping that he would be reinforced, and by the end of October Brune, in Holland, had compelled the Duke of York to embark for England, so that his *Armée de Batavie* could spare troops. About the 9th November Lecourbe was expecting eighteen battalions during the month, but these men did not arrive in time. Some of the men—one can hardly call them soldiers—whom he did receive, could not have added to his strength. For instance, when one body was sent to Decaen to be incorporated in a regiment, Decaen reported not only that they were undrilled and for the most part had no uniform, but that more than four hundred were unarmed, 'ce qui est le plus désagréable'. Lecourbe believed he had ordered the arms to be sent for, but as Decaen received no such instructions, he carried out the incorporation and then sent the men back to their depot. In the confusion in 1870 unarmed battalions of troops were sent up close to the enemy, but it is surprising that such a thing was done with a regular army. The English, it is true, in 1793 sometimes sent out recruits to the army of the Duke of York 'with undress jackets' (Light Dragoons) and without boots, those who sent them presuming that they might be fitted out from the dead men's kits, as if the effects of the slain were regularly collected and stored,¹ but even the English War Office seems to have considered arms were necessary.

When Lecourbe had left Masséna's *Armée du Danube* to take up this command, it was with the most friendly feelings towards his late chief, but his part of the operations, to clear the front

¹ Sir Robert Wilson, *Life*, i. 97-8.

of another force, became, almost inevitably, too hard for him. On the 2nd November, when he had made his advance and got his parties within eighteen miles of Stuttgart, he wrote that this, he believed, would bring down the Archduke on him and so enable Masséna to advance. Then on the 5th November, after his first reverses, he wrote again, rather in a complaining tone: he was too weak to do more than make some diversions, and he thought that Masséna alone could operate on the right of the Rhine.

There was a long discussion between the Directory, Masséna, and Lecourbe as to operations to be undertaken: part of the great might-have-beens with which we are not concerned. Masséna considered that his army should be reinforced from that of the Rhine, and, once across that river, all the troops should be under one command—his own, of course. His idea was that his own advance was to be supported by 15,000 men taken from 'Rhin', who were to cross the Rhine at Breisach and move on Freiburg, and he was asking the Directory to order Lecourbe to collect these men at Breisach and to send a bridge equipage to Switzerland. How Lecourbe was to find such a force, unless heavily reinforced from Holland, is puzzling. Lecourbe, on the other hand, believed rightly enough that the inaction of the *Armée du Danube* enabled the Archduke to reinforce the Austrians in front of him, who indeed soon drove him back over the river, and he pointed out to Masséna that if he kept a large army in Switzerland his troops would die of famine. This naturally vexed Masséna, who replied that he was waiting for orders: he knew his business, and would not make a point into Swabia to get beaten as so many others had done. He would only cross the Rhine after being well assured he could maintain himself there, and he had no idea of making a wild dash. As for dying of famine, Lecourbe was helping in that by ordering the Department of the Haut-Rhin to send nothing to the *Armée du Danube*. However, at last Masséna approved of a plan, suggested by Soult, of an advance from the left, which was to be strengthened, followed by the centre, which could cross at Schaffhausen. Soult was sent to Rheinfelden, near Bâle, and began reconnoitring the *Villes Forestières*,¹ while Turreau's division was brought up from the Valais.

¹ Laufenburg, Rheinfelden, Säckingen, Waldshut, and Ensisheim.

During the lull in active operations Wickham once more had been busy in another of the many schemes for using the great amount of disaffection which existed in France. Pichegru, whom we have seen amidst the ranks of the enemy at a French success before Zürich on the 14th July 1799, was suggesting the formation of a body of deserters from the French army, who were to be collected in rear of the Austrians, and whom he would command when enough had been received. Thugut, the Austrian Minister, however, objected to this body having anything to do with the Austrians, and the project was dropped, though Wickham still hoped to form a body of artillery for Pichegru. Then that General, with General Willot, who had acted with him at Fructidor, and de Précý, the 'fidèle Précý' of Louis XVI, who had defended Lyons against Kellermann and the Armées des Alpes in 1793, with d'André, the Royalist conspirator, arranged for a great rising in the south-east of France.¹ Pichegru was to lead in Franche-Comté, de Précý at Lyons, and Willot at Marseilles, Wickham finding the money; whilst, not knowing the Bourbons, it was hoped that a prince, Monsieur possibly, would place himself at the head of all. The signal for the rising was to be the entry of the Allies into France, but Masséna stood in the way.²

Now came the news of Brumaire and of the establishment of the Consular Government, which the Armée du Danube received with enthusiasm but Masséna with scarcely concealed dislike. The news came dramatically to the Armée du Rhin. Suddenly Colaud, then commanding at Strasbourg, received a dispatch on the 15th November by the Chiappe or semaphore telegraph, dated the 9th November, from the Capital. 'The *Corps Législatif* has moved to Saint-Cloud, Bonaparte is nominated Commandant of Paris. All is quiet and contented.' And then another dated noon of the 10th November: 'The Directory has given in its resignation. Moreau, General, commands at the Palace of the Directory. Everything . . .' Here the dispatch, as not unusual with that sort of telegraph, was broken off—as in the English case of 'Wellington defeated . . .' which, broken by

¹ Comte Louis-François Perrin de Précý (1742-1820). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* xxxvi. 30-8; *Biog. des Cont.* iv. 1014. Baron Antoine-Baltazard-Joseph d'André or Dandré (1759-1827). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxii. 80-3; *Biog. des Cont.* ii. 1185-6.

² Wickham, ii. 355-7, note p. 377, 382, 395, 400-7, 456.

fog, kept the nation anxious till it took up the tale next day, 'Wellington defeated Marmont at Salamanca.' Colaud wrote this news to Ney, wisely announcing that the last word, 'Tout', meant something more yet of change, and he sent on the news, apparently added to by still later messages, to Lecourbe, then at Mannheim, so that on the 11th November Lecourbe knew not only that the Directory had ceased to exist but also that Bonaparte and two other Consuls were at the head of the Government, Paris was quiet, and Moreau had command at the Luxembourg. Lecourbe was surprised, and so were the Generals when he informed them, no great satisfaction nor great discontent being shown: the only one to whom the change obviously was unpleasant was Lacombe-Saint-Michel, commanding the artillery. More of a politician than a soldier, long a Deputy at the Convention, and a regicide, his republicanism, and having had Bonaparte under him in 1793 in Corsica, where he had been sent as a Commissioner by the Convention, may well have made the change trying to him.¹ Later, when it was known that Moreau, and other Generals such as the honest old Lefebvre, had assisted in the *coup*, Ney and Colaud were hopeful; it was believed in this army that the change was very favourable to the interests of France, and satisfaction was shown.

The campaign on this front was not quite over yet. On the 16th November 1799 Lecourbe again advanced, the 1st division, Legrand, moving up the right of the Rhine, again investing Philippsburg, and occupying Karlsruhe. The 2nd division, under Decaen, marched on Bruchsal, Lecourbe accompanying it. D'Hautpoul's cavalry reserve followed these two divisions. Ney with the 3rd division, now reinforced by a cavalry and an infantry regiment, moved by Hilsbach and Eppingen with his left towards the Neckar, protected by a weak division formed at Heidelberg under his enemy, Baraguey d'Hilliers, now no longer Chief of the Staff. The enemy resisted stoutly, but Ney drove the Prince de Hohenlohe through Sinsheim to Eppingen; Decaen took Bruchsal, Lecourbe himself bringing up two cavalry regiments and determining the enemy's retreat; whilst the 1st division captured five guns and a whole battalion.

¹ See Chuquet, *La Jeunesse de Napoléon*, Toulon, iii. 104, 137, &c.; Decaen, i. 359-60, 373-4.

I have said this was a curious army, and now we have a scene something like that in 1795 when the Generals of Division before Mayence insisted on a General of Brigade commanding them.¹ The enemy had been reinforced, for the Archduke had sent a body of infantry and cavalry under Sztaray, who, with some troops of the Palatinate and of Württemberg, joined the Prince of Lorraine and attacked the flanks of the army on the 1st December 1799. Overpowered, the French fell back until on the 3rd December the centre, Decaen, stood behind Wiesloch, Ney being to the north at Nussloch. That night Decaen, d'Hautpoul, and Colaud, who on the 23rd November had relieved Delaborde in command of the 1st or right division, met at Schwetzingen, where they held an informal council. Lecourbe, for some unexplained reason, had for some time remained in Mannheim, just when one would have thought he would have been watching the advance of the enemy. He was reported to be ill. All three Generals were in a bad humour, resenting having been left by Lecourbe to fight for two days without orders and with only the brief apparition of an A.D.C. Decaen suggested that the senior General, Colaud, should take it upon himself to order the retreat on Schwetzingen. Colaud was not the man for such a proceeding, and instead he had post-horses put to his *calèche* and at 9 p.m. started for Mannheim to see his commander, whom he styled the 'Mountain Bear'. He returned about 3 a.m. on the 4th December more angry than ever, as, having reported the events of the day to Lecourbe, he had only been told that orders were about to be sent. While he had been away, orders had indeed been received by Decaen and d'Hautpoul. Lecourbe must have been in an odd state. On the 2nd December he had written to Decaen that he was proposing to Colaud to raise the blockade. 'I think if Philippsburg be unblocked, the enemy will leave us quiet.' This naturally annoyed Decaen, for at the moment Bruchsal, in front of Philippsburg, was being held, and he thought that if Lecourbe had been at the front he would have been better able to judge whether to retreat or not. Now he wrote to Decaen that he intended to recross to the left of the Rhine, so that the trains and park ought to be sent over on some pretext, the announcement of the arrival of reinforcements being made at

¹ Phipps, ii. 205-6.

the same time. Further orders would be sent. A postscript told Decaen to carry off some thirty cattle by a raid on his front.

Decaen now pointed out to Colaud and d'Hautpoul that, as the enemy forces were massed in front of him and of Ney, it would be more than rash to await an attack; it would also be dangerous to take the chance of orders arriving in time from Lecourbe, and he asked Colaud to undertake the responsibility of giving orders to them. Colaud, of the school of Kléber, of course again refused, as then did d'Hautpoul, so Decaen said, 'Well, I will undertake it myself, and I hope you will obey.' 'What are you going to do?' said the other two Generals. 'Replace the Commander-in-Chief; give you orders', replied the General of Brigade to the two men who had been Generals of Division for years; and he wrote not so much orders as letters to the two Generals and to Ney, saying that he intended to put his troops in march to retire on Schwetzingen, a step which, of course, forced the divisions right and left of him, Ney and Colaud, to retire also. The letters written, 'I suppose you have nothing to say?' 'Nothing, we are going to take our measures', and off they went, not even taking their letters. Ney, receiving his letter, made no remonstrance, and announced that he was falling back to Kirchheim and Rohrbach to the east of Schwetzingen, and away went the army. Lecourbe now sent instructions to take up much the same ground, but the Generals made no alterations in their plans.¹

In these orders of the 4th December Lecourbe directed the divisions to recross the Rhine, the cavalry of d'Hautpoul at 7 p.m. that day, Ney at 8 p.m., Decaen at midnight, and Colaud at 2 a.m. on the 5th December. On the morning of the 4th Lecourbe sent an officer to treat with the enemy for a suspension of arms, and an agreement was concluded that day, a formal one being signed by Lecourbe and Sztaray on the 5th December. By this the French were to hold the ground close in front of Mannheim, the line giving them Neckarau (where, as I have said, Lecourbe had thrown a bridge over the Rhine) and running to Seckenheim, over to the right bank of the Neckar. Lecourbe apparently meant to hold Mannheim, I suppose with the troops of the 4th division under Baraguey d'Hilliers, for all the other divisions went over the Neckarau bridge to the left of the Rhine,

Decaen, i. 405-12.

and were broken up at once. Ney had said that he could hold Neckarau against 30,000 Austrians, but I presume he meant with a strong garrison. Sztaray, however, had stipulated that the approval of the Archduke should be necessary for the validity of the armistice, and the Prince naturally refused it, as it was too advantageous to the French. Lecourbe then brought the remainder of his troops to the left bank, and on the 11th December the Austrians took possession of Mannheim. It gives an idea of the odd state of Lecourbe that when Decaen went to find where he himself was to go, after the breaking up of his division on the 4th December, he found Lecourbe at the theatre at Mannheim; Lecourbe's wife falling ill there, Decaen could get no reply till the next day.¹

Further operations on this front and in Switzerland were stopped by Bonaparte, now First Consul. On the 24th November 1799 the Consuls had ordered that the Armée du Danube was to be amalgamated with the Armée du Rhin, the whole being called the Armée du Rhin, distinguished by me as 'Rhin D', the force which was to fight at Hohenlinden and to be commanded by Moreau, now in Paris. Head-quarters soon were placed at Strasbourg, so that this formation was the reversal of that by which in May Masséna had brought the Armée du Danube 'A' up the Rhine into Switzerland. At first this new army stretched from the St. Gotthard down the Rhine to Düsseldorf. On the 28th November Moreau wrote from Paris most affectionately to Lecourbe, saying he had been given the selection of the Generals of Division he wished to have as his lieutenants. He had chosen Lecourbe, who was to hand over his command to the General in whom he had most confidence, and was to go to Switzerland to replace Masséna in command of the late 'Danube B', now the right wing of 'Rhin D'. Lecourbe seems to have started on the 4th December, that is, before Mannheim was evacuated on the 11th December, and his late Chief of the Staff, Baraguey d'Hilliers, took command here of what was now the left wing of 'Rhin D'; later he was succeeded by Saint-Cyr. Moreau arrived at Bâle on the 26th December.²

¹ Decaen, i. 413-14. In Révérend's *Armorial du premier Empire*, Lecourbe is only shown as marrying in 1802.

² Picard, *Bonaparte et Moreau*, 71. Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 349, which makes him arrive on the 24th January, must be wrong.

Whilst Moreau returned to the Rhine, where he had commanded in 1796-7, Masséna was sent to command in Italy, where he had fought and served until 1798, a change natural enough considering the past record of the two Generals, but one which gave Masséna a beaten instead of a victorious army. Turreau, the senior General, took command of the late 'Danube' until the arrival of Lecourbe on the 10th December. Masséna left for Paris on the 29th November 1799,¹ expressing to Soult his regret at parting from him and his hope of getting him in Italy. On the 10th December he wrote from Paris telling Soult to get ready for Italy, where he would be ordered. A little later Moreau met Soult at Rheinfelden, when he showed his discontent with Bonaparte's accession to power. Soult then left to join Masséna, visiting his mother on the way to present to her his wife, for the first time; but he was hurried on by Masséna to receive the command of the right wing, three divisions, of the Armée d'Italie. He reached Genoa on the 14th February 1800. Masséna had taken with him General of Division Oudinot, his Chief of the Staff, and also chose Turreau and Loison to follow him to Italy. Turreau, though the senior General in the army, seems a curious choice: he had commanded the Armée de l'Ouest in La Vendée in the early months of 1794, with an evil reputation. Placed at first, as I have just said, in command of the Armée du Danube when Masséna left it, he was ordered to Italy on the 28th December, when he handed over his own division, the 1st, to Mortier; then, fearing that Lecourbe, who was now commanding the army, might be displeased, he remained for orders. Masséna had applied for Mortier to join him too, and that General started, half unwillingly; but on his way, at Paris, an order of the 15th April gave him the important command of the 17th Military Division, at Paris, where he succeeded his friend Lefebvre, who used this appointment to reassure his friends on the frontier as to the meaning of the *coup d'état* of Brumaire.

Throughout Masséna's command in Switzerland there were constant complaints from the Swiss of his exactions and requisitions, levied on them often with threats such as that of destroying Zürich if his demands were not complied with. These

¹ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 445, says 28th, but see Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 338, and Gachot, *Helvétie*, 493.

demands, however, seem to have been made for the supply of his army, and however tender-hearted a General may be, his first duty is to enable his men to live. From whom was he to get supplies? From France? When the Minister of War, Dubois-Crancé, was asked to furnish statements of the pay, food, and clothing furnished to the armies, he replied that they did not pay, feed, or clothe the armies,¹ and it would seem that, far from disapproving these demands of Masséna, he considered his conduct modest and patient; whilst all the French Directory did was to promise that they would regard the loans made by Masséna as a sacred debt for France. This was no consolation to the Swiss, any more than Masséna's insistence on the gratitude they ought to feel for the army which saved them from the Austrians. They complained that they were treated and drained as if they had been a conquered country. No doubt they were right, but the fault did not lie with Masséna, who seems to have done his best, for instance, to save Zürich from the worst evils of assault. It was one of the hard necessities of war. One sentence of the report of the Minister, on the 24th October, shows all that could be expected from France. 'For four months the service for the war is null. Hospitals, pay, subsistence, ammunition, clothing, armament, remounts, all is blocked, every sort of service is abandoned, all credit is destroyed.'² Unless Masséna abandoned the country, all he could do was to wring from it what France refused.

Considering the campaign as a whole, it will have been seen that the history of the *Armée du Rhin* is that of a series of advances from Mannheim up the right of the Rhine, to call off the attention of the Archduke from Masséna in Switzerland. Although the frequent retreats may give a ridiculous appearance to the army, still it was successful in its real duty. It was obvious that the army must retire whenever the enemy in front of it was reinforced, and any criticism of Muller on that ground applies also to Lecourbe. It would seem as if more effect might have been produced if less attention had been paid to Philippsburg, and more of the army had been thrown boldly forward. We have Lecourbe's reason for not doing this: he could not advance farther leaving in rear Philippsburg with its garrison of some 3,000, besides a corps of the enemy at Durlach, which might have taken him on his right rear.

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 327.

² Jung, *Dubois-Crancé*, ii. 299.

Napoleon considered the whole campaign of this army a mistake. Philippsburg could not be captured without a siege of from 30 to 40 days, and before that could be undertaken the Archduke would have had to be driven back even from Ulm. 'It would have been preferable for the Armée du Bas-Rhin, instead of acting on the extreme right of Prince Charles, to have acted on a system contiguous to that of the principal army.'¹ He thought the advances of the army dangerous: Lecourbe should have established an entrenched camp on the right bank, before Kehl or Strasbourg, which, at first with 20,000 and later with 30,000 men, would have disquieted the Archduke and kept all Germany in alarm. Here, as in a few other instances, it is permissible to believe that the Emperor was not fully informed of the facts. We, who are not so much concerned with true strategy as with what was actually done here, must remember that Muller (whose actions, I take it, Napoleon confuses with those of Ney and Lecourbe), having only some 18,000 men, had called off the Archduke with some 30,000 men from in front of Masséna, and in reality had kept a body of some 40,000 or 50,000 of the enemy employed against him whilst Masséna fought at Zürich. Of course Napoleon was right and the march of the Archduke, as that prince well knew, was absurd, but still this army had much to do with it, and it did invaluable work, though unskilfully. If it blundered, yet it induced the enemy to make a blunder fatal to their campaign.

As I have said, the reader may find a resemblance between the operations of this army and those of Moore in the Corunna campaign, if he imagines an army advancing from Corunna to attack Soult, whose outposts it could soon reach, its commander knowing, and intending, that his march would bring down Napoleon, operating on Madrid, on his flank. When Napoleon marched on him, the Corunna General would retreat towards Corunna, turning back on Soult as soon as Napoleon fell back on Madrid. Of course there are many differences, especially in the existence of Philippsburg, a fortress which lay on the right of the line of march and which tied down a great part of the Rhine army for its blockade. The Archduke's attacks on this army were always a good deal in the nature of flank strokes

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 276, 290-1. Napoleon always refers to this army as 'l'armée du Bas-Rhin'. Also compare Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 164-5, on this point.

if it ventured far on its true line up the Neckar, and the Austrians always held Durlach, above Karlsruhe.

There are three main points of interest in the history of this army: the effect it produced in drawing the Archduke away from the front of Masséna; the revelation Ney made during his service here of his unruly, insubordinate character; and, lastly, what was believed to be an intrigue of Bernadotte. Once made Minister of War, it was but natural that he should propose the formation of an army to operate in this theatre. Dubois-Crancé, his successor in the Ministry, thought that two armies were not required to act in Germany.¹ That opinion, however, was given when it was intended that Masséna's *Armée du Danube* should penetrate into Swabia, and really the use of such a flanking force is obvious. The Archduke, when advancing against Jourdan for Stockach, considered his success depended on whether Bernadotte's *Armée d'Observation* were made strong enough to advance;² and in 1800 Bonaparte provided the *Armée Gallo-Batave*, under Augereau, to flank the *Armée du Rhin* under Moreau, although now he blames the action of this army so far from Masséna.

In describing this campaign of Masséna's I have not considered the higher, wider strategy, which would involve him with the operations of the *Armée d'Italie* on his right, across the Alps, and only slightly his connexion with the *Armée du Rhin* on his left, for I think that practically he acted with regard only for his own theatre. Doubtless it would have been different had the *Armée d'Italie* made a better fight for it, and we have seen Lecourbe trying to communicate with that force on various occasions, but the retreat of Schérer and then of Moreau was so rapid that there was no real connexion between the two armies. Masséna gained by having Bellegarde's army of the Tyrol, or its remains, called away from him into Italy, and he nearly lost everything when, the *Armée d'Italie* being practically crushed, Suvárof came over the Alps to attack him. He had to try to hold the St. Gotthard and other passes as well as the Valais, and before striking any blow to his front he had to calculate the chances of his rear being attacked: otherwise he had no dealings with Italy.

It was much the same with the *Armée du Rhin* on his left.

¹ Jung, *Dubois-Crancé*, ii. 305-7.

² *Paget Papers*, i. 159.

When the Mannheim force was under him, he did use it to make a diversion on that flank,¹ but when once, to his annoyance, it was made a separate force, he seems to have thought but little of it. He does not seem to have urged Lecourbe on when he became commander, and certainly he did not consider himself bound to try to take any pressure off him. He may be said to have owed his victory of Zürich and his repulse of Suvárof to the effect of the operations of the *Armée du Rhin*, but the order to the Archduke to march down the Rhine in September 1799 was so contrary to common sense that I presume Masséna considered it a lucky chance, not to be put to the credit of Lecourbe. I think he believed he might have done better had he been free to use Lecourbe's troops at his pleasure, probably drawing some of them up to Zürich, and he saw only danger in the detachment of such a force. Anyhow, there was no more attempt to act with the *Armée du Rhin* than with the *Armée d'Italie*.

It is very hard to judge the strategy of Suvárof. He can scarcely be made responsible for the choice of the St. Gotthard route, for he can have known nothing of the comparative merits of the passes. I can only suggest that the St. Gotthard may have seemed to present one advantage: his approach behind the right of Masséna might prevent Masséna striking at Korsakoff, whilst a longer route would give him time for his blow. Had the proper transport met Suvárof at Taverner, apparently he would have been in time. As it was, he was under a wrong impression all the way, and was exposing his army for the sake of a junction with men who were deserting him. Granted that he had no right to expect to find Korsakoff victorious, or even holding his position at Zürich, still he was justified in not conceiving the craven abandonment of the Zürich Berg, and the extraordinary retreat to and over the Rhine. When Masséna on the 26th September knew that the Russian was almost at Altdorf, he also knew his front was clear, at least for some days, and he could send two divisions to meet the raid on his rear. Had he had to deal with an enemy holding the Zürich Berg, or massing on the Thur, he would have been in a most dangerous position. Without Soult's and Mortier's division to oppose him, Suvárof would have made his way from

¹ See pp. 88-9.

Schwyz, or certainly would have cut his road through Glarus. Also, what can be said for his abandonment by Lincken and Jellachich? Jellachich at least could have prevented Gazan sending reinforcements to Molitor, and nothing is so easy to understand as the fury of Suvárof with the Austrians.

The usual accounts of Suvárof's expedition into the Alps make it seem as if he was constantly headed by the French, eventually escaping from them with difficulty and being harassed by them to the end. This does not represent the real events, even if we follow the French accounts. On his way over the St. Gotthard and down to Altdorf he had to deal with two brigades of Lecourbe's. One, Gudin, he swept aside to the Furca; the other, Loison, he drove right down the Reuss valley and threw over to the left; both remained guarding passes he did not intend to use, and neither made any serious attempts on his rear: indeed the St. Gotthard does not seem to have been cleared by the French till some time after Suvárof had gained the Rhine valley. He then crossed into the Muottathal, meeting no real resistance from the French. Here on the 28th September he was halted by the news of the disaster at Zürich, otherwise it seems there would have been no difficulty in his advancing by Schwyz against Masséna's right. Mortier only reached Schwyz late that night, and when he did attack, on the 30th September, he was forced back, and when attacked in his turn next day, he was driven off the field with loss and had to retire in confusion: this not by the assault of the whole Russian army but only in an action fought by their rear-guard to cover their movement by the Prigel and Klonthal on Glarus. The effect on Mortier was to make him keep his hands off till the enemy was safely away from Glarus. According to Soult, Mortier took 300 prisoners from an enemy who must have been dropping men at every step, but these were mostly dead by the time Mortier reached them.

At Glarus Lecourbe's 3rd brigade, under Molitor, reinforced by Gazan, really did check Suvárof and turn him from his path, but, as I have explained, he and his best counsellors believed he could have broken through: he gave way to his Russian Generals, men whose ignorance he had before despised, and to his Grand Duke. It is significant that when he left Glarus for the fearful ascent of the Panixer Pass, when it was so much the

interest of the French to maim their retreating enemy, Molitor, who must have been daring enough, halted at Schwanden and busied himself, not in following the foe, but in barring the road against the possibility of his return; he sent on Compère with some men, who followed farther, but he advised him not to risk himself in any adventure.¹ In other words, the French, having started with the idea that they had Suvárof in their toils, seem to have been relieved when he broke free.

Lecourbe is often represented as the conqueror of Suvárof. He was too great a General to be given praise he did not deserve, and Soult, who succeeded him, modestly and truly enough says that Lecourbe left for the Armée du Rhin before the French took the offensive against the force from Italy. To do him justice, Lecourbe did not represent himself as victor. It was not that he had been driven down the St. Gotthard to Altdorf, but that he had delayed Suvárof so little. To Masséna he represented the course of affairs up to Altdorf as a disaster, and he considered he had been lucky in not having been taken with three or four battalions. 'I have just been unfortunate,' he tells Molitor, 'this contretemps upsets all our plans.' With his back to the hills, he dared little in attacks on the Russians, as Masséna complained, even when they had begun to withdraw from before him for the Muottathal. Obviously he, like Molitor later, was nervous about a return stroke from the enemy, and he acknowledged that his troops were disheartened. The bull-like rush of Suvárof had overborne the distinguished General. One is so often called on to admire the triumph of intellect, and to see the bull fall before the skill of the matador, that one cannot but be a little amused when the matador has to make for the barrier and stands there panting, leaving the bull master of the arena.

Mathieu Dumas believed that Lecourbe had prevented Suvárof, when he reached the end of the Reuss valley on the 26th September, from breaking out to the west for Stanz and Lucerne with part at least of the army, as originally planned.² Driven down to Altdorf, Lecourbe had naturally taken post on the left of the Reuss, guarding the bridges at Seedorf and Erstfeld and thus blocking the Surenen and other passes. When

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, 418-19, 442.

² Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, 53-5. He overestimates Lecourbe's strength.

the head of Suvárof's column came down, of course contact was made with it to find its strength, and a regiment was sent to take Erstfeld and to make its way up the Erstfelderthal for Stanz. Then when Suvárof himself arrived and the whole situation was reviewed, he saw that without news of Jellachich, Lincken, or Korsakoff, the army could not be divided as had been originally intended; nor could the whole army, not a very strong force, be sent in rear of Masséna if Korsakoff were not ready to act. No doubt the resistance of Lecourbe was taken into account, and the Russians overestimated his strength, which they put at 6,000 men. He himself says he had three weak battalions and some grenadier companies, but several companies had been sent or driven into the Muottathal, and Gachot gives him 1,550 infantry, 26 troopers, and 8 guns. He had with him at Altdorf from 700 to 800 men, whilst Loison, higher up the valley, had the rest of the force, two battalions, with a long line to guard.

Lecourbe's own dispatches show that at Altdorf he did not receive any of the fierce assaults the Russians made when they wanted to break through. On the 26th September he informed Masséna that he had eight battalions before him, and they had been cannonading one another since noon. 'Send troops very rapidly to Schwyz; the enemy is filing by the Schächenthal and will turn off by the Muottathal.' Next day he wrote that 'all day the enemy has been in movement in the Schächenthal and in the valley of the Reuss; he has sounded the river wherever he could, but has effected nothing'. There had been 'un combat des plus vifs', but that was on the right of the Reuss when, anxious lest he should be turned on his right, he had recalled the enemy acting there by a sortie across the Altdorf bridge, retiring, or being driven back, when his purpose had been attained. From the first he judged that Suvárof would go up the Schächenthal for the Muottathal, though naturally he was anxious not to be turned if the enemy wished to disable him from any pursuit of their rear-guard by such a blow as they were soon to deal Mortier. Everything we know is inconsistent with his having had to meet a serious attempt to break through him to the west.¹

I do not mean to diminish the extent of the disaster to

¹ Philebert, *Lecourbe*, 293-308.

Suvárof and his army. Not including Austrians, Auffenberg's brigade of 2,000 which joined him in the Reuss valley from Dissentis, or Strauch's brigade of 6,000 which he found at the foot of the St. Gotthard and which he left at the top, he had at Taverne 21,284 Russians. On the 30th September in the Muottathal he had 18,249 in the ranks, a nominal loss of 3,035, but I think some 647 of these were still with him, sick, lame, or defaulters. At Chur he only had 9,315 in the ranks, many of whom were really ill. He himself acknowledged a loss from the 12th September to the 12th October of 131 officers and 5,100 men, but I presume he still counted the sick left at Ilanz as part of his strength. The light artillery brought with him, and almost all the mule transport, were gone; the army was a wreck, unable to take its place in the campaign. Still, of the loss, the proportion from French fire or steel was small compared with that from cold, fatigue, and famine. He did bring off part of his convoy, and the march was never a flight.¹ For instance, he had all his decorations carried in a case on a mule behind a Colonel, Trotcherko, and when that officer was at length extricated after falling into a crevasse on the 20th September on the way to Muotta, the Marshal had all his jewellery laid out and counted. On arrival at Ilanz, in the Rhine valley, Suvárof and all his staff appeared at dinner in full dress. Auffenberg at Chur still held 1,418 French prisoners taken by the Russo-Austrian army between the 24th September and the 2nd October.² The end of the campaign is disappointing. With Suvárof's army maimed, he himself furious with the Austrians, and the Archduke's attention divided between Masséna on his left and Lecourbe with the Armée du Rhin on his right, some great stroke might have been expected from the French.

Napoleon's remarks on this campaign are based on such incorrect information that I prefer to consider those of Soult, who was engaged in the campaign.³ He blames the Archduke for not having followed up Masséna when he had forced the French to evacuate Zürich. He might have thrown them right back across the lower Reuss, beyond Lucerne and the Brienzer-

¹ Gachot, *Helvétie*, note 2, pp. 266-7, note 1, pp. 366-7, 440, 449.

² Spalding, *Suvárof*, 208-9; Gachot, *Helvétie*, 451.

³ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 272-6, 289-90. Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 305-10. Some of the dispatches of Wickham had been seen by Soult, apparently in 1838 or before. Wickham, ii. 169, 201-2.

see. Already he had troops in the upper Valais and on the Grimsel, and he would thus have opened the way for Suvárof, who, Soult considered, should have crossed by the Valais (I presume he means by the Great St. Bernard). Instead, the Archduke let Masséna make his positions too strong for attack, and when he did try to cross the Aar it was done feebly and was not persisted in. Finally he blames the Archduke for leaving Switzerland before Suvárof had arrived. He knew that in this case the Prince acted on orders, but these, he considers, should have been disobeyed; and he mentions the belief held by some that the Prince was influenced by dislike for being subordinated to Suvárof, under whom he had nominally been placed.

One has to walk warily in considering the criticisms of such a General, but the Archduke himself, if he had been a free agent, would have agreed with most of them. For instance, at the end of June a considerable force under Haddick, of which Strauch's brigade was the advanced guard, had been marching into the Valais, when it was twice recalled by Suvárof. As I have said, we find the Prince on the 2nd July lamenting this: if Haddick, he said, had remained, he himself would at least have been at Berne, and, had not Bellegarde sacrificed eighteen battalions, he had no doubt that he would long since have driven the French from Switzerland. As it was he thought he might, by a desperate attack, drive Masséna from his position, but that 'it would cost him the flower of the Austrian infantry, already too weak, and leave the army incapable of making any use of its victory'. To add to this, the Archduke was much depressed by his peculiar position with respect to the Austrian Court, which, he complained to Wickham on the 2nd July, had left him from the beginning of the campaign without any orders or instructions. His advance from the Lech had been objected to; when he had driven back Jourdan's Armée du Danube, he had proposed to attack Switzerland, but 'he had been peremptorily ordered to abstain from the attempt, and the same orders alone had prevented him from marching forward after the capture of Zürich'. So hurt was he that he declared that if a larger discretion were not given him in the next campaign, he certainly would resign the command of the army.¹ Here, then, we find two masters of the Art of War in agreement.

¹ Wickham, ii. 116-17, 123, 124-6, 185.

As for the Archduke's march down the Rhine, we have seen that the cause of it was made the subject of a dispute between the Austrian and English Ministers.¹ Fortunately, all we are concerned with is the conduct of the Archduke, who announced that the withdrawal of his army would be fatal. The difficulty of his position was great, for the Count of Dietrichstein arrived from Vienna bringing positive orders not under any circumstances to attack the enemy or to make any forward movement, but to withdraw his army from Switzerland. When the Archduke did resolve to cross the Aar, Dietrichstein not only opposed the operation, but also warned the Generals who advised it that they were taking a very heavy responsibility on themselves, for if the Prince remained any longer in Switzerland it would involve the Courts of Vienna and London in a serious dispute. It is obvious that the Prince fully realized the errors of the march, but he was powerless in the matter. As he said, had the order been based on military considerations, not on political ones, he would have disobeyed it, but he could not take the responsibility in such a matter. Lord Raglan in the Crimea might have disregarded an order from his Government if based on military reasons, but not if the alliance with France were said to depend on its performance. The quaint thing is that the fate of this campaign was decided by the different attitudes of the two commanders towards their Governments, the Archduke marching away in obedience to an order he knew to be wrong, and Masséna refusing to make the detachment he felt would be fatal.² Had Saint-Just been at his side, with the guillotine in prospect, he must have obeyed, and the campaign would have ended in disaster.

It will be seen that these campaigns in Germany and Switzerland affected the fortunes of several future Marshals. Of these, Soult made the greatest stride in advance, becoming what I may call a Wing Commander, entrusted with important operations, and thought so highly of by Masséna, who first met him here, that he took him to Italy, where unfortunately their good understanding ceased. Ney and Oudinot both began their careers as Generals of Division in this army, both showing themselves to be hard fighters and both being wounded, though that was a commonplace incident with Oudinot. Ney must have been

¹ See *ante*, p. 121.

² See *ante*, pp. 161-2.

highly praised to Masséna to have been given the different commands he held here in succession. He justified this confidence in him by his conduct as a fighter, but unfortunately he began to show his unruly temper, which was to become more pronounced while he was with the Armée du Rhin. Oudinot, having shown how he could lead a division, became Chief of the Staff to Masséna, who must have been well satisfied with him as he took him in the same capacity to Italy. Suchet had shown skill in leading a brigade: indeed it is a curious, though common, error which makes his success only begin in Spain. For a short time he had been Chief of the Staff to Masséna, their separation being a puzzle I cannot resolve.¹ Mortier was winning his way upwards. Masséna promoted him General of Division on the battlefield of Zürich on the 25th September, and the notice soon taken of him under the Consulate would prove that I have underestimated his conduct both before Zürich and in the Muottathal.

As for other Generals, Lecourbe, not long promoted General of Division, had done his finest mountain work here in the Engadine and on the St. Gotthard. That the Engadine expedition did not lead to disaster was due to him, and I presume that his leadership there won for him the rather unfortunate command of the Armée du Rhin. He had been unlucky, if not careless, for a moment on the St. Gotthard when meeting Suvárof, and he showed signs of indecision in his new command, difficult as that was. It must be admitted that in the whole period from the time Suvárof came on him on the St. Gotthard till the end of his command of the Armée du Rhin, he fell far below his usual standard. We find all his commanders of divisions, except perhaps Baraguey d'Hilliers, dissatisfied with his inaction and with his absence from the front of the army at critical moments. It is true that Colaud, Ney, and Decaen were all men of the 'frondeur' type, hard to please at any time, but here their complaints were well founded. The case of Decaen was a peculiar one. He, only a General of Brigade, was holding the post of a General of Division, and as he had so lately been charged with misconduct by Jourdan when with the Armée du Danube, it might be assumed that, besides having a natural ambition, he would wish to retain his post; yet we find him asking to be

¹ See *ante*, p. 104.

relieved, nominally as the post was beyond his powers, but really on account of the absence in Mannheim of General Lecourbe, who gave no instructions, and who in Decaen's opinion left the division too much exposed.¹ If the Generals were 'frondeurs', still, fortunately they co-operated with each other willingly enough and acted a good deal for themselves.

Lecourbe shows himself too fine a General both before and after this for us to believe there was any failure in his mental powers. Indeed, next year Napoleon was most anxious to get him for the Marengo army, a regular contest taking place with Moreau for his body, and nothing could have been more unfortunate for him than his cleaving to Moreau. When we find the General who had led his men so well in the Engadine and in the Alps, staying at Mannheim, where he could be of no use, and merely instructing the Generals of Division, who were expecting every moment to be attacked by the enemy, to work together with a good understanding, we can only surmise that he was kept from his post by illness. On the 11th October, as we have seen, when trying to get rid of the command of this army, he had asked for forty days' leave before rejoining his division under Masséna, a curious request at such a time. In the early campaigns on the Rhine, and again in 1800, he suffered from stricture, which was to kill him in 1815. Some such physical incapacity must have influenced him now. I presume that the small effort he made to retain Mannheim came from the orders of Bonaparte to stop further operations on the frontier, although the First Consul apparently would have preferred to have kept a hold there on the right of the Rhine.²

Molitor is the General one wonders not to see more highly praised.³ The limpet-like tenacity which made him at Glarus the man who checked Suvárof, should, one would have thought, have won him greater credit than he seems to have received. Perhaps his claims were overlooked, while success was believed to be due to Lecourbe, Soult, and others. To us the way in which he

¹ Decaen, i. 379, 390.

² *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 290.

³ Général-Comte Gabriel-Jean-Joseph Molitor (1770-1849). Pair de France 4th June 1815. Marshal and Pair de France 9th October 1823 after the Spanish War. *Revue Générale, Biographique et Littéraire*, Galerie Militaire, iii, Maréchal Molitor; *Biog. des Cont.* iii. 630-1; *Fastes*, iii. 409-12. Compare Gachot, *Helvétie*, 369, to the effect that he was unappreciated.

never lost his head nor his confidence when attacked by column after column, but 'stood four-square to all the winds that blew', seems most remarkable. Praised by Masséna, he got no other reward, and was only made General of Division on the 26th October 1800 after serving under Moreau in the Armée du Rhin of that year.

As for the merits of Masséna, let us hear the Devil's Advocate. Granted, says that unpleasant but useful person, that Masséna did well: still, look at the great advantages he had. When he held the ground in front of Zürich he was opposed to the Archduke, a cautious General, whose hands were tied by his Government. Yet, had Suvárof not delayed so long in Italy, had the Archduke been allowed to remain after the arrival of Korsakoff, to make a combined attack or at least to be replaced by Suvárof, what could Masséna have done? He could not have stood before the Archduke and Suvárof together, nor most probably before the Archduke and Korsakoff, nor could he even have hoped, the Archduke gone, to have crushed Suvárof as he did Korsakoff. Can we imagine Suvárof abandoning the Zürich Berg as his lieutenant did? Then what luck to have had such an antagonist as Korsakoff, who went off, abandoning Suvárof completely! Had the Russians held the Zürich Berg on the 26th-27th September, how could Masséna have dealt with Suvárof? He might, it is true, have broken the Zürich bridge, which Wickham said it was admitted he could do at any time, and, leaving only a detaining force, have marched to head off Suvárof; but his time would have been limited, and Suvárof, finding the junction with Korsakoff still possible, would have forced his way from the Muottathal over Mortier, or, at the worst, would have cut his way through Molitor and have come down by the Walensee. Also is there not now and then a certain vagueness or want of weight in Masséna's strokes—for instance, in his attempt to deliver a blow at the junction of the Archduke with Hotze on the Thur on the 25th May?¹ Then, too, what frequent breathing-spaces were given him; and what an advantage he possessed in meeting Suvárof in the mountains, where a style of warfare was needed for which the Russians were the least, and the French the best, suited.

Yet, allowing many of the objections of the advocate for his

¹ See *ante*, pp. 97-8.

Sable Majesty, there remain all the proofs of a great captain. Never despairing, never hurried into action by the orders from Paris, he waited for the right moment, and then struck again and again. On the 25th September he strikes right and left at Hotze and Korsakoff; next day he swings round to deal with Suvárof; and on the 7th October he is once more attacking Korsakoff and throwing him over the Rhine. Except in the Italian campaigns of Bonaparte, there is nothing in the wars of the Revolution like this mastery of his army, this fine use of his position. Fancy the slow Moreau in his situation! But it requires close study of the wars of the Republic to do justice to Masséna's attitude towards the Directory. He was ready to resign, or to disregard the supersession he must have known to be so near, rather than be forced into an unwise stroke. One cannot but believe that both in his blows at the foe and in his attitude towards the Directory, he had learnt much from Bonaparte. This is the true Masséna, not the worn man the English knew in Spain. Master of himself and of his instrument, he saved the Republic from the ruin which menaced it, and won for himself an immortal name in war.

IX

HOLLAND

(December 1797 to November 1799)

First commanders of French troops in Holland. Brune. Composition of Allied army. Landing of the English. Battle of Bergen. Convention of Alkmaar. Brune's conduct of the campaign.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See previous chapters.

It perhaps seems rather an anti-climax to turn to the history of the French arms in Holland after such stirring deeds elsewhere, but we must follow the Marshals' fortunes and Brune is to be found here. At the end of 1797 Joubert from 'Italie' succeeded Macdonald in command of the French troops in Holland.¹ In July 1798 Hatry came here from the Armée de Mayence, exchanging with Joubert. On the 9th January 1799 Brune took command of the Armée de Batavie, that is of all the troops, French and Dutch, in Holland, having been appointed in October 1798 when he was in Italy. The French Directory had not carried out their engagement to keep 25,000 French troops in the country to protect it, as they had drawn troops up the Rhine for the Armée de Mayence, and at this time they only had 18,568 French troops in Holland. Of these a division of 10,700 had its head-quarters at Alkmaar, another of 2,498 was at The Hague, and a third of 5,370 was at Bergen-op-Zoom. Only part of these troops could be used against the English as the country had to be kept down, but Brune soon raised the strength of the first, the fighting division, to 15,000, and he received reinforcements from time to time. Indeed, the Minister, Bernadotte, promised the Directory to make troops descend, or rather fly down, the Rhine: 'J'inventerai, je créerai: je ne laisserai Brune dans l'embarras, il faut sauver la Hollande.' Some troops also were sent by Tilly, who commanded in Belgium. The active French division was given to the hard-fighting, plundering Vandamme, whom we have seen with the Armée du Danube; he had just suffered one of his eclipses for having

¹ Phipps, ii.

made certain exactions in the territory of Baden. For this he had been tried, and although acquitted, he had been left unemployed at his birthplace, Cassel. Bernadotte, who at first had ordered him up the Rhine to fight under Masséna, now sent him to Brune, who no doubt was glad to get such a good fighter. Indeed, after the campaign, Brune's success was ascribed by ill-natured persons to Vandamme.¹ Brune had also two Dutch divisions, 20,000 strong, under Daendels and Dumonceau.

On the 13th July 1799 the first body of English, 10,000 men, sailed from the Downs. The expedition, at one time intended for Walcheren, was now to have landed at the mouth of the Meuse, in the islands of Voorn and Goeree. However, the difficulties of a landing made the Admiral, Mitchell, and the General, Sir Ralph Abercromby, determine to attack the Texel. Stormy weather kept them off and allowed the enemy to prepare for their reception, but on the 27th August the landing began on the sea side of the point of the Helder, Moore's brigade being the first put ashore.² Brune had placed his divisions as follows: Daendels in north Holland, that is, the great promontory between the North Sea and the Zuyder Zee; the French division, soon to be Vandamme's, to the south in Zeeland, and Dumonceau to the east in Friesland and Groningen, so that Daendels had to meet the English. He had assured Brune that he guaranteed the enemy would be beaten if they landed, but now, though the ground made the covering fire of the ships ineffectual, he did not oppose the immediate landing, which otherwise Moore thought might have been beaten off easily. As more English landed and advanced, Daendels attacked them, and a severe action began which lasted till 3 p.m., when Daendels retreated with a loss of 1,377 men, Abercromby losing 475. This operation has some interest as it gave Abercromby a lesson for the landing he executed in Egypt in 1801, where he arranged to avoid much of the confusion which existed here.

That night the Dutch evacuated the forts at the Helder and their well-stocked Arsenal, which were taken possession of by the English the next morning. Daendels soon retired to Bergen, and the English took up the line of the Zype Canal, which they strengthened. The Dutch fleet had been at anchor close to the

¹ Thiébault, ii, note 1, p. 35.

² See a view of the ground, Gachot, *Brune*, 224.

fort but sailed away when the English appeared and anchored off the Vlieter. On the morning of the 30th August the English fleet, carrying the flag of the Prince of Orange, came in. The Dutch sailors refused to fight against their old flag, and when their Admiral, Story, tried to get them to engage, they unloaded the guns and threw the charges and some cartridges overboard, so that Story had to surrender. By this transaction, which Story called an 'extraordinary manner of carrying on war', the English got sixteen two-deckers, five frigates, three corvettes, and a brig, which, to the discontent of the sailors, were taken to England, the men apparently intending to fight the French in their own vessels. This success was so great that Moore thought it would have been well for the Government to have withdrawn the army now. Others considered that the position was so strong, and the country in front so difficult, that the line held might have been fortified and handed over to a small force to hold, whilst the rest of the expedition was employed on a different point.¹

This must be remembered when considering Napoleon's blame of Brune for not having from the first assumed that the expedition would land at the Helder, and not having massed his army there so that it could have thrown Abercromby back at once into the sea.² It is dangerous to differ from the Emperor, but, as we have seen, it was a mere chance that the expedition did not land far south of the Helder. As a matter of fact, before he had got the command of the Dutch, and whilst he had to contend with Daendels about the movements to be made, Brune had announced that the landing might be at the Helder, whilst Daendels asserted the place would be at Scheveningen, or even at Flushing. As for massing his army at the Helder, he considered that Daendels could have thrown back the first landing-parties of Abercromby, and we have seen that Moore agreed with him. Napoleon believed that, with proper care and precaution, Brune could have forced the lines of the Zype, a thing Brune was disappointed at his troops not doing. As it was, however, the whole of the troops of the expedition were landed here, and an attempt was made to carry out the original idea and at least to make a stroke for Amsterdam. This was quite practicable, but the country through which the advance had to be made

¹ Moore, *Diary*, i. 350-5; Bunbury, 6, 47-50. ² *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 293-6.

was most difficult, cut up by canals, ditches, and every sort of obstacle, so that the attacking party was almost always at a disadvantage, and whichever force had to retire could soon secure a good position in which to continue its resistance. Each time Brune stood to receive an attack he fortified his position, a thing to be remembered when considering the difficulties of the expedition from an English point of view. Napoleon, who inspected this part of Holland in 1811,¹ considered he should have constructed an entrenched camp, large enough to have contained the whole army, across the Canal, using the floods as cover. Napoleon at this period had a strong belief in such camps.

The so-called battles here really were a series of small engagements, and as only one future Marshal, Brune, was engaged, it is unnecessary to follow the campaign in detail; the works of Gachot and Bunbury, with the Diary of Sir John Moore, give all the information the most exact student can require. Any ordinary atlas will suffice, but the sheets Nos. 9, 15, 19, and 25 of the Dutch 1:50,000 scale map should be used.

The Allied expedition was under certain great disadvantages, the chief of which was that it was composed of troops of two nations having little affinity with one another. The Russians were fine men, 'formed altogether for service, and not for show', whose attention to their religious duty of fasting on certain days was sometimes convenient.² They were, however, accustomed to act in mass and to deliver one crushing blow in the somewhat brutal style of Suvárof, and here, as in Switzerland, they were at a great disadvantage in dealing with the agile French in a broken country. As for the English, some of their regiments were very good, others were bad. To fill up cadres which had shrunk to 'one or two hundred wasted old soldiers', numbers of men had been obtained from the Militia by extravagant bounties, so that regiments leaped from 200 to 2,000. These men were fine enough fellows, but during August they had been spending their bounties in drink and excesses, and 'hardly sobered from the riotous jollity of their volunteering, their minds were unsettled; to them their new officers and

¹ Schuermans, *Itinéraire général de Napoléon*, 291-2; *Corr. Nap.* xxii, Nos. 18, 179, 18, 180, 18, 194.

² Walsh, 48 and note.

Sergeants were utter strangers, everything was new and bewildering. In this condition they were hurried down to the seaside, packed into transports, and sent off in a tempestuous season to engage immediately with the French armies in one of the most difficult countries in which a war can be waged.¹ They did not even wear the uniform of their corps, so that Bunbury calls some of these bodies 'the newly formed Militia regiments'. 'The Guards', says Moore, 'are certainly a fine body of men. The regiments of the Line are in general but poor, and few of them are formed or disciplined.' Such men fought gallantly enough when standing on the defensive, in the Zype lines, for instance, but when regiments were scattered over broken ground they naturally became confused and hard to lead.

Then the Duke of York was far from being an ideal Commander-in-Chief. Brave and cool enough under fire, he was not sagacious enough to form, or quick enough to appreciate, great designs; he was too easily disheartened, and talked too much and too loosely over his wine of men under him, a dangerous thing with a force composed of troops of two nations. Also his power was limited, for the English Government had insisted that on every occasion of importance he should convene a Council of War, consisting of himself, four English Generals, and the Russian commander. Now in this campaign it was essential to strike with desperate vigour and to push the advance with the greatest possible rapidity, to reach Amsterdam before Brune could be reinforced. A Council of War proverbially is slow and seldom adopts vigorous measures. Add to this that the two Generals who in succession commanded the Russians were difficult to work with. The first, Hermann, 'despised all assistance and certainly had too much boasting and pretension for a man of sense. His action fell short of his talk, as it generally does with men of that description. He displayed nothing but personal courage, and was at last taken prisoner: some suspect purposely to cover his misconduct.' According to the French, when a prisoner he cursed the perfidy of the English and accused them of abandoning his brave troops. His successor, Essen, according to Moore, seems as cautious as the other was imprudent: 'He was false, intriguing, and ill-disposed towards the

¹ Bunbury, 38-9. See *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 283, on the difficulty of the country in Holland.

British.' 'He held himself as much aloof as possible from the Duke's council and society', says Bunbury.

If this seems unfair to the Russian commanders, it is to be noticed that the Russian Admiral, Tchitchagoff (so is his terrible name spelt in his memoirs), represents Hermann when taken prisoner as having gone on in front alone, believing that his men were ready to die for him, whilst they, hardly knowing him, as he had been raised from nothing by the Emperor, were in no hurry to follow him. As for Essen, the Admiral says that when the Russian vessels were ready to disembark that General's division, he refused to land it, saying that he did not see on the shore any preparation to receive the Emperor's troops with honour, and he could not be so regardless of the dignity of his sovereign as to disembark in such an unceremonious manner. 'Nothing could shake the obstinacy of a man on whom reason had no hold.' The wind, however, drove the squadron into the canal of the Texel, and Essen condescended to land hurriedly enough.¹ The check of the 6th October the Admiral ascribes to 'the talents of General Essen and of the head of the expedition'. Finally the Admiral honourably calls the statement made to his Emperor, Paul, that the English had sacrificed the Russians, a 'shameful calumny, whose absurdity I have myself been able to recognize during my stay in the camp of the Duke of York. Besides, the Russians declare unanimously that the English, far from sacrificing our troops, were in front wherever circumstances required it. Their military honour is, besides, too well known for any other than Paul I to put faith in such reports.'

On the 2nd September Brune himself arrived at Alkmaar, taking up his quarters at the Maison Groen, 173 Oude Gracht, where he stayed from the 2nd September to the 3rd October and from the 8th to the 29th October. Dumonceau's division, ordered up from Friesland and Groningen, passed through Amsterdam on the 3rd September and reached Alkmaar on the 8th. Tired as these troops were by their forced march, Brune, anxious to drive the enemy off before they could be reinforced, attacked on the 10th September. He himself went with Vandamme's French division, on the left, along the dunes. Dumonceau's Dutch division was in the centre and that of Daendels

¹ Tchitchagoff, *Mémoires*, 234-5.

on the right. The English position was too strong. Vandamme's men made attack after attack, persevering with reckless bravery, but they were thrown back by the fire of the Guards and of the artillery with them. The Dutch did still worse; the division of Dumonceau became panic-stricken and fled, followed for some way by the English, when Daendels on the right retired, with little loss, and on the left Vandamme fell back, leaving his wounded. The English did not realize how completely Brune's force had been disorganized. That night a panic amongst the Dutch sent 5,000 of them flying, only stopping when halted between Alkmaar and Amsterdam by the National Guards of Groningen, who brought them back to their camp. Brune lost 2,086 men, the English only 177.

Brune, with his experience of Italy, was very confident and sanguine for most of the campaign, but he was indignant at this repulse. On the 10th September he wrote to Bernadotte, the Minister of War, that the two Dutch divisions, in general, had not fulfilled the promise of firmness given by their first appearance. He intended to send before courts martial several officers on whose conduct he had asked for reports. 'Send me troops, my dear Bernadotte, or I shall not know how to get free from the combination of cowardice and treason that forms around us. We' (the French division of Vandamme) 'reckon nearly 600 wounded. The Dutch, nearly double our strength, have only about 400.' It was the rout of Dumonceau's division which vexed him. Fifty men, he said, could have held the position that eight thousand had abandoned. 'Prayers, threats, energy, nothing could rally them, and certainly at that moment 25 cavalry would have made the whole of this division lay down their arms. An extraordinary thing was then seen, the Batavians flying on one side, the English on the other, and the field of battle abandoned by every one.' As for this last sentence, I do not know to what Brune alludes as there seems to have been no rout among the English. He had really seen such a state of things in the battle between two French forces at Vernon on the 12th July 1793.¹

On the 13th September the Duke of York himself landed and the expedition was gradually reinforced by the two Russian divisions, under General Hermann, and some English, so that

¹ Phipps, i.

the Duke had about 18,000 English and 12,000 Russians. On the 19th September the Duke in his turn attacked, and the battle of Bergen took place. On the right a mass of Russians made for Bergen, followed by an English brigade and supported on their left by two columns of English, 4,000 under Dundas and 5,000 under Pulteney. On the extreme left Abercromby with 10,000 English was to march on Hoorn and then to come down on Brune's left or rear. The Council of War, which had formed this plan, had not made a proper calculation of time. The first three columns only had to march eight miles to Alkmaar, while Abercromby had fourteen or fifteen miles to reach Hoorn, and then another thirteen from Hoorn to Alkmaar. Allowing for a rest at Hoorn, Abercromby required a very long start, but he was only to begin his march at dusk on the 18th, whilst the other columns were to move at daybreak on the 19th September. Altogether the Duke of York had some 35,000 against Brune's 21,000, supposing that Abercromby got up in time, otherwise the forces were not very unequal.

On the 19th September the Russians, confident of victory, and moving in one great mass, poured steadily on, crushing all resistance. They entered Bergen, but by this time they were jaded and in confusion, whilst in rear the men left behind were straggling after plunder in the villages. Here, as at Zürich, the Russians were no match for the agile and energetic French, and their mass became the target for the line of battalions which Brune drew round them. When their cavalry, preparing to charge a body of French horse which seemed to be in compact formation, made up a column, the French front opened and a battery of artillery overwhelmed the Russians with ease. Finally, having expended their ammunition, the Russians drew back, leaving their commander Hermann and many men prisoners. Covered by the English they regained the lines of the Zype, 'their retreat', says Moore, 'being as unsoldierlike as their advance'. The two other columns had made fair progress. Brune had drawn troops from Dumonceau to reinforce Vandamme against the Russians, and Dumonceau, wounded in the chest, was replaced in command of his division by Bonhomme. Finally, exposed by the retreat of the Russians, the two columns of the English retired. As for Abercromby, whose detachment had so weakened the columns which had fought this day, marching

under torrents of rain on a narrow causeway, he only reached Hoorn between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. The men had been under arms for twelve hours and required to rest till nearly noon. Before that time the Duke ordered Abercromby back as the other columns had retired, and this body, which ought to have decided the day had it reached Hoorn in time to make for Brune's rear before the other columns had been beaten off, or had it fought with them, now reoccupied its lines, having been utterly useless. Napoleon, remarking that Abercromby might as well have been on the Thames as at Hoorn, says that in such a broken country this sort of detachment is proscribed by the rules of war. If the Duke of York 'had put Abercromby on the right instead of on the left, and had placed him in second line behind Hermann, he would have slept in Amsterdam two days later'. Moore, who was with Abercromby's column, thought that it should have been sent out ten days earlier, but that, 'even as it was, this body might have profited by the advantage gained by Sir James Pulteney, and at least have made it possible to retain Oude Kas Karspel. I can impute the retiring thence to panic only.' Indeed the Duke seems to have passed rather rapidly from confidence to depression, for on learning the defeat of Hermann he had announced, 'We are going to win the battle which the Russians have lost', but the retreat soon came.

In this battle of Bergen the French lost 815 men and 21 prisoners. The Dutch lost 1,539 men and 1,052 taken prisoner, making Brune's total loss 3,427. He himself reported: 'We have lost 50 dead and 300 wounded. This calculation does not seem credible but it is exact.' The English lost 1,016 and the Russians 2,975, so that the Duke of York's total loss was 3,991, as well as six Russian guns and twelve from Pulteney's column. The capture of General Hermann was a calamity for the Duke of York; he was a brave soldier, who in spite of his faults had been ready to act with the English, whilst his successor, Essen, was suspicious of them and held aloof as far as possible. The Russians, hitherto believing themselves invincible, now attributed their defeat to want of support from the English, whilst the Duke 'took up a violent contempt for, as well as dislike of, the Russians. He ridiculed them at his table, and talked of them not wisely and too loudly.' Brune, of course, was triumphant, and he wanted to attack the Zype lines again but he

was dissuaded by Vandamme and others. Then, showing his bad blood, he sent squads of his prisoners through the town as if they had been so many wild beasts just captured. Lieut.-Colonel Augereau, brother of the future Marshal and A.D.C. to Brune, was promoted Colonel for this day.¹ Vandamme had fought under difficulties, for on the 14th September he had dislocated his left shoulder by a fall, an injury from which he was in pain for some months.

On the 1st October Brune was reinforced by 3,000 men, which enabled him to form a 4th division. His army also was cheered by the news of the victory of Masséna at Zürich. The Duke's army too was increased by a Dragoon regiment and 3,000 or 4,000 Russians, with 300 Cossacks. On the 2nd October 1799 the Duke again attacked, in four columns as before, only this time the Russians were flanked on their right along the dunes by Abercromby's column, assisted by the fire of vessels accompanying the march. The French were pressed back, but Brune was master of his army and the Duke was not, so that when the Duke twice called for reinforcements from the Russians to support Abercromby, each time Essen refused, saying: 'We don't budge from here.' Still, by night, although Brune still held Alkmaar and Bergen, Abercromby was so far advanced that he threatened to reach the Haarlem road and to cut off Brune and throw him into the polders. The forces this day probably were about equal, Brune having 23,500 men, of whom 13,444 were French. He lost 1,632 men and seven guns. The Duke lost 1,971 men.² Amongst the wounded was Moore, who had received a slight injury in the thigh, then had a horse killed under him, and had finally been knocked down by a shot which entered behind his ear and then came out at his cheek under his left eye, so that he took no further part in the campaign. Abercromby had had two horses killed under him. Moore considered that had Colonel Macdonald, who had four battalions on Abercromby's inner flank, kept in touch with this column instead of diverging inland, Abercromby would have reached Egmont-op-Zee by noon, and have turned Brune.

Brune, who must have seen discouragement enough amongst

¹ Général-Baron Jean-Pierre Augereau (1753-1836). *Fastes*, iv. 411; Gachot, *Brune*, note 2, p. 272.

² Gachot, *Brune*, 270-82, which gives the English 28,000.

the troops of the *Armée du Nord* after the flight of Dumouriez, now affected surprise when he found that 'the fatigue of the men, and I know not what dispositions which I had not before seen in the minds of soldiers, told me that if the enemy, who had the superiority in numbers, attacked us next day, weariness might occasion a real reverse'. Consequently under cover of a fog he drew back on the 3rd October, and by the 4th he occupied the strong position of Beverwyck, where he only had to guard a narrow isthmus between the sea and an inlet from the *Zuyder Zee*, a movement approved of by Napoleon. The Duke now seemed close to Haarlem and Amsterdam, but the country between him and Beverwyck was awkward and was still held by Brune, who was expecting further reinforcements. On Sunday the 6th October came the battle of Kastrikum. Brune had 14,142 French and 3,200 Dutch, when the Duke advanced with 19,000 infantry, 1,400 cavalry, and 500 artillery, not expecting a battle but meaning only to approach the position the French were fortifying at Beverwyck. Abercromby was again on the right, the Russians in the centre, and Dundas on the left. The French held the posts in front of their position, and gradually the two forces became engaged in the confused struggle called the battle of Kastrikum. Rain fell heavily, and the dense smoke hanging round the coppices and the villages made it impossible to distinguish any details of the struggle. The Duke was in Alkmaar, sending out A.D.C. after A.D.C. to ascertain the main points of the fight, but Brune was flying from one menaced point to another. Essen, confident again, pushed on for Kastrikum, and by one o'clock Brune's position was critical, for if the other columns came on his army would be crushed. Bringing up infantry against Essen, he himself led a charge of Chasseurs and Dragoons which was successful, though during it he had two horses killed under him. Later he led the Dutch Hussars against the English Dragoons, and at night the two armies drew off, the Duke holding the posts attacked and Brune his original position. Brune had lost 1,398 men; the Duke of York 3,439 and six guns.¹

This battle was claimed as a victory by both sides, but its substantial gains fell to Brune. 'Our best troops', writes Bun-

¹ Gachot, *Brune*, 285-96; *Vict. et Conq.* xi. 235-43; Bunbury, 30-3; Walsh, 74-6, 77. The French seem to understate their loss in prisoners.

bury 'were disheartened; our officers had lost all confidence; the Russians were angry, sullen, and scarcely to be counted as allies.' The French had been reinforced and no doubt would soon retake the offensive, so that all hope of gaining Haarlem, and much more Amsterdam, was abandoned. Also each side now knew of Masséna's victories in Switzerland, and the defeat of Suvárof told here. 'To our Russians this disastrous intelligence afforded fresh food for discontent; they regarded their countrymen (and not without reason) as having been deserted and sacrificed by the Austrian Government; and the bitter fancy that they themselves had been deserted by the British on the 19th September, became more deeply rooted in their minds. Then, in the truce which soon came, the French officers told of the arrival of Bonaparte from Egypt. The enthusiasm with which they announced this event was very remarkable. Though Napoleon had come alone, bringing nothing to France but the powers of his mind and the influence of his name, yet already did the French armies hail his advent as the certain presage of victory.'¹ This has to be remembered when we come to treat of Brune's proceedings when the news of Brumaire reached him.

On the 7th October the Duke of York held a Council of War, where Essen complained that his troops had not been supported by the English and that now, his corps being reduced to 9,893 combatants, he demanded a retirement to the Zype lines. The council unanimously decided to retire, and the movement was carried out on the 7th and 8th. Brune followed slowly and cautiously. In Alkmaar, according to the French account, he found 415 Scotch women and children left by the Highland regiment, who had suffered 'odieux outrages' from the Russians. These Brune treated well and sent on to the British. The Duke now sent his Secretary, Colonel Browning, to England, to get instructions from the Ministry, and, considering the position and that the Dutch had shown no signs of rising against the French, he was authorized to negotiate. Brune was quite ready to come to terms and on the 18th October 1799 a Convention was signed at Alkmaar.² Brune at first had demanded the return of the Dutch fleet and the delivery of 15,000 prisoners of war as the equivalent for the free departure of the expedition, but

¹ Bunbury, 30, note.

² Walsh, 139-40; Gachot, *Brune*, 402-3.

the Duke declined to negotiate about the fleet. As to the return of the prisoners, he assumed this meant that his army would lose that number of men if they embarked under fire, which he disallowed. Still, as the army, if it remained in campaign, would lose men, he agreed to deliver 5,000 French and Dutch prisoners of war. The batteries at the Helder and elsewhere were to be left in good condition, with their Dutch guns. Brune made no difficulties and the expedition embarked by the 19th November 1799, the English returning to England and the Russians being taken to Jersey and Guernsey. The failure of this expedition did much to throw the mad Tsar into the arms of Bonaparte.

The surprising thing about this Convention is the anxiety of the French to come to terms. Brune, whilst professing, probably truly, to have received instructions from the Directory to make the return of the Dutch fleet a *sine qua non*, still gave way on that point as soon as he found the Duke was firm. As Gachot says, 'Brune saisissait avec empressement l'occasion de traiter', although he had just been reinforced. As for the Directory, they seem to have approved. When the Minister, Dubois-Crancé, announced the news of what the French chose to call the capitulation, he modestly ascribed the credit to his own predecessor, Bernadotte, who certainly had done his best to reinforce Brune. One knows what would have happened had Custine or Houchard in 1793 concluded such a Convention: accusations of treachery and cowardice would have rained on them. One instrument the Duke of York possessed: he could have covered his embarkation by flooding the country, even if he did not obstruct the entrances to the Zuyder Zee. However, the Directory had much to think of nearer home when the Convention was signed; indeed it was to Berthier, the Minister of War of the Consulate, that Brune's report of the evacuation was addressed.

One would like to read the secret dispatches of Brune to the Directory, as they might explain his and their action. The English were surprised and disappointed at finding none of the Dutch rebelled, but they should not have expected that as long as their army was jammed on a long horn of land, with the rest of Holland open to the French. Still, as long as their army threatened Amsterdam, so long was there great danger to French prestige in Holland and to the Batavian Government formed

by them. A French official wrote to Talleyrand his fears lest gunboats should bombard Amsterdam from the Zuyder Zee. 'Its inhabitants, in general, are well disposed, but it is not the less certain that some shells thrown into a town so populous, and whose riches consist in its stores, would determine it to capitulate. This would be the death-blow to the Batavian Government; there would be no more money, credit, nor resources, and the next day it would find itself unable to furnish the pay of its army. Its embarrassments are already very great in this respect, and, as you can well understand, in this critical state of affairs no one pays his taxes, ordinary or extraordinary.'¹ Consequently no one was better pleased with Brune's action in concluding the Convention than the Batavian Directory, who were glad, as they told the General, to find him more ready to facilitate the retreat of the enemy than to risk the lives and happiness of so many persons in 'the uncertain fate of a battle only to be won at the cost of torrents of the blood of the brave Republicans' Brune commanded, who deserved more consideration than the slaves he fought. Obviously neither the General nor either of the two Directories was very confident as to the final result.

Napoleon blames the conclusion of the Convention, but not severely, and there must be some mistake in his reasoning, for he says that Brune had a mass of ordnance in the arsenal of the Helder and plenty of teams and canals for their transport; these guns, with 150 from the fortresses, could have been collected, when the Zype would have been but a feeble protection for the English expedition. Now the Helder was in the possession of the enemy: the ordnance there was available for the defence of the Zype lines, and apparently it would have been a very heavy and lengthy work to take heavy ordnances from the fortresses up to the Zype. The truth is that Brune's army had suffered a good deal, and I have already referred to his acknowledgement of its discouragement on the 4th October. Although, as we have seen, the English were not all, as Napoleon calls them, 'troupes d'élites', still they and the Russians were capable of a return blow, and one would have thought Napoleon would have known that confusion in a retreat was not specially disastrous for the English, as he wrote

¹ Gachot, *Brune*, note 1, p. 245.

that it was. Still, he ends his remarks on Brune: 'Il a conduit la campagne sagement.'¹

On the 30th October 1799 Brune made a triumphal entry into Amsterdam, and he received from the Dutch Directory a sabre with a golden handle and 100,000 florins. He well deserved his triumph, for much of the success was due to his personal direction of the different columns of his army, while there seems to have been little guidance for those of the Duke of York once they had started on their march each day. The difference between the conduct of the two commanders, for instance on the 6th October, is very remarkable. Doubtless Brune was lucky to have Vandamme, but that General led a division while Brune had to handle an army. Soult praises him for his skilful and bold manœuvre at the battle of Bergen at the head of his cavalry, and for the charge he directed in front of Beverwyck. 'A ces traits, on reconnoît le chef digne de commander.'²

During the campaign Brune practically had been a military dictator in Holland, but, once free from the fear of the expedition, the Dutch returned to their attitude of suspicion of the French and revoked the order giving Brune the command of their troops, who were ordered not to obey him. Brune probably would have rectified this by a *coup d'état*, but then came the news of Brumaire, when at first he was ready to oppose Bonaparte but soon changed his attitude, perhaps finding how much his officers hoped from the seizure of power by Bonaparte. On the 14th January 1800 he was given command of the Armée de l'Ouest. The Armée de Batavie had ceased to exist and most of its French troops went with Brune to the west of France, but, at least as far as its Dutch troops were concerned, it may be said to have been continued in the Armée Gallo-Batave, led by Augereau in 1800.

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 297-8.

² Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 176.

THE ARMIES OF ITALY AND OF THE ORIENT
AND THE *COUP D'ÉTAT* OF BRUMAIRE

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

- Arrighi de Casanova, Duc de Padoue, Le Général*, par A. Du Casse, 2 vols., Paris, Perrotin, 1866.
- Barante, Souvenirs du Baron de, 1782-1866*, 8 vols., Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1890-1901.
- Barras, see other list.
- Belliard, Mémoires du Comte*, 3 vols., Paris, Berquet et Pétion, 1842.
- Berthier, Le Maréchal, *Relation des campagnes du Général Bonaparte en Égypte et en Syrie*, Paris, 1800.
- Bodley, J. E. C., *The Church in France*, London, Constable, 1906.
- Bonnal, M., *Histoire de Desaix, d'après les archives du Dépôt de la Guerre*, Paris, Dentu, 1881.
- Boulart, Général-Baron, Mémoires militaires du, sur les Guerres de la République et de l'Empire*, Paris, Librairie Illustrée, 1892.
- Boulay de la Meurthe, Le Comte A., *Le Directoire et l'Expédition d'Égypte*, Paris, Hachette, 1885.
- Bourrienne, Mémoires de M. de*, 10 vols., Paris, Ladorcet, 1829; English edition of above, edited by Colonel R. W. Phipps, 3 vols., London, Bentley, 1885.
- Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, 2 vols., Paris, Herdelhof et Cassel, 1830.
- Bruce, *Life of Sir William Napier*, see other list.
- Bunbury, *Great War with France*, see other list.
- Carbuccia, Le Général J., *Le Régiment des Dromadaires à l'Armée d'Orient, 1798-1801*, Paris, 1853.
- Championnet, Le Général, *Souvenirs, 1792-1800*, with notes by Maurice Faure, Paris, Flammarion, 1904.
- Chénier, L. J. G., *Éloge historique du Maréchal Moncey*, Paris, Dumaine, 1848.
- Colbert, Napoléon-Joseph-Auguste, Marquis de Chabanais, *Le Général Auguste Colbert (1793-1809). Traditions, Souvenirs et Documents touchant sa vie et son temps*, 3 vols., Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1888.
- Colletta, General Pietro, *History of the Kingdom of Naples*, translated by S. Horner, 2 vols., Edinburgh, Constable, 1858.
- Copies of original letters from the Army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the Fleet*, 3 parts, London, Wright, 1798-1800.
- Damas, Le Comte Roger de, *Mémoires, 1797-1814*, 2 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1912-14.
- D'Armaillé, Marie-Célestine-Amélie, *Désirée Clary, reine de Suède, 1777-1860*, Paris, Perrin, 1897.
- De Cugnac, Le Capitaine, *Campagne de l'Armée de Réserve en 1800*, Paris, 1900.
- Desvernois, Le Baron, *Mémoires, 1789-1815*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1898.
- D'Hauterive, Ernest, *Le Général Alexandre Dumas, 1762-1806*, 2^{me} édition, Paris, Ollendorf, 1897.

- Doguereau, Jean-Pierre, *Journal de l'Expédition d'Égypte*, Paris, Perrin, 1904.
- Du Casse, A., *Mémoires et Correspondance politique et militaire du Roi Joseph*, 10 vols., 2^{me} édition, Paris, Perrotin, 1854.
- Dufourcq, Albert, *Le Régime jacobin en Italie: étude sur la République Romaine, 1798-99*, Paris, Perrin, 1900.
- Dumas, Général-Comte Mathieu, *Précis . . .*, see other list.
- *Souvenirs du*, 3 vols., Paris, Josselin, 1839.
- Ernouf, Le Baron, see other list.
- Fastes de la Légion d'Honneur . . .*, see other list.
- Fauriel, Claude Charles, *Les Derniers Jours du Consulat*, Paris, Lévy, 1886.
- Foucart (Paul) et Finot (Jules), *La Défense nationale dans le Nord*, 2 vols., Lille, Lefebvre-Ducrocq, 1890-3.
- Fouché, Joseph, Duc d'Otrante, *Mémoires*, 2 vols., Bruxelles, de Mat, 1825.
- François, Le Capitaine, Journal du*, Paris, Carrington, 1903.
- Gachot, E., *Les Campagnes de 1799: Souwarow en Italie*, Paris, Perrin, 1903.
- *Histoire militaire de Masséna: La Troisième Campagne d'Italie*, Paris, 1811.
- Gaffarel, Paul, *Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes, 1796-99*, Paris, Alcan, 1895.
- Gay de Vernon, Le Baron, *Vie du Maréchal Gouvion Saint-Cyr*, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1856.
- Giglioli, Constance H. D., *Naples in 1799*, London, Murray, 1903.
- Gohier, L. J., *Mémoires des contemporains, pour servir à l'histoire de France, et principalement à celle de la République et de l'Empire*, 3^{me} édition, 2 vols., Paris, Bossange Frères, 1824.
- Gourgaud, Le Baron, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon*, 2 vols., Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1823.
- Hamley, Colonel E. B., *The Operations of War*, 3rd edition, Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1872, and 1873 edition.
- James, William, see other list.
- Jung, Le Lieutenant-Colonel Th., *Lucien Bonaparte et ses mémoires, 1775-1840*, 3 vols., Paris, Charpentier, 1882-3.
- Junot, Mémoires de Madame, Duchesse d'Abrantès*, 3 vols., London, Bentley, 1883.
- Lahure, L. J., Le Lieutenant-Général Baron, *Souvenirs*, Paris, Lahure, 1895.
- La Jonquière, Clément de, *L'Expédition d'Égypte*, Paris, Hachette, 1901.
- Lanfrey, P., *Histoire de Napoléon I^{er}*, 5 vols., Paris, Charpentier, 1867-75.
- Larévellière-Lépeaux, O., see other list.
- Lavalette, Mémoires et souvenirs du Comte*, 2 vols., London, Bull, 1831.
- Lumbroso, Albert, *Correspondance de Joachim Murat, 1793-1808*, Turin, Roux Frassati, 1899.
- Macdonald, Souvenirs du Maréchal*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1892.

- Madelin, Louis, *Fouché*, 2 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1901.
- Marbot, *Mémoires du Général-Baron de*, 3 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1891.
- Marès, Louis, see other list.
- Marmont, see other list.
- Marmottan, Paul, *Bonaparte et la République de Lucques*, Champion, 1896.
- *Le Royaume d'Étrurie, 1801-07*, 2^{me} édition, Paris, Ollendorf, 1896.
- Masson, Frédéric, *Napoléon et les femmes*, 3^{me} édition, Paris, Ollendorf, 1894.
- Maurel, *Les Trois Dumas*, Paris, Librairie Illustrée, 1896.
- Michaud, *Biographie universelle . . .*, see other list.
- Miot de Mérito, see other list.
- Montholon, Le Général C. de, *Récits de la captivité de l'Empereur Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène*, 2 vols., Paris, 1847.
- Moore, Sir John, see other list.
- Murat, S.A. le Prince, *Lettres et Documents pour servir à l'histoire de Joachim Murat, 1767-1815*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1908.
- Napoléon I^{er}, Correspondance de*, see other list.
- *Correspondance inédite . . . avec les cours étrangères, les princes, en Italie, en Allemagne, et en Égypte*, 7 vols., Panckoucke, 1809-20.
- *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous le règne de Napoléon, écrits à Sainte-Hélène sous sa dictée*, 2^{me} édition, 9 vols., Paris, Bossange, Dufour, 1830.
- Ney, Mémoires du Maréchal*, see other list.
- Pajol, Général le Comte, *Kléber, sa vie et sa correspondance*, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1877.
- Pascallet, M. E., *Notice biographique sur M. le Général Prével, Pair de France*, 2^{me} édition, Paris, 1842.
- Pasquier, E. D., *Histoire de mon temps: mémoires du Chancelier Pasquier*, 6 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1894-5.
- Pelleport, Le Général Vicomte de, *Souvenirs militaires et intimes de 1793 à 1853*, 3 vols., Paris, Didier, 1857.
- Perrin, Claude-Victor, Duc de Bellune, *Extraits d'une histoire inédite des guerres de la République et de l'Empire*, Paris, Donde-Dupré, 1853.
- Peyre, Roger, *L'Expédition d'Égypte*, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1890.
- Picard, Ernest, see other list.
- Pingaud, Léonce, *L'Invasion Austro-Prussienne, 1792-4*, Paris, Société d'histoire contemporaine, Picard, 1895.
- *Bernadotte, Napoléon, et les Bourbons, 1797-1814*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1901.
- Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, *Commentaire sur les mémoires de Fouché*, Paris, Ollendorf, 1900.
- Rapp, Jean, Mémoires du Général, 1772-1821*, édition revue et annotée par D. Lacroix, Paris, Garnier Frères, n.d.
- Révérénd, Le Vicomte, see other list.
- Revue des questions historiques*, 1st April 1910.

- Reynier, Le Général Jean, *De l'Égypte après la bataille de Héliopolis*, Paris, Pougens, 1802.
- Rigault, Georges, *Le Général Abdallah Menou et la dernière phase de l'expédition d'Égypte, 1799-1801*, Plon, 1911.
- Roguet, Lieutenant-Général Comte, *Mémoires militaires du*, 4 vols., Paris, Dumaine, 1862-5.
- Ropes, John Cadman, *The Campaign of Waterloo*, London, Putnams, 1893.
- Rousseau, François, *Suchet*, see other list.
- *Kléber et Menou en Égypte, depuis le départ de Bonaparte (août 1799-septembre 1801)*, Paris, Picard, 1900.
- Saint-Cyr, Le Maréchal Gouvion, see other list.
- Sainte-Beuve, C. A., *Causeries du Lundi*, 15 vols., Paris, Garnier Frères, 1851-62.
- Saint-Hilaire, E. G., *Lettres écrites d'Égypte*, recueillies . . . par E. T. Hamy, Paris, Hachette, 1901.
- Sauzey, Camille, *Iconographie du costume militaire, Révolution-Napoléon III*, 3 vols., Paris, Dubois, 1901-3.
- Savary, Duc de Rovigo, Mémoires de*, 8 vols., Paris, Bossange, 1828.
- Sciout, L., see other list.
- Ségur, Le Général-Comte de, *Histoire et Mémoires*, Paris, Firmin-Didot, 1873.
- Soult, see other list.
- Spalding, see other list.
- Susane, see other list.
- Thiébault, see other list.
- Thiers, L. A., *Histoire de la Révolution française*, see other list.
- *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, 21 vols., atlas, Paris, 1845-69.
- Tuetey, Louis, *Sérurier, 1742-1819*, Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1899.
- Turquan, Joseph, *Napoléon amoureux*, Paris, Montgredien, 1897.
- Vandal, Albert, *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*, 2 vols., Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1902-7.
- Victoires et Conquêtes . . .*, see other list.
- Victor, Duc de Bellune, see Perrin.
- Villiers du Terrage, R. E., *Journal et Souvenirs sur l'expédition d'Égypte, 1798-1801*, Paris, 1899.
- Wickham, Rt. Hon. W., see other list.
- Wilson, General Sir Robert, *Life*, 2 vols., London, Murray, 1862.
- *History of the British Expedition to Egypt*, 2nd edition, London, Egerton, 1803.
- Wirth, see other list.
- Wouters, see other list.

X

THE ARMY OF ITALY IN PEACE

(December 1797 to February 1799)

Masséna and Saint-Cyr at Rome. French extortion and organization in Italy. Brune and Joubert in command. Schérer's appointment.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See previous chapters, I, II, and IV.

THE end of the year 1798 had seen Berthier in command in Italy,¹ with Bernadotte, Brune, Masséna, Sérurier, Suchet, and Victor under him, all Generals of Division except Suchet, who was General of Brigade. Murat, also General of Brigade, was either with this army or soon joined it from Paris. The group was soon diminished. Brune and Suchet went to Switzerland, as already related, to serve in the Armée d'Helvétie. On the 12th January 1798 Victor was appointed to the Armée d'Angleterre, and on the 17th March he relieved Grouchy in a local command at Nantes, returning to Italy in May the same year. Sérurier also went, early in 1798 or possibly late in 1797, to the Armée d'Angleterre, where he had his quarters at Rennes. On the 15th September he was appointed Inspector-General of the troops stationed in the interior of France; and on the 5th November he was ordered back to Italy to serve under Joubert, whom he had commanded in earlier campaigns. As for Bernadotte, there had been much questioning between him, the Directors, and Bonaparte, as to his destination.² At one time the Directory had intended him to follow Berthier in the command in Italy after the expedition to Egypt should have sailed, but, as will be explained a little farther on, this did not suit Bonaparte. On the 11th January he was appointed Ambassador at the Austrian Court; a little flattery by Berthier as to the importance of this post made him accept, but he only reached Vienna on the 8th February. Ill at ease there, and reproached by the Directory with slackness in displaying the national

¹ He arrived in Milan to take command on the 22nd December. Phipps, iv. 203, 204.

² Phipps, iv. 217-21.

cockade, he provoked a riot on the 13th April by displaying a large tricolour which the mob tore down. Probably glad of the excuse, he left Vienna on the 19th for Rastadt. There he was kept for some time by the Directory, who at first seemed to disclaim his action. In May he was offered a local command at Strasbourg, and on his refusing that, his pride was salved by a proposed nomination to the embassy in Holland, to the République Batave. This too he declined, and we have seen his subsequent command on the Rhine.

In the period between the sailing of Bonaparte for Egypt and his return for Brumaire, only four of his former lieutenants, besides Suchet, who had not been more than a Lieutenant-Colonel under him, served in Italy, though Masséna was left at Hyères for a short time. Brune, bringing Suchet as Chief of the Staff, came back from Switzerland in April 1798 to command, returning to France in October. Joubert came to relieve him, retaining Suchet; but Suchet was recalled in December 1798 and Joubert resigned in February 1799, returning to Italy in August of that year to die at Novi. Suchet came back with Joubert and after the death of his General remained in Italy, to join Masséna for the 1800 campaign. Sérurier and Victor, who had been serving in France with 'Angleterre', returned to their original theatre, Victor in May and Sérurier in November 1798. In the 1799 campaign Sérurier fought under Schérer and then under Moreau till taken prisoner at Cassano on the 27th April 1799, when he went back to France. Victor fought in the same campaign, joining Macdonald's Armée de Naples for the battle of the Trebbia, after which he seems to have been ill during the Novi campaign, rejoining for the subsequent fighting and then returning to France in time to join Bonaparte's Armée de Réserve and to fight at Marengo.

Then four future Marshals who had not been in Italy with Bonaparte came there during 1798-9, all as Generals of Division. Grouchy, after two months with the Armée de Mayence, arrived at Milan on the 29th November 1798 and served here till taken prisoner at Novi on the 15th August. He was not released till June 1800. Pérignon, who had not served since the Armée des Pyrénées Orientales was broken up in 1795,¹ brought a weak division to Genoa about May 1799, and was taken

¹ Phipps, iii.

prisoner at Novi, being released sooner than Grouchy. Saint-Cyr came from France in March 1798 to relieve Masséna at Rome. Disgraced in July 1798, and then employed with Jourdan's Armée du Danube, he returned here on the 24th June 1799 and, fighting under Joubert at Novi and then under Moreau, he remained here till December 1799, when he joined Moreau on the Rhine. Macdonald, from France, joined under Brune as Bonaparte sailed. Relieving Saint-Cyr at Rome in July 1798, he marched with Championnet for Naples, and he relieved that General in command of the Armée de Naples in March 1799. After fighting at the Trebbia, he returned to France in August 1799 in time for Brumaire. A more remarkable appearance in Italy was that of Moreau, who seemed inseparably connected with the Rhine. Disgraced after Fructidor in 1797 he was sent here in the modest post of Inspector-General of Infantry, under Joubert, in November 1798. When Schérer was defeated and left the army, on the 27th April 1799, he handed over the command to Moreau, and though nominated to command an Armée du Rhin, Moreau remained here till Joubert arrived in August. Accompanying that General at Novi, he took command when Joubert was killed and retained it till called back to France in September 1799, when he handed it over to Championnet.

In February 1798 the Armée de Rome was formed as an offshoot of 'Italie', in consequence of a riot in Rome in which the French General Duphot was killed. Berthier was ordered to march on that city with a force of some 16,000 men, in which served Murat and the younger Kellermann, whilst Sérurier, not yet, I think, started for the Armée d'Angleterre, commanded the divisions left in Lombardy. These divisions gave much trouble for they more than once threatened open mutiny in order to obtain their pay, and the Austrians in consequence might have marched on Mantua. Sérurier contrived to restrain his troops, and soon afterwards, if my dates be correct, he left for the Armée d'Angleterre, returning, as I have just said, in November. Meantime the expedition to Rome was an easy matter. On the 10th February Berthier occupied the city; the Pope was sent to Siena, and a République Romaine was proclaimed. The force at Rome was to be a separate command; and on the 20th February Berthier handed it over to Masséna, who was intended

also to succeed him in the command in Italy, as he was soon to return to France. This *Armée de Rome*, which became on the 24th January 1799 the *Armée de Naples*, and then on the 6th August of that year was amalgamated with the *Armée d'Italie* from whence it had sprung, was chiefly formed from the troops which had entered Rome under Berthier. As the garrison of Rome, though separate it was not independent, forming part of the *Armée d'Italie*, and though Championnet was appointed as Commander-in-Chief in November 1798, that title was taken from his successor, Macdonald. Towards the end of 1798, as the prospects of fresh hostilities with Austria became grave, the troops in Rome most probably believed they would either remain there as garrison or else be called to the north to rejoin the active army. In reality they were to form a fresh army, which was to defend Rome, capture Naples, and return to the north to end its existence after the desperate battle of the Trebbia, having led a short but most eventful life. Macdonald was the only future Marshal who belonged to this force, though Victor joined it with his division for the Trebbia in June 1799, therefore I need not deal with it at great length.

As I have said, on the 20th February Masséna took command under Berthier. Now began a most extraordinary business. Ever since the French had entered Italy there had been very much plundering, in which certain of the Generals were believed to have shared. Matters had got worse as the agents of the Directory, and also those of the new governments established by the French, came to make the heaviest exactions in the conquered and the occupied provinces. The regimental officers and the men had looked on with growing disgust, their sense of the moral iniquity being sharpened by the fact that they did not share in the booty: indeed we have just seen the troops in the north of Italy mutinying for pay, and the first use Brune had to make of the millions he obtained at Berne was to pay his men. Masséna was one of the Generals on whom the strongest suspicions of peculation lay. The garrison of Rome believed the arrival of this General would lead to fresh plundering; and, suffering themselves, they sympathized with the inhabitants. Also, unluckily for Masséna part of the troops were badly disposed towards him. Some of them had belonged to Bernadotte's division in 1797, and there had been open feud between

them and the men of Masséna.¹ Further, one of the regiments had belonged to Masséna's division but had been removed from it, at his request, on account of its bad behaviour. All this fuel soon took fire. Three or four hundred officers of the junior ranks assembled in the Pantheon and demanded that the systematized robbery of private houses should cease; that they should receive their pay; that the objects of art and of value removed from the palaces should be restored; and that the agents of the system of spoliation should be punished. Finally, after some parleying, they refused to obey Masséna, and declared they would call on Berthier to come and explain his conduct.

Placed in a most difficult position, and receiving little support from Berthier, Masséna showed some weakness. Intending to assemble his troops outside the city at Ponte-Molle, he left Rome with Berthier and the chief officers of his army, but the troops refused to follow and would only obey Berthier, or in his absence General Dallemagne, whom Masséna thought it best to nominate to command in Rome. Berthier behaved badly, for on the 25th February he had returned to Rome and joined in the refusal of the mutineers to send the staff of the army to Masséna. The situation was made worse by the Commissioners of the Directory, who, perhaps glad to get a scapegoat, declared they also would not recognize Masséna as in command but only Berthier, or in his absence Dallemagne. It is hard to understand the attitude of Berthier, who, it will be remembered, was the commander of the *Armée d'Italie*. His presence in Rome told against Masséna, and he even appeared at a review ordered by Dallemagne. Finally he did feel that he could not remain, and he started for Milan, having an angry interview on the way with Masséna and excusing his conduct by the exasperation of the men and the impossibility of Masséna retaining the command: indeed, he even tried to get him to resign. In the meantime the inhabitants of Rome had naturally taken the opportunity to rise, as so many districts did against their liberators. Dallemagne sent General of Brigade Murat against them with a column which soon restored order.

At Paris the Directory were no doubt glad to present Masséna as the culprit, and thus to call off attention from the work of

¹ Phipps, iv. 185.

their agents. On the 8th March 1798, therefore, he was ordered to Genoa, and he started from Rome on the 18th, an hour after the receipt of the dispatch, only too happy to get out of the furnace. When he reached Genoa on the 28th March he found fresh directions to proceed to Antibes. Either as a blind, or because the Directory had changed their attitude towards him, this order was couched in flattering terms and was represented as intended to give him an opportunity of rendering fresh services, and so compensating him for the annoyances at Rome. At Antibes he was to receive orders from Bonaparte concerning the Armée d'Orient. It seems that this letter was written at the instance of Bonaparte, who meant to employ him in what was called a false attack, which failing, he was to join the main expedition. Something changed this, and, either from sheer hurry, or, more likely, from Berthier's report that tranquillity in Italy required that Masséna should not be employed, he was neither left in command in Italy nor made part of the expedition. Fretting at what he considered a disgrace, not knowing it was to give him the chance of his life, he remained at Antibes with his wife and family until on the 16th August the Directory gave him a subordinate position, the command of a division in the Armée de Mayence, at that moment under Joubert, far his junior when they had served together under Bonaparte in 1796-7. We have already seen him arrive at his new post, meeting Jourdan instead of Joubert in chief command.

Berthier's departure from Italy had marked the cessation of Bonaparte's influence in this country. What now occurred here during 1798 and 1799 influenced the fortunes of several of the future Marshals, but it also affected the attitude of the whole army and its Generals towards the Directory. The situation which resulted was one of the causes of the success of Bonaparte at Brumaire, and consequently is worth studying. At one time the English firmly believed that if every country would but adopt the English constitution, all would be right in the world. In the same spirit, the French now insisted that every State, however large or small, which fell under their power, from Holland to tiny Lucca, must become a Republic, with Councils and Directors as in France. They sheltered these Republics by leaving in them an army of occupation, to be paid by the protected State. The French General in command of this force

was always ready to prevent any difficulties in starting the machine, by nominating the Directors, if not the Councillors, and having thus launched the barque, it was but natural that he should consider himself justified in correcting any errors in its course. The French Directory assumed that they could interfere in every way with these so-called independent Republics, and often they saw with a different eye from that of their Generals on the spot. Then also they had their own agents or Commissioners in the Republics, and these men could not always keep to the exact line proposed at Paris, so that, as happened with Fouché at Milan in 1798, the local Commissioner sometimes violently opposed the policy of the Directory whose agent he was. Consequently the unfortunate Republics were often a battle-field on which the French Directory, their agents, and the French commanders, struggled for supremacy.

Of course money was the cause of most of these contests. Holland had little to be plundered, and nothing large was to be hoped for from Switzerland when the treasure of Berne had gone to pay for the expedition to Egypt. It was different in Italy, which Bonaparte had made the treasure chest of the Directory. From it he had paid his own troops, had sent cash enough to the armies on the Rhine to enable them to move, and had filled the coffers of the Government. This system should have ceased with the war, but the Directory tried to continue it. Their agents were everywhere, trying to drain the land, and on the occupation of fresh territory it became a race for who was to get the treasure first, the agents or the troops. One of the Directors, acknowledging the justice of much of the complaint about the system of plunder, yet says that on these occasions it was the troops, not the Commissioners, who arrived first.¹ This was true, but if the troops supplied their immediate wants, the Commissioners came up in time for the worst, because systematic, robbery. Bonaparte had taken cash, pictures, and jewels from the rulers of States as ransom: the Commissioners would strip a noble of his plate.

Bonaparte had taught his Generals that the country they occupied should support their troops, and the Generals did not require to be taught that it ought also to support *them*. A Commandant of a great town, for example, might surely expect

¹ Larévellière-Lépeaux, ii. 335.

a free table for himself and his staff and a good allowance from the city authorities, to whom his goodwill was worth so much; and a little pressure might bring in a handsome present on leaving. The troops knew of these things, but when such a system was carried to excess by their chiefs, as in the case of Masséna, they were shocked. Masséna, however, was not over-careful of his men; in most cases, if a General filled his pockets, he also saw that his men were clothed and paid, and was it not natural that a protected State should pay its protectors? I am not attributing any low scale of morality to the French army in this matter, although one may not always see with their eyes.¹ They were turned loose into rich or well-to-do countries, and, as far as their own Government were concerned, they might have starved had they not helped themselves; and starve they did on the Rhine. It was a very different matter when the Commissioners of the Directory drained a district. Then the troops naturally were horrified. They had a certain amount of sympathy with their involuntary hosts, and were shocked to see them plundered, especially when the booty did not go into the army chest.² When the wives of two of the Roman Consuls appeared sparkling in diamonds taken from an *ostensor* seized from Prince Doria, nominally to pay for the French occupation, we may be sure that Saint-Cyr was not the only French officer who took fire. Each French commander naturally looked on all the funds obtained in his district as first of all applicable to the needs of his troops. The Commissioners at best thought of Paris; the troops believed they thought only of their own pockets. Hence came many a bitter struggle.

Now to finish with the south of Italy. Saint-Cyr, the successor of Masséna at Rome, seems to have owed his appointment to the fact that at the moment the Directory wanted a General he chanced to pass through Paris on his way from the late Armée du Rhin to his division of the Armée d'Angleterre at Coutances, which Oudinot, one of his Generals of Brigade, was temporarily commanding in his stead. He was not to occupy the same independent position as Masséna had done, for the force at Rome was now to be but part of the Armée d'Italie. Appointed on the 9th March 1798, on the 26th he arrived at

¹ Plunder has been discussed in Phipps, iv. 204-9.

² Lahure, 135-6, for example.

Rome and took charge from Dallemagne. Murat had, I think, already been sent back to Milan, whence in due time he went to Genoa for embarkation for Egypt. Saint-Cyr on his way had seen Berthier in Milan and had been given the orders of the Directory to arrest certain officers who had signed a declaration refusing to receive Masséna as Commander-in-Chief. Berthier had declined to say that it was possible to carry out this instruction; but Saint-Cyr, having only a paper signed by twenty-one officers, contrived to get them arrested and sent to France, and the wound to military discipline was at least skinned over. On the 1st April Desaix arrived from France, with his first A.D.C., Savary, the future Duc de Rovigo and Minister of Police. He had travelled incognito, without a word even to his staff of his real mission, which was to prepare for the embarkation at Civita Vecchia of part of the troops from Rome for Egypt, and he spent some six weeks in this work.

There is something very interesting, and also something pathetic, in this meeting at Rome of the two great lieutenants of the 'Rhin-et-Moselle', the friendly rivals Desaix and Saint-Cyr.¹ No men could present a greater contrast: the cold, calm, self-contained Saint-Cyr, measuring every man as he did the enemy, as if to see where his rapier should strike, winning respect but never love; and Desaix, communicating his thoughts readily and entering into the jokes and absurdities of his men, gaining not only the admiration but the love of his hearers. Their aides-de-camp, being consulted on the respective merits of their Generals, agreed that success would be certain and no reverse need be feared if the plans of such a man as Saint-Cyr were executed by such a man as Desaix. This saying would have horrified Saint-Cyr, who, wisely enough, was convinced that almost everything depended not so much on the plan as on its execution; and he used to exemplify this by the instance of the sagacious but unfortunate Mack. Saint-Cyr would have said the difference was that Desaix did—or I mean rather he tried to do—with his advanced guard what he himself did with his reserve. Moreau, who liked Desaix but did not get on with Saint-Cyr, asserted that Desaix would win battles and Saint-Cyr would prevent their being lost. This will

¹ For their relationship and qualities see also Phipps, ii, especially 63-9, 399-400.

not bear investigation, for Saint-Cyr had a way, once he had selected the proper spot, of sending his rapier home; and one doubts whether Desaix would have been capable of such a combination of caution and determination as won Polotsk in 1812. It is odd, considering Moreau's phrase, that Desaix was to immortalize himself not by winning Marengo but by preventing its loss.

The pathos lies in the effect of their separation. Desaix went to serve under Bonaparte, who acknowledged that he had a tendency to fumble at the beginning of an action, which the great master thought he had cured him of. Had he lived, Desaix would have stood high in the favour of the Emperor. When he fell at Marengo the Empire really lost two Marshals, for in his rise he would have carried up Saint-Cyr. As it was, Saint-Cyr, with no one to explain his curious temper, was soon to see men far his inferiors preferred to him, and to become himself the soured man whose talents were never really used by the Empire, which needed them so much. Desaix had a curious staff: Savary, clever, bold, unscrupulous, ambitious, and Rapp, rough and plain-spoken, looking on the ruins of Rome with great contempt, and always ready for battle, and, what was the same thing with him, for wounds, of which he managed to accumulate an extraordinary number, until he was described as a piece of lace-work. No doubt Saint-Cyr had no fancy for the marvellous expedition on which these were bent. On the 26th May 1798 Desaix and his convoy sailed to join Bonaparte off Malta and Saint-Cyr saw him no more on earth, although one would like to fancy the two meeting in some military heaven.

The lesson given by the troops in the question of the systematized plunder of Rome had not been taken to heart, and Saint-Cyr, a man of clean hands and strict discipline, soon came into conflict with the agents of the new Roman Government. Disgusted with them and with the agents of the Directory, he had requested to be transferred to another army or to be allowed to retire. On the 11th July 1798, accordingly, he was appointed to relieve Championnet in command of a division of the Armée de Mayence, whilst Championnet was to take up the command at Rome. Before this exchange could be carried out Saint-Cyr had committed himself with the plundering crew, like the

honest man he was. At a ball he noticed the wives of two of the Roman Consuls with splendid diamonds: learning that these jewels came from a piece of plate seized from the Prince Doria, he had the whole restored to its owner. This piece of military interference with the rights of civilians brought down on him the wrath of first the Roman and then the French Government. On the 15th July his appointment to the Armée de Mayence was cancelled and he was placed on the unemployed list. Too proud to defend himself, he left for France, but even the French Directory had been shamed into virtue when all was fully known. They recalled their Commissioners and sent others, who in their turn dismissed the five Roman Consuls. Every effort was made to intercept Saint-Cyr with fresh orders for employment with the Armée de Mayence. He had wished not to serve again under such a Government, but, now satisfied, he arrived at Friedberg, the head-quarters of the army, on the 19th October 1798, and took command of the division left by Championnet, who had started for Rome.

Macdonald had joined the Armée de Rome from Milan, probably in July, and had been placed at the head of the division occupying the Eternal City. When the transfer of Saint-Cyr to the Armée de Mayence and his replacement by Championnet had been ordered, Macdonald had been appointed to command at Rome till Championnet could join. He now therefore took charge of the army, and whilst Saint-Cyr had been anxious about the threatening attitude of the Neapolitans, Macdonald, as his custom was, took the situation lightly enough. He had strong support at Paris, and he seems to have counted on retaining his command permanently. He was proportionately disgusted when on the 10th November 1798 Championnet arrived and he had to return to his division.

I must now return to the north of Italy with Berthier, whom we left going from Rome to Milan. Ever since he had come back to Italy he had lived in terror lest his separation from Bonaparte should be final and lest his commander should sail for Egypt without him. He might have spared his anxiety; but all this time he had been complaining about his health, and had been whimpering like a child longing for its nurse, and demanding a successor. Especially did he wish to 'sortir des Révolutions'. The Directory, as I have said, had all but

nominated Bernadotte, and had certainly promised the command of 'Italie' to that General, who was anxious to get it. Berthier thought this a good choice, but then he would have welcomed any successor. Now Bonaparte interfered. Many of the troops and stores for Egypt were to be drawn from Italy, and Bonaparte required to have in command there a General whom he could rely on to carry out his demands. Nothing would have been easier than for the man responsible for Italy to declare the drain on her was too much, as indeed it was. Bernadotte was a great deal too independent, and besides he had showed signs of hostility to, or at least of a wish not to serve under, Bonaparte. Masséna would have been a natural choice, and, although the point is not quite clear, as I have said, he seems to have been intended to succeed Berthier when that General should obtain his release and return to France. But then Masséna wanted to be part of the expedition, and Bonaparte at this time intended to take him. Brune, for whom Bonaparte had a curious favour, was at the moment profuse in his demonstrations of respect, and had not enough standing to give his remonstrances, if he did try any, sufficient weight to prevent their being over-ridden. Brune also was a man trusted by Barras, one of the leading Directors. It was, I presume, for all these reasons that in February 1798 Brune was appointed to command in Italy. Bonaparte had intended to take him to Egypt, but there were enough Generals without him. Retained for a time in Switzerland, where he was commanding the Armée d'Helvétie, Brune did not reach Milan till the 2nd April 1798, and on the 4th Berthier, at last happy, handed over the command.

The first business of Brune was to get off the troops and the convoys for Egypt from Civita Vecchia and Genoa, for which purpose he went to the latter port on or before the 21st April and superintended the preparations. On the 28th April the convoy from Genoa sailed, with General of Brigade Murat—who by some contretemps took only five cases of wine for Bonaparte—and also General Leclerc, the future husband of Pauline Bonaparte, who had hitherto been Chief of the Staff in Italy, first to Berthier and then to Brune. General of Brigade Suchet, arrived from Paris, now took this post. Brune was already complaining, with good cause, of the manner in which

Italy had been stripped of troops and Generals: he wished to keep General Delmas, but that officer insisted that he must either be given leave or be permitted to resign. Bonaparte had tried to sweeten the pill by representing the command in Italy as but a passage by which Brune could join the expedition in Egypt, and Brune himself, soon dissatisfied with his task, talked about carrying out this idea, for he seems to have been ambitious of military glory. For the present he and Suchet, both ardent revolutionists, agreed well together. As for other future Marshals during his command, we have already seen Murat embark for Egypt in April. Macdonald arrived in April from Paris,¹ a week or so after Bernadotte's affair in Vienna which caused hostilities to appear likely. Indeed, when Brune had returned from Genoa to Milan he found orders for the troops of the convoys to disembark. Macdonald is said to have joined the party opposed to Brune, and though he himself says nothing of this in his memoirs, it is strange to find him allowed to travel for two months and then kept idle in Milan until he went to Rome in July to relieve Saint-Cyr. In May, Victor arrived from Nantes to command a division. Thus in October 1798 when Brune's command ceased, he himself with Macdonald, Suchet, and Victor were the only future Marshals in Italy.

I have spoken of the conflicts between the army and the Commissioners of the Directory, and we have seen Saint-Cyr openly opposing them in Rome. When Brune arrived the political organization of Italy was as follows. Bonaparte's first creation had been the Cispadane Republic;² his conquests to the north of the Po had been added to this, and the State so formed had been recognized as the Cisalpine Republic. This consisted of the Valtelline, Lombardy, with the former mainland possessions of Venice (Venice itself falling to Austria), Mantua and the districts to the Adige, the Principality of Massa-Carrara and Guastalla, and the three Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna. In this way a State of some three or four million inhabitants had been formed, occupying the north and centre of Italy. Its Capital was Milan, and it had its own

¹ See p. 217.

² First organized the 16th October 1796, of the Legations of Bologna and Ferrara, Duchy of Modena, and Province of Reggio. Romagna was added in 1797. *Corr. Nap.* xxix. 208-10; Thiers, *Rév.* iv. 198-201; Phipps, iv.

troops which served with the army of occupation. It looked forward with eagerness to the prospect of gaining more territory. East of it Austria held Venice, Verona, and the line of the Adige. To the west the King of Sardinia in Turin was permitted to continue a shadowy reign over Piedmont, but French troops occupied the country and were soon to seize it. Genoa had become the Ligurian Republic, with its own army, though held by the French troops. Tuscany was still nominally under its Grand Duke, but it was at the mercy of the French and was soon occupied by them. The little Republic of Lucca was in trembling expectation of the occupation which was soon to come. To the south French troops held Rome, which had become the Roman Republic. Ancona had formed itself into a Republic, not officially recognized by the French, but favoured by them. Thus, with the exception of Venice to the Adige, all the north and centre of Italy was in the hands, or at the mercy, of the French. Naples was still independent and its attitude was causing anxiety. We shall see it, too, occupied.

Bonaparte apparently had intended his creation, the Cisalpine Republic, to walk on its own feet, and he deprecated the removal of two of its Directory by the French Directory as degrading it. Neither the Directory at Paris nor Brune in Milan thought in this manner, and a struggle soon began between the French Directory and its commander in Italy as to whose views should prevail in the management and composition of the nominally independent Cisalpine Republic. One side of this is told by Larévellière-Lépeaux, but in fact the French Directory was divided on the treatment of Italy, as on many other matters, and while Larévellière-Lépeaux was strong against Brune, that General was defended by Barras. However, it is worth while to give Larévellière-Lépeaux's opinion of Brune, and of the Chief of the Staff, Suchet.

'This Brune was a mediocre man, with little capacity in business matters, much occupied with his own pleasures, and, like all the Dantonians, to which party he belonged, a great supporter of disorder, from the midst of which they drew with impunity the treasures necessary for the maintenance of their luxury. He was vain, very susceptible to flattery, jealous of his military authority; dissimulation and falseness, which showed themselves in all his features, formed one of the foundations of

his character. He began by leaguering himself with all men of exaggerated opinions, and the rascals, who, usurping the name of patriots, nevertheless offered incense to his intolerable despotism. They joined with him to destroy the credit of all good men, and to possess themselves of all the places, and every means of swindling money, whether from the public treasury or from individuals. The subsequent conduct of Brune at Hamburg has let it be seen what he must have done in Italy. He was powerfully seconded in his culpable conduct by his staff, whose chief was Suchet, since Marshal of the Empire, a very insolent soldier, and one of the most shameless plunderers. A General Dufraisse, a General Gardanne, &c., men who dishonoured the French uniform, also surrounded him.' Before one can take breath after this douche of abuse, he goes on to ridicule Brune for his claims to be a poet, and relates, as I have already done,¹ how the General bored Daunou for a whole day with his verses, a crime apparently placed on a level with the serious charges made before. In fairness to Brune and Suchet it must be remembered that Joubert, Saint-Cyr, and Championnet were all denounced as sinners in Italy at this period, though before and afterwards their characters seem blameless enough. Suchet's brother, well employed under the Empire, is described as 'sans probité, sans moralité'.²

Brune certainly took the most brutal view of the situation. To him Italy was a conquered country, to be treated in that style. The Italians would be humble enough if dealt with severely: otherwise they would be insolent and dangerous. Considering himself the master of the country, Brune was in constant dispute with the French Minister, Trouvé, who disliked the Jacobin tendencies of the General. Still, Brune in June 1798 installed a Jacobin Directory at Milan. In August that year he was called to Paris by the Directory, and after being heard by them he was sent back with fresh instructions. On the 1st September 1798 he allowed Trouvé to 'purify' the Councils of the Cisalpine Republic, and to give it a fresh Constitution. The democrats, probably supported by Brune, complained at Paris, and, the party of Barras in the French Directory getting the upper hand for the moment, Trouvé was recalled and Fouché was sent to Italy instead.

¹ Phipps, iv.

² Larévellière-Lépeaux, ii. 291-2.

Fouché arrived at Milan on the 12th October 1798 with instructions to respect the new Constitution, but on the night of the 18th October Brune carried out a fresh *coup d'état*, replacing the Jacobins in power; and when Fouché affected to be alarmed, Brune showed him a letter from the Directory permitting him to make what changes he liked. That such a letter expressed the formal ideas of the Directory is denied by Larévellière-Lépeaux, who believed that all this was a plot by Barras, Brune, and Fouché. However this may be, the general knowledge of the Jacobin antecedents of Brune and Fouché gave the more importance in Italy to this change, which was considered as a victory for the extreme party. This was too much for the party of Larévellière-Lépeaux in the French Directory. Hostilities in Italy with Austria were feared; Brune's military talents were disparaged (Macdonald, it is hinted by Barras, being engaged in this work) and, to the regret of Barras, Brune was removed by being appointed to command in Holland, nominally from the 13th October 1798;¹ Fouché also was soon recalled and the former Constitution was restored. Brune went off expressing his satisfaction at first having avenged himself and, it is said, bearing away a large sum in cash.

Joubert, Brune's successor, who had been commanding the Armée de Mayence, arrived at Milan early in November. He retained Suchet as Chief of the Staff. General of Division Victor was already in Italy. Two other officers of the same rank, Sérurier, returning from France, and Grouchy, joining like Joubert from the Armée de Mayence, came here in November 1798, as did Moreau, now only Inspector-General of Infantry, but still thus drawn from the disgrace and non-employment which had been his fate since Fructidor. One change came in this month which, though it did not directly affect Joubert, diminished the fighting strength of the Armée d'Italie by some 22,000 men: that is the formation of the Armée de Rome under Championnet, as an independent force. Joubert's command nominally included the 14,000 troops in Corsica, Corfu, and Malta, but, not counting the Armée de Rome, he had actually in Italy, that is in the Cisalpine Republic, Liguria, and Piedmont, 102,938 men.

¹ I do not understand the date: perhaps he was antedated. He did not arrive in Holland till January 1799; Gachot, *Brune en Hollande*, 204 and note 1.

Joubert, a former lieutenant, and a favourite one, of Bonaparte in Italy, to whom Bonaparte had referred when reproached for taking so many Generals to Egypt, came as a fighting commander. It was nearly certain that hostilities with Austria would soon recommence, and he had no idea that instead of leading a campaign his service in Italy would be, as Sainte-Beuve puts it, 'deux mois seulement de contestation encore plus que de commandement'.¹ Whilst the agents of the Directory were trying to get his power limited to the command of the army, he himself declared that he did not know what was wanted with an Ambassador to the Cisalpine Republic, and that at the first gun-shot he would kick Rivaud, the occupant of that post, out of doors. He soon found himself the agent of the disgraceful policy of the Directory. Fouché, the former Minister, with whom Joubert had at once struck up a friendship, was recalled, or rather had to fly to escape arrest, which he only avoided through the shelter given him by Joubert. A fresh *coup d'état* was carried out by the new Minister on the night of the 7th December 1798, although he did not dare to present a new Constitution as he dreaded the attitude of Joubert, who was sulking at Reggio,² and the army might refuse to recognize a new Government.

One of the first proceedings in which Joubert was engaged was discreditable enough. After the Treaty of Cherasco, made by Bonaparte when he cut across the Apennines in 1796, the little Kingdom of Sardinia had been allowed to exist, but Piedmont was occupied by the French.³ On the 3rd July 1798 the citadel of Turin had been occupied by Brune, under a treaty which was only to last for two months, but which was not observed. The Cisalpine Republic wished to gain the country, and the French Directory, after attempts to plunder it, determined to seize it and to force the King to abdicate. It was easy for the wolf to show that the lamb was a disturbing influence, and Grouchy, just arrived from the Armée de Mayence, was ordered to take command at Turin, where he arrived on the 1st December 1798. There he received orders, through Suchet, to try and make the King abdicate, and to get it done as if it were a voluntary act, so as not to harm the negotiations still going on with

¹ Sainte-Beuve, *Causeries*, xv. 180.

² The northern Reggio, in the Duchy of Modena.

³ Phipps, iv. 28, 31.

Austria at Rastadt. One happy idea was to win over the King's confessor and to get him to persuade Charles Emmanuel to abdicate. Keeping himself secret for some days, as if to give the affair the proper air of a conspiracy, Grouchy by threats and negotiations carried out the work.¹

On the 7th December 1798 the King signed the Act by which he renounced all power, and ordered his army to consider itself as an integral part of the French army. Meantime Joubert was marching on Turin with Victor's division from Modena and other troops, occupying various military posts on his way. On the 9th December Joubert reached Turin, Victor's division entering the citadel, and next day he ratified the abdication. The Directory had intended to bring the Royal Family to Paris as prisoners, but the order arrived too late, and like a funeral procession the royal carriages passed through Turin. Reaching Sardinia, the King found the islanders determined to resist the French whether with or without his sanction, and in due time he disclaimed his abdication, retaining Sardinia till in 1814 he regained Piedmont. Meantime there was a scramble for his property at Turin, some coldness arising between Grouchy and Joubert as Grouchy had disposed of nine saddle horses he said the King had given him, taking four for himself and allotting the rest to his staff. Grouchy himself said, what was true enough, that the horses were being stolen, and, oddly enough, he claimed to dispose of these steeds as there was no order against taking them, except one from Suchet, not in Joubert's name and which no one attended to. In true Grouchy style he announced that 'La raideur de mon caractère jointe à la pureté de mes principes' made him ask for another command than that of Piedmont. He was soon engaged in suppressing the insurrections which naturally enough broke out. Joubert returned to Milan and was plunged into quarrels with the agents of the Directory. The occupation of Piedmont cannot have been pleasant work, and, disliking the changes in the Cisalpine Republic, he was proposing to resign, when Barras and the Minister of War, Schérer, were employed to induce him to disregard the attacks of certain newspapers, which in characteristic Bonapartist style he bitterly resented, and to get him to remain at his post.

¹ Grouchy, *Mémoires*, i. 443.

Another piece of French annexation took place when in December Joubert sent Sérurier from Modena to occupy Leghorn; but after entering Tuscany his expedition was turned against the tiny State of Lucca by order of the French Directory. On the 22nd December 1798 he entered Lucca with his cavalry, and heavily ransomed it in money and clothing for the army. Lucca indeed was looked on as a treasure house and had already paid large sums to Berthier and Brune. The Neapolitans, who had occupied Leghorn, embarked for their own country on the 3rd January 1799, and on the 2nd and the 3rd January Sérurier's infantry, 6,000 strong, entered Lucca. Sérurier now proclaimed the State a Republic, on the 25th January 1799. There was a little difficulty about this. The French Directory had wanted to ruin the nobility of the tiny State, but the first elections went in favour of the nobles, so that Sérurier had to nominate the men who were to rule the 'freed' people. On the 5th February, as Joubert was concentrating his army in consequence of the probability of hostilities with Austria, Sérurier left to take command at Mantua, Miollis relieving him here.¹ Later, when disasters were befalling the French, Lucca was evacuated by them on the 17th August 1799. This sort of work seemed to delight Grouchy: it can hardly have been as pleasant to the old Sérurier.

Joubert now sustained a loss which he felt and resented. Suchet suited him as Chief of the Staff and the two had become friends. Suchet, however, was abhorrent to those men, now triumphant, who had got rid of Brune. They had hoped Joubert would be their passive instrument, and his opposition to many of their plans they put down to the evil influence of Suchet. Even before the recall of Brune, they had averred that Suchet ought to be removed as well as Fouché. When Joubert came, the Minister to the Cisalpine still complained he could do nothing whilst Suchet let himself be led by 'odieux terroristes', the nickname for any one attacked after the fall of Robespierre. One thing especially annoyed Rivaud. Suchet would not even answer his letters on important matters: part of a system, Rivaud believed, of ignoring him and the new Government of

¹ Probably the Général-Comte Charles-François de Miollis (1759-1828), who had fought with 'Pyrénées Occidentales', and with Bonaparte's Armée d'Italie. *Fastes*, iii; Phipps, iii. 210, note 2; iv. 137 and note 1.

the Cisalpine. One measure employed to damage Suchet was to demand from him the amount of the contributions received by Joubert and employed under his orders by Suchet for the supply of the troops. Knowing that the removal of Suchet was proposed, Joubert wrote to the French Directory on the 21st December 1798, positively requesting that Suchet and Auberon, another official, should be left with the army, in possession of their rank. If he were to command, he must have men who had gained his confidence and that of the army: both these men had done so, and neither meddled with politics—indeed they were too busy to do so. Still, on the 27th December 1798 the Directory suspended Suchet, who went to Paris, whence on the 1st February 1799 he told Joubert of his interviews with three of the Directors. Joubert had written pleading the state of his health and insisting on being relieved. Barras, always friendly towards Joubert, seemed to believe he would take a month's leave and come to Paris, when he hoped to be able to convince him of the confidence the Directory had in him. Still, Barras spoke as if Joubert might have been used as a tool for foreigners. Two other Directors, Merlin and Treilhard, accused Suchet of being the author of all the troubles in Italy and of having influenced Joubert in matters of policy. He does not appear to have seen the other Directors, Larévellière-Lépeaux and Rewbell, probably assuming they were too hostile to listen to reason. The Minister of War, Schérer, was most friendly; he did not even know the charges made against Suchet, and regretted that Joubert had not let him know the annoyances he had undergone, for he would have got rid of them. Like Barras, he counted on Joubert taking a month's leave and resuming his command. He looked on war as certain, and he told Suchet part of his plans, by which the army in Switzerland was to penetrate into the Tyrol (a plan highly blamed by Napoleon). However, Suchet remained unemployed until, soon after the 19th February, he was sent to the Armée de Mayence, where we have seen him, although Masséna, then commanding the Armée d'Helvétie, wrote on the 22nd January asking whether Suchet was to be employed with his army.

This removal of Suchet was the last drop in Joubert's cup. He was in constant conflict with the financial agents of the Directory, whose methods he disliked, whilst they considered

he had nothing to do with such matters. It was not that Joubert took the side of the Italians. He disliked the provisional Government given to Piedmont, believing that the Piedmontese, who had both 'nerf et instruction', would not fail to use it against French influence, and he demanded a prompt solution of the question whether the country was to be annexed or not, a point on which the Directory seemed undecided. In some matters he supported the provisional Government, and, very naturally but to the great indignation of the financial agent, he would not allow the King's plate to be sold. Finally Joubert had sent his resignation to the Directory, who on the 17th December 1798 begged him to remain, trying to satisfy him. Joubert, however, had already withdrawn from his official quarters to a private residence; on the 23rd January 1799 the Directory gave the victory to the financial agent, and Barras, the supporter of Joubert in the Directory, now voted for the acceptance of his resignation, believing this alone could save the General from the measures threatened against him. On the 2nd February 1799 Joubert passed through Turin on his way to France.¹

It seems strange that the Directory should have permitted Joubert to leave, as hostilities with Austria were almost certain, and, as we shall see, they were undecided as to his successor. Joubert's wish to leave is easier to understand. Like Brune he had attempted to adopt Bonaparte's attitude of independence, but he had not the victories of his master or his power of the purse, for now the agents of the Directory raised the contributions from the conquered provinces. Also Bonaparte had been, as he told Miot de Mérito, 'more sovereign than General of the army', in Italy, and Joubert was not in that position with the present Armée d'Italie, which no longer was a homogeneous body. As for the approaching war, he may have been unwilling to take the responsibility of acting with the force assigned to Italy, as we shall find Bernadotte was. Joubert commanded at Paris at the *coup d'état* of the 30^{me} Prairial An VII (18th June 1799), when, supporting Barras and his party, he had the satisfaction of evicting his enemy Larévellière-Lépeaux from the Directory.

The question of who was to succeed Joubert in command was

¹ Grouchy, *Mémoires*, ii. 29. For various orders given during Joubert's command, see Roguet, ii. 64-102.

a difficult one. He had recommended Moreau to the Directory. 'He is the only man whom I recognize as really worthy of the command; the only one whose military reputation offers, in my opinion, the guarantee necessary in the grave circumstances in which the Republic finds itself placed.' At Paris, Schérer proposed the appointment of Moreau, which was warmly advocated by Larévellière-Lépeaux but was successfully opposed by Barras, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the silence of Moreau as to the treachery of his friend Pichegru in 1797. Joubert had anticipated this feeling of the Directory, and on leaving Italy he handed over the command, not to Moreau,¹ but to General Delmas, who had led the contingent from the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' to 'Italie' in February 1797. He was a sharp-tongued man, whose bitter retort to Bonaparte, when the Consul spoke of the coronation ceremony in Notre-Dame—that a million men had died to put this down—brought on him a disgrace only lifted in 1813 to let him die at Leipzig.²

Of other possible choices for the Italian command, Masséna had been the chief lieutenant of Bonaparte, but his prestige in Italy had been damaged by the insurrection at Rome, and he was in command of the Armée d'Helvétie. Brune, for whom Bonaparte destined the command here, had displeased the Directory and now was in command in Holland. Bernadotte remained, and the Directory authorized Barras to offer the command in Italy to that General. With all his wealth of diction, gestures, and picturesque phrases, Bernadotte, having ascertained the strength the Directory would give the army, replied that the force was insufficient. With much truth, he argued that Bonaparte, believed to have done wonders with small resources, really had been given great ones: reinforcements had been poured on him, and the whole of Kellermann's Armée des Alpes had been made a mere depot for him.³ Without being such a butcher of men, Bernadotte required a certain strength, and as that could not be given him he declined the command. Of course every General had pressed for reinforce-

¹ Roguet, ii. 102. I think *Vict. et Conq.* x. 141, and *Fastes*, iii. 430, are wrong in making Joubert hand over the interim command to Moreau. See *Biog. des Cont.* ii. 1287, and Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxii. 281.

² Général Antoine-Guillaume Delmas (1768–1813), *Biog. des Cont.* ii. 1286–8; Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxii. 279–81; Phipps, ii; iv. 159, &c.

³ Phipps, iv. 42.

ments, but Bernadotte wished for a command on the Rhine, where, as Suchet was to remind him later, he said, 'I shall promptly receive reinforcements: in Italy, I have only to hope for promises.'¹

Bernadotte was right about numbers, but, if Barras tells us all, he did not point out the great mistake of the Directory, the detachment of the troops forming the army of Naples to the south of the peninsula whilst the fate of the campaign was to be settled in the north: indeed he assumed they could furnish no help. A certain magnet in the south drew the French there. Even in May 1796 when the hold of Bonaparte in Italy was so precarious and the citadel of Milan was not yet taken, still the Directory proposed to march on Naples, but Bonaparte discouraged them. At St. Helena he laid down that the Armée de Naples ought to have been recalled, on principles that condemned his own march into Spain in 1808.² Another great fault of the Directory, the retention of a great number of troops in France for political reasons, probably was unknown to Bernadotte.

In a conversation with the puzzled Directors, Schérer argued that the forces in Italy were sufficient; and on the question being put to him, whether he was ready to undertake the command, he replied that he could not refuse the task he asked another to undertake. Two Directors cried out that he was nominated to command in Italy, he and they being taken at their word. Schérer was a man of some distinction. He had served eleven years in the ranks of Austria before the Revolution, and, returning to France, had fought in the war, becoming a corps commander in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' under Jourdan in 1794. After commanding the Armée d'Italie from the 3rd November 1794 to the 9th May 1795, he passed to the command of the Armée des Pyrénées Orientales. He had finished the campaign by advancing into Spain and taking Figueras. Then in October 1795, returning to the Armée d'Italie, he had superseded Kellermann, and had won the important battle of Loano. It is true that he had shrunk from the task of advancing farther, and, horrified by the bold plans of the young Bonaparte, he had

¹ Roguet, ii. 546. See Bernadotte's observations, given by Gachot, *Souvarow en Italie*, 423-6.

² *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 261.

left the command to him in March 1796. On the 25th July 1797 he had become Minister of War.¹

There were some blots on his prestige, for in reality he had not done well in Spain, but on the whole he had been a successful General. In the office he now held he had been a severe administrator, and consequently had indisposed many officers against him. Like a true War Office official, he was determining the proper length for officers' hair, eight inches, fastened by a ribbon of black silk, with a flat-headed pin. The men had a worsted ribbon. Also life in Paris had told on him. In the Pyrenees and the Alps probably he had lived sparsely enough; now good dinners in the Capital had affected his physique and his health. He was 'old, worn, given up to the pleasures of the table, apoplectic, and thence deprived of all activity', was the opinion of Larévellière-Lépeaux, and Barras says that he himself and Rewbell, the latter being a relation of the General, remarked on the infirmities of the man they were appointing to such a command.²

It would be interesting to know who did vote for Schérer. Larévellière-Lépeaux says he opposed the appointment, apparently suggesting Macdonald, with Moreau to replace Jourdan on the Rhine; and he says that Schérer himself only accepted with very great reluctance, pleading his age and his weight and proposing to substitute Moreau. He believed he would be repugnant to the army. Barras implies that he and Rewbell objected to Schérer and that Merlin was fiercely against him, this leaving only one Director, Treilhard, unaccounted for. No doubt Barras really was responsible for the choice, and there was much to be said for it. Larévellière-Lépeaux agrees that Schérer had genius and knew the science of war, and that both Joubert and Bernadotte, consulted together and separately, replied that, after the departure of the army of Egypt, the best of the remaining Generals was Schérer, and that they all considered him their master in the art of war. This might be taken as praising a man for a post they did not want forced on themselves, but even after Schérer's defeats, Macdonald believed he had failed from the faults of his Generals and not from want of capacity.³

¹ Général Barthélemy-Louis-Joseph Schérer (1735-1804). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* xli. 111-15; *Biog. Cont.* iv. 1279-80; Phipps, ii, iii, iv.

² Larévellière-Lépeaux, ii. 112-14, 378; Barras, ii. 315.

³ Macdonald, *Mémoires*, 83.

XI

FIRST PHASE OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

(November 1798 to April 1799)

War against Naples. Macdonald and Championnet. Schérer's retreat to the Adda.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See Chapter IV.

BEFORE continuing with this army, where Schérer arrived in March, we must bring the Armée de Rome up to date. War had already broken out in the south while Joubert still commanded in Italy and Championnet was on his way to take up the command of 'Naples'. Championnet arrived on the 18th November 1798 from Holland. He was one of the men who most probably would have been a Marshal had he lived. Jean Étienne was the illegitimate son of a female servant whose master, a man of some position, Étienne Grand, master of post horses at Valence, married her. The lad received a fair education, and having filled a post in the civil administration, he entered the National Guard on the 14th July 1789, becoming Lieutenant, when he attended the Federation at Paris. Either in August or September 1792 he became Lieutenant-Colonel of the 6th battalion of the *Volontaires de Drôme*. In some way he incurred suspicion, and appeared before the *Comité de salut public*, but cleared himself. His battalion went to the Rhine, where, in the Armée de la Moselle under Hoche, we have seen him complaining of Soutt being 'très tranquille', at the relief of Landau, and by his report probably nearly getting Soutt disgraced.¹ Serving in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' under Jourdan he had risen to be one of the leading Generals of Division. He had been a personal friend of Jourdan's successor, Hoche, and had been his companion in the debauches which weakened the constitution of both. He had been recommended by Hoche to the

¹ Général Jean Étienne *dit* Championnet (1762-99). Faure, *Championnet*; Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* viii. 27-8; Soutt, *Mémoires*, ii. 365; Thiébault, ii. 255-7; *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 288-9. He never served in the Walloon Guard in Spain as reported. Phipps, ii. 107, for the incident with Soutt.

Directory. A good fighting General, he bore a high character for personal probity, a virtue specially valuable in Italy, and he won the esteem of the Armée de Naples. He spoke Italian fluently, a fact which must have assisted him in gaining the confidence of the Neapolitans.

The troops already in the district which were to form the new Armée de Rome had been strengthened and now numbered 22,000 or 23,000. Further reinforcements were on the march, but of these only two cavalry regiments joined before the army reached Naples. Championnet had been promised 50,000 men. The army was formed in two divisions, one led by Macdonald and the other by Duhesme, whose Chief of the Staff soon was Thiébault, the memoir-writer.¹ Kellermann *fils*, the son of the future Marshal Kellermann, was one of the Brigadiers. The French Directory had announced their intention of attacking Naples, and the King of that country was preparing to anticipate them and to occupy Rome. Amongst the French nothing was ready; the men had received no pay for some eighty days; Championnet says he only had four guns; and most of the stores were deficient. Garrison guns were in one place, their shot in another. What, however, seems most extraordinary, is that the troops themselves were scattered and no real preparations for resistance had been made. Only from 8,000 to 9,000 men were round Rome, with 3,000 or 4,000 at Ancona under Duhesme and 3,000 at Treni under Lemoine.

It was at Rome that the first shots were fired. The King of Naples was taken with a bellicose fit, and, placing his army under Mack, the sagacious staff officer of the Austrians in the first Netherlands campaign in 1793,² in November 1798 he advanced to occupy Rome. The force there under Macdonald was scattered and unprepared for hostilities, though Macdonald professes to have foreseen the attack of the Neapolitans, whilst Thiébault, then Chief of the Staff to General Casabianca, says that the warnings he constantly gave to head-quarters were not attended to. Saint-Cyr, Macdonald's predecessor, had antici-

¹ Duhesme had fought on the Rhine and in La Vendée, Phipps, ii, iii; with the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' in 1797 he led the division in which Davout and Vandamme had brigades. Général-Baron Paul-Charles-François-Adrien-Henri-Dieudonné Thiébault (1769-1846). Phipps, iii, iv.

² Baron Charles Mack de Leibach (1752-1828). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxxii. 284-90; Phipps, i.

pated an attack by the Neapolitans, whose army was on the frontier, and he wanted an army of 40,000 men, which Thiébault, sneering at his anxiety, still acknowledges would have been required had the Neapolitans had good troops. Championnet, before joining the army, had written to Macdonald from Rome on the 8th November, telling him to concentrate his troops as much as possible; but Macdonald did not do this, pleading, apparently with truth, that he had no authority with the Commissioners of the Directory, and therefore presumably had no funds. Then the storm broke, and six days after the arrival of Championnet at Rome on the 19th November 1798, the Neapolitans under Mack crossed the frontier, really only with 11,000 regular troops, but followed by 40,000 armed peasants. The news was given to Macdonald at a ball in Rome.

In order to concentrate his force Championnet determined to evacuate Rome and to call in his troops on Civita Castellana. He left a garrison in Fort San Angelo, promising to relieve them if they would hold out for twenty days. Macdonald was charged with the actual evacuation, and here springs out his hatred of Championnet, whom he never forgave for replacing him in command, and whom he describes as a very brave man with little ability. He declares Championnet brought on an insurrection in the town by galloping out of it, whereupon the people rose against their liberators and attacked the house of Macdonald. He brought up guns but their detachments were driven off and he had to mount and cut his way out with his staff. Rome was evacuated on the 27th November, and Mack, coming in, saw, he wrote, 'with horror', that the men in Fort San Angelo fired on his troops, though he could not doubt that Championnet did not want to declare war, apparently assuming that he and his Neapolitans were engaged on a friendly visit to Rome, much as Jourdan was to advance on the Danube. The Roman populace then fell on the French sympathizers.

The fighting in this campaign presents little interest as far as the regular troops are concerned, though some incidents may be related. Mack advanced to attack the French but was easily beaten back: indeed the mere march to Rome had exhausted his raw troops, and the Neapolitans then evacuated Rome. Before the city could be occupied in force, Championnet and his staff rode in, on the 15th December 1798, well within the time

he had given to the garrison of San Angelo. Just as the General sat down to dinner, news came that the city was attacked from the north. A column of some 7,000 Neapolitans, under Comte Roger de Damas,¹ had been cut off and now were marching to pass through Rome, Damas believing that Mack had arranged for a safe-conduct for his column. So unexpected was his appearance that the French believed, and most writers still allege, that this column was a force which the English had landed at Leghorn, and so, they assumed, had come south to join Mack. Damas sent on in front a nephew of Talleyrand to arrange matters with the French.

On the approach of this column being known, Captain Romieux, just arrived with a handful of men, came out of San Angelo with 200 men and two guns, and holding the Ponte Molle, halted Damas, who entered into negotiations with Bonnamì, the French Chief of the Staff. Bonnamì denied the validity of the safe-conduct and told Damas that his position was hopeless, as indeed it seemed, and called on him to surrender. Damas could easily have broken through; however, believing this impossible he asked for three hours to deliberate, but was only given one. Championnet and Macdonald now came up with troops and soon attacked, but Damas slipped off, and though hotly pursued by Kellermann *filis*, and badly wounded himself in the fighting, eventually he got to Orbitello, in the Presides or Stato degli Presidii,² an enclave of Naples opposite Elba, where he was safe from the French and by a capitulation was able to embark for Naples. He had done well with troops so bad that Lahure, who was in the pursuit, describes the fighting as the most curious affair of arms he had been present at. Damas's column finally was taken off in the ships bringing back the Neapolitan force from Leghorn, under Naselli, and reached Naples, only to be disarmed by the people. Macdonald criticizes the time given by Bonnamì to Damas, declaring he foresaw this extraordinary march on Orbitello; but he assumes that Bonnamì had a force capable of dealing with the column, which is denied.

¹ Comte Roger de Damas (1765-1823). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxxii. 53-6; Damas, *Mémoires*. There were several Damas.

² See Spruner-Menke, *Hist. Hand-Atlas*, xxviii, *Italien VIII*, for the Stato degli Presidii.

Championnet now sat down again to his well-earned dinner, when a fresh alarm on the opposite quarter sent him and his staff off once more. It seemed to rain columns, for another body of the enemy, 6,000 strong, had fallen back from Frascati and was attacking the Lateran gate, to assist the passage of Damas. This was easily beaten off, when it is to be hoped that Championnet got his dinner at last. After this the Neapolitans gave no further trouble near Rome but made a rapid retreat for Naples.

Thiers represents Championnet as now conceiving the project of conquering Naples, but in reality before taking command he had received verbal orders to carry the war into the territory of that country if the King invaded Rome.¹ On the 25th November 1798, just before evacuating Rome, in the presence of the Roman Consuls, Macdonald, and other Generals, he had sworn on his word of honour that he would beat the then triumphant Neapolitans, and, even if the French Directory ordered him to fall back on the Cisalpine Republic, he would pursue them to Naples. This he now proceeded to do, scattering his small army by different routes. The regular Neapolitan troops gave little trouble, but the peasants rose and fought with bitter hatred, giving a foretaste of what was to happen much later in Spain, cutting off detachments and massacring any parties of French which fell into their hands. Whole battalions, says Championnet, were repulsed by them and almost cut in pieces. Leaving Rome on the 20th December 1798 he made for Capua, apparently intending to halt on the Volturno before Capua to await the junction of the other divisions, for his position was very precarious. On the right Rey's division, bullying Gaeta into surrender, was advancing along the coast, whilst on the left, to the north of the Apennines, Duhesme by the Adriatic and the linking force under Lemoine were cut off from the rest of the army by the mass of armed peasants. The war took on a curious aspect, perplexing to the French, for whilst strong fortresses were surrendered on a summons, positions having no real importance were defended with the most extreme tenacity.

Besides studying scientific methods of attacking fortresses, officers might learn a useful lesson from the procedure of General Duhesme before Pescara. Having heard from the officer sent to

¹ Thiers, *Rév.* iv. 302-3; Faure, *Championnet*, 230.

summon the place that it was in good condition, and all the details he had learnt about the garrison, which was 2,000 strong and well supplied, Duhesme went on to inquire into the personal characteristics of the Governor, who had tried to deceive the emissary by passing before him the same force several times, in uniforms of different regiments. Finding that he was old, thin, very pale, weak in voice, and deaf, with well-powdered hair in ringlets, and, instead of long boots with spurs, wearing silk stockings and shoes with large buckles—'Large buckles!' cried General Bayonet.¹ 'Forward the artillery and begin fire: the place is mine'—as, to the astonishment of his officers, it was next morning; the most wonderful thing about the capitulation being that the place was not surrounded, so that, even if the garrison did not choose to defend it, nothing prevented their marching out to freedom with all arms and baggage, instead of giving them up and engaging not to serve again in the war.

Now came a final breach between Championnet and Macdonald. Macdonald never understood what harm his bitter tongue did him: it had nearly cost him his life in early days with the *Armée du Nord*,² and now he was surprised that his correspondence before the recapture of Rome, '*plutôt gaie que sérieuse*', where he treated the fighting jocosely, had given offence. Also he was aggrieved that the greater part of the credit was not given to him and to his division. Even before re-entering Rome there had been an angry interview between the two Generals, where Championnet took as satire what Macdonald professed to be mere jokes. Eblé had reconciled them for the moment, but Macdonald thenceforward, till his attack on Capua, had renounced all initiative, even if he did not, as Thiébault asserts, intentionally delay his movements. He had disapproved of the armistice, and it is said sent private notice of it immediately to the Directory. Now he sent in an inordinate application for promotions in his division. He had asked for the rank of General of Division for Maurice Mathieu, properly enough, but now he wanted five Colonels to be promoted Generals of Brigade, and three hundred steps in his division. Rey's division, it must be remembered, had taken Gaeta, and Duhesme and Lemoine had gone through much hard fighting. Another angry interview between the two Generals led to Mac-

¹ Thiébault, ii. 373.

² Phipps, i. 268-9.

donald requesting and obtaining leave to go to Rome. Whilst writing to the Minister for employment elsewhere, Macdonald remained at Capua. Later, to anticipate, he entered Naples after the army, and after passing a week there went back to Rome. Before leaving he had done as much as he could to damage Championnet, representing to his officers that they owed any lack of promotion to the injustice of the Commander-in-Chief. 'You are the victims of the most unjust of hatreds.'

In his memoirs Championnet makes no complaint of Macdonald and praises his division. At the time he wrote to the Director, Barras, on the 14th January 1799: 'The jealous spirit of Macdonald does harm to the army, and by not carrying out the orders I have given him he has constantly prevented the execution of my plans. It is to your friendship I entrust these confessions; I beg you will recall him from the army.' To Joubert, then commanding the Armée d'Italie, he wrote: 'Macdonald has just asked for leave to retire to Rome, to await there his recall, which he has asked for from the Directory. I grant him his request, only too happy to disembarass myself of the most cruel of my enemies. I know that he tries to ruin me at Paris; I beg you to recommend him.' To the Directory Championnet wrote officially: 'When I arrived with the army General Macdonald commanded the troops stationed in the Roman Republic. His reception proclaimed him an enemy to me. . . . I have lavished praises and money on General Macdonald: nothing has been able to stop his jealousy. . . . General Macdonald no longer conceals his views, he openly declares himself my enemy. He has asked me for five places for General of Brigade and more than three hundred places for officers. As I did not wish to grant these demands, he has not scrupled to tell these officers so, and by this vile means he has sought to make himself a party which may become very dangerous. I had quite another opinion of General Macdonald. I thought I should find in him a man animated only by sentiments of love for his country, but I was mistaken. He has asked me for leave to retire to Rome, there to await his recall, which he asks from you, and probably there to gather his fortune. I grant him his request and beg you to send him elsewhere than under my orders.'¹ It will be seen that after this campaign was ended

¹ Faure, *Championnet*, xlii-xliii.

and Macdonald was leaving for France, Joubert complained as strongly as Championnet of Macdonald's inordinate recommendations for promotion.¹

At Caserta Championnet received an unexpected visitor in the person of General Mack. This unfortunate General had made the most excellent plans for the Allies in the Netherlands, and his departure thence in 1794 had been lamented. Now he had tried to command the Neapolitans, but they had broken loose, and for his own safety he had to leave them and place himself in the hands of his antagonist, who sent him to France. To Macdonald, Mack said they had poisoned him at Capua and had tried to assassinate him at Naples. As for his troops, the King of Naples himself once declared to a reformer of their uniform, 'Dress them in blue, red, or yellow, they will run all the same.'² Saint-Cyr, in one of his charming critical moods, expatiates on the comparative ease of forming a good plan as against the difficulty of executing it, and cites Mack as an instance of a General who formed plans which were long the admiration of Europe, although he was unable ever to see one succeed. It was in the execution of one of these plans that he was caught by Napoleon at Ulm in 1805 and was promptly devoured. Condemned to death by the Austrians for his surrender of Ulm, he argued himself out of his peril and died in retirement. Mack's name is now only a by-word; still, I give the lamentation made when he left the army in the Netherlands: 'With Mack, confidence, order, discipline, disappeared from this army, which knew nothing further but reverses'³

After long and severe fighting Championnet and his army stormed their way into Naples on the 23rd January 1799, and next day took the title of l'Armée de Naples. Nelson, who had sunk the French fleet at the battle of the Nile, had carried off the Royal Family of Naples to Palermo on the 23rd December 1798. Championnet now set to work to conquer the country, whilst its Government was reorganized as the République Parthénopéenne, one of the numerous offspring of the French Republic.⁴ He acted under orders, but all this was a mistake,

¹ See p. 309.

² Lahure, 178.

³ Langeron in Pingaud, *L'Invasion Austro-Prussienne*, 69-70.

⁴ Gaffarel, *Bonaparte et les Républiques Italiennes*, 247-99; Colletta, *History of Naples*, i. 289-366.

fatal to the French in Italy that year and still more fatal to their supporters in Naples. The gathering storm on the north-eastern frontier of Italy should have warned the Directors that Championnet's army ought to have been recalled. With the force they had in Italy they could not hope to hold Naples, which was exposed to attack from the sea. Their supporters were encouraged to compromise themselves in a manner for which the Neapolitan Bourbons were soon to take a bloody revenge. Napoleon in 1805, with a much stronger force in Italy and irritated as he was with Naples, was careful not to commit his troops to the farther end of the peninsula until Austerlitz had made his rear free from danger.

The French armies had never taken seriously the war against religion declared by the Revolution, and now at all events there was no hesitation in taking advantage of any favour which could be won by acting in accordance with the local customs in matters of faith. Almost as soon as the French had entered Naples, a guard had been placed by them over the shrine of San Gennaro, and soon Championnet and his staff appeared in the Cathedral to witness the liquefaction of the blood of the Saint. The General 'prayed like the devil', as his Chief of the Staff irreverently wrote, the blood flowed, and finally Vesuvius by an eruption showed that the entry of the French had been under Divine favour. The inconstant multitude veered round, and at the Opera Championnet was given an immense reception.

Hardly had Naples been pacified when the struggle between Championnet and the agents of the Directory came to a head. The agents by their exactions, especially by their claim for 3 centimes on every franc of Neapolitan Funds, were irritating the people into rebellion, and Championnet, stung by a proclamation against him by the agent Faipoult, on the 6th February took the bold course of ordering the existing agents out of the Neapolitan and Roman territories and substituting others. This step delighted the people, who declared Championnet must be a Neapolitan; but the Directory looked on Italy as their source of wealth, and probably did not care much for the feelings of a nation they could hardly hope to keep long in subjection. Apparently before they received Championnet's dispatch they removed him from his command and ordered him to report himself to the Minister of War. He left Naples on the 28th

February 1799.¹ On the 25th the Directory had ordered him to be tried by court martial. In the Directory Barras was inclined to defend the General, but Larévellière-Lépeaux, even long years afterwards when he himself was in retirement, wrote of Championnet with what seems personal bitterness.² At Milan he was arrested and was sent a prisoner to Grenoble for trial, together with his Generals Duhesme, Broussier, Rey, and Dufresse. From prison he sent to the Directory fourteen flags captured by his army. All the Generals except Macdonald, and Dufresse, who had turned against him, supported him; Moreau, for example, another clean-handed man, went to Milan to see him as he passed, and, missing him, wrote to express his regret and his sympathy. Joubert told the Directory that this affair required as much attention as reserve, and the President of the Court which was to have tried the Generals went to Paris with documents telling against the accusers.³ Championnet was kept in arrest until Bernadotte became Minister of War in July 1799 and had him released, when he came back to Italy on the 5th July to command a new Armée des Alpes, 'Alpes B' in my tables, passing to command in Italy on the 28th August.

The Directory had the support of one General. Macdonald had been lingering at Rome, part of Championnet's command, in a way strange for a General wishing to leave the army of Naples. It is said, and it is pitiable if true, that he denounced Championnet to the Directory for his conduct at Capua, and he took sides with the dismissed agents from Naples, who now were with him in Rome. The influence of his old patron Beurnonville had been used in his favour, and on the 13th February 1799 he was nominated to succeed Championnet in command of the Armée de Naples. He professes to have been taken by surprise, but with wonderful alacrity he was in Naples at 4 a.m. on the 29th February, a few hours after the departure of Championnet. He states that he intentionally avoided the brilliant reception the army intended to give him, but Thiébault and Lahure represent the army as aggrieved at the loss of

¹ Thiébault, ii. 480. The date 16th March, given by *Vict. et Conq.* x. 36, Wouters, 202, and *Fastes*, ii. 478, must be wrong.

² For the dispute between Championnet and the Directory, besides the references already given to Barras and Larévellière-Lépeaux, see Thiers, *Rév.* iv. 307-10; Lahure, 211-15; Faure, *Championnet*, 295-337.

³ Thiébault, ii. 491.

Championnet.¹ With Macdonald came back the agents of the Directory. It was a sorry victory for Macdonald over his late commander, who bore a good name in the army, not only for military talent but also for integrity in money matters.

The King of Naples had annoyed Austria and his allies by his premature declaration of hostilities; but in reality they owed him much, for though he himself had to fly to Sicily, yet he had drawn to Naples a large part of the French force which otherwise would have been ready to serve against Austria in the north when she began hostilities. Then Championnet instead of holding his troops ready to return to the north had begun a system which intensified the evil, and which was partly followed by his successor, Macdonald. Beginning in February 1799, a great part of the army was used to attempt to occupy the whole country, to crush the insurrection which had broken out, and even to threaten, if not to invade, Sicily, where the Neapolitan Court had established itself, supported by the English. We shall see how, when the call for succour came from the north, the *Armée de Naples* was delayed by the time it took to rally the columns and the various garrisons.

The French columns had dropped parties in various towns to hold them, and to this we owe what probably was 'The Last Fight in Armour'.² Some four hundred men were left in a small fort in Aquila, where they were soon surrounded by a large force of armed peasants and were cut off from all communication with the army. On the *glacis* were lying twelve iron guns, too heavy for the garrison to have been able to bring them into the fort; but the officer of the artillery, the future General Boulart, kept two pieces loaded with case on the ramparts, ready to fire on these guns if any attempt were made to remove them. One night a noise was heard near the guns, which continued though case was fired on them. Morning showed that the insurgents had established a capstan in a house, and a cable fixed to the breech and trunnions of one of the guns had been used to drag it towards the house, till the ever-deepening trench made by the breech had stopped the work. Directing his guns on the house, Boulart smashed it in, but he wished to prevent

¹ See the discrepancy between Macdonald's account, pp. 67-8, and Thiébault, ii. 480-1.

² I furnished a similar account under this heading to *Temple Bar*.

any further attempts to remove the guns, by spiking them, though they could be swept by the fire of the insurgents.

Boulart was a man of resource. In his stores were twelve suits of armour: men thus protected could, he hoped, do the work in safety. The commandant approved, and on the appointed morning, whilst the garrison kept up a heavy fire on the insurgents' lines, twelve knights strode out, walking heavily and slowly, and with levers, hammers, and spikes, spiked each gun, swept as they were by gun-fire. The scene, says Boulart, 'avait quelque chose de pittoresque, de diabolique, et tenait de la féerie', and after the first gasp of astonishment, the whole garrison was taken with a fit of laughter. At last the knights returned, all unharmed, except one whose armlet had shifted and who consequently had been wounded in the arm. All the men had been hit and their armour showed marks where the balls had struck, but whilst at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo the cuirasses did not save their wearers, here, probably from the longer range, the armour held good.¹ After this, besieged and besiegers watched one another quietly until the garrison was borne off by a column of the army when it retired on Rome.

This retirement was caused by the needs of the *Armée d'Italie*. Schérer had arrived in Italy in March 1799. He was in command of all the troops in Italy, having the superior control of the *Armée de Naples* as the Directory had taken the title of Commander-in-Chief from Macdonald. There were then four future Marshals in Italy. Grouchy commanded the territorial division in Piedmont, where he was always occupied in suppressing insurrections and settling and resettling the government of the country, which resented the removal of its King. He remained at Turin until, after the first disasters, Moreau brought the army back through Turin for Genoa, when Grouchy joined the active force. Sérurier, having left Lucca on the 5th February 1799, was commanding a division under Mantua. Victor also was leading a division of the army. Macdonald was in Naples in command of the army there. Moreau was present with the army but only as Inspector-General of Infantry. Schérer on arrival at once took him as his lieutenant or Second-in-Command.

¹ Boulart, 45-7.

At this time there were in Italy 96,023 French troops and 38,925 'troupes auxiliaires' raised from the countries occupied, a grand total of 134,948. Of these 32,010 were in the south in the Armée de Naples, all these being French except 2,440 Poles, 926 of the Légion Cisalpine, and 2,757 of the Légion Romaine. Excluding the garrisons of Corsica, Malta, and Corfu, altogether 14,002, which technically belonged to the Armée d'Italie, Schérer had 102,938 men immediately under him. Of these 8,729 were Cisalpines, 5,280 Liguriennes or Genoese, 16,041 Piedmontese, and 2,752 Poles, that is 32,802 'troupes auxiliaires' and 70,136 French troops, the Légion Helvétique being apparently counted amongst these last. Schérer, however, could not dispose of all this force. Piedmont and Liguria required 9,521 French troops to hold them down, and the Cisalpine Republic, the occupied part of northern Italy, and the Mantuan district, took other divisions. Altogether Schérer's active army was only 55,129 strong. This small strength shows how urgent it was that the Armée de Naples should have been recalled to the north before hostilities began there.

The manner in which the Directory wasted their forces is shown by the plundering expedition they ordered on Tuscany. On the 22nd March at Mantua Schérer received orders to send Gaultier¹ with his division of 6,400 men to occupy Tuscany. Gaultier accordingly occupied Florence on the 25th March 1799,² and then Leghorn, and drove the Grand Duke from his throne. Heavy requisitions were levied on Tuscany and even the sacred vessels of the churches were melted down to obtain cash. This work occupied 6,400 men whilst Schérer with 43,000 men was fighting on the Adige to decide the fate of Italy. The occupation was but temporary. When Macdonald with the Armée de Naples left Florence in June, on his way northwards to join the Armée d'Italie he took away most of Gaultier's troops, Gaultier himself being left with a small force to hold Tuscany. This detachment was futile, for when Macdonald was

¹ I think this General, called Gauthier in the ordinary accounts, must be Général Paul-Louis Gaultier de Kervéguen (1757-1814). *Fastes*, iv. 283-4. He had been Chief of the Staff to Schérer in 1795-6 with 'Italie', and had served in that army under Bonaparte, occasionally deputizing for Berthier. Phipps, iii, iv.

² See Marmottan, *Étrurie*, 29, although Wouters, 204, correcting *Vict. et Cong.* x. 156, makes it the 26th.

defeated at the Trebbia the Austrians soon entered Florence, and by July 1799 the last French troops were driven from that State. Hardly ever has a more useless waste of a force been seen. Another detachment which weakened Schérer, though it strengthened Masséna's Armée d'Helvétie, was the dispatch of Dessoles's division, or brigade, to co-operate with Lecourbe, commanding Masséna's right. Still, Dessoles rejoined Schérer early in April.¹

When the active army was formed it had six divisions, each from 8,000 to 10,000 strong. Delmas had the *avant-garde*, 9,908; Sérurier the 'division du Tyrol', 8,328; Montrichard the right, 10,187; Victor the centre, 8,851; Grenier the left, 8,080; and Hatry, whom we have seen commanding the Armée de Mayence and the French troops in Holland, had the reserve, 9,775. Although, as I have said, the total nominal strength was 55,129, it was with only 43,000 men that Schérer delivered battle on the 26th March 1799. Even this force was far from being an homogeneous one. There were 1,569 Cisalpine troops, 1,984 of the Swiss Legion, 4,790 Piedmontese, 2,477 Poles, and 32,980 French troops.

The army which bore the glorious title of the Armée d'Italie had small claim to that name, and it was not in a sound state. Bonaparte had taken good care to pick out for Egypt those regiments which had most distinguished themselves under him in 1796-7. The Armée de Rome had drained part of its strength; regiments had been brought from the Rhine and from the Interior, and the newcomers, together with the recruits, who formed such a large part of the body that we shall find the Armée de Naples speaking of it as 'les conscrits', were utterly ignorant of the peculiar character of the theatre in which they were to act and the manner of warfare required.² Then the troops had suffered a good deal in the confusion which had existed since Bonaparte left, and naturally blamed the Minister of War, who now was to lead them, and who was suspected of being jealous of the glory won under Bonaparte, to whom he was going to present a striking contrast. Also the presence of Moreau did harm to Schérer. The troops from the Rhine knew him, whilst they knew nothing of Schérer. From the first the

¹ See under the Armée d'Helvétie, pp. 74-5, 82-3.

² Roguet, 100-1; Phipps, iv. 223-5.

army had no confidence in its commander, a state of affairs, says Saint-Cyr, in which it is impossible to be successful, especially with the French.

Perhaps the following list will give the best idea of the intermingling with other armies which had taken place in Italy. Of some twenty-five Generals of Division who fought in 1798-9 in the armies of Italy, Naples, and Alps, I only count four as having led divisions under Napoleon: Delmas, who had not joined from the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' till the end of 1796, Gauthier or Gaultier, who had only commanded troops in rear, Sérurier, and Victor. Dombrowski, Miollis, and Rusca, who led divisions in 1799, had only had brigades under Bonaparte. Joubert had been what we may call a wing commander. Suchet, his Chief of the Staff, had been a Lieutenant-Colonel. Seven others, Championnet, Grenier, Hatry, Lemoine, Olivier, Richepanse, and Watrin, came from the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'. Six, Delmas, Dessoles, Duhesme, Laboissière, Montrichard, Moreau, and Saint-Cyr, came from the 'Rhin-et-Moselle'. Macdonald came from the Armée du Nord, and Grouchy from La Vendée and the 'Nord'.¹ This intermingling of officers of such very different service and traditions tended to produce jealousies, especially when reverses came in a theatre where some could recall such glorious memories.

Schérer had a grievance, of which he made the most: that according to the first instructions of the Directory the Armée d'Helvétie was to advance to the Inn and to the lower Adige. Lecourbe, commanding the right of 'Helvétie', joined by Dessoles from Schérer, did penetrate to Glurns, as we have seen. In Schérer's mind this force was to be joined by the division of Sérurier, called the 'division du Tyrol', and, forming a small army, would have threatened the right of the enemy and have forced them to abandon the line of the Adige. The operations of Lecourbe and Dessoles were declared useless by Napoleon, who considered that Dessoles should have been with the army on the Adige. Schérer, however, attributed most of his failure on the Adige to his left not being covered as he hoped it would have been, whilst Masséna complained of the tardy

¹ Phipps, i, for Armée du Nord; ii, for 'Sambre-et-Meuse' and 'Rhin-et-Moselle'; iii, for La Vendée. Schérer himself originally come from the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'.

dispatch of Dessoles, on which he blamed the bad result of that part of the campaign.¹

When the campaign began the fighting was not of a kind whose details we need go into. One imagines that Schérer was much influenced by ideas of what Bonaparte would have done. Also, by his side was Moreau, whose advice he valued but did not always follow. The Austrians had in Italy itself 60,000 men, besides other forces in Carinthia and the Tyrol, altogether 125,000 men.² Some 50,700 were round Verona under Kray, whilst a Russian force under Suvárof, 24,551 strong, was coming up to join them. In 1797 when the Archduke had been bringing up reinforcements from the Rhine, Bonaparte, dashing at the Austrians, had defeated and crushed them in detail before the Archduke could muster a force strong enough to stand. The wisest course now would have been to have taken up a position at some distance from the Adige, on the Tartaro, or better still on the Mincio, and called up the Armée de Naples, awaiting its arrival before acting.³ Schérer, however, determined to follow the example of Bonaparte and to try to maim Kray before Suvárof could get up, not realizing how inferior his position was to that of Bonaparte in 1797. It was partly a question of time, and Schérer was not capable of forcing the pace in the way Bonaparte had done. Also he only brought up 43,000 men. Bernadotte, in refusing the command here, thought success only possible with 70,000, and had realized the inferiority of Schérer's resources compared with what Bonaparte's had been.

Schérer advanced and on the 26th March delivered an attack on Verona. In this battle of Verona, on the left three divisions under Schérer himself started from the east of Peschiera to throw the Austrians over the Adige above Verona. Sérurier, supported by a flotilla on Lake Garda, drove the enemy from Rivoli, while on his right Delmas and then Grenier forced the Austrians over the Adige by Bussolengo and Pescantina. Schérer for some reason had left his bridge equipage at Peschiera.

¹ Koch, *Masséna*, iii. 142, 166-7, 187-9; Tuetey, *Sérurier*, 241. Dessoles seems only to have had two regiments, the 12th Light and the 39th, probably only 4,000 men. Marès, *Guerre en Suisse*, 78.

² Gachot, *Souvarow en Italie*, note 1, p. 41.

³ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 177, 191-2. See Napoleon's suggestion in 1805 that Masséna with 40,000 men might take post on the Adda, Gachot, *Troisième Campagne d'Italie*, note 2, pp. 19-20.

Now he ordered a bridge to be prepared, but this took so long that the two divisions could not cross. In the centre Moreau, with two divisions, Victor on the left and Hatry on the right, coming up with a wide front from opposite Ronco to Sona, after a desperate struggle in which Hatry's reserve division supported Victor's left, forced the enemy back on Verona. Moreau's line stretched straight from Tomba, near the southern bend of the Adige, to San Massimo, to the west of the San Zeno gate of Verona. Actually this was small gain to the French. On the right, lower down the Adige, Montrichard attacked Legnago, Anghiari, and San Pietro, but though he drove the enemy on Legnago, in the end he was beaten, and that night he drew off westwards to Cerea, although the Austrians, hearing their right had been defeated, also retired. In this day's fighting, which was stubbornly contested, the French lost 4,600 killed and wounded and 900 prisoners, and the Austrians 4,320 killed and wounded and 2,631 prisoners.

If such operations, pitiable on both sides, were worthy of criticism, we have that of Napoleon, who knew this ground so well. He points out that Montrichard on the right and Sérurier on the left were wasted if the stroke were to be on Verona. The whole army ought to have been concentrated there, the wings only having small forces; and the main body should have been ready to cross the Adige on the 28th. Saint-Cyr characteristically chuckles over the way in which each commander thought his adversary's main force was on his left, and imagines how pleasant it would have been had each pushed his advantage: Schérer crossing to the left of the Adige and Kray, the Austrian temporary commander, to the right of it, each able to strike at his adversary's communications. 'The most skilful would then have finished the movement to his own advantage.'¹ One would, however, imagine that Schérer would have held the best position as he cut Kray from the Austrian reinforcements.

The proceedings of Schérer now were so extraordinary that they are worth recording briefly. For three days, the 27th, 28th, and 29th March, he left his army lying in the marshes. Then on the 29th he proposed to cross the Adige at La Sega, above Verona, and, working through the mountains, swing round to the right on the Vicenza road to deliver battle. Moreau and the

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 264-5; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 178-9.

Engineer-in-Command, however, pointed out that neither the artillery nor the cavalry could cross the mountains, so Schérer changed his plan. Now he thought of crossing at Ronco, that is of repeating Bonaparte's Arcola campaign. This was accepted by his lieutenants, and two divisions and the pontoon train were moved in that direction. Then the river rose and the crossing there was declared impracticable by the engineers. Next Schérer proposed to attack Verona itself (the greater part of the town being on the right of the Adige) by the Ponte Novo or southern end. This was approved by the Generals, and thence came the battle of Magnano, so called from a little village to the south of Verona where Schérer had his head-quarters.

Saint-Cyr, who had not yet arrived in Italy but who would be likely to make himself well informed about the conduct of his former commander on the Rhine, says that Moreau had advised Schérer to leave only Montrichard's division to watch Verona and the Legnago road and to move the rest of the army to the left. Then without waiting for orders he had set his two divisions in march for Bussolengo, but Schérer disapproved, and now took the extraordinary step of altering the relative positions of his divisions, two of those on the left passing behind those of the centre to gain the right. In the first battle the divisions had stood, in order from the left, Sérurier, Delmas, Grenier, Moreau with Victor and Hatry, one of whose divisions was in reserve, and finally, on the right, Montrichard. Now they stood, from the left again, Sérurier, Moreau with Hatry and Montrichard, Delmas, Victor, and Grenier. The marches entailed were made on roads worn by troops and ruined by heavy rains; they confused the officers and exhausted the men. Saint-Cyr remarks that the execution of this plan was almost ridiculous.¹ Also the long pause of Schérer had made his position worse, for Kray, recognizing that the attack would be on Verona, had drawn up most of his troops from his left, down-river, and he had received reinforcements.

Sérurier was sacrificed first. On the 30th March he was ordered to cross the Adige at Polo and to march down the left of the river, to make a false attack on Verona. It is true he was told not to commit himself fully, but his men were young and pressed on. The Austrians were thrown back on Verona, but then of

¹ Gachot, *Souvarow*, 75-82; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 181, 183-4.

course the enemy poured out of the town, and Sérurier with his 6,000 men found himself faced by 15,000. He retreated at first in good order, but the enemy pressed on his flanks and got to the bridge before all his men could pass. One regiment, the 18th Light, being surrounded, cut its way through and, going up the river, got across at Rivoli with a loss of 800 men. The whole division lost heavily, and Sérurier, finding that the Austrians occupying Rivoli were coming down the right of the Adige, drew back between Lake Garda and Villafranca. Schérer did not blame Sérurier for this disaster, in which some thousands of men were lost. He had acknowledged that the division was 'nécessairement un peu en l'air' (one does not see the necessity), and he reported to the Directory that Sérurier had shown in these critical conditions 'intrepidity beyond proof, and the most consummate military experience'.

On the 5th April 1799 both armies advanced, that of Schérer facing about north-west and making for Verona. On the left Sérurier with the wreck of his division took Villafranca, and advanced beyond. Moreau with his two divisions forced the enemy back on San Massimo and Verona, and by 5 p.m., after a hard struggle, stood victorious before the town. Schérer had been with him in the morning, and had then gone to the division of Delmas, which, coming up late to Buttapietra, did not take the pressure off Moreau on its left or off Victor and Grenier on its right, and in the end, itself uncovered on its right, fell back to Isola della Scala. On the right Victor and Grenier met disaster. Victor, always a good fighter, at one moment seizing the staff of an Austrian banderolle torn from the hands of the bearer, believed for a time that he was leading his men on to victory: San Giovanni Lupatoto was won, but Kray had most of his strength here, and the French troops, outnumbered, fell into confusion and had to retire behind the Tartaro. Schérer, who perhaps knew that his troops considered he was timid, had exposed himself enough at the end of the day with Delmas's division, but the French, with the exception of Moreau's two divisions, had fought isolated battles. Their loss was from 7,000 to 8,000 men killed, wounded, and taken prisoner, with seven flags and eight guns. The Austrian loss was 5,228.

That night Schérer, accepting the defeat of his right as

decisive, began his retreat, against the advice of Moreau, but the Austrians had been hit so hard that they attempted no pursuit. Now began a series of defeats for the *Armée d'Italie*, which seemed like a ship whose motive power had failed and which could only drift helplessly to leeward. With some 43,000 men Schérer had been able to face the Austrians. Had the Directory permitted, he might have had the 6,000 or 7,000 men of Gaultier's division and, say, some 18,000 or more from the *Armée de Rome*. With this reinforcement he ought to have been able so to maim the Austrians that even the arrival of Suvárof's army would not have restored its equilibrium. His first reverse under Verona on the 26th March made him on the 30th call on the commander of the *Armée de Naples* for the Polish Legion, two infantry brigades, and a regiment of cavalry, about 6,000 men. On the 3rd April, before Magnano, he sent another demand for a reinforcement, and on the 8th April, after Magnano, at last he sent a formal order for the *Armée de Naples* to join him by double marches; but even then that force was to be weakened by leaving garrisons in the forts and strong places in Neapolitan and Roman territory.

According to Napoleon, Schérer should only have drawn back to the Mincio and have stood there; or, if he abandoned that line, he should have posted himself in the great camp to the south of Mantua, with its bridges to the north and south, and there awaited his reinforcements. Napoleon, who knew what fever had done in and round Mantua in 1796-7, and who was always careful about unhealthy ground, said that the fever season round the fortress only began towards the end of June. If the Russians had come up before the *Armée de Naples* could arrive, Schérer should have marched south to meet Macdonald. Schérer, however, was panic-stricken and retired as fast as he could. Moreau, who was skilful in retreats, saw the disastrous effect of this flight, and, proposing to defend the line of the Oglio, he wrote to Schérer that a halt of several days would allow the troops to rest, and would give time to reorganize the army and to prepare for a more orderly retreat. But Schérer was determined not to halt till he reached the Adda, and back he went, weakening himself by sowing garrisons on the way. Mantua had cost so much that it could not be abandoned, and 6,600 men were added to its garrison, now 12,000 strong. Napo-

leon does not blame this, and indeed the place held till the 30th July. Other weaker places were, however, also garrisoned with troops, who soon fell into the hands of the enemy.

The losses in the battles and in the retreat, and the drain of the garrisons, had left but 28,000 men in the ranks, and the army was reorganized in three divisions, under Victor, Grenier, and Sérurier. Montrichard was sent with a small force to the right of the Po, where he and Lemoine acted almost as onlookers, watching the force under Klenau which had been sent there by Kray. As for the other commanders of division, Hatry with 1,800 men was left in command of the citadel of Milan, where he capitulated on the 24th May, and Delmas, who had been seriously wounded under Verona on the 26th March, had to go to France. On the other hand Dessoles rejoined from the Engadine at Pizzighettone on the 13th April. His men were distributed amongst the divisions and he himself became Chief of the Staff.

As we have seen, to get the divisions into their places for the two battles, according to Schérer's plans, there had been much painful marching; and though the extraordinary demands made on the troops for the victories of 1796-7 had been forgotten in the triumphs won, it was different now when a long retreat was undertaken. There were many recruits in the ranks, who at first had given trouble by their impetuosity but who now were as greatly depressed. The whole army was demoralized, and pillage and insubordination were rife in the ranks. In some regiments the officers who had endeavoured to repress disorder were slain by their own men. The stiff old Sérurier was horrified and wished to resign. Murder, he wrote, was the order of the day in his division; he had no authority over his men; there was no one to assist him; two Colonels of excellent service had been threatened by the bayonets of their own men. 'This manner of serving', wrote the old soldier, 'cannot be suitable for a man of my age', and he demanded to be replaced. Moreau, with such different experience, took the same view of affairs, and called on Schérer to show some energy, to make terrible examples, without which the army would be lost. One can fancy with what rage in their hearts the veterans of Italy, Sérurier, Victor, and others, fell back and back with their host of mutineers, who greeted their officers with derisive cries.

If the army was demoralized, so was its commander. From the first the troops had no confidence in him: indeed it is easy to imagine what reception the reforming chief of the War Office would meet with when he joined an army. He realized this, and to make certain the unhappy man (as he told the Directors later) hung about the bivouac fires to catch the sentiments of the men. He found he was right. His name was treated in the most annoying and offensive manner; there was no confidence in him: all the wishes were for Moreau. The strong, confident, desperate Bonaparte had won Italy through a hundred dangers. What chance had this unhappy eavesdropper of retaining it? The comparison with Bonaparte was always in his mind: on the 7th April 1799 he wrote to the Directory that the *Armée d'Italie*, accustomed to success won under Bonaparte, 'whether he had more talents than I, whether he had in his hands more means for conquering', saw with pain the check it had just undergone, which Schérer attributed to the superiority in numbers of the enemy. Probably if he had thought less of Bonaparte's achievements and considered his own position more and the strength of his army, his mind might not have run on defeat and he might have restricted himself to his more modest plans of 1795, with some chance of success.¹

Schérer implored the Directory to recall him on any pretext, and to send him anywhere, except to command an army. Fatigue and exposure had brought on a painful internal disease and he was not fit to ride except for a short time. Fortunately there was no difficulty about a successor. Moreau was there: half the troops, wrote Schérer, belonged to the Rhine armies, and had confidence in Moreau. 'Soldiers attach themselves to lucky men, and Moreau is one.' 'He has great military talents. He had acted perfectly in the two battles.' Knowing the Directory suspected Moreau after his conduct at Fructidor, Schérer went on, 'I cannot believe he is not republican, or even that he does not like the Government, since he exposes his life and reputation for it.' On the 25th April Schérer ordered Moreau to take charge of head-quarters, established at Inzago, while he himself went next day to Milan to get the Directory of the Cisalpine Republic not to abandon their Capital. At Milan, however, he found the order he had requested, dated the 21st

¹ Phipps, iii.

April, replacing him by Moreau. The unfortunate broken man went back to tell the French Directory all his sorrows. They gave him a certain amount of sympathy, and appointed him Inspector-General of the troops stationed in Holland, where Brune commanded. However, the clamour against him became so great that on the advice of Barras he returned to his country place at Chauny, in the Department of Aisne. The *coup d'état* of Brumaire stopped all attacks on him and he died in peace and retirement in August 1804. He might have met with some little recognition from Bonaparte, but a scapegoat for the disasters in Italy was much required. Napoleon's remarks on him should be read.¹

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 266.

XII

SUCCESS OF SUVÁROF

(April to June 1799)

Moreau against Suvárof. Sérurier's capture. Macdonald's march north. French and Russian strategy.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

1799 4th June. First battle of Zürich.
See Chapter V.

THE position of Moreau was a very peculiar one. Having led one of the great armies of the Republic, the 'Rhin-et-Moselle', in 1796-7, having been disgraced at Fructidor and then grudgingly employed in a subordinate position,¹ he was now, the Directory having small option, given the command in Italy as Schérer advised. It was a cruel gift, for he received a shattered army and had not time really to take over the command before he was attacked. Nothing, indeed, could be worse than the position of Moreau when, called up from Lodi, he took command on the evening of the 26th April. The divisions of Sérurier, Victor, and Grenier were stretched along the Adda on a line some seventy-two miles long, which could be pierced at any moment, and the first news that he received was that the enemy were advancing. He had some 27,000 dispirited men: he himself later said he had only 18,000.² In front of him was Suvárof, the famous Russian General, who had joined the Austrians with some 24,551 men and had taken chief command. Although part of his forces were employed in sieges and blockades of the fortresses, such as Mantua, Suvárof had some 70,000 under his hand, and his task therefore was an easy one.

Schérer had placed the army as follows: Victor on the right at Lodi, Grenier, centre, holding the bridge-head at Cassano, on the left bank, and Sérurier extended to Lecco on Lake Maggiore. Sérurier had not been sent by the shortest route,

¹ Gachot, *Jourdan en Allemagne*, 91, says that in April 1799 an order arrived for Moreau to succeed Jourdan with the Armée du Danube. I think this is a confusion with what happened in July 1799, when Moreau was to have command of the Armée du Rhin (C) and to succeed Masséna with 'Danube'.
Ante, pp. 119-21.

² Roguet, ii. 519.

and while he himself was away, called in to Inzago by Schérer to consult, the enemy got across to the right of the Adda. Sérurier reported to Moreau, who ordered Victor in from Lodi, meaning to unite him and Grenier at Vaprio.¹ On the 27th, Victor coming up late, Moreau with Grenier's division tried to penetrate by Vaprio to Sérurier but failed, and at last, leaving the *tête-de-pont* of Cassano, he retired over the Ticino, abandoning Milan. Sérurier's division, on the left, remained cut off and separated into two parts, one by Lecco and the other under Sérurier himself at Verderio. The Lecco force succeeded in getting away by Lake Como and rejoined Moreau on the Ticino, but Sérurier held on at Verderio, awaiting orders. Surrounded and having used his last cartridges, at night on the 27th he surrendered with the remainder of his division, now reduced to 2,400 men. This battle of Cassano or Vaprio cost the French 2,542 men, as Moreau reported to the Directory.

It is difficult to understand the action of such a proved General as Sérurier this day. In the morning of the 27th April he wrote to Moreau that, not having received any orders, he considered he ought not to compromise the few troops he had and at 2 p.m. he would retire on Moreau's head-quarters. This would have fallen in with the wishes of Moreau, who told the Directory that, if his order to support the attack of Grenier had reached Sérurier, he believed that though very inferior in numbers to the enemy, they would have won a fine success. Sérurier was close to where Moreau and Grenier were fighting but he seems to have made no effort to reach them and only to have waited for orders. Possibly it was anxiety for the fate of his left wing at Lecco which detained him, but Moreau believed that his own order to retreat by Como on to the upper Ticino had reached Sérurier. Some days later, meeting Sérurier, who was on his way to Paris, a prisoner *en parole*, Moreau reproached him harshly; but later with fuller information he considered this was unjust, and writing to the Directory he said: 'There is but little to reproach him with: he has perhaps acted with too much exactitude at Verderio.' That is he had been too scrupulous in obeying the first orders, remaining in his position till ordered to leave it. Perhaps this may be understood in the case of a man who had seen such desperate situations

¹ A little higher up the Adda than Cassano.

relieved by Bonaparte, and who may have feared to ruin some great stroke. However, undoubtedly this was the great mistake of his life.

Received with insults by the mob of Milan, Sérurier was courteously treated by his captors and was lodged in the Palace Anguisola. Suvárof invited him to dinner, and tried, of course uselessly, to extract information from him as to the plans of Moreau. On the Russian expressing surprise at his serving a Republic, Sérurier replied proudly, 'My father, in giving me my sword, expressly ordered me only to use it to defend my country.' Finally Sérurier was permitted to go to Paris *en parole*, and, after hearing Suvárof recite some Russian verses in honour of his own noble conduct, the two parted, Sérurier ironically agreeing in the hope of Suvárof that they might meet in Paris. Ill received by the Directory, Sérurier naturally joined Bonaparte in the *coup* of Brumaire, and on the 27th December 1799 he was appointed a Senator. He was not to appear again in the field.¹

As for Moreau himself, thrust into command just as the enemy attacked, he cannot be held responsible for the disaster. As he himself, fairly enough, wrote to the Directory: 'Our misfortunes came from our being too extended, occupying an immense line on the Adda without a strong reserve. They came also from the troops of General Sérurier, obeying the orders of General Schérer, having entered their camp by one of its extreme points, at Lecco: the enemy, having less ground to go over, arrived there before them. Finally, they came because I arrived to take command without knowing how the army was placed, and when the line was already broken, which was not known at headquarters.'

Moreau had retired with Grenier's division by Vercaglio and Novarra, hoping to be joined by Sérurier's division, whose fate was unknown to him, but he only got its wreck. Then, saying he had no bridge over the Po, he made for Turin, though he feared the enemy were throwing themselves between him and Macdonald's Armée de Naples, coming up from the south.

¹ On the creation of Marshals, he, Kellermann, Pérignon, and Lefebvre were nominated Honorary Marshals. He was Governor of the Invalides from 1804 till the second Restoration, when he was removed, having welcomed the return of Napoleon. He died in retirement in 1819. Tuetey, *Sérurier*, 269-90.

Lemoine with some troops had been sent over to the right of the Po at Piacenza, breaking the bridge when he had passed, to reach Genoa by the direct road, throwing troops into Tortona and Alessandria if necessary to complete the garrisons. Moreau's right wing, with what was called the *avant-garde* division under Laboissière, crossed the Ticino at Pavia, then marched up the left of the Po, which they crossed between Casale and Trino, and finally took post under Alessandria. As for Moreau, he deposited a large train of artillery in Turin and sent a convoy of French sympathizers into France. Then he started to join Victor, taking with him Grouchy, who had been at Turin in command of Piedmont. The Chief of the Staff, Dessoles, had been sent on to Genoa, and Grouchy now filled that post temporarily. By the 7th May Moreau had joined Victor, and his army now held what was believed to be a very strong, if not impregnable, position between the Po and the Tanaro, with its flanks resting right and left on Alessandria and Valenza. I have said 'his army', but deprived of the numerous garrisons he had left he only had 20,000 men.

Napoleon blames the retreat of Moreau on Turin, where I suppose he believed Moreau had taken his whole army. Napoleon considered he should have crossed to the right of the Po at Piacenza, to remain in communication with Macdonald's *Armée de Naples*—which at the time of the battle of Cassano had not begun its march northwards. 'Il faut toujours opérer sa retraite sur ses renforts.' It is said that whilst Schérer was still in command, Moreau had proposed to draw back the whole army into Piedmont and, avoiding all engagements, there await reinforcements from France.¹ This would have been the selfish Moreau of 1796, thinking only of the safety of his own army and letting Macdonald, like Jourdan, save himself. Once in command, certainly he thought of Macdonald. After Cassano he believed the enemy were throwing themselves between him and Macdonald, and he wrote as if he regretted his own march on Novarra, if not on Turin, to which he considered himself forced in order to receive Sérurier's division and to gain a bridge. It was, says Napoleon, the irresolution of Suvárof which gave him time to reach Alessandria. The movements of Moreau were not always very clearly defined.

¹ *Vict. et Conq.* x. 176.

On the 6th May 1799 Suvárof crossed the Po. His left wing crossed at Piacenza and then advanced south to Bobbio on the Trebbia, while the main body crossed by a bridge at Cervesia and moved south, Suvárof placing his head-quarters on the 7th May at Voghera and then at Tortona. The right, crossing the Ticino, advanced westwards to Borno. Suvárof thus lay to the east of Moreau, but his right threatened Turin and his left endangered the junction with the Armée de Naples. The position of the two armies was peculiar, for Suvárof not only cut Moreau from Macdonald but also from Genoa, as he prevented him using the direct road by Novi and Gavi. Still Moreau preserved his communications with France, and his position, with his flanks protected by two fortresses, was so strong that Suvárof did not venture to attack him in force. Saint-Cyr thought that an attack by a skilful General would have crushed the small army of Moreau, but Suvárof held his hand. Indeed, throughout these operations one is tempted to believe that the word 'army' applied to Moreau's force did much to protect it: had it been styled what it really was, a mere division, less respect would have been shown it.

Believing that Moreau had left his position, Suvárof ordered Rosenberg's division to cross the Po and to attack Valenza. He discovered his mistake and recalled the division, but Rosenberg disobeyed and on the 12th May crossed the river. Whatever his faults, Moreau was no blunderer on the actual field, and bringing his army near Valenza, he attacked Rosenberg's front with Grenier's division, whilst Victor was to take him in flank. The Russians were driven into and across the river, and the Grand Duke Constantine only escaped with difficulty, after having been penned in a little island for some hours. The disaster to the Russians would have been complete had Victor's division got up in time, but, recalled from a march on Alessandria and without food for forty-eight hours, it only reached the mouth of the Tanaro when the battle was finished.

Moreau now thought that Suvárof had abandoned his march against Macdonald and the Armée de Naples and was drawing near him, so on the 13th-15th May he assembled his army on the Bormida, and, throwing a bridge of boats over the river to the east of Alessandria, he ordered Victor to make a strong reconnoissance towards Tortona, to overthrow the enemy's

advanced guard, and to see what was in front of the army. This we may call the first of the battles of Marengo, the others taking place on the 20th June 1799 and on the 14th June 1800. Victor now was alone while on the 14th June 1800 he led the advance of Bonaparte's *Armée de Reserve*; and this time the French, holding Alessandria, faced eastwards, reversing the relative positions of 1800. On the night of the 16th May Victor's infantry crossed the bridge, his cavalry fording the river a little above, and he threw back the enemy from Marengo, Spinetta, and San Giuliano. Now, however, Suvárof brought up the mass of his army and Victor had to retire, suffering severely although not losing a gun or a wagon, his troops retiring, as Moreau said, in all possible order and carrying off their prisoners. His left and centre had to pass through Marengo on account of the Fontanone ravine, which we shall find figuring in the greater battle. Gardanne, one of the Generals now under Victor, was to defend Marengo with him in 1800. Unfortunately Moreau took this check as showing that Suvárof intended to remain, preventing him throwing his army into Genoa as he wanted to do.¹

Now came a curious movement by Moreau, apparently designed to draw Suvárof northwards, but which separated Moreau himself from the *Armée de Naples* which was approaching Florence. He had sent Victor, with 7,000 infantry and 200 cavalry but no guns, before he started on this expedition, to join Pérignon at Genoa, which Victor did after severe fighting with the insurgents, reaching Genoa on the 22nd May. Moreau now only had twelve battalions and six weak cavalry regiments. First he marched westwards by Asti, where he was on the 18th May, as if for Turin, but then, halting short of that Capital, he threw advanced guards beyond it to Rivoli² and passed a convoy by Pignerol over the Mont Cenis in safety. One wonders he did not also send back the train of artillery he had left in Turin. All this time he was suffering terribly from the insurrection of the whole country, which had assumed a most serious aspect: indeed, he had nearly lost his artillery park at Asti and the insurgents took the fortress of Ceva.³ He turned south-west

¹ Moreau in Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 465. Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 205, hints that Moreau had another motive than to ascertain whether the enemy meant to attack him, but does not suggest what this might be.

² West of Susa; not the battle-field of 1797.

³ For the insurrection see Roguet, ii. 118-42; Gachot, *Souwarow*, 159-78.

by Cherasco and reached Coni, or Cuneo, as if making for France. Then, really making for Genoa, he turned eastwards for Mondovi. After Mondovi, Ceva had had to be passed. It was held by the insurgents and could not be retaken, so Grouchy with a force watched it whilst the column turned it and marched for Caressio. With immense labour a road was cut across the mountains, and on the 6th June the column reached Loano, on the coast. Moreau himself had gone on in advance, leaving the column under Grenier, and his troops arrived at Genoa apparently about the 11th or 12th June. Grouchy, having blocked Ceva, covered the flank of the column till it reached Genoa. Most of the artillery had to be brought by sea from Loano.

Moreau was seldom well informed of the movements of his adversaries, and his reconnaissance of the 16th May had been most unfortunately timed. Suvárof really was off to the north-west for Turin. On the 15th May he had issued orders for his troops to cross to the left of the Po, and had Moreau attacked a day later he would have found Suvárof gone. Moving on the right and to the north of Moreau, whilst that commander was at Asti on the 18th May, Suvárof was at Chivasso, to the north-east of Turin, on the 25th May. On the 27th the French garrison of Turin was driven into the citadel, and Suvárof got the town and the arsenal, where he found the large siege train¹ which, he said, enabled him to turn the blockades of Alessandria, Serravalle, and Tortona into regular sieges. This was such an obvious possibility that one can only suppose Moreau had found that sending the siege train into France with the large convoy he had dispatched was impossible.² Once possessed of Turin, Suvárof re-established the government of the King of Sardinia, to the annoyance of the Austrians.

Napoleon again blames the march of Moreau towards Turin, as taking him needlessly away from Macdonald, who on the 26th May had reached Florence. I do not know whether the Emperor makes due allowance for the position of Suvárof, at least as Moreau thought it when he moved. Moreau had broken up his weak army into three columns. One, under Lemoine, had been sent from Piacenza by Voghera, Novi, and Gavi to Genoa; then from under Alessandria Victor had been detached to Genoa,

¹ For detail see Gachot, *Souvarow*, note 2, p. 206.

² See *ante*, pp. 265, 267, for dispatch of convoy.

whilst Moreau himself went as far west as he well could without returning to France.¹ Moreau and Grouchy saw nothing odd in all this, believing the march towards Turin deceived the enemy and drew them away from the mountains whilst the artillery moved to Genoa. In reality Suvárof had intended to move on Turin, leaving Moreau under Alessandria. With all respect for Moreau, one is tempted to see in these movements a certain ludicrous resemblance to those of a frightened hen, rushing alongside and round a carriage whose approach it could have avoided by a direct flight.

All these operations of Suvárof obviously were faulty and fully justify the criticism of Napoleon, who says that the Russian had the soul, but not the brain, of a great General, and had no knowledge of the principles of war. Instead of wasting his strength by undertaking the siege of Mantua, he ought to have devoted himself to preventing the junction of Moreau with Macdonald. After the defeat of Moreau on the Adda, 25,000 men should have been sent over to the right of the Po in order to deal with the division of Montrichard, sent across by Moreau, and that of Gaultier, left by Schérer in Tuscany.² Then, sending 30,000 men to pursue Moreau, he himself should have marched with 20,000 for Genoa, whence he should have gone to join his force in Tuscany and with this combined body dealt with Macdonald's *Armée de Naples*. Suvárof, however, as will be seen, only accepted the gifts of Fortune in a half-hearted manner. He did send Klenau, Ott, and Hohenzollern across the Po by Piacenza for Parma and Modena, but they were too weak to deal properly with Montrichard and Gaultier, who remained to join Macdonald. He himself did march to Voghera, which he reached on the 7th May, the date Moreau joined Victor under Alessandria, but by Napoleon's calculations he should have been at Genoa by the 9th May, and Victor's 7,200 men could not have stopped him.

It is true that Suvárof at Voghera on the 7th May theoretically cut in between Moreau and Macdonald: for on his left he occupied Bobbio, on the upper Trebbia, and his troops even

¹ I presume Lemoine had about 2,000 men, and Moreau at Coni, 10,000. Victor had 7,200.

² See *ante*, pp. 251-2, for the detachment of Gaultier, and p. 259 for that of Montrichard.

passed the Apennines and occupied Pontremoli on the southern slope for a time ; but his left was too weak, and when Macdonald with his army came up it was driven off and the communication with Moreau by Sarzana was restored. The march of Suvárof to Turin, though he replaced part of his troops by those of Bellegarde from Switzerland, had the effect of opening the communication between the two French armies. His numerical superiority, it is said, enabled him to reoccupy the position when he chose, but time was of the first importance. The communication by the south of the Apennines was left open and that by the north was only closed at the Trebbia by the last-minute rush of Suvárof, which would have been checked had Moreau advanced a day or so sooner than he did.

It certainly shows a strange deficiency in Suvárof's character that he did not look on the march of Moreau towards Turin as opening to him the road to Genoa. Moreau seemed almost to force his hand and make him adopt Napoleon's plan. Still, it is not easy to judge Suvárof fairly. Spalding acknowledges that he was 'unusually apathetic' about this time, but to a great extent he was tied by orders from the Austrian Court, which considered his advance dangerous and which wished him only to defend the line of the Po. Sometimes he took it on himself to disobey these Austrian orders, but a great part of his force was composed of troops of that Power and obedience to him could not be strained beyond a certain point. Further, his policy and that of the Austrians differed very much. He wished to restore the King of Sardinia and the other princes dispossessed by the French to their former dominions, whilst the Austrians were more than ready to despoil their friends. These considerations may partly explain his conduct. Still, had he been a Thunderbolt of War, as he figures in some accounts, he would have made short work of Moreau and then of Macdonald. On one point we may be allowed to differ from the suggestions of Napoleon, for any one who has tried to follow the workings of his mind can hardly believe that he himself would have followed the course he recommends for Suvárof. One may be permitted to believe that his impatient spirit would never have left Moreau after the Adda till the *Armée d'Italie* had ceased to exist.

There had been some changes amongst the future Marshals with the *Armée d'Italie*. When hostilities had begun Sérurier

and Victor had been with the fighting part of the army under Schérer, and Grouchy in rear at Turin, in command of the troops occupying Piedmont. Now, Sérurier, a prisoner, had gone back to France. Victor lately had been used with what we may call the striking division, and he was pushed out to make the communication with the Armée de Naples; he was soon to be regularly detached with that army, so that after fighting in the Army d'Italie under first Schérer and then Moreau he was to go through the battle of the Trebbia under Macdonald, returning to the Armée d'Italie afterwards. Grouchy had been picked up by Moreau when, in his retreat, he had reached Turin, and was leading a division after being temporary Chief of the Staff. General Dessoles, who had begun the campaign at the head of a brigade detached with the Armée d'Helvétie, had rejoined the army and had become Chief of the Staff to it. Sent on in advance to Genoa, he had been in the curious position of being in communication with Macdonald whilst completely cut off from Moreau by the insurrection. During the long retreat of the army, Pérignon, unemployed since he had finished the war with Spain in July 1795 under Schérer in the Armée des Pyrénées Orientales, had brought a weak division from the interior of France to Genoa, where he held Liguria till the army reached him.¹ Thus Moreau had three future Marshals with him, Victor, Grouchy, and Pérignon, Victor soon being detached.

Now, however, the exclusive attention of both Moreau and Suvárof was drawn southwards by the tramp of the Armée de Naples, which was approaching under Macdonald, on whom the fate of the campaign now rested. I must go back to the progress of this body, which we left in March 1799, detached in the south of Italy round Naples. Schérer had called on Macdonald, as I have said, on the 30th March, to send him the Polish Legion, two infantry brigades, and a cavalry regiment, say 7,000 or 8,000 men.² On the 3rd April another demand for reinforcements was made, and on the 8th formal orders were given for the Armée de Naples to rejoin that of 'Italie' by double marches; but unfortunately Macdonald was told first to garrison and supply with ammunition and provisions the strong places held

¹ Phipps, iii; *Vict. et Conq.* x. 265-6; Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 150, 465, 467. He only had 4,000 French troops, and as many Ligurians or Genoese.

² See *ante*, p. 258.

by the French in the Neapolitan and the Roman States. The order apparently reached Macdonald on the 14th April. He only started on the 7th May.

This long delay is blamed by Napoleon but it is difficult to judge fairly on the point. Macdonald certainly could not have started at once as he had to recall the columns pushed out to repress the insurgents. Also he had to provision the forts at Naples, Capua, San Angelo at Rome, and Ancona. But, according to his own account, even before the campaign in the north had begun he had asked the Directory to withdraw his army in order to fill the ranks of the *Armée d'Italie* if victorious, or to reinforce it if beaten. The forts he proposed to retain, so the work of provisioning them to be fit to stand in the absence of the army ought to have been already done. In the same way, if he were preparing, as he says, to be ready to march north, it seems unwise to have pushed out columns. Olivier's division, the third, 'recalled from its absurd expedition on Brindisi', says Thiébault, did not rejoin till the 26th April. Why did not the army start even when this last division had returned? Because, says Thiébault, all the treasure belonging to Macdonald and to the Civil Commissioner, besides that intended for the Directory, had to be conveyed. One does not see why this should not have been provided for before, as one would gather from Macdonald was the case with his own personal property. His share of pictures, objects of art, &c., amounted, he says, to the value of 800,000 francs, besides the collection of such objects he had already made at Rome. For an army marching to save another already in peril of its existence to carry with it such a train seems extraordinary. These articles got as far as Pisa, where as Macdonald did not look after them they were plundered, much to his disgust as he lost 'one of the most magnificent private collections of objects of art, of taste, and of the fashion of that time', particularly a dessert of fruits in marble—on which one would like to have heard Ruskin. The troops in Italy were over-suspicious of the integrity of their commanders, and the mere fact that cases containing gold formed part of the convoy was assumed to prove that it was not funds for the army but private booty which was being carried off.

The preparations for withdrawal had made the Royalist party active, and the miracle of San Gennaro was to be used to give

credit to the Revolution, as with Championnet. Macdonald, with a small staff, went to the church with Cardinal Zurlo. He had placed two companies of grenadiers in the building and the troops from Caserta surrounded the town during the day, but the crowd, excited to frenzy, was enormous, and nothing could have saved the handful of French in the church had the Saint been hostile. The Cardinal took the sacred phial but the blood did not flow, and the cries of the people became louder and wilder. The President of the République Parthénopéenne played the last card for his life. Getting Thiébault, who stood by the Cardinal, to change places with him, he showed the Cardinal the butt of a pistol he wore under his waistcoat, murmuring in his ear, 'If the miracle does not take place at once you are a dead man.' The Cardinal, an old man, handed the phial to his Grand Vicar, when the blood flowed, and the Cardinal, showing the phial, announced to the crowd: 'You see, my brothers, San Gennaro favours the Revolution.' The crowd burst into a delirium of pleasure, but still the success was not as great as on the first occasion with Championnet; and the Cardinal, and even the Saint, suffered when the Bourbons returned.

Macdonald considered himself bound to leave the garrisons. One wonders if he received the letter written from Pavia by Moreau, not later than the 29th April,¹ in which he stated that the Directory had ordered the garrisons to be left 'à moins d'une grande extrémité'. Moreau, writing after the defeat on the Adda, most sensibly considered that extremity had come, and he did not see why 5,000 or 6,000 men should be left to guard points the French could retake if they were successful. These were words of wisdom. Macdonald says he left from 14,000 to 15,000 men in the Neapolitan State and in Rome, which, if we add to Gachot's calculation 4,500 sick said by Thiébault to have been left at Gaeta, would agree pretty nearly with the figures given by that writer.² Macdonald also says he left from 4,000 to 5,000 in Tuscany. Making every allowance for sick unable to march, the strength of a whole division must have been lost, and the presence of another division at the Trebbia would have meant the gain of that battle and in all probability the reconquest of

¹ I think this is the last possible date Moreau could have been at Pavia if he were ever there.

² Gachot, *Souvarow*, notes, pp. 216, 218, gives 9,429 combatants.

Italy. On the other hand the only gain by leaving garrisons was the protection given for a short time to the sympathizers with the French. The garrisons left at Naples had to surrender by the end of July; Garnier in Rome had to capitulate on the 29th September; Ancona held out till the 13th November, the garrison joining Masséna in Genoa.

Part of the army had already started when on the 5th May Macdonald was calculating that one column, under Merlin, should be at Florence, the Poles being close behind; whilst 4,000 men of the 62nd Regiment ought to be starting from Rome. These no doubt were sent in compliance with Schérer's first demands for reinforcements, but I think that Garnier, commanding at Rome, detained part at least of these advanced bodies. The army moved in two columns, besides a third one of 3,000 men which had evacuated the Abruzzes to rejoin the army near Rome. The column under Macdonald met with no resistance, but the others, moving farther inland, had severe fighting with the insurgents. The smaller column lost 600 out of 3,000 in one day, and all knew that every wounded man left behind was sure to be tortured. This sort of warfare ruined the discipline of the men: at one time 300 or 400 men of one regiment intended to plunder and burn the baggage of the head-quarters staff, and were only kept off from the carriage and the mistress of the Chief of the Staff of one division by the arrival of the grenadiers of another body. Officers interfering with the disorderly bands did so at the risk of their lives, and General Olivier, deploring the fate of officers having to command such men, vowed he would get himself killed at the first affair with the enemy to avoid disgrace, as indeed we shall find him nearly doing.¹

By the 16th May, whilst Moreau was still between Alessandria and Valenza, preparing to move towards Turin, the Armée de Naples was at Rome, where it found Garnier's division of the Armée d'Italie. Here it left a garrison of 2,568 men, with some of its own sick and lame. Florence was reached on the 26th May. Here it joined Gaultier's division of the Armée d'Italie, foolishly sent into Tuscany at the beginning of the campaign,²

¹ Thiébauld, ii. 532-3. For the daily marches of the army see *Vict. et Conq.* x. 327-56.

² Marmottan, *Royaume d'Étrurie*, 39, for the Austrian occupation of Tuscany.

with which Pérignon in Genoa was trying to link. Gaultier had been put under Macdonald by Moreau, as had been Montrichard with the troops sent on the right of the Po after the retreat from before Verona in April. Montrichard had been holding Bologna against the Austrians. With the clear sight of self-interest, Macdonald had written from Naples to both these Generals, conjuring them if forced to retreat to do so on him, not on Genoa, which would be ruinous; whilst with him the combined body would force a passage or perish.

Macdonald was now in touch with Montrichard, as well as virtually with Victor's division of 'Italie', which Moreau had pushed out from Genoa to Pontremoli, whence Victor had driven the enemy's advanced posts; he was now on the upper waters of the Taro and held the pass to Parma. Although the physical junction with Victor was not yet made, Macdonald now had all his troops under his hand, and the Armée de Naples and the two divisions from the Armée d'Italie were formed as one force. Salm had the *avant-garde*, 2,977; Olivier had the 1st division, 5,826; Rusca the 2nd, 5,476; Montrichard the 3rd, 5,773; Watrin the 4th or reserve, 5,845; Dombrowski the 5th, 3,555; and Victor the 6th, 6,750; altogether, with the artillery park of 526 men, some 36,728 troops. This does not include the 12,380 men in garrison battalions and 643 cavalry depots which belonged to the Armée de Naples. Macdonald himself says he had 25,000 at most, stretched over a long line. It is to be remembered that both Moreau in advising him and Napoleon in criticizing him assumed that he had 40,000.¹ Lapoype with a small force of 2,500, placed at Bobbio, was to be at his disposal, but this he only learnt later on at Piacenza.

The Generals of the Armée de Naples were rather a peculiar and mixed body. All Macdonald's own experience till this year had been in the north, where he had fought in flat country, which may partly account for the way in which he now kept clear of the mountains, the best ground for the French and the worst for the Russians. Salm and Watrin like him had belonged to the Armée du Nord, where in 1794 Salm and he had both led brigades. Salm still was only a General of Brigade, whilst Macdonald was in command of an army. Later both Watrin and

¹ Macdonald, *Souvenirs*, 81; Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 465; *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 268.

Salm had led brigades in the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' in 1797 under Hoche. Salm had been intended for the army of Egypt but had been detained by Macdonald, who wanted Generals. Watrin, made General of Division by Macdonald for his conduct at the Trebbia, was later described by Saint-Cyr as young and ardent—he was then 27—and after distinguishing himself at Marengo he died at San Domingo. Olivier came from the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', and is described as a brave but not very good General. He was to lose a leg at the Trebbia. Rusca belonged to the real Armée d'Italie but was not one of its ornaments, being described by Thiébault as a mere brigand. He was killed in the defence of Soissons in 1814. Dombrowski was a true-hearted, hard-fighting Pole.¹ After struggling against the dismemberment of his country he had gone to France, and was the organizer of the first Polish Legion in the service of the Republic. He was to give way before the Russians at the Trebbia, but we shall meet him fighting against them again in 1812. Most of these Generals were either young or very junior and had little experience of the peculiar fighting carried on in Italy in 1796-7. Olivier and Rusca had been but lately promoted,² a fact which we shall see had its importance. I will leave the Generals from 'Italie' who joined 'Naples' till after I have dealt with the battle of the Trebbia.

Macdonald had pushed his left northwards along the coast, clearing the enemy from Sarzana and then from Pontremoli, which were handed over to Victor, so that the junction with Moreau was made. As we have seen, the Armée de Naples was originally only a detachment from the Armée d'Italie, but it had had time to crystallize into a separate body, with the almost hostile spirit towards other armies which was so prevalent in the forces of the Republic and in the corps of the Empire. The troops from Naples had had a course of victory, whilst those from the Armée d'Italie, in the divisions of Victor and Mont-ricard, had suffered a series of reverses. The regiments from Naples, who do not seem to have had their ranks filled up with

¹ François Watrin (1772-1802). *Fastes*, ii. 218-20; Phipps, ii. Jean-Baptiste Olivier (1765-1813). *Fastes*, iii. 456-7. Général-Baron Jean-Baptiste Rusca (1759-1814). *Fastes*, ii. 485-6; Révérend, *Armorial*, iv. 191. *Biog. des Cont.*, iv. 1190-1 calls him Dominique. Phipps, iii. Jean-Henri Dombrowski (1755-1818). Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxii. 527-33; Phipps, iv.

² Rusca the 5th February and Olivier the 22nd May 1799.

raw recruits as those in the north of Italy had been, spoke confidently of repairing the disasters in the north and of avenging what they called 'the conscripts' of the other force. On the other hand the divisions of Victor and Montrichard showed a spirit of unfriendly rivalry with those from Naples, whilst the supply agents of the two forces quarrelled about their work. One cannot but suspect that Macdonald with his sneers and sarcasms was not the man to lessen the friction which existed in his command.

Tired, he says, of these disputes, Macdonald proposed to unite the two armies under the commander of 'Italie', offering his own resignation but declaring himself ready still to serve in the army. This sounds magnanimous but one has certain suspicions. The offer was made, not to Moreau on the spot, when it might have been acted on at once, but to the Directory at Paris, with the knowledge that much time must be lost before it could be received, whilst matters in Italy were pressing. Indeed, far from Moreau knowing anything of this fine self-sacrifice, we find him apparently trying to reassure Macdonald against any dread of loss of rank by their junction. 'I do not wish', he wrote, 'to dissolve the Armée de Naples. I shall sketch out its operations and I venture to assure you that we shall gain much from the spirit of emulation which ought to rise in the two armies.' It is to be noted that Moreau implies that he had power to dissolve Macdonald's separate command: he was the Commander-in-Chief in Italy and Macdonald was only a General commanding an army there. It may seem ill-natured to point out that Macdonald had his friend Sémonville and other well-informed correspondents in Paris and probably knew that his own name had been already mentioned for the command in Italy. The Director Larévellière-Lépeaux, writing of the appointments to command of Jourdan in Germany and Schérer in Italy, at the beginning of hostilities, says: 'Had we not Moreau? Had we not Macdonald? I proposed them instead of Schérer and Jourdan.' That is, he would have sent Moreau to the Armée du Danube instead of Jourdan, and Macdonald to Italy instead of Schérer, and he was still a Director when Macdonald reached Florence, though he was forced out on the 8th June. Also it is possible that Macdonald may have had some inkling of the idea, carried out on the 5th July although cancelled later, to nominate Moreau

to the command of the Armée du Rhin. Such a change, the recall of Moreau to his proper theatre, was always possible, and then who so likely to succeed to the command in Italy as the self-sacrificing Macdonald, who was already on the spot?

We now come to the operations which eventually caused a breach between the two commanders. The junction of the two armies was made. All that Macdonald had to do was to file his troops along the coast and join Moreau in Genoa. It is true that the road after Sarzana became unfit for artillery; but there was nothing to prevent the train being embarked at Spezia and being taken by sea to Genoa, as Schérer had told him on the 27th April; this was done eventually and Macdonald was wise enough now to make preparations for it. But even had the guns to be abandoned, the arsenal at Genoa, as Napoleon says, could have furnished a fresh supply. Had this been done, Macdonald's force would have joined that of Moreau, the two divisions from the Armée d'Italie would have returned to that body, and Macdonald's Armée de Naples, some 23,679 strong, would have acted alongside 'Italie' under the superior guidance of Moreau. The two armies, which Napoleon believed would have been 75,000 strong together, could then have crossed the Bochetta Pass, raised the sieges of Tortona, Alessandria, and Turin, and have carried the war back under the walls of Mantua. I will deal with this question of numbers in a moment.

Macdonald, however, conceived a bolder plan, which would retain him in his position as the striking force. Suvárof had divided his troops into two bodies, one round Turin, the other besieging Mantua and holding Bologna, Modena, and Parma. Instead of remaining in touch with Moreau behind the Apennines, Macdonald proposed to dash over them, and, joined by Moreau there, to cut off the left wing of the enemy or to force it back over the Po. The rest of the forces of the Allies would have to deal with the two armies joined in one. The Devil was in it, wrote Moreau, if they could not sweep the right of the Po. A still bolder project seems to have been in the mind of each General. Macdonald had left his bridge equipage at Rome: if he could seize a bridge over the Po from the enemy, and he means far below Voghera, then, 'Je médite un projet très hardi', which would ensure an uninterrupted series of successes.¹ This

¹ Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 470.

seems to point to a dash over to the left bank of the Po. As for Moreau, he cheered Macdonald on by assurances that Suvárof was far off Pérignon would send some 3,000 or 4,000 men into the valley of the Trebbia. Moreau himself, with sixteen battalions and 2,000 horse, would cross the Bochetta, but he could not be between Serravalle and Gavi until the 16th or the 17th June. Thence he would march down the Scrivia; but wisely enough he pointed out that neither he nor Macdonald ought to lose their hold on the mountains until after a definite success.

Confronted by ordinary Generals, Macdonald's plan of a stroke at the rear of the Allies, for that is what it really was, would probably have been successful. It would have been the 'coup de Jarnac' of Marengo, delivered from the south instead of the north; but there was always a possibility of a blow being delivered from the north at the French as they advanced. The question was: were the French sufficiently strong? Napoleon, as I have just said, put the necessary strength at 75,000; Macdonald, including the divisions of Victor and Montrichard, nominally had 36,000 men, but he says he only had 25,000 available. Moreau is said to have advanced for the junction with 25,000, which would make a total of 50,000. But Moreau himself said he would move with sixteen battalions, 2,000 horse, and eighteen guns. Now the battalions probably were weak, but at the utmost this would make 18,000 men, a total, if the armies met, of 43,000, or, if you take Macdonald's strength on paper, 54,000.¹ Suvárof brought some 42,000 to the Trebbia to deal with Macdonald alone. Then it is curious that Macdonald, if he wished to strike for the Po, should have asked Moreau to make the junction by 'a column from Tortona to Piacenza by Voghera'. Moreau, more wisely, on the 8th June, whilst accepting the junction at Tortona, still said if he could start that evening he would move at first along the coast to Pontremoli, getting to Parma in nine marches. A glance at the map will show how much more advantageous such a junction would have been. A much shorter march down the Trebbia, by Bobbio, would have made the junction on the Trebbia for Piacenza.²

¹ Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 204, 479; *Vict. et Conq.* x. 353; *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 267-8; Macdonald, *Souvenirs*, 81.

² *Corr. Nap.*, xxx. 269, treats this route as practicable.

Napoleon in his criticisms did not know that the reason for the conduct of Macdonald, breaking away from the right of Moreau, which he already touched, to meet the Armée d'Italie to the north of the Apennines, was to strike for the left of the Po. He treats this plan as a mere suggestion of critics and says that during July the Seraglio is uninhabitable, and that the army would have lost 500 men a day. He had had his own experience of the swamps of Mantua, but it is to be remarked that the Governor of that fortress was offering to march to meet Macdonald with a force of 5,000 or 6,000 men and a strong train of artillery. Saint-Cyr, judging only by the movements, assumes, rightly, that the object of the junction by Tortona was to carry the armies on to the banks of the Po. Both these most capable critics condemn the plan. Soult, on the other hand, writes as if he had learnt the plan from Macdonald, and he does not exactly condemn it, though he says the junction by the coast would have been simpler and that the bolder plan failed through the indolence of Moreau and the too great precipitation of Macdonald. Both Napoleon and Soult decide that Moreau should have joined Macdonald by Bobbio.¹ The difficulty of being certain what Macdonald's plan really was is increased by the fact that, as will be seen later on, when he reached Modena on his advance he detached at least two divisions towards the Po to demonstrate as if he were about to pass to the left of the river, in order that the enemy might draw their forces to that bank. One would have thought that if he really meant to operate on the left bank, the more the enemy divided their forces the better. The explanation may be that, failing to seize any bridge near Mantua, or abandoning the plan of crossing so low, as Moreau might not be available there, he was thinking only of facilitating his junction with the Armée d'Italie. But that originally he meant to cross the Po, and to do it low down, there can be no doubt.

When Napoleon in 1800 threw himself upon the communications of Melas, he had his own retreat open as long as his right wing were not completely cut from the Alps. A mere lost battle, driving him eastwards, would not necessarily have cut him from his base. If he were cut from the St. Bernard he could

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 267, 268; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 212-13; Soult, *Mémoires*, ii. 138-49.

have got off by the St. Gotthard, with, at the worst, the loss of his artillery.¹ But in 1799, once Macdonald was on the left bank any defeat driving him eastwards of his bridge would mean complete ruin. As Napoleon said, the rivers would have formed great obstacles to his throwing back the forces in front of him, whilst Suvárof would have been thundering behind. It would have been a curious thing if he, like Wurmser in 1796, had been driven into Mantua.

Macdonald soon placed his head-quarters at Lucca, and advanced on the 4th June after a delay of a week. This delay is bitterly blamed by Napoleon, who believed it had been a fortnight,² but Macdonald declared it was necessary after the fatigues his troops had undergone and the loss of horses, mostly brought from Naples and unaccustomed to heavy work. The shoeing, harness, and equipment also had to be seen to. However necessary, the delay once within reach of the enemy was most unfortunate, for success against the Austrians in the east had to be attained before Suvárof could reinforce them from the north. The army passed the Apennines in three columns. On the right Rusca and Montrichard marched on Bologna. In the centre, led by Macdonald in person, Olivier and Watrin moved by the main road on Modena. On the left Dombrowski, a little to the west, went by the pass to Reggio, whilst on the extreme left Victor made for Borgo San Donino, to the east of Parma.

On the 12th June Macdonald drove the Austrians under Hohenzollern north-east from Modena, towards Ferrara, cutting them from the rest of their force. Rather unfortunately he sent the two divisions of Olivier and Montrichard for a time in pursuit, with orders to spread the report that they were moving northwards to reach the Po at San Benedetto, to raise the siege of Mantua, that fortress being only some forty miles away on a good road. Kray, indeed, left before Mantua to besiege it, had already been ordered by Suvárof to turn the operation into a blockade and to advance southwards on the right of the Po. On the news of Macdonald's advance from Florence, Kray,

¹ Hamley, *Operations*, 117. I do not see why the loss of the artillery should have been inevitable. Moncey, coming over that pass in 1800, assumed that his artillery would follow his infantry and cavalry; Chénier, *Moncey*, 126, 132-3.

² *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 268. Perhaps Napoleon counted from the first arrival of troops at Florence, whilst Macdonald wrote of the main body.

removing the bridges over the Po, had taken post with 10,000 men on the left bank, ready to resist any attempt by Macdonald to cross the river, and it was his troops Macdonald was now meeting. Kray was ordered by Suvárof to join him, but secret directions from Vienna prevented him doing so. Latour-Foissac,¹ the Governor of Mantua, was making a vigorous defence, and he communicated with Macdonald, offering to march to meet him with from 5,000 to 6,000 men and a strong park of artillery. Macdonald, however, wished first to make the junction with Moreau, so he marched westwards by the main road from Modena to Piacenza, away from the mountains; the two divisions of Olivier and Montrichard rejoined him, but unfortunately not till late on the 18th June. Before that, on the 14th, Macdonald, driving Ott with some 8,000 Austrians before him, was at Parma, and on the 15th June he reached Piacenza, having split the Austrian left wing in two, Ott still retreating in front of him and Hohenzollern now closing on his rear.

Before Modena a strange accident had disabled Macdonald and probably had much influence on the campaign. His troops, entering Modena, had dispersed to plunder, and he himself was outside the town on the road to Bologna with his Guides when a handful of the enemy's cavalry, followed by French horse, came up by a cross-road. At this moment a battalion of French grenadiers came out of Modena and was placed by Macdonald to block the road, whilst his Guides, not seeing there was a ditch between them and the cross-road, prepared to take the enemy in flank. Passing in front of the grenadiers, and telling them not to fire till ordered, Macdonald was about to move behind the battalion and draw his sword, when the party of the enemy, calling in French to the leader of the Guides, 'Don't you recognize me? I am your brother', leapt the ditch and charged Macdonald and his staff. Embarrassed by a sword cane which he carried attached to his wrist, Macdonald checked his horse, and, unable to draw his sword, he was between the enemy and the grenadiers, who began firing. His horse was struck, and was knocked down by the enemy's cavalry, he himself received two sword-cuts, one on his head and the other on his right thumb, and he was trodden under foot by the horses.

¹ Général Philippe-François de Latour-Foissac (1750-1804). Permanently disgraced by Napoleon for the surrender of Mantua on the 28th July 1799.

All the enemy were slain, but Macdonald was carried senseless into a house.

Some hours afterwards he opened his eyes and found himself surrounded by his Generals, amongst whom was Montrichard,¹ on whom he at once laid the blame for his accident, saying that if Montrichard's division had been up none of the enemy could have escaped from Modena. Montrichard, alleging that he waited for the park, also said that he had been detained by finding that the regiment leading his column had no cartridges. Why this should have been the case, and why he did not simply leave this regiment in rear, Montrichard could not explain. Carried into Modena and still surrounded by his Generals, Macdonald, feeling himself unable to retain the command, offered it first to the senior, Victor, I presume, and then in succession to the others, but all refused. This was hardly a fair proceeding. Victor was only detached from the *Armée d'Italie* and it would have been rather invidious for him to command the Generals of the *Armée de Naples*. Further, if the junction with Moreau were assured the army would pass under that commander; if the junction were not assured, then the position of the army was most dangerous and the Generals of Division may well have shrunk from responsibility for Macdonald's plan. Had he actually resigned it might have been different, but a mere offer implied that he could retain it. His substitute would have borne the burden of any defeat and would not have received much credit for success. The Generals suggested that he could be carried to Genoa as well by Bobbio as by the route they had come, so Macdonald retained the command. Borne in a litter on the march and thus brought on to the field, where he was able to stand for a time, the great disadvantage he was under for the rest of the campaign must always be remembered.

It was, Macdonald afterwards believed, between Parma and Piacenza, that is, about the 15th June, that Victor gave him a letter from Moreau which from his description seems to be that of the 8th June, when Moreau was uncertain whether he would move on Tortona or follow Victor by Pontremoli to Parma. One would have thought, however, that this letter must have been that of the 11th June, where Moreau said he could not be

¹ This was before the detachment of Montrichard's and Olivier's divisions in pursuit of Hohenzollern.

between Serravalle and Gavi until the 16th or the 17th June.¹ Neither Moreau nor Macdonald seems to have calculated on there being any possibility of the enemy between them being reinforced by Suvárof from Turin. Besides the Austrians of Ott at Piacenza, Moreau spoke only of 16,000 men round Tortona. On the 14th June Pérignon, then commanding Moreau's right, would throw 3,000 or 4,000 men into the valley of the Trebbia, to make the enemy wary in defending the passage of the river. This detachment, under Lapoype, ought to have played a very important part in the operations at this time, linking the two armies, but Lapoype halted at Bobbio and neither he nor Macdonald seems to have made any effort to communicate with one another. This is the more strange as Lapoype ought to have been able to tell Macdonald when Moreau had started and by what route he was moving. The earliest date given by Moreau for the junction was the 17th June at Parma, supposing he could leave Genoa by the 8th June and moved by Pontremoli, which Lapoype probably could have told Macdonald that Moreau had not done. However, Macdonald assumed that, allowing Moreau a day for delays, the junction ought to be made on the 14th or the 16th June at Parma or at Piacenza.

¹ *Ante*, p. 279.

XIII

THE TREBBIA

(June to August 1799)

Battle of the Trebbia. Moreau's inaction. Retreat of the army of Naples. Macdonald and his Generals.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See Chapters V, VI.

ON the 16th June Salm, who led the *avant-garde*, turned northward down the Nura towards Cremona and the Po, watching the fords there as a flank attack was feared from troops detached from in front of Mantua. It is, I suppose, this movement which was the cause, as Macdonald says, of Salm not leading next day. Victor meantime went straight on for Piacenza, driving Ott from Fiorenzola and reaching Piacenza as the Austrians, under the protection of the fire of the Château, were withdrawing a bridge recently laid over the Po. Rusca and Dombrowski followed Victor, halting in rear on the Nura. Still farther to the rear, on the Taro, Olivier and Montrichard encamped, fortifying their position, to watch any passage of the Po by troops from in front of Mantua and to destroy any boats on the river. It is curious that in the formal account of the movements of the army, Watrin's division is not mentioned. Macdonald speaks only of two divisions, obviously Olivier and Montrichard, but certainly Watrin was with them, as we know from Boulart, who was serving with this group.¹ Apparently it was these rear divisions which were to seem to collect materials for a passage of the Po, and to spread rumours of an advance on Mantua, so inducing the enemy to draw his troops to the left of the Po.

Acting on his theory of when Moreau would arrive, on the 17th Macdonald, himself quite crippled, remained in Piacenza—the town, but not the Château, being held by the French—and sent forward the part of his army which was immediately under his hand, Salm's *avant-garde*, Victor, Rusca, and Dombrowski—say some 17,000 or 18,000 men—to cross the Trebbia

¹ Gachot, *Souvarow*, note 1, p. 228, quoting *Arch. Guerre*; Macdonald, 90; Boulart, 56.

and to take post on the Tidone. The divisions in rear were ordered to come up by forced marches. Suffering much from the jarring his wounds had received on the journey, Macdonald stayed in bed, giving the command of the divisions on the Tidone to Victor, the senior General of Division. He intended to take post on the Tidone to await Moreau and the divisions left in rear. A crippled General, unable to see everything for himself, may find it hard to get his orders carried out, and Victor, probably not attaching much importance to the day's work, also stayed in Piacenza, without letting Macdonald know. His divisions, under Charpentier,¹ who led the column, threw Ott over the Tidone and then halted. Rusca came up and with characteristic folly² prepared to follow Ott over the Tidone. Charpentier, who knew Macdonald's orders, remonstrated, but he had no authority over a General of Division, and Rusca got part of his troops over the river and was hotly pursuing Ott, when at 3 p.m. he was met by fresh troops of the enemy and was repulsed.

Overpowered, he fell back. By this time the divisions of both Victor and Dombrowski had followed him across the Tidone. Without a commander for the whole force they were thrown into confusion and retired. By an odd inversion—I have mentioned a possible reason³—the *avant-garde* of Salm had been in rear; it now came up and throwing itself on to the right it took the enemy in flank and covered the withdrawal of the rest of the force across the Tidone. Report was made to Macdonald in Piacenza. He wished the troops to retain the position between the Tidone and the Trebbia which they now occupied and which he had selected, the Tidone being a more difficult river for the enemy to cross than the Trebbia; but the Generals objected, saying the ground was not fit and that it was better to withdraw across the Trebbia, as some of the fugitives had already done. The crippled Macdonald had to give an unwilling assent, and the divisions of Victor,⁴ Dombrowski, and Rusca recrossed to the right, or Piacenza, bank of the Trebbia, Salm alone being ordered to remain on the left bank. So strong were the enemy

¹ Général-Comte Henri-François-Marie Charpentier (1769–1831). He commanded a division of the Young Guard in 1814. *Fastes*, iii. 136–7.

² See his previous conduct in Thiébault, ii. 268.

³ p. 285.

⁴ We are not told when Victor himself came on the ground. Macdonald only speaks of 'On' as referring to himself for orders.

now that they made three attempts to force the passage of the Trebbia, but they were beaten off by the fire of the French batteries placed on the higher, right bank, and the main body of the enemy remained on the left of the Tidone. So ended the first of the three days of the battle of the Trebbia.¹

This day the Armée de Naples, all unknowing, had received the first shock of the storm which was coming on it from the west. Suvárof at Turin had at last become aware of the danger he ran from the approaching junction of Macdonald and Moreau, and, awaking from his lethargy, he was making one of his bull-like rushes at his enemy, dashing past Moreau to crush Macdonald. On the 13th June he had learnt that Macdonald was passing the Apennines, and he began collecting his troops round Alessandria. His vigour saved him from the consequences of his previous carelessness, but the fact that he was delayed two days for want of a bridge over the Bormida proves how improvident he had been. Crossing late at night on the 15th June and marching swiftly down the right of the Po by Marengo, Tortona, and Voghera, on the 16th June he was at Casteggio, having done thirty miles in twenty-four hours. His advanced guard was near Stradella. At Tortona he had passed one debouch by which Moreau might advance from Genoa, but Bellegarde, from the Grisons, was left to continue the blockade of Alessandria and Tortona and to check Moreau should he advance. Whilst professing the utmost confidence in his success, Suvárof took all measures for safety in case of defeat, a bridge at Valenza being provided for Bellegarde and two others at Mezzana Corte and opposite Stradella. Seven hundred men were pushed out across the hills for the valley of the Trebbia to watch Lapoype at Bobbio. With Ott, Suvárof would have 30,000 men against Macdonald, whose nominal strength was 36,728 but probably was really 25,000, less losses since the 12th June. All this done, Suvárof rushed at the Armée de Naples.

As he drew near the Tidone, the news of the attack on Ott in his front excited Suvárof, who realized the danger Ott and his

¹ For this day's fight I follow principally General Lahure, 230-1, and Macdonald, 90-3, with Spalding's *Suvóroff*, 150-1. Most accounts seem wrong. Compare, for example, Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 195-7, on Salm, with Lahure, who served in the division. It was only 2,977 strong and not 5,000, as Dumas asserts, and it followed, not led, the other divisions. See also Gachot, *Souvarow*, 229-34.

own advanced guard were in, and he hurried his men on. No attention was paid to formation and 'the troops were running in a long straggling column along the great highway', Suvárof encouraging the men to race for the battle, regardless of the long trail of stragglers dropping breathlessly behind. He himself, coatless as usual, rode with the sweating men, shouting, joking, gesticulating, and always urging them on. Every now and then he played a sort of game of bo-peep with them, riding on ahead and then rushing out from some cover. In his own favourite phrase, 'The head did not wait for the tail'. Though his men came up panting, still they came, in time to save Ott. At 3 p.m. on the 17th that General, as we have seen, had been in full retreat and hotly pursued, and it was only Suvárof's arrival with four regiments of Cossacks that gave pause to the French. By 4 p.m. the infantry columns came up, but so great was their confusion that Bagration, accustomed as he was to Suvárof's manner of fighting, advised delay, saying there were not forty men up with each company. 'Forward, forward!' yelled Suvárof in reply. 'Macdonald has not twenty.' Had he recoiled the French might have shattered the head of his long column, but as it was they were thrown back over the Tidone, and retired, as we have seen, to the right of the Trebbia, Salm's *avant-garde* alone remaining on the left of that river.

The result of this day was very important. The French lost a better fighting-ground than they now held—the only disadvantage Macdonald felt at the moment; and also it now became difficult, if not impossible, for Macdonald to throw his trains, his '*cul*', as Napoleon might have said, up the Trebbia valley in the line of retreat to Bobbio. This, the Imperial critic says, would have been the proper course, and then the more the enemy pressed down the Po for Piacenza the worse became their position, as they would expose their flank more and more to the French. Also, fighting amongst the hills the agile French would have had a much better chance than the heavy stupid Russians or the solid Austrians, and they lost this in the level cockpit where Macdonald, a General of the plain, accepted battle. I shall say more about this later. If the army had to retreat, the route, says Napoleon, was good for artillery for fourteen leagues, and at the source of the Trebbia the army would have been only three leagues from the Bochetta Pass. If Moreau did not

arrive by that road, nor make himself felt in rear of Suvárof, four days would have taken Macdonald to Genoa. Macdonald, however, was not thinking of retreat. He had full right to be confident in his men, and he believed Moreau *would* either come down the Trebbia by Bobbio or else make himself felt in rear of the enemy force now coming on so proudly.

The morning of the second day, the 18th June, passed quietly, for Macdonald was resting his troops and awaiting the three divisions coming up in rear. Suvárof was preparing his attack, refusing his left and reinforcing his right as he meant to try and cut the French from the hills and to jam them on the Po. Macdonald came up from Piacenza, and so quiet did everything seem that Salm asked leave to go into the town. Then, about 4 p.m., the enemy advanced in five columns. The heat of the day, the fatigue of his men, and perhaps his own prolonged dinner, had made Suvárof late in moving. His attack was received by the *avant-garde* and the divisions of Victor, Rusca, and Dombrowski. The other divisions, Olivier, Montrichard, and Watrin, had not come up till about 2 p.m., and at first remained in the second line. Salm, who of course was the first struck, had orders to retire as soon as pressed but he stood firm; he himself was wounded, his successor, Sarrazin,¹ also fell, and Lahure took command of the *avant-garde*, which fell into confusion, and, crossing to the right of the Trebbia, masked the fire of the other divisions which ought to have covered the withdrawal. However, once the front was clear the fire of the French batteries from the higher right bank of the river checked the enemy, and the French line held good; though it was far into the night before the fight in the very bed of the river ceased. One Russian division had penetrated to Settima on the French left, carrying out Suvárof's plan, but having no further orders it remained till daylight and then rejoined its army on the left of the Trebbia.

It will be seen that my account of this second day's fight, the 18th June, differs from most of the works to which I have given reference, which make the French advance and fight on the

¹ Général Jean Sarrazin (1770-1819). In 1810 deserted in a boat from Boulogne to England, and wrote many works against Napoleon. In 1819 the French courts sentenced him to the galleys for bigamy. *Biog. des Cont.* iv. 1260-1, with list of his works.

left of the Trebbia.¹ Salm's *avant-garde* alone began the engagement there and it soon was forced back over the river to join the rest of the army. For this, besides Macdonald's own account we have that of Colonel Lahure, who brought the *avant-garde* back after Salm and Sarrazin were wounded, and who, like Macdonald, knows nothing of the flanking manœuvre against Melas, apparently rather late in the day, attributed to it by Spalding.² There must be some confusion here with the flanking action of the *avant-garde* on the first day. I have put the commencement of the action at 4 p.m., the time given by Lahure, who was with the *avant-garde*, the first body attacked. This also seems to agree with Macdonald's account, as Salm at such an hour might well believe there would be no action that day, whilst he would never have assumed so much at 10 a.m., the time given by Spalding, who oddly enough attributed the delay to the heat, a good reason for delaying till 4 p.m., but not for beginning at 10 a.m. The French, having held their ground, at last had their army nearly concentrated. It does not appear when Watrin's reserve came up: it was certainly in rear at first.³ It was ominous that the army was getting near the end of its ammunition. Still, the 'drums and music' of which Suvárof had spoken to his troops had not sounded yet for any victory of the Allies.

Hitherto the Trebbia merely figures in the account of each day's fight but it was now to be the centre of the struggle of the last day, as it had been in Hannibal's victory of Canná. Running almost straight out of the Apennines to the Po, the ordinary gravelly bed of the river was about 165 yards wide in summer, but the shores were some 660 yards apart. On the left bank the slope was so gradual that both cavalry and artillery could pass with ease. The right bank was higher and steeper so that it could not be passed everywhere, but the French had reconnoitred and had marked the various points of passage.⁴ Numerous stony islands broke the course of the river. 'Oddly enough,' says Colonel Spalding, 'owing to the enclosed nature of the surrounding district it forms the most favourable space in the

¹ *Vict. et Conq.* x. 343-4; Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 197-8; Spalding, *Suvóroff*, 153-5.

² Macdonald, 92-5; Lahure, 251-5; Spalding, 154.

³ Boulart, 56; Lahure, 234.

⁴ So says an eyewitness, Colonel Lahure, 236.

neighbourhood for the action of cavalry. Add to this that the battlefield is a defile between the mountains and the Po, and a fair idea may be formed of the contracted area which was to be the scene of conflict.'

There is one obvious comment on this description: the ground was not that which should have been selected for French troops to fight Russians and Austrians. Broken ground was where the French had shown superiority over the heavy, slow Austrians, both in the Vosges and in Italy; and much of the success of Bonaparte's Armée d'Italie had been due to the skilful use of difficult ground. Still more was it a disadvantage to fight the stubborn but heavy Russians on ground where their solid masses could be brought to bear. A very short experience in Switzerland was soon to teach Suvárof that his men were not fit for hill warfare, and the strokes of Masséna were to fill the troops, now so confident of success, with a strong disinclination to face the French again. Moreau had already pointed out to Macdonald the necessity for keeping to the hills, as if he were thinking of a means of withdrawing from the attack of the enemy. Saint-Cyr, always fond of hill fighting, was soon, before Novi, to urge the advantage of drawing the Austrians and Russians into the mountains, giving good proof of the wisdom of his advice by his victory at the second, his own, battle of Novi on the 5th November 1799. Macdonald now, to his destruction, chose a level battle-field.

The third day of the great battle came, and Macdonald, believing his whole army to be under his hand, determined to make a general attack, for like most French officers he considered his troops were best on the offensive. His army of course had shrunk and now was probably but some 20,000, with 28 guns, whilst Suvárof had been reinforced by 3,500 infantry and 1,000 cavalry brought over from the left of the Po. Unfortunately Macdonald planned an action beyond his strength, for he tried to outflank both the wings of the enemy whilst he also attacked their centre. Watrin, with his reserve, was to move along the Po on the far right; Olivier commanded the right, consisting of his own division with that of Montrichard and the *avant-garde*, now under Lahure. Victor commanded the left wing, his own division and that of Rusca; Dombrowski's Poles were detached on the left, to move round amongst the

mountains. A reserve of infantry and cavalry, not to be confused with Watrin's reserve division, was left on the right of the Trebbia. No attempt seems to have been made to communicate with Lapoype's force up the river. As for Suvárof, he intended, as on the 18th, to cut the French from the mountains, refusing his own left by the Po and throwing his reserve on their left—not, as Napoleon seems to have believed, trying to cut them from Piacenza.¹

The French advance was to have been at 9 a.m., but Montrichard's division, worn with its marches, could not get up in line for a long time, and then at first it came without its General. It was 12.15 p.m. when the troops began to move. Formed in columns, they advanced to the Trebbia. Holding their muskets high over their heads, the men waded across at the marked passages under showers of case, with water up to their waists. Once on the left bank the columns deployed in the most perfect order, on several lines with skirmishers in front; the cavalry were placed in rear, in the intervals, and on the flanks of the divisions. At first all went well. Several batteries were captured by the French, the enemy's cavalry was thrown back on their infantry, and Suvárof's troops were being forced towards the Tidone. On the right Watrin, moving close to the Po, had almost reached the Tidone, beyond the left of the Allies. Suvárof, however, had wisely massed a great part of his troops on his right, and there Dombrowski's Poles were surrounded and the division was almost destroyed. Dombrowski was wounded and owed his life to his having carried into battle, of all things in the world, a history of the Thirty Years War! This ruin of the Poles had compensations, for in turning on Dombrowski, Bagration had left a gap in the line of the Allies of which Victor skilfully took advantage, throwing his own and Rusca's divisions into the space left and driving back the enemy on to the village of Casaliggio.

Now came the disaster of the day. Montrichard had not yet joined his division,² which, built up of various detachments, had shown much indiscipline, especially in the regiment which

¹ Spalding, *Suvóroff*, 155; Gachot, *Souvarow*, note 1, p. 244; *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 269.

² So says Macdonald, 96. Other accounts make him try to rally his troops. There seems no explanation of his absence.

now led it, the 5th Light. Charged by the Austrian cavalry, which overthrew the horse covering it, the regiment broke and fled for the river, followed by the whole division. Macdonald, injured as he was, rallied them on the right of the Trebbia, but some of the fugitives reached Piacenza. Lahure with the *avant-garde* was on the right of this division and at once prepared to throw his men on the pursuing Austrians; he might have saved the day but he fell wounded; his successor, Dessailly, had his horse shot under him, and the movement was not made.

The enemy now turned on the *avant-garde* and on Olivier and forced them back over the Trebbia, although the French carried off some captured guns. Bagratiou, returning from the repulse of Dombrowski on the French left, fell on the flank of Rusca and of Victor, who had to retreat over the river. On the extreme right, by the Po, Watrin had advanced far, the enemy not having occupied that ground, and, reaching the Tidone, he would have turned the enemy's left had not the disaster to Montrichard halted him. Eventually he regained the right of the Trebbia without much loss. His threat had halted the infantry of the Austrian column under Melas. Suvárof had intended Melas to move obliquely to the right at the end of the day and to throw his weight on the French left, as, indeed, had been his intention on the previous day. Melas, sending on his cavalry to attack Montrichard, still held back his infantry to watch Watrin; but this was the only effect Watrin's division had that day. Also Dombrowski's Poles did nothing after they were back on the right of the Trebbia. Once the whole force was on the right bank Macdonald covered his line with his reserve cavalry, and his troops, re-forming, presented a line of steel against which assault after assault of the enemy was shattered. At nightfall both armies were in the positions they had occupied in the morning, but both had suffered very severely. Thus ended the third and last day of the battle of the Trebbia.¹

Borne on an ambulance-litter, or standing while he could, escaping by a miracle from a shell which burst close to him, the

¹ The Memoirs of Joseph de Montfort, unpublished, I believe, are said by MM. Foucart et Finot, in their *Défense nationale dans le Nord*, ii. 736, to contain an interesting account of this battle, of which he was an eyewitness. For plans of the battle see Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, Atlas; *Vict. et Cong.* x. pp. xxvi, 341; Alison, *Atlas*, xxvi.

crippled Macdonald had passed the day on the field. Officers and men had fought like heroes. General Olivier, when Macdonald came to the ambulance to condole with him on the loss of a leg, answered: 'I shed my blood for the Republic: it is nothing; how go our affairs?' Colonel Lahure, when being carried off the field wounded, saw by his side a grenadier whose breast had been pierced by a ball, and told the man he ought to go and have his wound looked to. 'No, Colonel,' came the answer, 'I wish to die alongside you.' Three paces farther and the wish was granted. 'There were giants in the land in those days.'

The Austrians and the Russians agreed that the French had fought both sternly and well. The Prince de Liechtenstein, who took the place of the wounded Austrian commander Melas, describing the fight of the 19th, when he had five horses killed under him, says that getting in rear of the French who were pursuing Ott's corps, he drove them back. 'Then our adversaries recommenced the fight with admirable vigour. They are courageous soldiers.' Suvárof himself, later, when in Switzerland, told Wickham that at the Trebbia the French 'fought most *ably* and obstinately'.¹ They lost proportionately, especially amongst the senior officers. Forrest, the cavalry leader, had been killed under Modena. Now Victor, Rusca, Dombrowski, Olivier, Salm, and Grandjean, with Sarrazin, Liébault, and Blondeau of the staff, had been wounded, and General Cambrai had died of his wounds. Macdonald wrote to Pérignon at Genoa, in a dispatch captured by the enemy, 'All the Generals of Division of the Armée de Naples, except two, are wounded; the same with more than forty Adjutant-Generals, Colonels, and Majors. Several regiments have lost thirty or forty officers. More than 12,000 men are *hors de combat*. The troops have no more cartridges. The artillery is unfit to serve.' More than 502 wounded officers and 7,183 men had to be left in the hospitals; 1,600 were killed, a total reduction of 9,240 out of action. The Allies lost 5,273 men.

The want of ammunition was not one of those excuses put forward by a beaten force. Boulart, who was with the artillery of Olivier's division, says that whilst the artillery had, relatively, lost less than the rest of the army, as most of the fighting had

¹ Wickham, 209. The italics are in the original.

been so close, yet almost all his ammunition had gone: there was not enough for another day. It seems a pity that more ammunition had not been brought on to the field. A convoy of it seems to have been left at Fort Urbino on the advance and to have been picked up by Montrichard on the retreat. There must have been enough transport, for Macdonald complains of the numerous wagons which, contrary to his orders, had followed the army to the field. Most of them were burnt when their conductors, not their real owners, believed Macdonald was going to seize them for conveyance of the wounded on the retreat. This failure in the supply of ammunition may partly be due to Macdonald's crippled state, but it is the more remarkable in a General who was planning a stroke on the left of the Po, where he would have had many more engagements.

Probably Macdonald knew that Suvárof's position was not so very dangerous, even if Moreau were on the line by which the Russian had swept down from Turin. It is usual to represent him as exposed to being jammed between the two French armies. On the 18th June a bridge over the Po had been constructed at Parpanèse—that by which the reinforcements had been brought over¹—and if Suvárof chose, instead of standing the shock of the French he simply had to slip from between them and march to the north for the left of the Po. This, no doubt, would have allowed Macdonald to achieve his end of clearing the right of the Po, but Suvárof most probably could have made a junction with Bellegarde's force in time, in spite of its having been brushed away from Alessandria by Moreau, for that General was hardly the man to march rapidly on Bellegarde and follow him up till crushed. Considering the fortresses the Allies now held (though Mantua was not yet won), there was a long way before they could be cleared from Italy.

The provision of a bridge, indeed of several bridges, over the Po might be thought proof of the forethought of Suvárof, but we may take all such measures as due to the Austrian staff officers. Suvárof himself, once roused, gave energy to the army, but he was curiously indifferent to matters generally expected from a commander. Taking three hours for his dinner, and then sleeping till 4 p.m., hardly ever reconnoitring a position, he left the plans of attack and march to the Austrians, who took his

¹ See *ante*, p. 291, and Gachot, *Souwarow*, note 3, p. 257.

decision at night. His own Russian officers he considered too ignorant to be consulted, and in Italy he never referred to them. Slighting the Austrian troops in public, from motives of policy, and sneering at what he considered their want of dash, in reality he believed them, when well commanded, to have 'all the good points of Russians without their faults, and that were it not for the folly and wickedness of the Austrian Cabinet, their army would before this have conquered the world'. He thought so highly of the skill and military knowledge of the Austrian staff officers that later in Switzerland he refused to act if abandoned by them. The Austrian staff officers, indeed, seem now to have been particularly good and to have been as enterprising as in past times they had been over-cautious.

The situation of the *Armée de Naples* was most serious. No news had come from Moreau, nor even from Lapoype up the Trebbia valley. The firm attitude of the enemy in front showed that they had no fear for their rear, so that Moreau could not be threatening them. What had happened was that Moreau on the 20th June, the day we have now reached, had beaten Bellegarde before Tortona and had thrown him over the Bormida, but this was unknown to both Suvárof and Macdonald. Moreau had said he would be between Serravalle and Gavi by the 16th or 17th June: he had 14,000 men there on the 16th, but his progress thence had been slow. Macdonald, fairly enough, considered he had done enough for the junction; he could not endanger the rest of his army in attempting a fourth day's battle, although one is tempted to believe that had he not been personally disabled, and unwilling to trust to the efforts of Generals who believed in the danger of further resistance, he would have stood. At midnight on the 19th June the order for retreat was given.

I return to the *Armée d'Italie*. Moreau at Genoa believed he had only to deal with a small force before him, round Tortona, which was besieged by the Austrians, and, apparently without exact knowledge of where Macdonald was, he determined to strike at this body and then to throw troops down by Voghera to meet the *Armée de Naples*. On the 17th June at 2 p.m. he himself with his Chief of the Staff, Dessoles, left Genoa and went on to Gavi, where he had on the previous day concentrated the divisions of Grenier and Grouchy, some 14,000 men. Already

Grenier's advanced guard had occupied Serravalle and had got beyond Novi. Next day, the 18th June, Moreau advanced, Grenier on the right of the Scrivia and Grouchy on the left, halting under Tortona, the siege of which was raised by the Austrians.

On the 20th June 1799 came the second battle of Marengo, or, as the French at the time called it, of San Giuliano,¹ the more interesting as this time the French and Austrians occupied the same relative positions as at the battle of the 14th June 1800. Moreau sent most of Grenier's division down the right of the Scrivia for Tortona, whilst to cover this movement Grouchy was sent on the left to drive the enemy from San Giuliano and the Marengo plain. This done, Grouchy would have joined Grenier in the march to assist Macdonald. Bellegarde, however, who was commanding at the siege of Alessandria, fully understood the importance of keeping Moreau off the heels of Suvárof, so he brought all his troops over the Bormida and attacked Grouchy in the Marengo plain. A long and severe combat took place, the French as in 1800 facing westward and the Austrians eastward with their backs to Alessandria. The French, again as in 1800, were far inferior in artillery and cavalry. Grouchy took San Giuliano and Cassina-Grossa, but when he tried to advance towards Alessandria the enemy were reinforced, now as in 1800 a column of Hungarian grenadiers being used. Late in the day, at 5 p.m., Moreau brought up the rest of Grenier's division, which, like Desaix in 1800, saved the battle; and the enemy were driven back on Alessandria, losing four guns, 900 prisoners, and some 3,000 men. Moreau, who took a most active part in the battle, had a horse killed under him. He only lost 900 men.

Before midnight that day Moreau heard from Lapoype of the retreat of Macdonald, whilst the enemy knew not only that Suvárof was sending back troops but that, as Turin had fallen to them on the 20th, the troops lately besieging it were marching to oppose Moreau.² It would seem that Moreau still might have advanced and relieved Alessandria, temporarily, of course, but doing much to cheer the garrison. Melas with the first troops of Suvárof, recalled from the pursuit of Macdonald,

¹ The first, or Victor's, battle had been on the 16th May. See *ante*, p. 267.

² Gachot, *Souwarow*, 308. Suvárof had just received orders to abandon this siege. Wickham, ii. 209.

only reached Stradella on the evening of the 24th June, Kaim with the reinforcements from Turin having got to Castel Novo, on the Scrivia south-west of Voghera, on the previous day. Suvárof himself only reached Castel Novo on the 25th. Always prudent, however, Moreau, demonstrating at first as if about to cross the Bormida, then drew back on Novi, and re-entered the hills. Now would have been the time for Suvárof to finish with Moreau before Macdonald could join him by the coast, but orders from the Austrian Court insisted on his first winning Mantua, Alessandria, Tortona, and the other fortresses. Consequently the junction of the two armies on Genoa was made unmolested. During Moreau's sally on Tortona, Pérignon, commanding the right of the army, had been left to hold Genoa.

Meanwhile Macdonald was retreating. The withdrawal from the field of battle was a difficult matter. The *Armée de Naples* was a very cherub among armies, having literally no base. When Macdonald left Naples and Rome he had removed everything he could, dividing all stores amongst the regiments, who did not carry them for long. After passing Modena the enemy he had thrown aside had closed on his track. Thus if the army had a base it was Genoa, on which Macdonald intended to march but to which he had no route practicable for artillery except that up the Trebbia valley by Bobbio; but he seems never to have thought of this route, and perhaps it was closed now that the enemy were on the Trebbia.

The first day of the retreat, the 20th June, was the most difficult. The guns of a battery on the left of the Po and those of the Château of Piacenza swept the ground by which the army had to move, and a road had to be cut in the night round the town. At midnight of the 19th the retreat began, Montrichard forming the first and Victor the last of three columns. The great thing was to pass the Nura river before the enemy could get up, but Victor only moved at 6 a.m. instead of midnight. The right and centre columns got over safely, but the enemy followed Victor, who sent to Macdonald for support, when the centre column was sent back across the river and brought him safely over. A severe combat took place on the Nura, where three battalions of one regiment had to surrender. It is a curious instance of the permanence of regimental traditions that a Sergeant of this regiment, the 17th, remembering its ancient

title called to his comrades, 'A moi, Auvergne, voici l'ennemi!' the cry of Captain Assas of 'Auvergne' in 1760.¹

Farther on Victor's division broke, merely on some Cossack alarm, according to Macdonald. Asking for help, he took to the mountains by cross-country roads, and missing the proper junction with the rest of the army at Cadeo, reached Borgo San Donnino first. When he informed Macdonald of the loss of his guns, that commander replied in his best sneering style that the detachment he had sent to Victor's succour had found the guns, left alone by friend and foe, and had brought them in.² This, however, even if true, does not prove that the artillery had been lightly lost. After Kulm, in 1813, Kleist's guns apparently might have been brought in by whoever knew of their unprotected state, though the fight over them had been severe enough. The whole army reached Borgo San Donnino safely on the 22nd June. Macdonald meant to throw his troops in succession over the Apennines to make the junction with Moreau by the coast route which on his advance he had renounced. After another scare from his division, Victor was detached first, going up the Taro for Pontremoli, the way he had come to join the army. Here he met Lapoype.

The inaction of Lapoype, whom Macdonald expected to come down the Trebbia on the right wing of Suvárof, seems extraordinary. It is true he only had 2,500 men,³ but the enemy would not have known that he was not leading the advance of Moreau. Suvárof on his advance had sent a detachment to watch him, and so early as the 17th June, the first day of the battle, his men had been skirmishing with Russian Dragoons sent up into the hills from Stradella. Still, he seems to have remained quiet until the morning of the 20th June, the day Macdonald began his retreat, when, coming down the left of the Nura for Piacenza, Lapoype captured some of Suvárof's baggage. He was then attacked by the Russians and retreated for Bobbio. He was struck by the Russians again at Lazzaretto, near Bobbio, when his Ligurian troops broke and took to the mountains. By the 27th June Moreau reinforced him and, as I have just said, Victor's division,

¹ Susane, *Infanterie française*, iii. 134-5; Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* ii. 584.

² Macdonald, 100-1. Lahure, 244-5, says Victor brought off his guns. Could those left have belonged to the park?

³ So says Pérignon, who sent him from Moreau's right wing. Roguet, ii. 513.

coming back from the plain, joined him and the two held the mountains to cover the coast route by which the rest of Macdonald's force was retiring.

The curious thing is that Lapoype seems to have been fully aware of what was passing in the plain below him. On the 20th June Pérignon from Genoa was writing to Colonel Roguet, as a mere piece of news, that Macdonald was at Piacenza, Lapoype with 2,500 men was in front of Bobbio, and Moreau had entered Tortona the previous morning: 'All this now makes only one corps', which unfortunately it did not. 'Soon there will be a big affair here, which doubtless will be in our favour.'¹ This looks as if Lapoype had sent in information of Macdonald's arrival at Piacenza, say on the 17th June, before the big affair of the 18th, the second day's fight. Again, before midnight on the 20th June, according to Gachot, Moreau, at Marengo after his defeat of Bellegarde, received a courier from Lapoype informing him of Macdonald's retreat—quick work, for it was within twenty-four hours of the beginning of the retreat from the Trebbia. Yet Macdonald before determining to retreat says he had heard 'nothing from Moreau, nor from the Armée d'Italie, nor from the detachment at Bobbio, which ought to have attacked in rear of the enemy's right'. French writers remark on the inactivity of Lapoype but not on his failing to act as a link between Moreau and Macdonald.

Suvárof himself only pursued the Armée de Naples as far as Fiorenzola, on the Larda, the French being then at San Donnino. There, hearing that Moreau had advanced against Bellegarde, he halted on the 22nd June. Next day he went back to Piacenza, where he allowed his troops to pillage and to violate the nuns in the place. On the 24th June he started back for Alessandria, which he reached on the 27th June. He left Ott with 7,000 men, 2,000 horse, and fifteen guns to pursue Macdonald, who also had to deal with the troops of Hohenzollern, which he had brushed aside at Modena on his advance and which had closed in on his rear.² This body of the enemy, however, did not give much trouble, for the Armée de Naples, although showing much

¹ Roguet, ii. 513. Roguet was not concerned with Macdonald's position, so it does not follow that Pérignon had only just received the news.

² I class as under Hohenzollern all the troops of the enemy left in rear by Macdonald on his advance.

indiscipline, still fought most bravely. Hohenzollern's troops were met at Reggio on the 23rd June, and after throwing them off, next day the French re-entered Modena. Montrichard's division was sent on eastwards by the main road to Bologna, leaving on its way, at Fort Urbino, the artillery taken from the enemy and drawing thence a fresh supply of ammunition.

While the two divisions from the *Armée d'Italie*, Victor and Montrichard, had been thrown off to the wings, Macdonald with the rest of his force, the real *Armée de Naples*, made his way southwards over the Apennines to Pistoja in Tuscany. That part of the enemy which had also drawn off southwards from Modena resisted, and attempted to capture Sassuolo. Calvin, who now had Olivier's division and who led the way, was so pressed that about 5 p.m., being short of ammunition and fearing he might be turned on his left, he drew off to the mountains, exposing the parks, which were coming up from Modena. Macdonald, hearing this, sent on Lacroix with a regiment and some cavalry and a gun to attack Sassuolo, following himself with a battalion, some odd companies, and two guns. Lacroix, arriving at 8 p.m., attacked with the bayonet; as he was entering the town he was summoned to surrender as he was cut off from his army and would be given no quarter. It was a mere ruse, and a rough answer brought the surrender of 600 men and two guns. After this Pistoja was reached without serious resistance on the 28th June, Lucca and Florence being occupied in due time and Montrichard rejoining from Bologna.

Worn by its exertions and badly mauled, the army retired proudly enough, and the retreat was made with skill. The guns captured from the enemy were carried off and were lodged in Fort Urbino, as I have said, but the fort was attacked after the army had left and had to surrender on the 9th July. Macdonald also bore off 5,000 prisoners. What became of this mass of men is one of those details which the annoying memory of Macdonald failed to retain.¹ The troops got little food on their hurried marches. 'Bread, wine, cheese: wine, cheese, bread, were our only diet', complains an officer, Boulart, who in 1812 would have been only too happy to get such food. It was during Macdonald's retreat by Modena that his guns were heard by the garrison of Mantua, which was still holding out.

¹ Macdonald, 105. Doubtless they were exchanged.

After some necessary rest Macdonald continued his retreat on Genoa by the coast route. The country was full of insurgents but the enemy gave no trouble. The camp at Pistoja was raised, and Florence was abandoned on the 8th July 1799. By a convention with the former Governor of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Leghorn was evacuated on the 17th July, and the garrison of Porto Ferrajo was brought off, the return of the sick and wounded being also stipulated for. The army moved by Sarzana along the coast road, the infantry and cavalry being able to scramble past the difficult parts; but the artillery and stores could not use the path between Sarzana and Sestri and had to be embarked at Spezia, whose ample bay gave every facility for the operation. The first division, with, I suppose, Macdonald, reached Genoa on the 8th July, but it was the end of the month before all the troops came in. Notwithstanding the presence of English ships on the coast the artillery and stores arrived safely, the last embarkation at Spezia being about the 31st July. The ease with which the junction by this coast route was made by the beaten and worn army in July, showed how still more easily it could have been made when the army first entered Tuscany at the end of May. When we remember the want of ammunition at the Trebbia it is curious to read that the army brought in a quantity of works of art, taken from Naples, Rome, and Florence, which encumbered the wagons. Any of the 'chevaux en statue' might well have been replaced by cartridges.

Moreau had been appointed on the 5th July 1799 to command the Armée du Rhin (the 'Rhin C' of my tables), which was not a large force; and on the 2nd August the new commander in Italy, Joubert, arrived, taking command on the 5th August. Macdonald, of course, was far senior to Joubert, having been a General of Division on the 28th November 1794, when Joubert was only an Adjutant-General. Macdonald would in any case scarcely have cared to serve longer in Italy; his wounds received before Modena were not yet healed, his chest was most painful, he was spitting blood, and he suffered from the fever brought on by his labours in his wounded state, so he urged the amalgamation of the Armée de Naples with 'Italie', from which it had sprung, and he applied for leave for himself. On the 5th August Joubert's Chief of the Staff, Suchet, took over the documents

of the Armée de Naples: all that would be got from it, he said, except many debts and expenses. Macdonald received his leave,¹ but he had lost all the art treasures he had collected. He had learnt by some secret and certain channel that Mantua had fallen, and advised Joubert to be careful if he advanced as a large body of the enemy would be set free from the besieging force to act against him.

Although Macdonald may have considered he had suffered from the slow operations of Moreau, still at this time he does not seem to have had any personal ill will against him. They agreed to go to France together and Macdonald engaged feluccas to take them both from Genoa. After a few days' delay Moreau said that Joubert had asked him to remain with him, and Macdonald started alone, keeping close along the coast to Toulon for fear of the corsairs who infested those waters; he was under the escort of a small armed craft which cleared out all the creeks and small ports as they moved on. He was only two or three days from Genoa when he learnt that the army had been beaten at Novi on the 15th August, Joubert had been killed, and Mantua had fallen, as he himself had believed, on the 27th July. From Toulon Macdonald went by short stages to Paris. Here, well received by the public, he was met most coldly by the Directors, one of whom, Barras, certainly disliked him, saying he would be better in the dress of an ecclesiastic than of a soldier. Then articles blaming him appeared in newspapers, and these he attributed to Moreau, who soon arrived in Paris, and to the staff of that General. Moreau sometimes asserted that these attacks should be despised; sometimes he said he himself would refute them; then that he must wait for papers which were on their way. Finally, Macdonald made a public attack on Moreau, 'avec loyauté, franchise, et surtout avec énergie', as he describes it. He declared that Moreau's reply, delayed for some time, was entangled and pitiable and that the verdict of the public was given against him.

Whilst Macdonald was living at Paris, on a meagre diet of milk and sago, and was nursing himself and his wrath against the Directors and Moreau, it may be a convenient time to try to judge between the two commanders, a most difficult thing

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii, note on p. 227, says he was called to Paris by the Directory.

to do. In one way Moreau had behaved generously enough: he had not called in the troops in Tuscany, &c., who had formed Montrichard's division, and he had detached Victor's division to strengthen Macdonald. He had thus weakened himself by some 12,000 men. On the other hand, he had done much to mislead Macdonald by telling him on the 11th June that he did not imagine that he (Macdonald) would find enemy forces to stop his march.¹ It is true that Suvárof had not then begun his dash south; and even when he did, and went past Moreau, still that commander, never knowing much about his opponents' forces, may have been blinded by the insurrection which existed all round his army. However, we have seen Macdonald, when in Genoa, and that for the first time, getting secret and accurate information of what had happened at Mantua, so it seems strange that no whisper of the large column which had passed across the head of the army should have reached Moreau.

Moreau was the Commander-in-Chief in Italy: he had been operating in the theatre which Macdonald was entering quite fresh. It was for him to set the pace of the two armies. As we have seen, by one letter he might be at Parma on the 17th or the 18th June; by another he would be between Gavi and Serravalle on the 16th or the 17th June. He did not march on Parma: and it was on the 18th June that he himself was at Serravalle and Novi. His fight with Bellegarde was not till the 20th June. Why was no communication made with Macdonald? That General was bound to cover the Trebbia, to keep the approach by Bobbio open for Moreau. The one important thing for Moreau to do was to let Macdonald know the route by which the force from Genoa was moving and the date of its arrival, whether at Parma or by Tortona. If there were any miscalculation it was much easier for Moreau to draw back than for Macdonald. But here we come again on the mystery of Lapoype's detachment, by which apparently the two armies ought to have been informed of one another's movements. Napoleon, blaming both Generals, does not apportion the responsibility for the disaster. Soult divides it between the indolence of Moreau and the too great precipitation of Macdonald. Both blame Moreau for not moving by Bobbio. One cannot but believe that here in Italy Moreau was as little careful of the fate of the sister army

¹ Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 479; *ante*, pp. 279, 283-4.

as he was in Germany in 1796, with Jourdan and the 'Sambret-Meuse'.

Macdonald gives us no hint of how far he was prepared for the storm which fell on him at the Trebbia. There was nothing extraordinary in the appearance of Suvárof there: he had marched rapidly, but that was necessary after his previous lethargy, which could not have been counted on. Nothing was more natural or inevitable than that he should try to place himself between the two French armies; and if Moreau were coming by Bobbio there would be no obstacle to the march of the Russian. One thing therefore was incumbent on Macdonald, that is, to keep his army concentrated and well in hand, a thing Napoleon was never tired of impressing on his Generals. The detachment of the two or the three divisions seems a mistake, especially as the rest of the army was pressing on, showing there was really no intention of crossing the Po near Cremona.¹ Supposing the army had met Suvárof's first attack concentrated under a commander in vigorous condition, such a blow might have been dealt on the head of the straggling column Suvárof was hurrying up as to daunt the enemy and go far to decide the final battle. Instead, for the first two days the French were practically on the defensive while bringing up their troops. As for the alternative possibility, of avoiding Suvárof's blow by retiring on Bobbio, about that too Macdonald is silent; and in suggesting any movement on Bobbio it is to be remembered that even at Modena, when considering how he himself might reach Genoa, his Generals had thought of that line of communication. As it was, he gave Suvárof every chance of success, offering him a column broken in half and a battle-field the most suited to Russian troops.

If one could have got at the bottom of the mind of each General one probably would have found that neither believed in the possibility of such a dash as that made by Suvárof past Moreau. Such a movement was beyond the scope of Moreau himself, who would never have slighted the Armée d'Italie lying on the flank of his march. He thought he had only to deal with what he would consider but a weak force, in his own front, which he could throw back—as indeed he did. He thought Macdonald could always avoid danger by retiring into the

¹ *Ante*, pp. 281-2, 285.

Apennines, as in 1796 he had been ready with various steps Jourdan could take to save himself without help from the 'Rhin-et-Moselle'.¹ To do him justice, his troops were worn and the insurrection round him kept him in ignorance of much he ought to have known. Macdonald doubtless believed no large force could get at him without Moreau's knowledge, and that he was safe from all except the party of the enemy he had already met. His physical condition must have been a heavy disability and must always be borne in mind. Sound and able to be in the saddle, he might have stood a fourth day, and achieved success.

Macdonald, always a bitter-tongued man, complains not only of Moreau but also of the Generals and the troops sent him from the Armée d'Italie, going so absurdly far as to allege that it would have been better to have done without them, that is, to have had only his own 24,205 instead of 36,688, which is a ludicrous statement. As for the Generals from that army, he considered he had been singularly unfortunate in getting them. In the attack on Modena, Montrichard had spoilt his combinations by coming up late, partly for the extraordinary reason that his leading regiment had no cartridges. Again, on the last day of the Trebbia Montrichard's division, a scratch one made up of various detachments, came up from its bivouacs late, and without its commander, and then bolted from the field.² As for Victor, when given command of the leading divisions on the 17th June he had remained behind in Piacenza, leaving the divisions in touch with the enemy without any commander. Then on the retreat, instead of marching at midnight he had delayed till 6 a.m., when, followed by the enemy, his division, so Macdonald implies, broke and fled in disorder, some getting as far as Genoa, others to Castel Arquato, and leaving its guns to be brought in by Macdonald. Finally, extending his complaints to the Generals actually with the Armée d'Italie, the delay of Moreau in supporting him is attributed by Macdonald to the evil counsels of Saint-Cyr, who he alleges always hated him.³

Macdonald may have had just cause of complaint against

¹ Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 479. 'On ne peut vous empêcher de rentrer dans les Apennins.' Saint-Cyr, *Rhin-et-Moselle*, iii. 204-6.

² *Ante*, pp. 283, 292-3.

³ Macdonald, 88, 91, 96, 99-100, 106 and note, 108.

Montrichard,¹ although that General held several posts after this. In May 1800 Lecourbe, in whose wing of the Armée du Rhin he then was, complained of him, apparently because his division was late in moving and had marched in disorderly fashion. In 1809 when Marmont, in whose 2nd Corps he served, complained of the 'incroyable incapacité' of 'ce malheureux Montrichard', whose delay in coming up had let the enemy escape, and whom he described as never being able to start marching or to finish off anything, Napoleon, to whom the complaint was addressed, while criticizing Marmont himself, said he did not think much of Montrichard and would try him by court martial if he had not executed Marmont's orders.² Now Montrichard was suspended by Moreau for his delay on the 19th June, the last day of the battle of the Trebbia, as was Lapoype for not coming down the Trebbia fast enough; though both were employed at the head of divisions next year in the Armée du Rhin under Moreau.

As for Victor, one is a little suspicious of Macdonald's blame. His absence when his division advanced from Piacenza on the first day of the battle was wrong, of course, but may have been due to Macdonald's own orders to 'prendre position sans rien engager', which did not involve any serious fighting. It is rather significant that when Macdonald later refers to the untimely engagement that day he does not there mention the culprit, Rusca, one of his own Generals. Victor's explanation of the delay in retiring from the Trebbia is not given; but in dealing with the disaster to his division Macdonald first says he heard his engagement very well from a short distance, whilst later he says that though only a short distance off he heard neither guns nor musketry, and this cannot refer to what he describes as a later scare.³ He implies that Victor's delay in the retreat brought the enemy close on him. In reality it seems that it was the capture of a Dragoon bearing a letter from Macdonald to Pérignon which not only made the enemy certain of his retreat but also gave news of the lamentable state of the army. Why the bearer of such an important document was left in rear of the army is

¹ Général Joseph-Élie-Désiré Perruquet Montrichard (1760-1828). *Fastes*, iii. 418-20; *Biog. des Cont.* iii. 671.

² Marmont, iii. 153-4, 294-5; *Corr. Nap.* xix, No. 15453.

³ Macdonald, 90-1, 99, 101, 103.

unaccountable.¹ Perhaps Macdonald was at last trying to make use of the Bobbio route to communicate with Moreau, and the messenger may have got caught following the route of Lapoype.

If the Generals with this army were a difficult team to drive, Macdonald, as I have said, was too bitter in speech to get the most from them. Victor both before and after this was known as a hard-fighting General, and he must have felt deeply the sneers which after so many years Macdonald remembered, and recorded with so much pride. Macdonald professes to be surprised that the simple and natural remark that he had picked up Victor's guns without difficulty should have cut Victor to the quick, and should never have been pardoned by him. Then he is surprised that Watrin's jeer, attributed to himself, that the second scare of the division only came from some Cossacks, should add to Victor's anger. Knowing how hot-tempered Victor was, one can understand how, when at Borgo San Donnino Macdonald sent for information as to the delays, Victor first replied that he was busy placing his troops and would come later; a second summons to receive instructions brought the reply that Victor was tired and had gone to bed, a snub which Macdonald chose to attribute to a wish to avoid explanations unpleasant to himself. After such a stern battle it is amazing to find Macdonald indulging, and letting others indulge, in sneers at a General who, be it remembered, had just been wounded. He might at least have controlled his tongue till the army was safe.

The levity with which Macdonald brings charges against other Generals is best seen by his attack on Saint-Cyr, who he alleges had an unjust animosity against him and had powerfully contributed to augment the natural hesitation of Moreau to help him. He and Saint-Cyr could, I think, only have met at Rome in 1798, when he had replaced that General in command there. It may well be that Saint-Cyr suspected him of intriguing against him, or at least of sympathizing with the Commissioners against whom Saint-Cyr was waging war. Macdonald was, to say the least, unfortunate, in being opposed to two such clean-handed men as Saint-Cyr at Rome and Championnet at Naples, succeeding each as they were removed for opposing the levies of the Commissioners of the Directory. But how could Saint-

¹ Gachot, *Souvarow*, 279 and note; Alison, iv, chap. xxvii, para. 90.

Cyr now have damaged him? Moreau himself left Genoa at 2 p.m. on the 17th June, and once in motion he acted quickly enough; it was only a week later, on the 24th June, that Saint-Cyr reached Genoa from the Rhine. He and Moreau seldom agreed on any point, but he could not have given any advice on this occasion.

As I have said, it is significant how much Macdonald has to say against Montrichard and Victor and how little against such a man as Rusca, who came with him from Naples. And when the army wanted Generals after the Trebbia, he might have remembered how much he himself had had to do with driving away some of the best officers. In bringing down Championnet he had brought down with him Duhesme (the 'General Bayonet' of the soldiers), Rey, who also had led a division in the advance on Naples, as well as Broussier and Dufresse. This is a case of curses coming home to roost.

Before leaving Macdonald one point may be mentioned. We have seen that Championnet, when complaining of Macdonald to the Directory, had mentioned the extravagant claims he had made for promotions in his division. When Joubert arrived in August, he wrote to the Minister telling him it was essential not to approve any of the nominations made by Macdonald on the field of battle: 'The number is so monstrous that it puts confusion into the army and deprives it of a means of emulation, so important when well employed and so dangerous when it is used in this manner.'¹ Macdonald was indeed unfortunate if it was only by chance that he differed from Saint-Cyr and Championnet on the point of probity, and from Championnet and Joubert on the point of rewards. Joubert, be it remembered, had served long under Bonaparte, who was profuse enough in giving rewards.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 244-6.

XIV

NOVI

(August to September 1799)

Joubert and the politicians in Paris. Formation of army of the Alps under Championnet. Battle of Novi and death of Joubert.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See Chapters VI and VII.

WHEN the two armies were united it was a curious collection of future Marshals that Moreau had under him. He had served with Macdonald in the *Armée du Nord*, and had commanded him as part of that force in 1795;¹ Saint-Cyr had been one of his lieutenants with the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' in 1796-7; Pérignon and Grouchy he had not had anything to do with till he came to Italy. Pérignon had served on the Spanish frontier with, and in command of, the *Armée des Pyrénées Orientales*; Grouchy had served chiefly in La Vendée, though he had been Chief of the Staff to the *Armée du Nord* after Moreau had left, and had known Macdonald there. Both Pérignon and Macdonald, now leading wings, had been in command of important armies. None of these Generals, any more than Moreau himself, had had any connexion with Bonaparte's *Armée d'Italie*.

Although the period of Moreau's command in Italy had been so disastrous he had become almost a favourite with the Directory, the composition of which had been a good deal changed in June 1799. On the 5th July he had been nominated to command the *Armée du Rhin*, the small force intended to act on the left flank of Masséna's *Armée du Danube*, but on the 17th he had been nominated to supersede Masséna with 'Danube', the main force on the Rhine; on the 19th this appointment was recalled and he was to have as before the *Armée du Rhin*. Moreau does not seem to have known of these changes. He was about to advance to relieve Alessandria, which the enemy were besieging, when he learnt of its reduction, it having fallen on the 22nd July. Three days later, on the 25th, he received news of his appointment to a command on the Rhine, although only on the

¹ Phipps, i. 327.

2nd August he told Saint-Cyr that he had just heard of his appointment to a command there, the exact post not being stated, possibly from some confusion caused by the change in intention which I have just mentioned.¹ He told the Directory he would act so as to respond to their confidence, and, remembering the suspicions of him in 1797 at Fructidor, he asked the Minister to assure them of his entire devotion to the Republic. He said he was expecting his successor in Italy, Joubert, at any moment, and would then at once proceed to the Rhine. He took his new post seriously enough, saying he would ask for some officers as his task required talented and highly experienced co-operators, but in reality for some strange reason his removal to the scenes of his former command annoyed him, and he would have preferred to remain in Italy, where he still hoped for victory, not believing the enemy were so strong as really they were.² In some accounts the Directory are represented as intending that he should remain in Italy as a sort of bear-leader to his young successor.³ This is a mistake; as I have just said, he had intended to travel to France with Macdonald and was only prevented at the instance of Joubert.

On the 4th August 1799 Joubert arrived to command in Italy a second time. It was not only a commander the Directory sent. A *coup d'état* similar to that which Bonaparte was to carry out at Brumaire was already in preparation. For this Sieyès, now a Director, required a sword and a head—or rather, profound legislator and founder of Constitutions as he believed himself, and others believed him, to be, he considered that he himself would provide the head or the brains: he wanted a General with sufficient prestige to ensure the approval of the army, and to hold Paris down whilst the Directory and the Councils were dealt with.⁴ Young, brave, impetuous, Joubert had won his way in Italy until he had become one of the principal lieutenants of Bonaparte. He had held Rivoli in 1797 until Masséna and other reinforcements could come up, and had he lived he, not Masséna, would have borne the proud title of Duc de Rivoli. Thrown forward in the spring of 1797 into the Tyrol,

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 323.

² *Ibid.* i. 222.

³ Vandal, *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*, i. 121.

⁴ For Sieyès see Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxxxii. 214–33; and here under Brumaire, Chapter XX.

he had extricated himself from the enemy who had closed round him.¹ When Bonaparte, about to sail for Egypt, was reproached for taking so many leading Generals with him, he had replied: 'I leave you Joubert.' In 1798 Joubert had commanded in Holland till July, when he took command of the Armée de Mayence. We have seen him there and in his first command in Italy from November 1798 to February 1799, when he went to Paris.

At Paris Joubert had fallen into the hands of the politicians, and he had commanded in the Capital during the *coup d'état* of 30^{me} Prairial An VII (18th June 1799), when the Directors Barras and Sieyès got rid of their colleagues Treilhard, Larévellière-Lépeaux, and Merlin de Douai, who were replaced by Gohier, Roger Ducos, and General Moulins; so that the Directory stood as Bonaparte was to find it when he returned from Egypt. More violent measures were adopted and a more vigorous prosecution of the war was promised. Joubert was to be sent to Italy to win a victory; then, returning to France, he was to help to overturn the Directory, thus earning the gratitude of France and a place in history. Love was used to entangle him in the party net. The *ci-devant* Marquis de Sémonville² was believed to have the most wonderful flair for success. During the *Cent-Jours*, when Louis XVIII at Ghent read a list of the Ministry formed by Napoleon, he threw himself back with a sigh of content, saying it would never succeed: de Sémonville's name was not there. It was of him that Talleyrand asked, on one occasion, what object he had in being ill. He served all the Governments of France except that of the *Cent-Jours*. He was one of the advisers of Macdonald, and in time became one of the fathers-in-law of that much-married Marshal. Without his usual luck, he had now seized on Joubert and had given him his step-daughter, Zéphirine de Montholon,³ only a few days before the General started for Italy, the marriage taking place at the

¹ Phipps, iv. 129-33, especially 133 and note 1; 174-6.

² Charles-Louis Huguet de Sémonville (1759-1839); Marquis under the *ancien régime*, Comte de l'Empire. Michaud, *Biog. Univ.* lxxxii. 76-86; *Biog. des Cont.* iv. 1310; *Fastes*, ii. 432-4; Barras, iii. 481.

³ On the 26th June 1802 this lady, then the widow of Joubert, married the then General Macdonald. In Révérend, *Armorial*, iii. 163, she is described as then Félicité-Françoise de Montholon, but in all references to her marriage with Joubert she is called Zéphirine. She died in 1804.

Château de Grandpré in the Argonne, where Dumouriez had placed his head-quarters on the 3rd September 1792. As Bonaparte had torn himself from Joséphine in 1796 to go to Italy, so Joubert now left his bride to win a victory—and he had seen so many won!

Sainte-Beuve has made Joubert the subject of one of his charming portraits and I am reluctant to retouch a picture drawn by such a master, but there are some shadows in the General's character which the great critic has omitted.¹ No praise can be too great for Joubert's military talents as General of Division, or even as a wing commander. Further, he seems to have kept his hands clean when many were dipping theirs in gold. Unfortunately for himself and for France, he took too kindly to politics. It is, by the way, odd that of Bonaparte's four leading Generals of Division in 'Italie' two, Augereau and Joubert,² should have been so ready to use their swords to carry out political changes, whilst Masséna and Sérurier kept themselves so entirely to their business as soldiers. In Holland we have seen that Joubert acquiesced in and covered the two *coups d'état* of the 2nd January and the 12th June 1798, his attitude being the more remarkable as he acted with the Dutch General Daendels, apparently in opposition to the wishes of the local representative of the French Directory. In Italy in 1798 he had carried out the rather treacherous seizure of Piedmont from its King. It may be said that he only obeyed orders, but he was soon now to oppose the policy of the French Directory in Italy: a course honourable to him, but not within his military duties. In Paris he had just covered a *coup d'état*, and, indeed, at first it had been rather a race between him and Bernadotte as to who should display the greater ardour to carry out this *coup*. When Joubert exclaimed, 'They lose time in words. When they like, I will finish it all with twenty grenadiers', Bernadotte tried to better the phrase by declaring twenty men too much: he would do it with a Corporal's guard, which would be enough to turn out the lawyers. Bernadotte, however, was always a curious mixture of ambition and caution. When actually offered the command at Paris, and the opportunity for trying his Corporal's squad, he drew back

¹ Sainte-Beuve, *Causeries du Lundi*, xv. 146–89.

² I omit Bernadotte, as not one of Bonaparte's real pupils.

and pointed out that as Joubert had taken the initiative there would be a want of delicacy in forestalling him. We shall find Bernadotte troubled by as strong, though different, qualms at Brumaire.

All this proves that, like Hoche, with whose hysterical character he had much in common, Joubert was very ready to throw his sword into the scale to alter the government of his country. So far he had only been engaged in what were bloodless revolutions, but the stroke contemplated at Paris was a great and important one. It was the morrow, not the day, of such a stroke which would call for the talents of the leaders, and Joubert, once away from his tempters, could hardly believe he had the qualifications necessary for the part he aimed at. If we imagine Brumaire attempted without Bonaparte and the talents he displayed once success had been won, we can judge of Joubert's position. He had ever balked at promotion. He had cursed the day he was made Corporal, had scrupled at accepting the rank of General of Brigade in 1795, and had been seized with sadness when promoted General of Division in 1797. Now in 1799 he was feeling the burden of the heaviest responsibility a soldier can undertake, the overturning of the government of his country by means of the army.

As Moreau had been advancing when Joubert arrived on the 4th August, the new commander only took command on the 5th. Next day the separate organization of the Armée de Naples was broken up and Macdonald went to France. There was little left of the fine force which had marched from Naples. Suchet reported that 'The whole of the army of Naples will not furnish to the army' (of Italy) 'more than 12,000 combatants. Almost all the corps have been destroyed; there only remain fragments, very badly clothed and requiring to be kept in hand by severe discipline.' Indeed, splendidly as the men had fought, they had now fallen into the most extreme disorder. 'They are brigands we have with us,' wrote one officer, 'they respect their officers hardly more than the country people, on whom they exercise every possible horror. O my country! what tigers thou hast given birth to, who will soon return to thy bosom to lacerate it.'~ It would be interesting to be quite certain what Suchet meant by the Armée de Naples. Technically, as we have seen, that army had been 24,205 strong at

Florence in June, or, with Montrichard and Victor, whose troops really belonged to the Armée d'Italie, 36,728. He probably included all these.¹ The army was now reorganized. Some of the regiments were mere skeleton cadres and were sent back to France to recruit; others could leave a battalion or a company while they also went back. Finally the army furnished two divisions, one under Watrin, 5,793 strong, and the other under Dombrowski, 2,340, a total of 8,133, which, at first still under Macdonald, formed the right of the force under Moreau protecting Genoa.

Saint-Cyr commanded this right wing, which included Laboissière's division and the divisions of Watrin and Dombrowski, with the *flanqueurs* of Miollis, a total of 22,806. Pérignon had the left, the division of Grouchy, who had relieved Victor on the 12th July,² and Lemoine, with an infantry reserve under Clausel and Partouneaux, and a cavalry reserve under Richepanse, some 17,907 men. Altogether the strength was 40,713, not including a division of 2,300, said to be under Montrichard, in the Ponente, and two regiments, 2,400 strong, in the Bormida valley.³ Joubert had brought with him Suchet, just promoted General of Division, from Masséna's Armée du Danube, to be his Chief of the Staff as in 1798. Thus four future Marshals were with Joubert: Pérignon and Saint-Cyr commanding wings, Grouchy leading a division, and Suchet Chief of the Staff. Victor was ill in rear.⁴

When it became evident that Moreau meant not only to stay but also to be present at the battle which was to be delivered, Saint-Cyr remonstrated with his former commander, whose proceedings he seldom approved. He told Moreau, with much truth, that if Joubert failed in his enterprise the presence of the older commander would add to the discontent of the troops, who would think he might have changed the fate of the day if he had led them. On the other hand, if the battle were won,

¹ Compare the regiments in Wouters, 216-17, or Gachot, *Souvarow*, 446-8, and Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i, Table 42, where Grouchy has those of Victor, Laboissière those of Montrichard.

² So I read Roguet, ii. 163; see Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii. 5.

³ Wouters, 223; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i, appendix 42.

⁴ It is often said that Victor was at Novi, but his name does not appear in any detailed account and his letter of the 25th August, Roguet, ii. 553-4, does not read as if he had been present there. Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii. 5, says Victor was absent from his division after the Trebbia until the 8th September 1799.

the glory of the day would not be attributed to Joubert, though he had the greater need of it to gain the confidence of the army. Rumours of the reason for sending Joubert to Italy had reached the army, and if Saint-Cyr believed them he was the more right in his opinion of the evil effect of the presence of Moreau alongside the young General who had come to win such a stake. Moreau did not care for this consideration. As he told the Directory after Novi, Joubert had begged him to remain with him till he had debouched in the plain of Tortona, where, according to the orders of the Directory, he ought to try the fate of a battle: 'Je ne pus me refuser à cette invitation.'¹ So Moreau remained, keeping with him his Chief of the Staff, Dessoles.

At first it may seem strange that troops of the Armée d'Italie should have more confidence in Moreau, who had only come to Italy for a series of disasters, than in Joubert, the successful lieutenant of Bonaparte in the glorious years of 1796-7; but Saint-Cyr was thinking of the regiments which, like himself, had come from the Rhine. Indeed it is significant of the manner in which the troops of the different armies of 1796-7 had been scattered that, whilst Bonaparte in Egypt was recalling to his men the memory of their triumphs in Italy, the regiments of Saint-Cyr were crying to their General in the Apennines to offer the guns of the enemy for booty, at so much a piece, as he had done at Biberach, in Germany, where he and they had fought in 1796.² Indeed the army was a very cosmopolitan one, and it had been sorely tried in the series of disasters it had experienced under Schérer, Moreau, and Macdonald. The troops had not only been crushed in the field, they also suffered greatly from want of food, clothing, and stores. Suchet, who had been with the army when Bonaparte came in 1796 to fling the starving troops over the Apennines, declared now to the Minister that 'la malheureuse Armée d'Italie' had been in infinitely better state to enter into campaign when it had been torn from the rocks of Genoa by Bonaparte than it was now. It was very creditable to the troops that they still fought undismayed. It is curious that three of the Generals who were to take part in the approaching disastrous battle of Novi, Moreau, Grouchy,

¹ Roguet, ii. 547.

² Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 260; Phipps, ii. 108, for this actual occasion.

and Richepanse, were to share in the glory of Hohenlinden in Germany in little more than a year.

Joubert was Generalissimo in Italy, and the formation of another army there should have affected his movements. Instead of cramming all the reinforcements they could into the Armée d'Italie, the Directory in July had formed another army, the Armée des Alpes, called in my tables 'Alpes B', to distinguish it from the Armée des Alpes which had existed from 1792 to 1797.¹ This force, which swallowed up the troops Moreau had in the 7th and 8th Military Divisions, was to defend Savoy and Dauphiné and to be ready to support either Masséna's Armée du Danube on its left in Switzerland or the Armée d'Italie on its right. For its commander the Directory chose a General who was their prisoner. Championnet, the first commander of the Armée de Naples, had, it will be remembered, been ordered back from Naples in March 1799 and had been in prison since. After the *coup d'état* of 30^{me} Prairial An VII (the 18th June 1799), when Bernadotte became Minister of War on the 2nd July, he very honourably pleaded for his old comrade of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', where they had both served under Jourdan, who probably also supported his former lieutenant. Championnet was released, and on the 5th July 1799 was appointed to command this new Armée des Alpes. 'A fortnight ago', wrote Bernadotte in his Gascon style, 'you were in fetters. The 30^{me} Prairial has delivered you. To-day public opinion accuses your oppressors; thus your cause has, so to speak, become a national one. Could you wish for a happier fate?'

Bernadotte invited Championnet to gather fresh laurels and assured him that 30,000 'braves' awaited him. This phrase probably was on a level with the 'fair words' with which he acknowledged he had tried to console Brune when he was attacked by the Duke of York in Holland. On the 6th May 1799 the Directory had ordered Masséna to send 15,000 men into Italy from his Armée du Danube, and now the Armée des Alpes was to be composed of these men and of troops from the Interior. Clarke, the future Minister of War of Napoleon, was then in the topographical department of the War Office in Paris, and he proposed that the strength of this new army should be imposing. One of the new Directors, General Moulins, had

¹ Phipps, iii, iv.

commanded the first Armée des Alpes from December 1794 to October 1795,¹ and he supported Clarke's proposal. The strength was to be from 15,000 to 30,000; indeed, it was expected to bring 35,000 to join Joubert in August 1799, and Saint-Cyr believed it had that strength. Masséna, however, as we have seen, never sent his draft. Hard-pressed himself, he delayed its dispatch, and when it began its march under Xaintrailles, he used it to put down a revolt in the Valais. On the 16th August Championnet reported that he only had 17,000 men: he hoped soon to have 21,000. When this army became the left wing of the Armée d'Italie after Novi, it only brought 19,600 men, though some garrisons may not be included in this number. On the 30th July Joubert, on his way to his army, had ordered Championnet to move at once on Coni, meaning to link with him, but then not waiting for his co-operation. Most of the troops of this army would probably have been more useful if sent straight to Joubert.

To return to the Armée d'Italie under Joubert. The battle of Novi, so soon to take place, is not interesting from its result, which, seeing the great inferiority in numbers of the French, could not be doubtful, but from the struggle which we can watch between Joubert's instincts as a General, telling him it was madness to fight, and the urgent need of a speedy success to win his position for the *coup* at Paris. The very day after he took command he told the astonished Saint-Cyr that he intended to deliver battle next day. Saint-Cyr told him how few troops he himself had available at the moment, and that it would take three days for Pérignon to bring up his left wing. Joubert had been influenced by the fatal belief of Moreau that only 8,000 men of the enemy were in front of him; but Saint-Cyr got him to view the force from the fort of Gavi and he saw 12,000 immediately opposite him, whilst he could estimate that there was a much larger body in support. Sensibly enough, he declared he would not fight except with his whole force: he would wait the necessary time, and he did not wish it to be said of him, as indeed Suvárof soon did say, 'He is a young madcap, run away from school to get a thrashing'.

In front of Joubert was Suvárof, who, instead of striking at the weak and scattered Armée d'Italie before it could be re-

¹ Phipps, iii.

inforced by the Armée des Alpes, was wasting his time and his ammunition at the siege of Tortona, expecting to receive more troops when Mantua fell. On his way to the army, at Nice, Joubert had heard a report that Mantua had capitulated; but, though the gazettes of Florence and Leghorn gave even the articles of the capitulation, which really had taken place on the 30th July, though Saint-Cyr believed in the disaster, and though Macdonald, as we have seen, before he left for France had got the news through a secret source in which he put the firmest faith,¹ yet still Moreau discredited the report, and Joubert and Suchet followed his example. Accordingly, wishing to deal his blow before troops from Mantua could join Suvárof, Joubert prepared to concentrate his army. He intended to move the right wing from Genoa towards Savona, believing the strength of the enemy lay far to the west of where it really was; but Saint-Cyr, who was certain that the mass of the enemy were in his front, induced Joubert not to do this but instead to bring up the left wing from Savona to join the right. On the 10th August Joubert started to join Pérignon. Moreau remained with Saint-Cyr, nominally to give information about the route but really because that gave him the shortest road to traverse for the contemplated battle.

Saint-Cyr with Laboissière's division was on the Lemme stream, between Voltaggio and Carosio, whilst on his right, to the east, Watrin and Dombrowski, the former Armée de Naples, were advancing on Arquata. To the west Pérignon's wing was moving forward from Savona for Spigno on the Bormida. Joubert joined Pérignon and marched down the Bormida with Grouchy's division, expecting to find the enemy at Terzo, west of Acqui, Lemoine's division being drawn eastwards from Cremolino² to support this attack. These movements are worth noting, for Joubert was acting on a belief, not shared by Saint-Cyr, that he would find the enemy in force at Terzo, whilst in reality he was leaving Saint-Cyr exposed alone to the attack of the main body of the enemy formed up to cover the siege of Tortona. Finding only a weak force at Terzo, Joubert came down the Orba, reaching Capriata on the 13th August and thus getting into touch with his right wing. Saint-Cyr that day placed part of Laboissière's troops on Monte Rotondo, and next day, the

¹ *Ante*, p. 303.

² West of Ovada, on the Orba river.

14th August, he debouched on Novi, chasing thence the Russian advanced guard and throwing it back into the plain. Pérignon came up on the left, halting his men some five hundred yards in front of Pasturana, Lemoine being on the right and Grouchy on the left. On the extreme right of Saint-Cyr, Watrin, a young and impulsive officer, had pushed on through Serravalle too far, and instead of linking with Laboissière had gone as far north as Betole di Novi, close to the Scrivia. Dombrowski's division remained blocking Serravalle, the fort of which had been taken by the enemy.

One great danger, that Suvárof might strike at the weak isolated wing of Saint-Cyr, was past. Meeting Joubert at Pasturana, Saint-Cyr went with him and Pérignon to Novi, whence they looked down on the enemy in the plain below them. Before them, to Joubert's surprise, lay a great army, really at least 65,000 strong, and though the centre, 36,000, alone could be seen, the presence of the wings was certain. There now could be no more doubt that Mantua had fallen. Holding the strong position of Pozzolo-Formigara, which blocked any advance from the south, Suvárof intended to attack on the 15th, and he hoped to entice the French down to the plain, where his own great superiority in cavalry would tell. Contrary to his usual custom he now reconnoitred the position of the French. Sending forward two battalions of light troops who, lying down amongst the barley, lined the front, he himself, alone except for one orderly, rode along the front, conspicuous by his wearing only a shirt and pantaloons. Leaving the others, Saint-Cyr went forward to order the outposts to skirmish with those of the enemy, and Suvárof, seeing he was recognized, rejoined his staff. Going back to Joubert, Saint-Cyr found him, Moreau, Pérignon, and the two Chiefs of the Staff, Suchet and Dessoles. Leaving Moreau watching the enemy, Joubert took Saint-Cyr, Pérignon, and Suchet into an inn for a consultation.

It is interesting to read Saint-Cyr's description of this consultation, as the cool-headed, critical General of the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' seems to have softened towards the young General of the Armée d'Italie, who was torn by conflicting desires. Also it is permissible to believe that Saint-Cyr may have had a certain pleasure in giving advice contrary to what he knew to be the opinion of Moreau, with whom he almost always jarred.

Saint-Cyr and Pérignon, perhaps also Suchet, were agreed in their advice. Nothing, they told Joubert, forced him to give battle. In ten days Championnet would be there with his *Armée des Alpes*, 35,000 men, almost as much again as Joubert now had.¹ They thought it better to fall back into the mountains till the junction was made. There, where the numerous cavalry and artillery of the enemy would almost be paralysed, the French could stand twenty combats. Still, whatever course he took they would support him: only he must decide at once as there was no time to be lost.² Indeed the troops of Pérignon had not yet even been posted but had simply halted as they stood, and Watrin's division of Saint-Cyr's force was still too extended.

Joubert could not come to any decision, and hour after hour he detained the fretting Generals from their troops. Towards evening he said he thought it would be wiser to draw back the army to its former positions, but he feared he had advanced too far and might be attacked during the retreat. Saint-Cyr replied that night was coming on and before daybreak the right wing, his own command, could be so placed as to hold the head of the defiles leading to Genoa, whilst Pérignon's left wing could quietly regain its positions covering Savona. This would have given Saint-Cyr work which would have delighted him. And actually Suvárof did not want to fight yet. He had been preparing to attack the French in the mountains but apparently only after he had taken Tortona. Later he described himself as having been 'anticipated by the enemy and obliged to fight the battle which terminated in the victory of Novi'.³ He may, indeed, already have suspected that his Russians were unfitted for mountain warfare, a fact which at all events he was soon to discover.

The Generals who gave this advice to retreat were men whose opinion was not to be lightly put aside. Saint-Cyr was a leader of great experience and was especially fond of hill warfare. If he had not yet fought in Italy, he knew some of the regiments, who had served with him on the Rhine. His fondness for criticism, not always of a kindly nature, sometimes made him suspected of ill will towards his comrades; but had he been the malicious man he was considered to be by some he would never

¹ Really Championnet could only have brought 15,000 or 20,000.

² Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 237-8.

³ Wickham, ii. 209.

have given the wise advice he now offered: he would have looked on whilst a General of the famous *Armée d'Italie* was defeated in his own country. Indeed he well might have chuckled over a defeat now as a victory over his late commander, Moreau, who was urging Joubert to fight, but I believe him to have been too honourable a man to entertain such feelings. Pérignon had had much experience of fighting in the Pyrenees, where he had commanded an army so far back as 1794. Suchet had served throughout Bonaparte's campaigns in Italy; he knew well what could be done there, and he had just had a lesson in mountain warfare amidst the Alps under Masséna. To retire in accordance with advice from such men could have nothing of disgrace for Joubert.

To the surprise of his Generals, and indeed of himself, Joubert remained in a state of indecision. He asked the two older Generals to excuse him for a weakness he had never felt when fighting under Bonaparte. Indeed he thought that then his advice had been useful to his chief more than once in difficult circumstances. This was a very different irresolution from that of Bonaparte when at Roverbella in 1797 his horses had stood twenty-four hours at the door, harnessed to his carriage, whilst he waited to determine where to strike. Bonaparte then had been puzzled by the extraordinary movements of the enemy, but once he knew where his foe was his decision followed fast. Joubert, on the other hand, knew the terms of the problem which he dared not solve. The man who in 1797 had cut his way through the enemy in the Tyrol now hesitated. If he trusted at all to the opinion of Moreau, that the whole strength of the enemy was not yet in front of him, there might have been some difficulty in quoting him or calling him into conference, as Moreau had no official post in the army, and the wing commanders might have been affronted. I doubt this weighing with Joubert. Also this was not one of those cases where men personally brave to the point of temerity shrink from throwing their army on the enemy, awed by their own responsibility. Most probably it was the accursed political scheme which paralysed Joubert. The plotters in Paris wanted a victory, and retreat might rob him of his battle. Delay would bring Championnet: but would not the junction deprive Joubert of part of the glory he required for Paris? Finally he dismissed his

Generals, saying that in an hour or two he would send them orders for the retreat.¹

Doubting that Joubert would really retreat, Pérignon and Saint-Cyr rejoined their wings, thinking more of resistance than of withdrawal. They could do little: Pérignon's men, asleep now, lay where they had been halted, covered only by posts, which Pérignon now supported by a brigade. Saint-Cyr had placed most of his men in position but now he ordered Watrin from near Betole di Novi to fall back and to join Laboissière on the heights in rear of Novi, keeping clear of the enemy. Then at nine at night he went back to Joubert, whom he found still undecided though still saying he would give orders to retreat; but the only order he gave was to conceal the bivouac fires as far as possible, and Saint-Cyr rejoined his troops. At 10 p.m. Joubert sent word that they heard a great noise in the camp of the enemy, as if they were drawing back their artillery, which would show their intention to retreat. Saint-Cyr replied that this was only what the French themselves had done, drawing back the guns to a safer position during the night; and he assured Joubert that the enemy would not lose such an opportunity of fighting in the plain and that they would attack at daylight, with the confidence given by their superiority in numbers and by advantages of position on which they ought not to have been able to count.

The consequence of Joubert's indecision was that his army lay, all unready for battle, not on, but at the foot of, the heights of Novi, the little town held by Laboissière's division, the only division of the whole army that was properly posted. Some three kilometres off, to the north-east, Watrin's division was coming in from Betole di Novi on the Scrivia, this detached position being all the worse as the fort of Serravalle was held by the enemy, so cutting the direct route to the rest of the army. On the extreme right Dombrowski was coming up from Arquata on Serravalle, but his force is not often included in the strength of the army. As for Pérignon's wing, the divisions of Lemoine and Grouchy, it lay in confusion before Pasturana. Worn by their past combats, the French troops had been left without food for some days and now thirst was added to their misery, for the rivulets were dry and the peasants concealed their wine.

¹ I follow Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 240.

In this state, under a commander who was unable to take any decision, the army, nominally some 36,000 or 37,000 but probably less, was faced by an enemy some 65,000 strong, under a resolute commander, which could come to close quarters with it in ten minutes.

About 3 a.m. on the 15th August 1799 Saint-Cyr, placed on the heights to the left of Novi awaiting the arrival of Watrin, heard firing on the left, heavy enough to tell him the enemy were attacking. He sent to warn Joubert, who was in the Palace Jérôme Durazzo in Novi, and who soon arrived, still unconvinced that the enemy would not retreat. Telling Saint-Cyr that he would go to the left, counting on him on the right, he went off, soon followed by Moreau, nearly as astonished as he was. Joubert had not reached his extreme left when he realized the gravity of the attack. He had told the Directory he would conquer or die and had given the same assurances to his young bride. Now he realized how mistaken he had been in his estimate of the position, and probably knew that defeat was inevitable. Calling to his A.D.C.s, 'Let us throw ourselves amongst the skirmishers!', he and they rode forward, when a ball striking him on the left side penetrated to his heart and he fell into the arms of Suchet, dying almost immediately.¹ His body was covered with his cloak and was carried back by four grenadiers to where Saint-Cyr still was. That General had it taken into an inn close by, the Casa Bianca, and the death was kept secret till the end of the day, when Suchet had the body carried to the house in Novi where Joubert had spent the previous night. Before the enemy seized Novi the body was removed in an ambulance to Genoa, which was reached about 11 p.m. At Paris, de Sémonville, first affecting to play the Roman father when the news of Joubert's death arrived, and asking only if the battle had been won, made the death of his son-in-law the means of getting much patronage. Joubert's widow in 1803 became the second wife of Macdonald, but did not live to see him a Marshal or herself a duchess.

On the death of Joubert, Saint-Cyr, who considered himself the senior General of the army—though Pérignon, I take it, was some months senior to him—should have taken command; but

¹ According to the entry in the register of the parish of Saint-André of Novi he did not expire till about 3 p.m. Gachot, *Souwarow*, note p. 379.

Moreau, knowing, he said, the awkwardness of assuming command on the field of battle, had already taken charge at the point of danger, the left, and Saint-Cyr, instead of disputing the point, even calls his intervention fortunate.¹ The battle was fought almost separately by the two wings. Fortunately for the French this was one of the worst days of Suvárof, who wasted his strength for long in isolated attacks and only took part himself late in the day. The first attack fell on the left, Lemoine and Grouchy, just as they were attempting to form, and a gallant charge of Richepanse's cavalry was beaten off. The Austrians crowned the slope up which they had advanced but they were left unsupported by the Russians; Moreau, coming up, sent to Saint-Cyr for a brigade and beat off the repeated attacks again and again.

Hitherto Suvárof had lain asleep in his quarters, but at 9 a.m. he announced, 'It is time', and, mounting, ordered an attack on the centre, where Saint-Cyr held Gavi with only Laboissière's division, weakened by the brigade sent to the left. The position was too strong and the attack by the Russians was repulsed, again attempted and again beaten off. Then at last Watrin arrived. On the way back from his advanced position, coasting round by Serravalle, he had made a not unusual mistake, for instead of sacrificing everything to reaching Saint-Cyr he had been tempted by the sight of columns of the enemy below him to descend from the hills and engage them. Consequently when, regaining the hills, he did reach Saint-Cyr, his men were already worn and exhausted by fighting.

Till now the French, though inferior in number, had been able to beat off the separate attacks which the enemy had made; but now Suvárof prepared a general attack, and for the first time he sent off a large force to turn Saint-Cyr's right wing, using Melas with 9,000 fresh troops. Saint-Cyr had handled his troops well. Boulart, an admiring spectator, describes his methods as admirable for their order, appropriateness, and precision. We have a curious instance of his cold-blooded methods. Seeing one regiment, who were holding a hedge, giving signs of weakness, he sent to warn them that he would fire case on them if they allowed the Russians to pass the hedge. Speaking apparently of another regiment, who eventually ran, he says that

¹ Moreau in Roguet, ii. 548; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 247.

unfortunately it was not the men who were the most afraid; and here Boulart, sent with the message, found the Colonel of the regiment and the senior officers away from their men taking cover in a sheltered spot: this when the attacking enemy might sweep the position at any moment.

As the great wave of assailants, extending to Serravalle, fell on Saint-Cyr, the weak points in his line showed themselves. The Cisalpine Legion was shaken, and though Saint-Cyr himself went to them and though the enemy in this front showed signs of having had enough, the Legion broke and ran, exposing the right of Watrin's division. Saint-Cyr wheeled the division *en potence*, to face the Austrians, who now were on the plateau, turning their flank, but the troops who had fought so well at the Trebbia were dispirited by defeat and demoralized by seeing the enemy making for their rear. The first line gave way, and then, trying the pretty parade movement of one line passing through and relieving the other, the whole fell into confusion, broke, and fled. Sending the Engineer-in-Chief, Chasseloup, to re-form the division farther in rear, Saint-Cyr took one of his old regiments of the Rhine for a final attempt to check the enemy. The position indeed was desperate, for Dessoles, the Chief of the Staff,¹ had taken on himself to send to the left wing two of the four battalions Saint-Cyr had in reserve. The 106th Regiment was equal to the occasion. When Saint-Cyr began to address them a voice cried out to him to put up the enemy's guns for pillage as at Biberach, and the two battalions, too cool to indulge in the usual shouts, met and checked the eight battalions of Lusignan and took that General prisoner. He had already been twice captured by the French, once at Rivoli and again by Masséna on the advance in 1797.

Had the rest of the reserve been available to follow up this stroke the day might have been saved, but it was marching uselessly to the other wing. Moreau now came from the left wing, which had hitherto held its ground, and gave orders for retreat. Novi was abandoned and Saint-Cyr drew back in good order to the position in front of Gavi, the 106th bearing off Lusignan and two guns. Dombrowski, who had been driven from Serravalle, drew in on the right to the Monte Rotondo.

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 258-60. I think this must have been Dessoles. Suchet was away with the corps of Joubert.

That night, at dinner in Gavi, Moreau read to Saint-Cyr and the staff the report he intended to make of the battle. To him it was a retreat, not a disaster. He believed the left wing had drawn back as safely as the right had done, and he pointed out where he believed Pérignon would be. Saint-Cyr, more sceptical, advised him to await the morrow, to be more sure of this.¹

The right wing, though weakened by the deduction of 5,200 men sent to the left wing,² still had extricated itself with comparatively small loss. It was a different matter with Pérignon's left wing, which had undergone a real disaster. At first, strengthened by Colli's brigade, which actually joined and fought with it, it had beaten off every attack of the enemy. Grouchy at one time, seeing a regiment show signs of weakness, had seized its colour and led it on, and when a shot broke the staff of the colour had put his hat at the end of his sword to lead a charge which repulsed the enemy. He had now swung his division round on the right flank and rear of the enemy, hoping to finish the day by a victory, when on account of the retreat of the right wing Moreau gave the order to retreat here too, directing the left wing to fall back on Acqui, to the south-west, on the route by which it had advanced from Savona. The first stage, to Capriata, was almost across the front of the enemy, but all went well, Lemoine's division covering the movement, until some Austrian skirmishers contrived to glide round and seize the Château of Pasturana, whence they fired on the artillery of the French rear-guard. Some of the drivers, who at this time were not soldiers, cut their traces and fled, others in their alarm overturned their guns on the steep slope from Pasturana, and the road thus became blocked.

Instead, however, of the French flying in a wild panic, as described in some accounts,³ they really suffered from too much confidence. Debelle, commanding the artillery, had halted his batteries in rear of Pasturana, merely to deal with some horse

¹ I follow Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 245-64, for the actions of the right wing in this battle. His account, which differs from some others, is supported by Boulart, 60-3, especially as to the quiet dinner at Gavi, whilst in other accounts the French were pursued for some distance. Saint-Cyr indeed, as we shall see, more than held his ground next day.

² Colli's brigade was 4,260 strong and the 3rd Regiment, sent later, was 1,000. Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 247, 258-9, and Table 42.

³ Spalding, *Suvóroff*, 176; Alison, iv, chap. xxviii, para. 23.

of the enemy, and as the rear-guard of cavalry passed through Pasturana, Pérignon, Grouchy, and Colli, dismounted, were in a courtyard. Then these Generals, assembling what men they could from the stragglers, tried to delay the advanced troops of the enemy; but Pérignon and Grouchy were cut down and taken prisoner, and though Colli stood behind Pasturana with a battalion for some time, covering the retreat, yet his horse was shot under him and he too was wounded and taken prisoner. Moreau, indeed, nearly had the same fate, as he had been going back to join Pérignon and Grouchy when warned of the danger by the officer commanding the cavalry bringing up the rear. The last attack of the pursuers was beaten off on the Francavilla road by General Clausel of the reserve.

The losses of the French, probably much fewer than those of the enemy up to the beginning of the retreat, were 6,663 killed, wounded, and prisoners, 4 colours, and 18 guns. The Austrians lost 6,050 officers and men, and the Russians nominally 1,880, but more probably 2,700, making a total of 8,750. The fighting had been most desperate, and an observer amongst the Allies remarked that whilst the faces of the dead Austrians and Russians were calm, those of the French expressed rage and fury. Marshal Melas is said to have written to his Government that the victory had cost them dearly, and Suvárof declared that whilst God had been very gracious to him, He had chastised him in making him come to Italy.

The loss of the guns, which can hardly be more than I have put down as the French were not strong in that arm, made the victory of the Allies seem much greater than it really was, and some accounts choose to represent the whole French army as flying in a mob. Really it was something like Vitoria, where the block of the artillery made the trophies of the victor out of all proportion to the actual fighting; but at Vitoria the French did really retreat far. Here not only did Saint-Cyr hold his position all next day, the 16th August, but he actually gained ground; Dombrowski, eventually supported by Watrin, retaking Arquata from the Austrians and thus linking with Miollis on the coast and covering the road from Serravalle to Genoa. When it is remembered how weak Saint-Cyr was, and that this wing of the army remained so close to such an enterprising commander as Suvárof, one can judge how exaggerated are the

accounts of the flight of the French and the pursuit by the enemy. In reality Suvárof had been hard hit, and besides the train of blocked artillery his only real gain was the citadel of Tortona, which surrendered on the 11th September. According to his own account, he only intended to follow up his victory on the 17th August, that is, two days after the battle; the blame for even this not being done was placed on the Austrians, who had not prepared sufficient transport and provisions, but not much of either would have been required to advance for one day if the enemy had been ruined.

Though the French carried off General Lusignan, yet the stroke of luck which had placed Pérignon, Grouchy, and Colli in the hands of the enemy made their victory more telling. All three Generals had been wounded, Grouchy having received four sabre cuts, one of which penetrated his skull, besides a ball and several bayonet thrusts—enough, as he said, to send a man into the other world. However, by the 8th September the wound on the head was ‘superbe’, and he only feared having his right arm slightly disabled, the clavicle having been cut in two places. The Grand Duke Constantine had him taken from the field and cared for by his own surgeon. Next day Melas authorized him to return to France in exchange for Lusignan, but he was unfit to be moved from Novi. Thence he was taken to Pavia and then to Verona. On his complaining to Melas, that General excused himself for not releasing him and suggested that as he was not fit for a long journey he should go to Gratz. This Grouchy did, remaining there for some time, and so getting information useful when he returned there in 1805 in the 2nd Corps under Marmont. At the end of September 1799 the Austrians still refused to send back Pérignon and Grouchy, as the French had no prisoners of equal rank. Finally Grouchy, and probably Pérignon, was exchanged in June 1800, oddly enough against the Russian General Hermann and the English General Donn, taken prisoner by Brune in Holland. Grouchy on the 6th July 1800 was posted to the Armée de Réserve, but on the 23rd August he was posted to the Armée du Rhin under Moreau, although it was only on the 27th October, after the armistice of Parsdorf, that he was given a division, replacing Grandjean, who replaced him now with the Armée d’Italie after Novi. We shall find him fighting at Hohenlinden. As for

Pérignon, he was forty-six, an age which to Bonaparte at thirty-one seemed old, and his rank made it difficult to employ him. On the 29th March 1801, on the First Consul's recommendation, he was nominated Senator, in due time becoming Marshal. Though we shall meet him in various employments, notably at Naples, he never again appeared on the field of battle.¹

Napoleon's criticism on Novi, though I venture to think he did not fully know the comparative strength of the armies, is interesting as he blames the march by which the left wing was brought up to the field separated from the right, instead of coming up in rear by the Bochetta Pass. This plan of a junction on the field of battle is much in favour with modern Generals. Bonaparte had shown its weakness in Italy in 1796 when he repeatedly defeated separated bodies of the enemy. He most justly blames Joubert for not waiting for Championnet and the Armée des Alpes. Serravalle ought to have been taken for the right to rest on. The left was too much extended. In half approving Watrin's descent into the plain, I think he did not know the time this occurred and believed it was after his arrival in line, whereas it really delayed his taking position. Finally he blames the retreat. The army ought to have fought it out where it stood—Joubert would have done so.² But on this point it is necessary to remember the great superiority in numbers of the enemy, who had gained the plateau, and that Saint-Cyr was a tenacious General. Also the disaster of the retreat was due to want of care: the left ought to have got away with even less difficulty than the right, when the army would have been fortunate in escaping from the position to which Joubert had brought it.

A lost battle often causes much ill feeling and recrimination in the beaten army, which in this case was composed of rather jarring elements. Victor, who was in rear at Finale getting his wound healed, wrote indignantly to the Directory to complain of the state of wretchedness into which the army had been plunged by the neglect of the supply departments: 'We have no means of transport, our cavalry is destroyed: finally, every-

¹ *Fastes*, ii. 406-8; Michaud, *Biog. des Cont.* lxxvii, 461-5. Wouters, 231, makes Pérignon to be nominated on the 15th September 1799 to command the Armée des Côtes de Brest: this is an error for the 15th September 1795; see Phipps, iii. 45, 47 and note.

² *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 298-9.

thing proclaims the dissolution of the soldiery and of the State which formerly held the first rank in the world.' Later events were to show that he did not exaggerate matters. From Thiébault, who was ill and had left the army and gone to France, losing his 'four superb carriage horses', we get a bitter attack on the four future Marshals with the army. Suchet comes off best with him. Thiébault asserts that Joubert brought two Chiefs of the Staff with him, Suchet, a General of Division be it remembered, and Prével, an Adjutant-General and Colonel. According to Thiébault Suchet was only the chief for the office work: Prével did the work on the battle-field. This is absurd and no such claim is made for Prével by his biographer, who represents him as what he was, a most useful and active staff officer, employed by Joubert in reconnaissances where it would have been out of place to send a Chief of the Staff.¹ Instead of Suchet being in his office he was by the side of Joubert when that commander fell. Afterwards, during the battle, Prével was employed by Moreau in taking messages to the different leaders, that is, in doing ordinary staff work.

As for Saint-Cyr, in defiance of all facts Thiébault represents him as intentionally allowing Watrin to engage in the plain and to get crushed by Lusignan at the head of a large body of cavalry, and saying, when warned by Prével of what would happen: 'Yes, but there is no harm in letting these Generals of the army of Naples get some lessons.' Now we have Saint-Cyr's own account. The fighting Watrin had in the plain was due to his descending from the hills on his way back to join Saint-Cyr, from the advanced position he had chosen to take up, and he did not get crushed then. His disaster came from his men not standing when attacked on the heights by a body of Austrian infantry: Saint-Cyr, far from being uninterested, intervened to form the division to meet the attack. Considering that any such 'lesson' to Watrin meant the defeat of Saint-Cyr, the absurdity of the charge is manifest.² The editor of Thiébault tries to confirm Thiébault's statement by referring to Marbot's account of Saint-Cyr's refusal to give advice to Marshal Oudinot at Polotsk

¹ Thiébault, iii. 42-4; Pascallet, *Prével*, 24-6. As we have seen, Dessoles, who had been Moreau's Chief of the Staff, stayed on apparently jointly with Suchet; *ante*, p. 320; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 236.

² Thiébault, iii. 48-50; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 257-60; *ante*, pp. 325-6.

in 1812. Marbot, like Thiébault, is not a very trustworthy writer, but his account may well be true. Saint-Cyr then was a man embittered by the way in which he had been passed over for long years. Oudinot, his commander in 1812, was more than five years his junior as General of Division and had been a little-known General of Brigade when Saint-Cyr had been a wing leader in the 'Rhin-et-Moselle'. Saint-Cyr may well have been disinclined to give advice to a man he believed far inferior to himself and whom he may have thought incapable of using it rightly. His situation then, anyhow, was far different from when he was playing a desperate game at Novi before a superior enemy. To prove Thiébault's untrustworthiness, his statement that in 1809 Ney refused to give Soult any artillery when that Marshal emerged from his Oporto disaster without guns, is totally unfounded. The quarrels of the Marshals were bad enough without exaggerating them.

It is, however, for Pérignon, Grouchy, and Colli that Thiébault reserves his worst charges. According to him Pérignon had commanded the left very feebly and been seconded still more feebly by Grouchy. Then, with Colli, when the retreat began they had decided it was better to be amongst the first prisoners, and taking shelter in the village of Pasturana they waited, allowing their men to pass on, ready to surrender themselves when the enemy came up, and making a Captain who wished to resist surrender also. That men who had fought bravely enough for years should suddenly show such cowardice, that men of long experience should believe it was safer to wait for a pursuing enemy instead of going off with their own men, all this is hard to believe. We know by the report of a cavalry officer to Saint-Cyr that the three Generals were in a courtyard of Pasturana, and were warned by him of their danger unless they placed a battalion in the cemetery to cover the retreat. But it was only later that this cavalry officer himself discovered what was to be the real cause of the disaster, the artillery block.¹ The Generals may well have delayed in order to cover the retreat, not knowing of the block behind them, and thus they got caught and sabred by the pursuing cavalry. Colli, however, was wounded and taken farther in rear, also attempting to cover the retreat.

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, i. 327-9.

It is curious how long it took Moreau to realize the disaster to his left. Two days after the battle Suchet was writing to Saint-Cyr, by Moreau's orders, that Colli (really taken prisoner on the 15th) had arrived at Campo-Freddo; and that he hoped that Pérignon had also reached his destination as he had heard of the passage of a body of his troops on Acqui. When he did realize the situation, he believed it hopeless to try to hold Genoa and its coast, and he prepared to withdraw his artillery and stores from the city. He had never understood how large a force the enemy had, but now Suchet had obtained returns of the Austrian staff which showed that they alone had 178,253 men in Italy. However, the enemy did not move and Moreau regained confidence and prepared to hold his ground. Suvárof did not follow up his advantage, partly, as I have said, from the Austrian slowness, and partly from the operations of the right of Masséna's Armée du Danube. Whilst Novi was being fought Lecourbe had retaken the St. Gotthard, and Suvárof sent a body of troops to the foot of the pass. These returned, finding the French made no advance, but then came orders for Suvárof and his Russians to proceed to Switzerland, and he only waited for the surrender of Tortona to leave Italy.

Moreau now re-formed the army. He himself with the divisions of Watrin and Dombrowski and with Miollis, who all this time had been guarding the country east of Genoa, held the debouch from Gavi and Serravalle and the east coast, whilst Saint-Cyr, taking Laboissière's division, went to Savona to join the divisions of Lemoine and Grandjean, late Grouchy, all of which he was to command. Victor, recovered from his wound received at the Trebbia, now came to take his own old division from Grandjean, on the extreme left of the army. As we have seen, Victor had not got on with Macdonald when he had joined the Armée de Naples, and now he and Saint-Cyr seem to have jarred, for Saint-Cyr requested Moreau to detach Victor's division from his command. Moreau, acknowledging this was necessary, still did not do it, as he knew that his successor, Championnet, was coming. An Austrian force which was threatening Genoa from the east was thrown back, and on the 8th September, perhaps knowing that Suvárof was about to leave for Switzerland, Moreau advanced on Novi as if for Tortona, but

he was beaten back.¹ The right of the Armée des Alpes, under Grenier since Championnet's appointment to 'Italie', was approaching to link with Victor, when on the 22nd September 1799 Championnet arrived at Genoa. Moreau then left for France, his horses and baggage having started before Novi. He arrived in Paris in time for Brumaire.

¹ *Vict. et Cong.* xi. 99; Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, ii. 38; Gachot, *Souwarow*, 408-10. I think the importance of this movement is exaggerated, see Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii. 5, who makes only Watrin attack.

XV

LAST PHASE OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

(September to December 1799)

Championnet as Commander-in-Chief. Saint-Cyr's operations round Genoa. Distress and desertion in the army. News of Brumaire.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

See Chapter VIII.

WITH the coming of Championnet to command begins a new state of affairs which we might pass over altogether if two future Marshals, Saint-Cyr and Victor, had not been engaged here. The continued existence of the Armée d'Italie seemed miraculous, and Suvárof, to whose failure to follow up his successes much of this was due, himself complained that the resources of the French seemed to multiply with defeat. Now he was called off to Switzerland, where he was eventually and permanently cowed by Masséna, and the French in Italy were relieved of so much pressure. During the short command of Joubert, Championnet with his Armée des Alpes, some 25,000 men, had advanced from the neighbourhood of Grenoble on the 8th August,¹ but he had separated his force into four columns. On the right one column had passed the Col de l'Argentière for the Stura valley and Coni, its posts reaching Demonte. Another column, some 8,000 or 9,000 men, with whom he himself moved, came down Mont Genève for Fenestrelles and Pignerol; then, turning south-east, it came into the Stura valley, occupying Savigliano and Fossano and so getting close to the Armée d'Italie. The third column came over the Mont Cenis for Susa and threatened Turin. On the extreme left, or north, a column passed the Little St. Bernard for Aosta, to attack Ivrea. The Austrians had an easy task in repulsing these scattered columns, using the troops that had beaten the Armée d'Italie at Novi and had taken Tortona. On the 18th September they attacked the

¹ So says *Vict. et Conq.* xi. 95; but Championnet in his report of the 16th August says he would be ready to move in five days; *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, i. 178. His actual attack was on the same day as the battle of Novi. Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 336.

French at Savigliano and Fossano and forced them to retreat, the other columns also going back.

Napoleon naturally criticizes the dissemination of Championnet's forces. His 25,000 men had better have marched behind the mountains to join Joubert, but as the plan of the Directory did not permit that, then Championnet should have moved the whole of his army by Mont Cenis to take position at Rivoli,¹ and thence to threaten Turin. His real strength would not have been known and the alarm he would have caused would have forced Suvárof to detach part of his army to meet him. Napoleon at St. Helena did not know all the details of this campaign, and his belief that Suvárof would have been alarmed by the appearance of Championnet at Rivoli depends on the date of that event. He says that Championnet could have been there by the 10th August, but I doubt if that were possible, especially if the different columns had to be brought round behind the mountains to Mont Cenis.

Championnet's strategy was so bad that one would have presumed it had been dictated by the Directory had we not the criticism of Bernadotte, then Minister of War, who told Championnet he had hoped for a more useful and consecutive concert between the two armies. Twenty-five thousand men coming down the Stura valley, before Joubert descended from the Apennines, would have decided Fortune whatever course the enemy took, whether they detached men against the *Armée des Alpes* or at once attacked Joubert. Bernadotte obviously did not realize that it was for Joubert to regulate the movements of the two armies. There was no reason why he should not have awaited the action of Championnet—that is, no military reason; and he not only forced the enemy to attack him but he also gave them the best field for their troops. It is to be noted that Napoleon laid down that Championnet should have moved on Rivoli and Turin, far north of Joubert, whilst Bernadotte thought he should have come down the Stura, that is by Coni for Joubert's left rear. Joubert certainly told Championnet to move at once on Coni, but he went on, 'after being assured of Fenestrelles my first effort will be to lend him a hand, and to preserve this place at least'.² Fenestrelles is so far north of Coni,

¹ The Rivoli west of Turin, not the famous battle-field.

² Joubert from Nice, the 30th July 1799; Roguet, ii. 543.

being west of Turin, that Joubert could not have meant Championnet to move as Bernadotte wished.

There are two points in Napoleon's criticism of Championnet which are worth noting.¹ Part of his plan for the Armée des Alpes was the fortification of the position at Rivoli, whence to threaten Turin. Later, when Championnet with the Armée d'Italie was trying to cover Coni, Napoleon again considered he should have remained in a fortified camp. Now Napoleon himself at one time or another had been placed in almost every position possible for a General to find himself in, yet he had never adopted such a course, however he might have used fortified bases. Our insular conceit cannot say that he was thinking of Torres Vedras, for he knew that the sea saved that from the dangers inherent in such positions. He himself says: 'A modern army, shut up in a Roman camp, would often be attacked there and defeated by an inferior army.'² Perhaps the study of the older writers was leading him to consider the advantages of field fortification in a different light from before. But this is a matter for the critics. Then he describes Championnet's left column, which was under Duhesme, as being stopped by the fort at Bard, which only its light troops could pass. This makes it the more curious that in the Marengo campaign the obstacle at Bard was not foreseen, Duhesme then being with the Armée de Réserve, though Napoleon explains that he knew of the existence of the fort, but that the plans and information he got made him believe it would easily be taken.

Championnet, arriving at Genoa on the 22nd September 1799 to take command, amalgamated his Armée des Alpes with that of 'Italie' and sent to Saint-Cyr to come and consult with him. That General was ill and had to write his opinion. Both agreed in wishing to diminish the great arc which the army had to hold, by abandoning Genoa, which now paralysed one-third of the force. The Directory refused to allow this; and the curious thing is that in this they were supported by Moreau, who when in Italy had actually prepared to withdraw from that town, but who now in Paris changed his opinion. Presumably he had something to do with the extraordinary report to the Directory made a little later by the Minister Dubois-Crancé, who had

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 286, 300, 302, 373, 374, 386.

² *Corr. Nap.* xxxi, *Essai sur la fortification de campagne*, 466.

succeeded Bernadotte on the 23rd September 1799, that the Armée d'Italie was superior to the enemy who faced it, being able to act with 60,000 men, though its cavalry and *matériel* were in a distressing state. In reality the fighting strength of the army was 53,581, or with garrisons, &c., 63,657. The Austrians a month before had 148,663 men, or with garrisons 178,253.¹ The error probably came from the incurable optimism on this point of Moreau, when removed from the influence of the better-informed Suchet.

There were now three future Marshals with the Armée d'Italie: Saint-Cyr in command of the right wing, Victor at the head of a division under him, and Suchet, a General of Division and Chief of the Staff. Of those who had been with the army, Sérurier, taken prisoner after Cassano and released *en parole*, was in Paris, as was Macdonald. Grouchy and Pérignon, taken prisoners at Novi, were still in the hands of the Austrians. Joubert, who would have been a Marshal had he lived, had fallen at Novi, and the shroud lay high on the breast of Championnet himself, who doubtless also would have had the baton otherwise.

Apparently there was nothing to prevent the Austrians from attacking Championnet's left *en masse* and throwing him back into France, with perhaps the loss of his right wing also, which was trying to hold Genoa, but fortunately all through this campaign they thought most of besieging the fortresses. For this they had made Suvárof hold his hand, and now they devoted themselves to the siege of Coni, the last important fortress in the north held by the French. Melas, their commander, threatened Coni, Kray marching against the French in the Aosta valley and Klenau acting in front of Genoa. Championnet placed Saint-Cyr in charge of his right, the divisions of Miollis, Dombrowski, Watrin, and Laboissière, 16,675 strong, the body Saint-Cyr had commanded at Novi. Championnet himself with his centre, the divisions of Victor and Lemoine, 15,215, marched on Mondovi. His left, the former Armée des Alpes, under Grenier, divisions of Grenier and Duhesme, 19,615 strong, with Calvin's reserve of 2,056, was to operate with Grenier near Coni and Fossano and Duhesme holding the debouches of Mont Cenis and the Little St. Bernard, by which latter pass he communicated with Masséna's Armée du Danube.

¹ Jung, *Dubois-Crancé*, ii. 307; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii, Tables 105, 106.

Saint-Cyr, very much his own master, was left to cover Genoa and its coast, which he did most successfully, dealing the carefully thought-out rapier-like strokes which his soul loved; although in some cases he lost part of the advantage he had hoped for through his Generals not fully carrying out his orders. All this part of his memoirs should be read.¹ Advancing on his antagonist, Karaczay, commanding Klenau's right, over the field of Novi, he struck him at Bosco on the 24th October, and though Laboissière failed to bring up his division, which enabled the Austrian to escape the fate intended for him, still Saint-Cyr took five guns and a thousand prisoners. This advance was a threatening one for the enemy, and if Masséna sent his right down the St. Gotthard into Italy, Saint-Cyr, now near Alessandria, could advance, cross the Po, and operate on the rear of the Austrians. It was now known that Masséna had won the battle of Zürich on the 25th–26th September, and Saint-Cyr believed that the Austrians were ready to abandon Italy, and that if Championnet had limited himself to threatening them they would have retired. As it was, Championnet's advance forced them to fight if they did not wish to have him on their heels; he gave them an opportunity and they beat him, as we shall see. Saint-Cyr ought to know, but considering the way in which the Austrians clung to the blockade of Genoa while Bonaparte was on their rear, one doubts their relinquishing Coni so easily.

Saint-Cyr had halted in the plain, where his men could get some supplies; but his advance was dangerous to the enemy, and Kray was sent against him with sixteen battalions, 2,800 cavalry, and twenty-five guns, Saint-Cyr having but a handful of horse and no teams for his few guns. Crossing the Bormida, Kray advanced by Marengo, when Saint-Cyr drew back for Novi and the position the French had occupied before the battle of the 15th August. Kray wanted the French farther back, and not wishing to fight, on the 6th November he kept on displaying his strength at the foot of the hills, pausing now and then to see if this made Saint-Cyr move. Saint-Cyr wanted to fight what we may call an offensive-defensive battle, if he could get the Austrians on the broken ground he had chosen and then strike them when on the move, so he stood firm. At last Kray launched

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii. 27–39, &c.

four columns, most scientifically, whereupon Saint-Cyr fell back, making enough resistance, however, to let Kray believe this was only to prevent himself being outflanked. Still the Austrians were not far enough advanced, and the same thing occurred again. At last Saint-Cyr had the enemy on his chosen ground: Dombrowski's troops flanked them, and the four horseless guns, all Saint-Cyr's artillery, could be brought to bear on them. Directing his guns to fire, Saint-Cyr sent his men on the Austrians and rolled them through Novi and Pasturana down into the plain. There Kray had his cavalry and artillery ready to reverse the day, but Saint-Cyr was not to be caught and he halted while still on the hills. Kray, besides many killed, had lost four guns and some 1,800 prisoners.

Meantime the mass of the army, the centre and left under Championnet in person, had been most unfortunate. Melas, always threatening Coni, had placed his head-quarters below Fossano between the Stura and the Tanaro, whilst Championnet moved his to Coni. After some desultory fighting in which Victor, on the extreme right, was victorious, Championnet determined to end the matter by an attack on Melas. Bringing up reinforcements from the rear, he collected some 20,000 to 25,000 men, and leaving Lemoine well on his right at Carru,¹ he came down the Stura with Victor's and Grenier's divisions, whilst Duhesme from Susa was to come down by Pignerol and Saluzzo, so that, as Championnet hoped, the enemy's right wing would be enveloped. Lemoine was to act against the enemy's left. Melas also had determined to attack, and on the 4th November 1799 the two armies met for the battle of Fossano or Genola. Though Melas was soon to be beaten by Bonaparte, he was no blunderer, and whilst Championnet spread out his army on ground favourable to the Austrians, who besides being superior in total numbers had a much larger force of cavalry, Melas had his divisions well in hand. On the French right Victor, brought across to the left of the Stura, at first was successful under Fossano, but Grenier was overpowered in front of Marenne and was thrown back on Savigliano. He was forced from there and had to retreat again, whilst Championnet called in Victor and the two divisions drew back. Four hours after Grenier had evacuated Savigliano, Duhesme

¹ North of Mondovi.

arrived in rear of the enemy and retook it. Finding himself isolated, he hesitated for two hours and then withdrew for Saluzzo. Next day, the 5th November, Victor, joining Lemoine, fell back on Mondovi, and Grenier on Limone, on the Col di Tenda; but they could not hold their ground, and, with Duhesme, had to withdraw over the Apennines and the Alps. In the battle and the retreat several bodies had been cut off, so that Championnet lost about a third of his strength. The Austrians now besieged Coni, which surrendered on the 5th December 1799.

Fine as the resistance of Saint-Cyr had been, it is difficult to understand why the Austrians did not make a determined attack on the whole French army and throw it back into France. Awed by the difficulties of a fresh campaign, they settled down in winter quarters on the eastern slopes of the mountains, allowing the French to hold all the crests of the Apennines and of the Alps to the Great St. Bernard. Napoleon's criticisms of Championnet are most severe. 'During the three months he commanded the Armée des Alpes' (read 'Alpes' and 'Italie'), 'Championnet had, by manœuvres calculated on false principles, three times ruined his army, without even making success hang in the balance; and yet he had a superior force to his enemy, not on the field of battle, for there he had the faculty of never being more than one against three, but in the theatre of operations. His manœuvres and his movements should be observed as a series of faults.'¹ True, of course, as most of this is, Championnet can hardly be said to have been superior in strength to the Austrians, as I have shown; and one great fault of the campaign which was always in Napoleon's mind, the holding of such a long line from the Alps to Genoa, certainly was seen by Championnet to be bad and was only continued by him when he was over-ruled by the Directory. Anyhow, at the end of 1799 the Armée d'Italie held much the same positions as those in which Bonaparte had found it in 1796, except that it now held Genoa, a most doubtful advantage. The last shred of the territory it had so recently won was torn from it when on the 13th November 1799 Ancona capitulated, its garrison reaching Genoa to embark for France at the end of December. General Monnier, its Commandant, was, as he had prophesied, soon to return to 'reconquérir l'Italie abandonnée'.

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 302.

The last months of 1799 were a long agony for the *Armée d'Italie*. Jammed between the mountains and the sea, almost abandoned by the Government, the sufferings of the troops were terrible. The testimony of Championnet, of his Chief of the Staff, Suchet, and of Saint-Cyr, with that of other officers, is unanimous as to this wretched state of the troops.¹ The district had long been stripped of all supplies and the only chance of maintaining life was the food brought from France, but the ships bearing provisions were harassed by the English vessels and were often detained by contrary winds. The pay of the men was five months in arrear, and they had neither clothes nor boots. The officers were even worse off: Championnet describes them as having sold their last garments to buy food and as now being at the mercy of their men, from whom they had to beg a small portion of their scanty subsistence. The state in which the hospitals were left made humanity shudder. Less than a million cartridges were in the magazine and no lead for bullets was in store. The artillery hardly had a hundred horses, whilst the cavalry were ruined. The whole army, as its distracted commander declared, touched the moment of dissolution. This was the state of that *Armée d'Italie*, the spoilt child of France, which once had paid its own way, found funds for other armies, and, swaggering in gold lace, had resented other troops, with their worsted epaulettes, coming to share its spoils.²

Under this strain discipline broke down. At first there was only desertion. Suchet, going with Championnet to La Pietra, found Lemoine and Victor singularly discouraged, especially the last, as indeed he well might be, having lost 6,000 of his 9,000 men. Whole regiments, even whole brigades, left their posts and marched on the towns, or for France, to get food. Championnet, with Suchet and his staff, went out from Nice to one such body of 3,000 men, marching on the town in perfect order. They received their commander with all respect, and listened to his entreaties to them to bear their misery. Weeping with rage and wretchedness, they declared they did not wish to desert their posts; if they could only get food they would

¹ Championnet and Suchet in *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, i. 179-97; Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii. 66-7, 339-41; Roguet, ii. 205-22; *Mémoires de Napoléon*, vi. 306-9; Koch, *Masséna*, iv. 22-3.

² Phipps, iv. 223, 313.

return to where their officers and *sous-officiers* still tried to impose on the enemy. In the last thirty days they had only received six days' rations. Championnet at last induced them to go back to the front. He mentions eight regiments and the brigade of General Seras as in open revolt.

At Genoa the men formally told Saint-Cyr they had determined to return to France, as they were persuaded that their chiefs could do nothing for them. With his characteristic cold good sense Saint-Cyr agreed that they ran great danger of starvation if they remained, but still at any moment ships might arrive with food; whilst if they retired to France through the long strip of exhausted country along the coast they must inevitably perish. The cruel but true argument told, and the men remained, when a shift of wind brought supplies by sea. This was under the boasted administration of Bernadotte, then Minister of War. One touch of humour was given to the painful scene by Watrin. That impulsive General had been alongside of Saint-Cyr, and expressed his certainty that his own troops would never have acted in such a manner as those of Genoa. The next moment he was in full gallop to halt his own troops, who, abandoning the Bochetta Pass to their officers and *sous-officiers*, were in full march for Genoa, and he only succeeded in getting them back to their posts by assuring them that the garrison of Genoa had returned to its duty. Fortunately they got back just in time to check the Austrians, who, learning what was happening, had advanced to take the pass.

Championnet had known much suffering in former years with the 'Sambre-et-Meuse',¹ but his misery in Italy and the mutiny of his men broke him down. It was hopeless to fight under the rule of the Directory, and he had already asked for a successor. On the 4th October 1799, at Coni, he heard of Bonaparte's 'fortunate arrival in France', and at once he announced the fact to his army. At the same time he requested the Directory, 'in the name of the country, the army, and the liberty of Italy', to entrust the command of the army to Bonaparte and to accept his own resignation. The burden was too heavy for him.² Later, on the 15th October, Suchet wrote to Bonaparte in a most lyrical

¹ Phipps, ii. 187.

² *Mémoires de Napoléon*, vi. 298-9, where the editor, the authenticity of the letter being denied by Bourrienne, states that the original was in his hands.

style: 'It is with transport that a soldier of the old army of Italy, honoured in the past by your esteem and your friendship, hastens to felicitate the Republic and you on the fortunate return which restores you to the wishes of the French.' The army, according to Suchet, was burning to see him again, and the enemy had learnt his arrival by the shouts: 'We have got Bonaparte!' 'Joubert', wrote Suchet, 'is dead two months too soon.' Suchet knew all: his attachment to his former leader, and how he regretted the absence of Bonaparte in Egypt. 'Admiration et dévouement', he ended.

The first news of Bonaparte's *coup* of Brumaire was brought to the army by an officer chosen with the First Consul's usual skill, Lieut.-Colonel Razou, a former A.D.C. of Joubert, and on the 24th November Suchet, as Chief of the Staff, passed round a circular from the new Minister of War, Berthier, giving the news of the stroke, with an order to assemble as many troops as possible to take an oath of fidelity to the new Consular Government. One would have thought that any change in the Government would have been welcome to an army which had suffered so much, but all the chiefs agreed—so general was the discontent at the change—that the utmost which could be hoped for was silence. Had not the different corps been so reduced they would have pronounced against the revolution just made. The troops formerly belonging to Bonaparte's Armée d'Italie were, says Saint-Cyr, the most violent against their former General. Of the officers, Victor, Lemoine, and Miollis, all of the old Armée d'Italie, also were the most hostile to Bonaparte. Richepanse, who came from the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', was more moderate. General Marbot,¹ who had been removed from the command at Paris to make place for Lefebvre, in preparation for such a stroke, now led one of the divisions, and several Generals and Colonels urged him to put himself at their head and march on Paris, but, unwelcome as the change was to him, he refused, asking who then would defend the frontier.

That neither Saint-Cyr nor Marbot exaggerates the hostility of the army to the new régime is shown by Roguet, who had served in the glorious campaigns of Bonaparte and who was now commanding the 33rd Regiment. When, later, he had to try and get the regiment to accept the new Consular Constitu-

¹ This is the father of the memoir-writer.

tion, several officers, maddened by their misery, told him 'they would never accept such a change: they had not been fighting for eight years, they had not borne every possible wretchedness, to serve as a footstool to a Cromwell'. Roguet, sensible man, told them nothing was asked from them, and their opposition would have no effect at Paris, and he wrote in that the regiment accepted the Constitution with enthusiasm. Thus, he says, he saved the regiment, the present opponents of the new Government becoming its exaggerated admirers.

Suchet, as we have seen, had already expressed his delight at the return of Bonaparte, and now he told Berthier that the interests of the armies could not be entrusted to more skilful hands. Championnet himself, a General of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', turned to the rising sun, and issued a proclamation to his army in favour of the change in the Government; but this was very badly received by the troops and cost him his former popularity with them. All this unpopularity of Brumaire was not so strange as it now seems to us. Part of the Armée d'Italie of 1799 came from the Rhine. Those troops which had belonged to Bonaparte's army had been left behind when the expedition for Egypt sailed and probably were not those most valued by him. The men saw no immediate gain from the change, and this army, the most Republican of all, as it had shown at Fructidor,¹ was naturally the most suspicious of the revolution which put one man at the head of France. Saint-Cyr was sure to sympathize with this feeling but the hostility of Victor is harder to understand. The reverses which this army was soon to suffer under Masséna in the defence of Genoa probably let the hostility remain till Marengo, after which the improved administration of supplies under the Consulate made the position of the troops much better.

Anyhow, Championnet's command was ended. On the 31st December 1799 he received the news that his resignation had been accepted and that Masséna, then commanding the Armée du Danube, was to succeed him. Bonaparte is sometimes charged with ingratitude to Championnet: in reality he could not have been left in the command he was so anxious to quit. On the 1st January 1800 he fell dangerously ill at Antibes, and the command passed temporarily to the senior General of

¹ Phipps, iv. 279-80.

Division, Marbot. A putrid fever showed itself and on the 9th January 1800 he died. His last thoughts had been for the supply of his famishing troops, while he regretted he had not fallen like Joubert on the field of battle. He was only thirty-seven. He was so poor that his staff had to pay the expenses of his funeral in the fort at Antibes. His heart was taken to Valence, his birth-place, and in 1848 a statue of him was erected there by public subscription, whilst a monument, surmounted by his bust, was set up at Antibes in 1901. Masséna, coming to succeed him, placed a wreath on his tomb, and Bonaparte, who had written to him a letter full of esteem and gratitude, did him full justice in the *Moniteur*. It was sad to die just before the sun rose and a new course of victory was to begin.

Saint-Cyr had applied for leave of absence on account of his health and on the 24th December Championnet had granted it, whilst expressing in the warmest terms his regret for the necessity and his gratitude for the General's services. Indeed he had reported so highly of Saint-Cyr that on the 26th December Bonaparte wrote that, on account of his satisfaction with Saint-Cyr's victory at Novi on the 6th November 1799, he sent him the first sabre distributed of the 'armes d'honneur' he had instituted, and which he said the General was to wear on days of battle. This may have been gratifying, but the army was vexed by the 'style oriental' in which Bonaparte said the soldiers under the General's orders were to be informed 'that *I* am satisfied with them, and that *I* hope to be still more so yet'.¹ They served the Republic, not any one man. Saint-Cyr was also nominated the First Lieutenant of the Armée d'Italie. He wished to remain there, but Masséna objected; without giving his real reason, connected with his being replaced by Saint-Cyr at Rome in 1798, and whilst doing full justice to the talents and services of Saint-Cyr, he said circumstances had separated them. When he took command of the Armée du Danube in May 1799 Saint-Cyr had chosen to leave it, and it would not do to expose the army to disagreements. Fortunately Moreau, appointed to command the Armée du Rhin which was to invade Germany, had claimed Saint-Cyr on the 18th December 1799, and that General, though perhaps not overjoyed to serve again under Moreau, left Italy, not to return till 1803.

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Directoire*, ii. 100, 342-3; *Corr. Nap.* vi, No. 4458.

During the first eight days of Championnet's illness his state had not appeared dangerous, and on the 3rd January 1800 Suchet, having been relieved in his post of Chief of the Staff by the Adjutant-General Degiovanni, sent on in advance by Masséna, obtained sick leave for fifty days and started for France. On his way, at Fréjus, he met Masséna. He had already in 1798 been Chief of the Staff to Masséna in Switzerland, and it was obviously convenient for that commander to have at his side an officer knowing the state of the army to which he was going; accordingly he induced Suchet to return to Nice with him. It is indeed said that, Marbot being ill, Suchet had temporarily taken charge of the army, but this can hardly have been the case for of course Saint-Cyr was far senior. Anyhow, Suchet remained, soon becoming one of the Lieutenant-Generals of the army, and he received the command of the left wing when Oudinot, brought by Masséna from Switzerland, took the post of Chief of the Staff. Soult also came to 'Italie' from 'Danube'. As for Victor, he was one of the Generals who returned to France ill. On the 18th March 1800 he was posted to the Armée de Réserve, the Marengo force, of which he became one of the Lieutenant-Generals on the 1st April 1800. Thus of all the future Marshals who had served in this Armée d'Italie, Brune, Grouchy, Macdonald, Pérignon, Saint-Cyr, Sérurier, Suchet, and Victor, only Suchet remained till 1800.

I have described the campaign of 1799 in Italy with what may seem unnecessary length considering its permanent importance, because it affected eight future Marshals and three men who might also have won the baton. The first part of the campaign had shaken the credit of Sérurier, who had been captured with the wreck of his division from a too strict obedience to orders. Macdonald also had damaged himself by his bull-like rush at the Trebbia. His independent march was too daring and beyond his means, although it might be argued that he had been encouraged—if not misled—and abandoned by Moreau. He had delivered battle on the very sort of ground most favourable to his enemy, and the splendid way in which his troops had fought made his defeat the more lamentable.

The next, or Novi, period discredited Joubert, who had been too rash and too undecided, and it also injured Grouchy and Pérignon, whose capture was made an opportunity for throwing

a slur on their courage. Doubtless there was no real foundation for this, but something seemed wrong when the commanders of a division and of a wing of the army were said to have devoted themselves to protecting the retreat of another wing which had not been broken. Victor had fought well. At the Trebbia he had incurred the sarcasms of Macdonald, but most Generals were unfortunate who came in contact with that high-going Scotchman who made even Napoleon a craven at Hanau. Victor had generally been successful in the latter part of the campaign, and even at Fossano he had been advancing and, supported by Richepanse's cavalry, had been driving his immediate antagonist back, when he was involved in the defeat of the other divisions.

As for Suchet, whatever we hear of him as Chief of the Staff is to his credit. Joubert thought highly of him and in 1798 made his removal a reason for tendering his own resignation. Then when Suchet came again to Italy with Joubert in 1799 it was he who at last succeeded in convincing Moreau of the real strength of the enemy, and this when he had only arrived in August whilst Moreau had been with the army from the beginning of the campaign. Had he been with the army from the first, he might, by better information, have prevented both the Trebbia and Novi. This in the eyes of Thiébault might be office work, but it was work of high value.

As for Moreau, he had been fortunate in his withdrawal after the defeat at Cassano, for which he was not responsible as he had only just taken command; but on the whole his influence in Italy had been disastrous. When Suvárof first heard he had succeeded Schérer, he professed to be delighted: 'Here also I see the finger of God. There would have been little credit in beating a charlatan like Schérer. The laurels of which we shall rob Moreau will be more fresh and green.' In reality Suvárof owed much of his success to Moreau, for it was that General's persistent disbelief in the numerical superiority of the enemy which helped to push first Schérer and then Joubert to disaster. He approved the dangerous plan by which Macdonald sought to threaten the communications of the enemy, instead of making his junction with the Armée d'Italie by the quickest and surest route. Here again he led a commander into danger. 'Je ne doute pas de vos succès, mon cher général: toutes vos troupes

sont braves et fraîches, et certes l'ennemi ne peut pas avoir sur vous de supériorité.' 'Je n'imagine pas que vous puissiez trouver des forces capables de vous arrêter.'¹ It is significant that his Chief of the Staff, Dessoles, as soon as Moreau reached Genoa at once assumed that Macdonald must change his plan. Moreau's very reputation for caution made his advice the more deadly.

Even after Moreau left Italy he exerted his influence in a disastrous way. He had quitted the army apparently convinced, as were Championnet and Saint-Cyr, that Genoa should be evacuated; but, as I have said, when he got to Paris for some reason he changed his mind and advised the Directory to retain their hold on that town. This was the immediate cause of the final ruin of the Armée d'Italie, for, obliged to occupy Genoa, Championnet could neither collect enough force to beat the enemy in front of Coni nor could he withdraw to a district where he could feed his men. The evacuation of Genoa now would no doubt have affected the Marengo campaign, but Moreau never dreamt that he was holding out a bait to draw the Austrians westwards and let Bonaparte fall on their rear. On the other hand, had it not been for him Bonaparte on landing would have found the Armée d'Italie something more than a wreck.

As for Championnet, Napoleon, who criticizes his operations sharply enough, did him justice personally. 'He had distinguished himself in the Armée de Sambre-et-Meuse, where his had been one of the principal divisions; there he had been imbued with the false principles of war by which Jourdan's plans were directed. He was brave, full of zeal, active, devoted to his country; he was a good General of Division, an indifferent Commander-in-Chief.' Soult writes in the same strain. Referring to his death from the epidemic which reigned in his army and the chagrin with which he was overwhelmed, Soult adds: 'He ended in melancholy manner a career which had been brilliant. Towards the end he had suffered misfortunes; perhaps he was not equal to the command-in-chief of an army in exceptional circumstances such as those in which he found himself suddenly placed, but he had no less real merit, and he possessed in a high degree the most honourable qualities.' General Lahure, who had served under Championnet both in the 'Sambre-et-

¹ Mathieu Dumas, *Précis*, i. 477-8, 479.

Meuse' and in the Armée de Naples, speaks of his fine character, strong in the field, gentle and kind off it.¹ A pleasing example of his character is given by the way in which, when beaten himself with his centre and left, he so warmly extolled the victory of Saint-Cyr with his right, which seemed to make such a contrast to his own achievement: conduct the more honourable as Saint-Cyr was a General of the rival army, the 'Rhin-et-Moselle'.

Had he lived Championnet ought to have had a good chance for the baton. True as Napoleon's criticism of course is, still, St. Helena, as Mr. Ropes has well pointed out,² was not an ideal place in which to write military history; and Championnet might have justified part of his conduct. Speaking of his wish to evacuate Genoa, his criticism of the contrary orders of the Directory might have come from Napoleon himself. 'An opposite system has prevailed. They wished to keep everything and to defend everything: we are on the eve of losing everything.'³ Also he was stretching his left out in hopes of help from Masséna in Switzerland. All this, had he lived, he would have explained to a First Consul grateful for his prompt support of Brumaire. He had taken Naples, and his promotion would have been pleasing to the army, which considered him as the chief victim of the rapacious agents of the Directory. Napoleon valued Generals who kept their hands clean from all stain of speculation. Championnet had envied the death of Marceau, 'that fortunate young man'. He had regretted not having the fate of Joubert. As it was he remains a pathetic figure, dying, worn out, amidst his starving army, for whose sake he turned so eagerly to the rising sun.

Here ends the history of the Armée d'Italie of 1798-9, years which at first had been a long struggle against the Directory and their agents, and then, hampered by the orders of the Directory, a contest against an enemy superior in strength. The result had been to make the Directory detestable to the army, which during the peace had seen Italy squeezed of riches as by the all-embracing arms of an octopus. The new Republics which were founded were so plundered and roughly handled that they were seldom very well disposed towards their professed bene-

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 288-9; Sout, *Mémoires*, ii. 365; Lahure, 216.

² Ropes, *Waterloo*, iii-iv. 351.

³ *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, i. 180.

factors, and the troops lived amidst a sullen and often a hostile population. When war had come, the strategy of the Directory had been deplorable. Schérer had been sent to the Adda, whilst Macdonald was left at Naples and Gaultier was detached on Florence with forces which should have turned the scale in favour of the French. Then a disaster had been incurred at Novi for political reasons. It had been bad enough when Generals of high character, Saint-Cyr at Rome, Championnet at Naples, had been disgraced for their resistance to the system of plunder, but now the army itself was treated as a pawn in the hateful game at Paris. Lastly, whilst all that could be wrung from Italy was taken to France, the army was left without pay, clothing, or food, and its former prosperity and wealth made its last state the more cruel. The spirit of the army remained Republican; but, while it did not approve of Brumaire, it had no sympathy for the victims of that stroke.

We have referred to Brumaire very often in the foregoing narrative, and it is now time to turn back to the year 1798 and follow the doings of Bonaparte and the future Marshals most closely connected with him at this period.

XVI

EGYPT

(April to July 1798)

Composition of the army. Capture of Malta. Landing at Alexandria. Desert marches. Battle of the Pyramids.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

None.

THE great event of the year 1798 was the dispatch of an expedition to Egypt. To us this enterprise seems extraordinary, for although England was at the moment the only country carrying on open hostilities against France, yet the war cloud hung on the eastern frontier. The settlement with Austria at Rastadt could not be considered permanent, as the next year was to show, and unless France was assured of supremacy in the Mediterranean it was wild folly to send an army, which might at any moment be wanted at home, overseas to a country where it might be completely cut off from France. The Egyptian enterprise, like that of San Domingo in later years, cannot be judged by itself but must be considered as due to the French character, which has so often shown a preference for distant expeditions which drain the strength otherwise available for the all-important eastern frontier. The wise Louis XI, when the Genoese offered themselves to him, declared he gave them to the Devil; but he stood almost alone in such a policy, and the disastrous sally of his successor Charles VIII into Italy was but a foreshadowing of that of Napoleon into Spain. The Republic was as foolish as the Monarchy and undertook expeditions to Corsica and to Ireland when every soldier was required in France. In 1796, while the Austrians were hunting Jourdan and Moreau to the Rhine, the Directory were planning to throw Hoche with an army into Ireland; and Hoche eventually sailed on the 13th December 1796, while the guns of the Archduke Charles were steadily battering down the defences of Kehl, the last hold of France on the right of the Rhine. The expedition sent by Napoleon to San Domingo, and his camp of Boulogne show that he was not superior to his predecessors, Royal or

Republican, in this policy, which was followed unhappily by the third Napoleon in Mexico. What might not France have been had all the blood shed by her in Italy, Spain, and overseas been given for the extension of her eastern frontier?

An expedition to Egypt had been dreamt of under Louis XIV, and apparently it was Talleyrand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who now suggested one to the Directory. The project suited the restless brain of Bonaparte, who found himself in a difficult position, unwilling to retire into obscurity yet unable to overthrow the Directory. To be out of France for a time, and, be it remarked, only for a time, would give time for the solution of many questions. Always undervaluing the power of the English at sea, he believed that he could go to, and leave, Egypt at pleasure; and whatever his original views may have been, and however conscious he was that others wished him out of the country, he eventually threw himself into the plan with all his usual ardour. As for the Directory, they were most certainly glad to rid themselves of the successful and ambitious General. To them every military chief was a possible rival for power, and the loss of the services of an army may not have been considered too high a price for security of office. Carnot was now in exile, but he had been in favour of the expeditions to Ireland and would probably also have approved that to Egypt. Once determined on the plan the Directory did not do things by halves. For all practical purposes Bonaparte was made Commander-in-Chief of all the French forces, and was free to use all the troops and supplies, much to the disgust of Augereau, who found his dignity as Commander-in-Chief of the army on the eastern frontier seriously compromised when he was subordinated to Bonaparte. The formal decree for the organization of the new force, the *Armée de l'Orient*, was given on the 12th April 1798, but preparations for the expedition had begun in February. Bonaparte was to command, although he retained the title of Commander-in-Chief of 'Angleterre' up to the moment of embarkation: indeed it pleased him to represent this new force as but a wing of 'Angleterre'.

The selection both of the troops and of the Generals lay with Bonaparte, and he made his new command simply a detachment from his former *Armée d'Italie*. Of the twenty-one regiments of cavalry and infantry actually taken to Malta, all had served

under him in Italy, and, though six had come to Italy from the Rhine armies only in 1797, three of these last probably owed their selection to the fact that they chanced to be at Rome, where they were not likely to be wanted and where they lay ready for embarkation at Civita Vecchia. This very important point, of the continuity of Bonaparte's command, has been concealed from many historians by the fact that so large a part of the *Armée d'Italie* had been dispersed early in 1798, one whole division having gone to Switzerland and others to France to join the *Armée d'Angleterre*, whilst some regiments had been left in Italy and others in Corsica. The order to the selected troops to join convoys at Toulon, Marseilles, Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Ajaccio was in reality not a new combination of so many units but a re-formation of the army from the districts into which it had been dispersed. That this was not any matter of chance or convenience is shown by one fact. Some other troops were taken with the expedition, and these, partly detachments, 4,317 strong, were left as a garrison at Malta; with the possible exception of one corps, which, however, had not been with any of the real fighting divisions under Bonaparte, none of the regiments represented in this detached force had served in Italy.

At first sight the Generals seem chosen differently. Instead of Augereau, Bernadotte, Brune, Joubert, Masséna, Sérurier, and Victor, or Kilmaine, as in Italy, the first distribution showed Baraguey d'Hilliers, Bon, Desaix, Kléber, Reynier, and Vaubois as leaders of divisions. It is just possible that Bonaparte may not have cared to have too identical a reproduction of his former command and may have preferred to take leaders not in complete touch with their men; but in most cases the changes can easily be explained. Augereau was in open opposition to his former commander; Bernadotte, not fully trusted, was at Vienna; Brune and Masséna were both to have gone but Brune was required in Italy and Masséna was left behind at the last moment, as we have seen. Victor was assured by Bonaparte that he would have been taken had not the Directory, with good cause, objected to more Generals being removed from France. The same cause may have operated in the case of Joubert, although I am tempted to fancy that there may have been some slackening in the tie between him and Bonaparte. Sérurier was too old and worn for such a venture.

Out of thirty-one general officers, however, only eleven names are not shown on the rolls of the *Armée d'Italie*. Of these Desaix, Reynier, Davout, and Dumas came from the 'Rhin-et-Moselle', Kléber and Caffarelli from the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', Menou, du Muy, and Chanez from the unemployed list. D'Hennezel and Manscourt I cannot trace, but the last at any rate probably came from 'Italie'. Remembering what I have said of the services of the old army of the Monarchy, it is well to note that, including Bonaparte, sixteen of these Generals had served as officers and eleven others as privates before 1789. Only five had entered the service under the Revolution.¹ The total strength of the *Armée de l'Orient* was 38,000, though including the sailors of the men-of-war and the convoys about 54,000 men were taken. Some 1,230 horses were embarked, of which only 700 were for the cavalry. It was because the force which went to Egypt was so nearly homogeneous, and had been for so long accustomed to be led to victory by its commander, that Bonaparte was able to master it and to overcome its first inclination to revolt from sheer despair when it found itself stranded in Egypt. The men who saw the Pyramids had also seen Castiglione and Rivoli.

Of the divisional commanders actually appointed at first, Bon had led a brigade, and both Baraguey d'Hilliers and Vaubois divisions, in the *Armée d'Italie*. The three strangers, Desaix, Kléber, and Reynier, were special cases. Although Bonaparte had been ready at a pinch to leave Desaix and Kléber behind rather than any of his own men, still the temptation to take three of the principal Generals of the Rhine armies must have been great. Desaix, the favourite lieutenant of Moreau, had submitted to the influence of Bonaparte from the time they had met in 1797,² and he had brought Davout with him. The unruly Kléber was absorbed in the expedition partly from military curiosity and partly from desire for a new field. Reynier was not on a level with these two Generals, but he had been Chief of the Staff to Moreau both in 1796 and in 1797. I think he was taken into favour by Bonaparte when that General found that Augereau, in assuming command of the *Armée d'Allemagne* in 1797, had at once sent him away from that

¹ Phipps, i, Introduction; *La Jonquièrre*, i. 513.

² Phipps, iv. 191.

force. One might have considered him as a possible successor to Berthier, but it was Ménou of all men whom rumour mentioned for the vacancy when the Chief of the Staff all but left Egypt for France and his lady-love. Saint-Cyr had believed that Reynier always favoured Desaix in the operations of the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' and it may have been friendship for Desaix which made Reynier now follow him to the new army. Anyhow, in taking the chief lieutenant of Jourdan and the favoured lieutenant and the Chief of the Staff of Moreau, Bonaparte had to give them high positions.

It was curious enough for these three to join Bonaparte, and but natural that officers who had not already belonged to the Armée d'Italie should not want to serve under a new commander in a strange enterprise. Such men as Jourdan, Kellermann, Moncey, and Pérignon were too senior to serve under a man who had been unknown when they were leading armies. The critical Saint-Cyr was too cold and cautious a General to approve of a mad expedition; and the Scot Macdonald was much relieved when he found that he was not to take part in it. Also Saint-Cyr and Macdonald, as well as Lefebvre, all three rather more than ordinary Generals of Division, together with Grouchy, had had no connexion with Bonaparte and had no such reason for seeking a new theatre as had Desaix, anxious for glory, or Kléber, disappointed of a command on the Rhine. The junior officers on the Rhine, Generals of Brigade Ney, Oudinot, and Soult, were in the same case, as would have been General of Brigade Davout had he not been influenced by Desaix. Colonel Mortier probably might have accompanied Kléber, on whose staff he was at the moment, had he chosen, but no doubt he preferred to remain with his comrades of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'. As for Moreau, he was openly hostile to the expedition, as might have been expected from his unimaginative brain and his love of methodical warfare.

Amongst the junior officers of the Armée d'Italie, Suchet, a General of Brigade, might doubtless have gone, but he had cut himself off from the Bonaparte group and was now in Italy as Chief of the Staff to Brune. Another General of Brigade, Lannes, used by Bonaparte for special work, was to go, as was Murat, who had been left in Italy with his cavalry brigade, but of whose disgrace by his former chief, as described by Bourrienne,

I can find no trace.¹ Of course the personal following of Bonaparte accompanied him. This group included General of Division Berthier, the Chief of the Staff, who was divided between his feeling of safety when he was alongside Bonaparte and his agony at being separated from his mistress. Colonel Marmont went as A.D.C., and Bessières, promoted Colonel on the 9th March 1798, as commanding the *Guides-à-cheval*, some 180 strong. The *Guides-à-pied*, numbering 300, were not yet put under him. Of those outside the Marshalate, Colonel Junot, Lieut.-Colonel Duroc, and Captain Lavalette went as A.D.C.s to Bonaparte, and Bourrienne as Secretary. Desaix took his two A.D.C.s, Lieut.-Colonel Rapp, and Savary, the future Police Minister but now a cavalry officer; both these men were on Bonaparte's staff after the death of Desaix at Marengo.

Few people knew the real object of the expedition, and still fewer dreamt how long it was to take; even Bonaparte believed he would be back in the autumn.² This perhaps explains the fact that two of his personal following considered this time of all others as one for marrying. Marmont espoused the daughter of the rich and influential banker Perregaux. Bonaparte explained to Lavalette that as he could not make him a Lieutenant-Colonel he must give him a wife, and directed him to propose to Émilie Beauharnais, the niece of Alexandre Beauharnais, the first husband of Joséphine. Marmont, who got the woman he loved, also got, according to his later opinion, a thousand misfortunes: certainly the marriage led to endless bickering. On the other hand, Madame Lavalette, who was not supposed to care for her husband, saved his life in 1815 at the expense, for a time at least, of her own reason. Of the six future Marshals who went to Egypt, two, Lannes and Marmont, were, like Bonaparte, married, whilst Davout had divorced his first wife. Berthier was deeply in love, but unfortunately with a married lady. Both wives and mistresses were left behind, with unsatisfactory results in the cases of Bonaparte and Lannes.

In the preparations for the embarkation of the different convoys Kléber was sent to the division at Toulon and Reynier to Marseilles, where his division and that of Bon, with the

¹ Phipps, iv. 212-14.

² *Corr. Nap.* iv, No. 3259. To his Secretary he said, 'A few months or six years: it all depends on events.' *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. ii. 49, Eng. ed. i. 118.

cavalry brigade of Davout, were to be formed. Desaix went to Rome, where he met Saint-Cyr, from whose troops he was to form a division to embark at Civita Vecchia. Murat, who had been in Rome, had been sent by Berthier to Milan, to embark at Genoa with a brigade of two Dragoon regiments, part of Baraguey d'Hilliers's division, forming at that port. The convoy from Corsica, under Vaubois, did not include any Marshal. Lannes was placed at Lyons to superintend not only the passage of troops drawn from that part of the country but also that of the millions of francs which Brune had seized at Berne. Then he was to go to Marseilles. Colonel Bessières started on the 15th April with part of the Guides from Rouen for Lyons and Toulon. Guns had not been long attached to this corps and the ammunition had probably not been well packed, for the shells in one wagon took fire—it is said from the galloping of the team—and the wagon blew up, setting fire to some buildings, so that troops had to be brought from Lyons to extinguish the conflagration. Unfortunately we have not got Bonaparte's reflections on this incident. Marmont went on to Toulon in advance, and on the 3rd May Bonaparte left Paris with Duroc, Lavalette, Bourrienne, and Joséphine, reaching Toulon on the 9th May 1798 at 7 a.m. Lastly Berthier arrived from Paris, and took up his work as Chief of the Staff on the 13th May. Much of this preliminary organization of 'Égypte' has been dealt with in the history of 'Italie', where it comes more conveniently.

Leaving Joséphine, Bonaparte embarked in *L'Orient* with Berthier, Bessières, and Lannes, the last having, I presume, come by land from Marseilles, or else having joined when the convoy from that port reached Toulon on the 11th May. He had charge of the grenadiers on board. Marmont was on the frigate *Diane*. Hardly any one yet knew of the destination of the expedition, and some had wild ideas that it might really be meant for England. Wherever it was to go, it was unpopular with the men, and the regiments, which should have been 2,000 strong, had lost from five to six hundred men *en route*. The news of Bernadotte's affair at Vienna and the consequent possibility of war checked the starting: the Genoa convoy, which had almost reached Toulon, was ordered back, and it is a question whether Bonaparte would not have been glad to seize the op-

portunity of abandoning the expedition. However, all was soon settled, and on the 19th May the two convoys in the harbour, that of Toulon and that from Marseilles, sailed. On the 21st May they met the Genoa convoy, which had sailed on the 17th May. Murat, who is often said to have embarked at Civita Vecchia, seems to have been on board with the Genoa convoy, and far from being in disgrace with Bonaparte, was bringing wine for him. On the 27th May the convoy from Corsica, which had sailed on the 15th, was met, but nothing was seen of that from Civita Vecchia. Anxious for Desaix, Bonaparte sailed on for Malta. Sometimes the sea was rough, and not only were the troops sea-sick but the sailors suffered also: indeed one of the smaller craft had almost the whole of its crew disabled from that inglorious cause. Crowded as all the vessels were with troops, and having only about half their proper crews, it is difficult to believe in the sincerity of Bonaparte's declaration that the English would have been well beaten had they attacked the expedition at sea. At last, on the 9th June, the fleet was off Malta, where Desaix with the convoy from Civita Vecchia was found.

Desaix had sailed from Civita Vecchia in the frigate *La Courageuse* on the 26th May with Savary and Rapp. On the way this convoy was joined by the frigate *Artémise* sent forward by Bonaparte to ascertain the whereabouts of Desaix. Murat, whose movements are not easy to follow at this moment, but who had probably changed ships after leaving Genoa, seems to have been on board this frigate, with Lavalette. The *Artémise* now led Desaix's convoy; on the 6th June, when off Gozo, she went ahead, and in the afternoon Murat was also sent on in the brig *Salamine* to ascertain if the main convoy were off Malta. Going close in to Valetta, Murat even insisted on being given a boat in which he reached the outer defences of the place. No signs of Bonaparte's convoy being found, Murat returned to Desaix, who came steadily on. It would seem that Murat now went back on board the *Artémise*, and as that frigate drew near again to Valetta he saw one of the large vessels of the Order of St. John coming up from Gozo with a frigate and a corvette. Nothing would suit Murat but that, against all custom, the Maltese ship must pass under the lee of his frigate. The vessel of the Order gave way and, after watching the convoy till night,

entered Valetta to give an alarm increased by Murat's proceedings. However, already on the 4th June the Grand Master had received news that an expedition against Malta and Egypt was preparing at Toulon, information obtained by his Minister at Rastadt from the Secretary of Treillard, one of the French negotiators there. That afternoon, the 9th June, the main convoy arrived, and by 4 p.m. *L'Orient* was off Valetta, when Desaix went on board to report to Bonaparte. The expedition was now complete.

Things now began to move quickly. Calling his A.D.C. Marmont on board *L'Orient*, Bonaparte then sent him ashore to obtain permission for the fleet to enter the main harbour. If this had been granted he would have tried a *coup de main* on the place, but as the Order of St. John would only permit four vessels to water at a time, he prepared a disembarkation for the next morning, the 10th June 1798. The convoys had been kept separate as far as possible, and now four of them were employed. Reynier, from Marseilles, took possession of the island of Gozo, and Baraguey d'Hilliers, from Genoa, landed at St. Paul's Bay to occupy the main part of the island of Malta. At Valetta itself Desaix with the Civita Vecchia troops landed on the east of the town, to march on Cottonera and the eastern forts. The main attack was by Vaubois's troops from Corsica, who landed to the west of Valetta between the Bay of St. Julian and the Bay of Madalena. Bonaparte accompanied this attack and sent two of his staff to lead it. Colonel Marmont with five battalions was to march straight for the crest of the neck of land connecting Valetta with the inland country, to seize the aqueduct, and to cut the communications of the town, whilst General of Brigade Lannes with seven battalions moved along the face of the western works to try to gain one of the forts, Tigné or Manoel, I presume, and to act as support to Marmont. The divisions of Bon from Marseilles and Kléber from Toulon were left on board, but the fleet exchanged shots with the forts of the sea face. Marmont reached the aqueduct without difficulty and then reconnoitred the Floriana works, when a sortie made by the garrison was easily beaten back. All the Order had to do was to close their gates and wait for Nelson, who was on the sea. But the French had long been carrying on secret negotiations with some of the Knights and the place sur-

rendered at 3 a.m. on the 12th June, when the French marched in, thanking Heaven, as they saw the mighty works and the deep ditches, that there was some one inside to open the gates for them. As we have seen, the only future Marshals mentioned as actually employed were Lannes and Marmont, but of course Berthier and most probably Bessières landed with Bonaparte. Davout and Murat should have remained on their ships with their cavalry commands, but one suspects that the last at least got on land, when he should have served with Baraguey d'Hilliers. No doubt Marmont had been selected for the advance to give an opportunity for promoting him, and he was nominated General of Brigade from the 10th June 1798.

At Malta Murat nearly ruined his own career. As easily and as quickly depressed as excited, he fancied that Bonaparte's liking for him had diminished, and that Berthier, annoyed at some abuse of himself, was doing him disservice with the General. He dreaded the attacks of his enemies, and every patriot at the time believed he was surrounded by enemies. He wrote to Bonaparte, regretting that he could not accompany him further and giving the state of his health for excuse. He also wrote to Barras, asking for an order to join Brune, then in command in Italy, that General having told him he would be enchanted to have him. We shall find Murat having a very bad opinion of Brune in 1801. I do not think Bonaparte ever really forgave any one who left this expedition to Egypt, and, had Murat gone back to France, he would probably have shared the fate of Alexandre Dumas. Fortunately for him Bonaparte seems to have reassured him, and he sailed on. It is amusing to find him prophesying that there was neither glory nor danger for him with the army he was reluctantly following. He was to find plenty of both at the battle of Aboukir.

Now, and again too before the expedition reached Egypt, several changes in the organization of the army were made. Vaubois was left at Malta with a garrison 4,317 strong, which held out against a long blockade by the English and Maltese and was only starved into surrender on the 5th September 1800. Baraguey d'Hilliers went home, and Kléber, Desaix, Bon, Menou, and Reynier had divisions. Lannes was sent to an infantry brigade in Kléber's division, and Marmont had a so-called brigade, one regiment under Bon. Dumas still commanded the

cavalry, the reserve of which was formed of two brigades, that of Davout consisting of one, and that of Murat of two, Dragoon regiments. This was a change of arm for Davout, who had hitherto been in the infantry. The *Guides-à-pied*, which had come from Genoa, were now added to the *Guides-à-cheval* under Bessières. Here we come across an incident which was to recur often enough when the Guides of General Bonaparte had grown into the Guards of the Emperor Napoleon. Vaubois, wanting men on shore, tried to use fifty of the *Guides-à-pied* whom he chanced to come across, but they promptly refused to obey without the orders of Berthier, that is, of Bonaparte. It is significant that when Vaubois appealed to Berthier, the Guides were not blamed, though Vaubois was allowed to employ them for two days.

A number of former soldiers of the Order of St. John, volunteers of very doubtful goodwill, were added to the army, and known, later, as the Légion Maltaise, whilst a number of galley-slaves were sent to the frigate *Sensible*. Meeting an English man-of-war, they promptly mutinied and caused the surrender of the vessel.¹ Bonaparte himself was busy settling the future government of the islands and the exact number of elementary schools to be maintained. The place was well ransacked for gold and silver, to help the millions from Berne, and when the expedition sailed it bore with it many a silver Saint on an unexpected crusade against the infidel. With the unhappy mania of the French for destroying all local interests, a silver model of the first galley owned by the Order was sent to Paris. On the 19th June 1798 the expedition sailed, Desaix, engaged in the settlement of financial affairs, following next day. It was only now that the object was guessed, for so far very few knew the secret.

On the 1st July Bonaparte was off Alexandria, and learning that Nelson had only just left he at once hurried his men on shore. A heavy sea delayed the operation and only three divisions got any real force on land that night, Menou for a wonder being first, and then Kléber and Bon, whose troops were on board of men-of-war. Bonaparte led the way in a Maltese galley, followed by a swarm of boats, many of the soldiers in these very sea-sick on their way to glory. In spite of all the

¹ La Jonquière, *Égypte*, i. 631-2, 643, 649.

haste only some 4,000 could be landed,¹ but with them Bonaparte at once advanced to the assault of the town. Menou was on the left or west, and took the Triangular Fort, but being himself thrown down from the rampart he was so bruised that he was put *hors de combat*. Kléber, under whom Lannes led an infantry brigade, was in the centre. He was wounded in the skull at the foot of the wall, but his division got into the town. There the fire from the houses was so hot that they withdrew but were ordered in again. Bon was on the right or east, and Marmont, leading one of his infantry brigades, seized the Rosetta gate. Several of the cavalry Generals, whom one would have expected to have been landing their men, were employed on shore. Dumas was with Bonaparte, Berthier, Bessières, and the *Guides-à-pied*; the wooden-legged Caffarelli, commanding the engineers, stumped steadily on with the staff through the heavy sand. Davout with a detachment was working round the Old Port until he reached the fort commanding the entry to the two harbours, which he eventually captured. Murat with part of the reserve was also on shore, linking Kléber with Bon, and it was his message, that he had got into the place and that the enemy were retiring on the Pharo, which first drew a word from Bonaparte. Until then the commander had remained near Pompey's Pillar, receiving the reports in silence and employed in much the same way as we shall find him at Marengo, in crushing with his whip the heap of broken pottery on which he was seated, or as at the affair the day before Wagram, when, having ordered the attack, he busied himself in gathering and destroying bunches of flowers. Now he descended from his mound, ordering the Sheiks and the keys of the place to be brought to him, whilst Kléber came to the staff to have his wounds dressed. Though the loss was slight, two of the Generals of Division, as we have seen, had suffered from their unnecessary zeal in the assault. Kléber, much to his disgust, had to be left behind as Governor of Alexandria, his division falling to a weaker man, Dugua. Menou also had to remain, and was soon sent as Governor to Rosetta, which he reached on the 12th July, Vial taking his division.

As little time as possible was lost in Alexandria, but the three divisions which had taken the town, landing piecemeal, had

¹ For plan see La Jonquière, ii. 48.

fallen into such confusion that they could not march at once. Reynier, who had been left to cover the landing with some of his men, got the rest of his division on shore. The boats of Desaix, filled with men unable to reach the land, had returned and had lain alongside the ships till morning, but they now succeeded in disembarking the men. These two divisions, landing at comparative leisure, were able to begin the advance on Cairo while the others recovered from their confusion. Desaix formed the advanced guard till after Cairo was reached ; Reynier followed, then Bon, under whom Marmont served, and next Vial (late Menou), under whom Lannes led an infantry brigade. This force with two cavalry brigades formed the main or desert column. On the 7th July Bonaparte, leaving Cairo with his staff, Berthier, Bessières, and apparently Davout, joined this column, which, after suffering great hardships, got across the desert to the Nile at Damanhur, the last division, Vial, arriving on the 9th July. In this march Mireur, commanding the cavalry brigade with Desaix, was either killed by the Arabs, who caught him isolated, or else threw away his life in anger at finding the other cavalry Brigadier, Leclerc, given a more prominent position.

Davout had, I presume, been escorting head-quarters with his 'brigade', one Dragoon regiment ; he now succeeded Mireur in command of the cavalry brigade with Desaix, a natural appointment considering his previous connexion with that General, with whom he also served most of the time they passed in Egypt. He now had two Light Cavalry regiments, one soon to be led by the famous Lasalle. Four divisions had made the desert march. The other division, Dugua (late Kléber), with Murat's cavalry brigade, only a small part of which was mounted, and the reserve, the savants, &c., had been sent to Rosetta, Murat leading and getting his first view of Aboukir, which may have been useful to him later. From Rosetta this division moved up alongside the Nile with the river flotilla Bonaparte had prepared, Murat and Verdier leading its advance, and on the 10th July they rejoined Bonaparte, who had by that time advanced to Er-Rahmanieh.

The march of the main column across the desert had been but the beginning of many miseries and sufferings, to be often repeated later and to which I need not refer again. Both now

and in the campaign of Syria, when the local conditions of warfare must have been better known, the troops suffered intensely. Wearing at first the same clothes as in France, the heat told on the men, who, with careless habits learnt in Italy, often half stripped themselves, throwing away garments momentarily superfluous, but finding reason to remember later that they were no longer in lands where such things could be replaced. Vermin preyed on them and ophthalmia constantly incapacitated a large proportion of them. No provision was at first made for the carriage of water, and though in September 1798 orders were given that the men should carry water-bottles, such articles were not easily procured, nor was sufficient care taken to see that the order was carried out, so that even in the march for Syria this had not been fully attended to. Marching on sand in great heat was made the more trying by the close formation which had to be adopted to prevent the Arab horse from breaking in. For long the number of French cavalry who could be mounted was very small and their horses were weak from the voyage, so that they were no protection. To straggle, were it but for a chance of a drop of water, meant death, but each square was often a walking hell. A mass of weary men, pressed close to one another, trying to keep their formation over broken ground, encumbered by the artillery and carriages in their midst, stumbling on under a burning sun amidst stifling dust, seeing nothing, hardly able to breathe, losing all count of time in the never-ending day, such was often each square. Its members lost all their physical powers and retained nothing but the sense of torture. Small wonder that when the Nile was reached there was a wild rush not up to, but into, it. Ophthalmia, of which Egypt is the very home, was always a curse to the French. Bonaparte attributed it to chills at night, and told Desaix that the only way to avoid it was to wear a flannel waistcoat. He himself was radiant with joy at his success in reaching Egypt: several times tapping the shoulder of Berthier, the 'doubtful Sancho trudging at his side', he said, fully satisfied, 'Well, Berthier, at last we are here!'

Frequent disappointment was the lot of the troops, for villages and towns which figured large on the map were reached to be found only groups of a few miserable huts. The mirage, which sometimes enabled the leaders to obtain fresh efforts

from their men to reach the lakes which seemed so near, added bitterness to the labour when the oft renewed deception was discovered. When a division did reach wells which were a reality the men threw themselves on the water, often suffocating one another, whilst others, worn out, expired unable to quench their thirst. When the march was begun again next morning a heap of dead lay round the spot where fresh life had been hoped for. In Italy the troops had seldom been harried except on the actual field of battle, and if made prisoners they fell into the hands of a civilized foe.¹ Now round the column were the Arabs awaiting stragglers; and here captivity meant death, and that often a cruel one, preceded by personal defilement and subjection to the bestial lusts of the natives. When the band of the 61st Regiment was taken, the men were made to play for some time and then were massacred. One party, captured when working ovens for bread, were forced to heat the furnaces for which they finally became the living fuel. The avengers arrived to see their comrades' bodies burning.²

No wonder that the temper of the men gave way, and some of them, accusing their commander as responsible for their sufferings, sought relief in suicide. 'Are you taking us to India?' they asked Bonaparte, as he rode by their side, only to be met by the sneer, 'Not with such soldiers.' The strain told as much on the officers as on the men and resignations poured in, only to be disregarded. Naturally it was Generals of violent character who showed most openly their despair, and amongst these were the gigantic mulatto Dumas, Lannes, and Murat. At Er-Rahmanieh there was even a meeting of Generals who wished to declare to their commander that they would not go beyond Cairo. It may have been fortunate that the inveterate *frondeur* Kléber was away at Alexandria and that Bonaparte had only to deal with officers accustomed to obey him. He himself never wavered; indeed only one course was open to him and that was to advance, while the mutinous Generals found no one to bell the cat. Through Lannes, it is said, he learnt something of what was planned, and he warned the leader, Dumas, that his high stature would not prevent his being shot in twenty-four hours.

¹ Except those captured by insurgent Tyrolese or Italian peasants, in 1797 and 1798-9.

² Desvernois, 169; François, 220-1.

He was equally open with Murat, and, talking later with that military dandy, he dwelt on his sorrow if he had had to make such a fine head fall, but he would have done it without hesitation. This we can well believe; indeed the mutineers were powerless, for certainly Kléber, for instance, would not obey any leader they might choose, nor would the men have obeyed Kléber against Bonaparte. Here the composition of the army told, for even if the regiments could be brought to a resolution not to advance, still they would insist on having Bonaparte at their head; no other General in the army had any real hold on them. Desaix, Reynier, and Kléber were strangers, Menou was devoted to Bonaparte, and the colossal Dumas might be followed in a charge but not against the winner of Rivoli. Here as elsewhere, 'they grumbled, but followed'.

Still, even amongst the former members of the Armée d'Italie discontent with the commander existed. Lanusse, who had belonged to that force and who had joined this army in Egypt after the landing, was so offensive in his language, even before Bonaparte's staff, that one day Junot took him up. An attempt made by Murat to reconcile the two by inviting them to dinner, with Lannes and Bessières, only made matters worse, for Lanusse used such language that the hot-tempered Junot challenged him. Refusing pistols, with which he was a dead shot, Junot fought with sabres in Murat's garden, and was severely wounded. Bonaparte was furious, considering there was loss of life enough without duels. Then, relenting, 'Poor Junot', he said, 'wounded for me! Besides, what an idiot! Why did he not fight with pistols?' He forgave Lanusse, a distinguished officer, but later, in considering him for the command instead of Menou, he put his name aside, declaring that he had diabolically demagogic ideas and was a gambler.¹

The whole army, five divisions of infantry, besides cavalry, went steadily forward for Cairo, with a flotilla accompanying it on the Nile on its left. The affair of Chobrakhit or Chebraeis on the 13th July need not detain us, for it was but a rehearsal on both sides for the battle to be fought in sight of the Pyramids. Here, at Chobrakhit, each division formed a square six deep, more or less *en échelon*, and flanked by the flotilla, whilst the Mamelukes did little more than sweep round and past the

¹ François Lanusse (1772-1801). *Biog. des Cont.* iii. 144-5.

squares, receiving their fire. Still advancing, on the 21st July, near Cairo, came the celebrated battle of the Pyramids. Here the divisions did not all fight the same sort of foe. The army marched up near to what was believed to be the position of the enemy, the right of which was formed by the village of Embabeh, on the Nile, which had been surrounded with entrenchments and armed with guns, heavy in comparison with the field artillery of the French but mounted on carriages which could not be traversed. Desaix's division was as usual in front, with that of Reynier a little to the left rear. Desaix's right rested on a large village, into which he sent some dismounted cavalry and artillery, covered by some companies of grenadiers, to look for horses. On the extreme left, by the Nile and flanked by the flotilla, was the division of Vial (late Menou), with that of Bon, in which Marmont led a brigade.¹ In rear, in the centre was the division of Dugua (late Kléber) in which Lannes led a brigade of infantry and Murat one of cavalry. It was with this division that Bonaparte and his staff, Berthier and Bessières, passed most of the battle. It was probably also to them that Bonaparte, when the army first formed up, addressed the words, 'Allez, et pensez que du haut de ces monuments quarante siècles nous observent.' 'C'était du grec pour la plupart de nos bons camarades, néanmoins ils applaudirent par instinct.'

Inside the squares were the cavalry, Davout's brigade, I presume, with Desaix, Murat's with Dugua,² besides the savants and the transport. The guns were at the angles of the squares. The formation of the squares was intended to give greater extent of fire than at Chobrakhit. In that of Desaix, which had three regiments, the front and rear faces were each formed of a regiment of the line, six deep, and the two other faces by the third regiment, a Light Infantry one, three deep. Bon's division, which also had three regiments, was formed in the same manner. Reynier's division had only two regiments with it. Here the front and rear faces were formed by the first battalions of the regiments, the second battalions furnishing the side faces; still this square is said, perhaps wrongly, to have been six deep.³ Vial's division, which also only had two regiments, had probably

¹ La Jonquière, ii. 191, 194; its position and that of Vial's division are reversed in map, p. 186, wrongly. ² See, however, François, 205, but I think he is wrong.

³ La Jonquière, *Égypte*, ii. 185-6, 189, 191; François, 205.

the same formation as that of Reynier, while Dugua's division had three regiments and was doubtless formed like those of Desaix and Bon, but it was not really engaged. It is to be presumed that by this time the troops had got accustomed to forming square, a manœuvre which was utterly unknown to them on landing so that they had to be led by hand into position. Hitherto Bonaparte had been with the division of Bon but he now joined that of Dugua, where he remained till the first charge of the Mamelukes was over.

The first event of the day might well have been the last of Murat's career. His proper place apparently was in rear with Dugua's division, but with his usual want of caution he had ridden forward to reconnoitre, accompanied by only one officer and a single Dragoon. This was the sort of thing which had led to the loss of so many officers and men, but, seeing the enemy in line, Murat went on so close that some forty of the Mamelukes came at him. By the advice of his comrade Murat moved slowly into a wood, as if he were trying to draw the pursuers into an ambuscade, and the Mamelukes, having got within gunshot, drew off, otherwise there would have been one Marshal the less. The divisions had an hour's halt, and, slack in discipline, most of Desaix's and Reynier's men had straggled out of the ranks and had gone into the village on their right to gather grapes and pomegranates and get water. Suddenly a mass of Mamelukes was seen forming in front and the alarm was given, but the men, accustomed to such recalls, were slow in rejoining and the last stragglers were running for their places when a flood of the finest horsemen in the world came down on the two right divisions. Indeed so great was the need that squares had to begin firing before all their comrades were clear and some of the stragglers fell by French bullets, whilst the two squares in danger were so close, and so placed, that their volleys reached one another and killed some eighteen or twenty men.

The mighty flood of horsemen dashed at the two squares, but the soldiers, panic-stricken at first, had regained their courage and poured in a heavy fire. Dividing into three torrents, the horsemen galloped between and on the outer flanks of the two divisions, passing so close that one man even cut between a gun and its limber. Streaming off in rear they came under the fire of a howitzer in Dugua's division, where Bonaparte was, and

then they made for the village and fell on the men in it. The French there, commanded by Dorsenne, to be later a type of Napoleon's Guard, got on the terraces and the roofs of the houses and fired down. The contest here lasted for some time, till Desaix sent a party in support, when at last the Mamelukes made off, leaving many dead. The strain had lasted for but a short time. Five minutes, Belliard put it at, yet thinking himself happy to have had troops seasoned to war: 'Otherwise not many French would exist in Egypt.' Of the future Marshals present, Berthier, Bessières, Lannes, Marmont, and Murat, none were to see the squares of Waterloo beat off as splendid, as gallant, and a much more dangerous mass of horse. At such moments men's nerves will not bear much and a troublesome donkey in the square of Desaix had come nearer breaking it than the golden horsemen outside had done.

The battle of the Pyramids was far from consisting only of the surging charge of the Mamelukes, sweeping past the squares and doing little damage. Both sides had learnt the lesson that the undisciplined horsemen were powerless against the close ranks of the French infantry, each man intelligent enough to know his peril if he moved. But whilst Davout, looking over the heads of Desaix's infantry, and Lannes and Murat from the safety of Dugua's square, watched the rapid advance and flight of their foe, Marmont and the divisions on the left had their own heavier battle, which inflicted great loss on the enemy. Bonaparte, once the plain was free, ordered Vial and Bon forward to attack the entrenched village of Embabeh on the Nile. For this the divisions altered their formation so as to have attacking columns and also squares to beat off any charge of cavalry. Marmont, who took part, says the advance of Bon was covered by three small columns, each of three hundred men, led by Rampon. In this order a charge by three or four hundred Mamelukes was beaten off, and then the enemy's guns opened. Bon was for halting and returning this fire with his pieces, but Marmont, an artilleryman, pointed out the folly of trying to beat down sixteen-pounders with the field guns, and the troops were thrown on the entrenchments. A sally of the enemy which took the attacking column of Bon in rear was beaten off by Rampon, who made his third rank face to the rear and fire, and the troops of Vial and Bon poured into the works.

Inside the village was a body of some two thousand Mamelukes, ready, no doubt, to come down on the attacking columns had they been beaten off. They now tried to escape up the Nile, but Marmont, who was in the rear of Bon's division, saw this, and breaking away one face of the square he ran along the parapet to where the entrenchments ended in a defile which the cavalry had to pass. The first men and horses which came up there were shot down, and those in rear, thus blocked, grew desperate and, forcing their horses into the river, tried to gain the other bank. Some did but several hundreds were drowned, Marmont estimating his own catch at fifteen hundred, whilst Bon more modestly put the enemy's loss at 1,000 drowned and 600 killed. The loss in front of Desaix's and Reynier's squares had not been heavy: an eyewitness, for example, describes only some twenty dead as lying between the two divisions, where the fire must have been most telling.¹ The two right divisions can have suffered but little, whilst those on the left had advanced not only under the fire of the guns but also under that of the enemy's flotilla, the French vessels not being up. Bonaparte put his total loss at 20 killed and 120 wounded. Bon reported 18 killed and 83 wounded in his division alone. On the other hand, Bon and Vial got almost all the booty. Bending their bayonets into hooks, their men fished up the dead Mamelukes from the river, and as these carried their wealth on them the camp was filled with gold, and the battle-field became an immense bazaar. Crossing the Nile, the army occupied Cairo without meeting further resistance.

The Mamelukes had misunderstood the situation, and, judging the French by the feeble infantry they had known up to now, they had allowed the invaders to advance, believing they could sweep them from the earth at pleasure. Powerless against firm infantry, at this time they could have done as they liked outside the squares, for the French cavalry were unable as yet to face them. Judging by the amount of harm done to the French by the Arab horse which had hung round them, constant pressure on the march by large bodies of Mamelukes, preventing all straggling and spreading to obtain food and water, or even fighting for the wells at the end of the day's march, might well have harassed the columns beyond endurance. There was no

¹ La Jonquière, *Égypte*, ii. 185, note.

knowing what captures they might make. Bonaparte, who had received a violent kick on his right leg from a horse at Damanhour, was nearly taken one day. He and his staff had been riding not far from Desaix's division when some four or five hundred Mamelukes charged the square. They were beaten off and drew away without noticing the prize which was at their mercy, whilst the General declared that it was obviously not his destiny to be captured by them.

During the march the men had seemed to have lost their usual assurance and gaiety, and after all the suffering, discontent, and insubordination, a victory had been necessary. The very act of fighting and the instinct of self-preservation had restored discipline, whilst the spirits of the troops were raised by the sight of the great city of Cairo, so obviously the end of the expedition and giving promise of rest and comfort after the pitiless desert. Proud and confident after their triumph, rich with booty, all for the moment were of good cheer except the commander, who was in the depth of despair. Twenty-nine years old, he lamented that all military glory had faded, greatness only bored him, sentiment was dried up, he had exhausted everything, and nothing remained but to become a thorough egotist. A country house near Paris or in Burgundy was all he wanted: 'Never will I give up my house to any one, no matter who', insisted the man who was to have so many palaces. He was heartbroken, with all a young man's belief in the finality of his emotions. 'C'est une triste position d'avoir à la fois tous les sentiments pour une seule personne dans un seul cœur.' He had learnt from Junot that Joséphine was unfaithful, and all was dust and ashes.¹

For us who know of the reconciliation with his unfaithful wife, the many mistresses of later years, the divorce, the marriage with Marie-Louise, and the long years of power, it is easy to sneer at such an outburst, but some melancholy hangs over Napoleon's private life. No one had loved more truly and more ardently than he had loved Joséphine, and the separation from her had thrown a gloom over the blaze of his triumph in Italy. Her unwillingness to join him there and the indifference she soon displayed for him had dimmed the enjoyment of his first

¹ La Jonquière, *Égypte*, ii. 207-8; *Bourviennne*, Fr. ed. ii. 119-20, Eng. ed. i. 142; Du Casse, *Joseph Bonaparte*, 188-9. But see *post*, p. 390.

victories, and the suspicions he began to entertain of her told on his heart and on his power of affection. To her and to his family he was always tender. Fresh from scenes where the rank and file, who owed him nothing but a share of his glory, were dying for him, he found Joséphine unfaithful from sheer want of heart, as Marie-Louise was to be from love of degradation. Later, in the supreme moment of his fortune, the men he had raised from nothing, Murat and then Marmont, turned the balance against him. Monarchs are apt to think badly of mankind, whose worst side they see. 'You do not know the accursed race', said Frederick the Great to one benevolent schoolmaster who was praising men, and 'pauvre et triste humanité' summed up Napoleon's own view. Small wonder if early in life, finding himself always considered only as the provider of good things, he became cynical and looked on every one who approached him as a seeker after rewards, at last even suspecting the men who asked for nothing. It would be absurd to follow some writers who try to treat him as a mere benevolent, well-meaning man, but much might have been altered had the great Napoleon been granted a happy home and love returned. Even the natural pride of a father in a son was denied to him. Left solitary with his glory, he became absorbed in that.

XVII

CONSOLIDATION IN EGYPT

(July 1798 to February 1799)

Destruction of the fleet. Organization of the country. Dumas and Davout. Desaix in Upper Egypt. Preparations for Syrian campaign.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

None.

ONCE Cairo had been occupied the army settled down somewhat. The destruction of the fleet by the English on the 1st August 1798 simplified the situation in one way, for return to France was now out of the question. The crews of the ships sunk or captured were used to strengthen the land force. The English, unable to provide for their prisoners, and thinking, perhaps, that Bonaparte could not feed them, landed 3,000 men, one-third of them wounded, who they considered could not serve until exchanged. Bonaparte used them at once, forming them into a 'Légion nautique' and employing them for his harbour and river flotillas. Kléber, by the by, was much disgusted with this addition to his garrison of Alexandria. He complained of the 'elegance' with which the naval officers, to whom the English returned all their effects, appeared in the streets, whilst the unhappy officers of the army had nothing. He was perhaps prejudiced against the navy and he declared that Casabianca had described it to him as a 'cadavre infecte', surely a cruel estimate of men who had fought well under the most trying circumstances.

Garrisons had to be provided to hold the country, and this gave new posts for many officers. Murat, for example, was made Governor of the province of Kelioub on the 26th July 1798, but he was also often employed at the head of movable columns of infantry or cavalry, at one time going north to the coast to strengthen the force there against any landing by the English, and afterwards scouring the country in different directions as ordered by Bonaparte. Marmont was also detached, being sent north on the 18th August 1798 with a regiment to support either Kléber in Alexandria or Menou in Rosetta against any

attack from the sea, and to maintain communication between Alexandria and the Nile. By guarding and repairing the canal from the Nile, he managed to supply Alexandria with water, and on the 29th August he arrived on the coast in time to see the repulse of an English landing party. The confirmation by the Directory of the rank of General of Brigade, given him by Bonaparte at Malta, had arrived, perhaps with the first dispatches received from France on the 2nd September, and Bonaparte, always partial to him, and considering him almost as a son, or at least as a promising pupil, had this promotion solemnly announced on parade at Cairo, assuring the General of the pleasure it gave him because he knew it would please his 'new family'. I presume this referred to his entry into the Perregaux circle, but one would like to think of it as meaning his staff, just as Moore describes Abercromby appearing on the field where he was to receive his death wound, 'without any of his family'.

Bonaparte had hoped that, with the force given him and his own activity, Marmont might acquire fresh claims to public esteem, and, with the 2,000 men he ended by having, he did well. A wild expedition undertaken by him with the eccentric Menou led to some loss of life and was blamed by Bonaparte as foolhardy, but fresh advancement awaited him. Kléber had chosen to hand over the command at Alexandria on the 19th September 1798 to General Manscourt, although he remained himself until the 18th October, when he went to Cairo, passing a night with Marmont, and then on the canal to the Nile. Manscourt, an officer of Bonaparte's former artillery regiment La Fère, did not give satisfaction as Governor of Alexandria, and on the 28th November 1798 Marmont was appointed to succeed him, under Menou, commanding at Rosetta. This post Marmont held until he left Egypt with Bonaparte; its importance will be seen, for at any moment an attack might be made from the sea. Another appointment to a Governorship affected Lannes. Vial, who had taken Menou's division, was sent to Rosetta, and Lannes, although remaining General of Brigade, was given the command of the division on the 26th July 1798, a post he retained till, like Marmont, he left Egypt with Bonaparte. Employment for the savants was found by the formation of the 'Institut' of Egypt, the first subject given by Bonaparte for

discussion by that learned body being the possibility of the improvement of the ovens for baking bread for the army.

In August Bonaparte made a dash from Cairo at Ibrahim Bey, who was giving trouble, to drive him across the desert into Syria; he used the divisions of Dugua, Lannes, and Reynier, Murat's column (two battalions from Kelioub), and the cavalry brigade of Leclerc. Berthier, as Chief of the Staff, and Bessières, with the Guides, of course accompanied him. Part of Bon's division, which Marmont had left, was used in support, and Desaix, with Davout, was left in charge of Cairo. Ibrahim was driven out of Egypt, but a cavalry action at Salihiyeh on the 11th August showed that, little as the Mamelukes could do against squares of firm infantry, they were most formidable to horsemen. Anxious to strike Ibrahim, Bonaparte had hurried forward with his small body of cavalry and thrown this on the enemy, who were escorting a caravan. The Mamelukes at once turned on their pursuers and a regular hand-to-hand fight ensued between the two bodies of horse. The French Chasseurs and Hussars first charged, but the foe in front seemed to melt away until they halted, to find themselves surrounded. The Guides, and every officer on the spot, except the wooden-legged Caffarelli, whom Bonaparte restrained, joined in the struggle, in which Murat, who always seems to have gone to the front, whatever his command, was fighting hand to hand with the Mamelukes, and was joined by his A.D.C., Colbert, who, unable to manage his own charger, had mounted a stray horse with a saddle but no stirrups. Duroc was in the crowd, and Arrighi, the future Duc de Padoue, a relation of Bonaparte's, was mentioned for his bravery. The sabres of the Mamelukes, brittle but terribly sharp and wielded by experts, took toll of the French. An officer coming up later saw heads cut in half, arms and thighs cut clean from the body, and one cut had gone straight through a Chasseur from the left shoulder to the waist. Lasalle, Colonel of the Chasseurs, had let his sword fall, but had been quick enough to dismount and regain it in time to defend himself.

The French would have been overpowered had not Leclerc at last come up with two squadrons of Dragoons. These, as was their custom, opened fire before charging, when the Mamelukes, fearing to be surrounded, and having got their caravan safely away, galloped off, leaving no prisoner. This affair is worth

notice, not only as showing the skill and intrepidity of the Mamelukes, which impressed Bonaparte, but also because it may have affected the fortunes of Murat, who was mentioned in Bonaparte's dispatch. Two men stood between him and the command of the cavalry, General of Division Dumas, whom we shall see miss his career by going back to France, and Leclerc, the senior Brigadier of the arm. The latter, it will be remembered, had been preferred to Mireur at the beginning of the march from Alexandria. He, presumably, would have led the cavalry in Syria, and thus have taken the post which brought Murat so much to the front, but he would seem to have lost ground now. He was said not to have handled his men well and not to have possessed their confidence. This was not the Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc who married Pauline Bonaparte and was now in France, but Pierre Leclerc,¹ whom Bonaparte in 1797 had described as the best cavalry officer of the Armée d'Italie and who died in Egypt. Bonaparte himself was blamed on this occasion for attacking without sufficient force.²

Ibrahim Bey being driven away, the army was spread wide in Egypt. Reynier, with his division and Leclerc's cavalry brigade, was placed at Salihyeh to establish a fortified post there against any attack from Syria. He moved thence to Belbeis in September 1798. The division of Dugua (late Kléber) was pushed northwards to Mansourah, and in the middle of October it was sent to the coast at Damietta. Murat was also sent northwards with a column. While these troops were sent down the Nile from Cairo, Desaix was sent south, up the river, on the 25th August, with his division, some 3,000 strong, against Mourad Bey. No cavalry was sent with him, for that arm was still weak. Davout, who otherwise would have accompanied him, was left at Cairo, ill with dysentery but employed in the organization and mounting of a body of cavalry for whom horses had at last been procured but who were not yet fit for the field, especially to face such antagonists as the Mamelukes. On this expedition Desaix reached Siut, then the most important town on the Upper Nile, with a population of 200,000, and returned by the Bahr Yusuf along the left of the Nile. On the

¹ Pierre Leclerc d'Osteins (1741- or 1751-1800). Phipps, iv.

² *Corr. Nap.* iv, No. 3045; La Jonquière, ii. 373-7; Colbert, i. 268-71, and others.

7th October he met and defeated Mourad Bey. at Sediman in a stiff fight, much like what his division had gone through at the Pyramids, except that here he had two small squares outside the main body, and one of these, reserving its fire too long, was broken by the Mamelukes. Meantime the divisions of Bon and Lannes held Cairo and put down an insurrection on the 21st October 1798. As for the rest of the future Marshalate, at that moment Berthier, Bessières with his Guides, Davout with his cavalry, and Lannes with his division were in the city, as were Bonaparte's staff, including Junot. Murat with his column was to the north at Mit-Gamar, on the Damietta branch of the Nile, about two-thirds of the way from Cairo to Mansourah. Marmont was guarding the canal from the Nile to Alexandria. Desaix, who had come north as far as Medinet-el-Fayum, had returned to El-Lahun. Kléber, as I have already said, had left Alexandria and reached Cairo on the 22nd October, whilst the insurrection was being suppressed.

Many of the Generals were young, and the Pyramids looked down on other scenes than battles. When Bonaparte at last, on the 19th September, had leisure to visit, but not to ascend, those great monuments, described by one of the learned men with the expedition as 'built in a pyramidal shape', after a moment of disappointment he exclaimed: 'Who will be first up?' Off set the whole band of his companions, inquisitive savants and laughing officers, whilst the commander, sitting down alongside the wooden-legged Caffarelli, urged them on. Berthier, now fifty years old, soon tired of the climb and suggested to his companion, Saint-Hilaire, that they should stop where they were and declare they had been to the top. From below, however, Bonaparte was watching his Chief of the Staff, and, himself only twenty-nine, he enjoyed the troubles of his elderly assistant whilst he shouted out his jeers. 'What, already done? Ah, my poor Berthier, *she* is not at the top of the Pyramids, but no more is *she* at the bottom.' Dreading the ridicule which awaited him if he came down, the unfortunate Berthier finished the ascent. *She* was Madame de Visconti, his adored but absent mistress, for whom his affection almost reached madness. For her rose a shrine in his tent, on which her portrait was placed and before which he knelt and offered incense, a proceeding which not all the sneers of Bonaparte could stop. General

Caffarelli, who had left his leg on the Rhine, furnished amusement to the men. When he tried to cheer them during their absence from their country, they replied that it was all very well for him who had always one foot in France. This wooden leg, by the by, he lost about once a week, notably at the adventure in the Red Sea, where it first had nearly floated him off his saddle.

Here it is interesting to trace in Bonaparte the first signs of many actions of the Emperor Napoleon. In Italy he had begun the system of 'armes d'honneur' which was to develop into the Légion d'Honneur, and whilst other commanders too provided pecuniary gifts for their officers, he in Egypt was the first to bestow land. Lannes, Murat, and the head of the artillery, Dommartin, were given the houses they occupied near Cairo, that of Lannes in the island of Roudah, opposite Cairo, being small but pretty. Then came an order by which the Roudah island and that opposite Bulak were each to be divided into ten portions, which the Commander-in-Chief reserved for officers who deserved them.¹ Of course these gifts were partly intended to make the recipients interested in the permanence of the conquest of Egypt, but there is a close and curious resemblance between this setting-apart of so much land in Egypt, and the decree by which in later years we shall find so much territory set apart for the creation of Imperial fiefs and duchies for men who at this moment would have been horrified at the idea of a higher rank than citizen. Even his punishments had something of the autocrat about them. An unfortunate medical officer who was accused of cowardice was to be dressed as a woman and paraded through the city with a placard declaring he was unworthy to be a French citizen, as he feared to die. For this, punishment nearly fell on the General himself, for an indignant lady wanted to challenge him to combat for the insult to her sex.

The commands given to so many Generals kept them employed and to a certain degree satisfied, while their separation and dissemination over the country prevented any such combination amongst them as had been attempted at first. Kléber, for instance, who had become a sharp critic of the expedition and of affairs in general, might well have acted as a ringleader to the discontented, but he was isolated in Alexandria. Always dissatisfied, and apt to turn against any one set over him, he was

¹ *Corr. Nap.* v, No. 3932; Miot, 101.

deeply hurt by Bonaparte's disapproval of some of his proceedings as Governor of Alexandria. He considered himself no ordinary General of Division, but a personage, and liked to designate himself as 'Kléber', *tout court*. 'You had forgotten', he once wrote in reply to a criticism by his commander, 'when you wrote this letter that you held in your hand the graver of History, and that you wrote to Kléber.' Bonaparte knew well enough to whom he wrote, and in matters of duty his blame fell as readily on Desaix, with whom he several times found fault, and on Kléber, as on his other Generals. But he did not wish for an open rupture with his angry lieutenant from the 'Sambre-et-Meuse'. 'Clouds in Egypt,' he wrote, 'when there are any, pass away in six hours: for me, had there been any they would have passed in three.' Still, he resented Kléber's criticisms as much as that General did his reprimands. Kléber found that his health, always a mysterious matter and apt to fail at moments convenient to himself, had sufficiently recovered to enable him to serve again, but not in Alexandria, or indeed in Egypt. On the 19th September 1798, as I have already said, on his own initiative he handed over the command of Alexandria to Manscourt and applied for leave to return to France. Caffarelli, a mutual friend, reconciled the two Generals, and, tempted by the prospect of commanding the proposed expedition to Syria, Kléber left Alexandria on the 18th October and entered Cairo on the 22nd. Resent Bonaparte's control as he might, yet it was evident that he felt he was under a stronger hand than that of Jourdan, with whom under similar circumstances he would have broken long before.

Although the men were still hard worked and suffered enough in the marches of the different flying columns, yet as a rule they were not under so great a strain as at first, and much was done to make them more comfortable. In Alexandria, at least, they were quartered not in the town but in stone huts, built by themselves, in the space between the wall of the old city and that of the modern one. Their dress was made more suitable to the climate and was of cotton, as already ordered for the garrison of Malta. Wellington was perhaps the only commander in modern times who did not care how his men were dressed as long as they were sufficiently distinguishable from the French. Bonaparte had the usual hankering of Generals for a

change of uniform. He had himself tried dressing like a Turk, but soon found himself as uncomfortable as when in later years he incautiously placed himself at the mercy of Murat's tailor, so he at once stripped off his robes. For the new uniform he submitted two patterns to a Clothing Board. The first pattern is described as in the oriental style and resembling the Grecian dress; the other was more like that actually worn by the troops. The first appeared to one member to be very convenient and very soldierlike, but when it came to voting the Ordonnateur and one other member were alone in that opinion. The other officers stuck to the old pattern and got a short coat, buttoning over the breast, without facings, a waistcoat, pantaloons with gaiters, and a cap in morocco, thrown back over the ears. 'On a rejeté la proposition de couper les cheveux aux troupes.' It was all very well to overthrow the Monarchy and many an institution, but it was a different matter when you came to tamper with uniform, and still more to dream of touching the men's hair. Pigtailed and long side-locks were to last for many years: indeed, Bessières died in 1813 still unshorn.

The savants who had accompanied the expedition sometimes annoyed and sometimes amused the troops. When they were worn with marching and were ready to curse the whole country, they were irritated at seeing the increasing delight of the old men at heaps of stones or ugly sculptures, and by their heavy chests, suspected to contain treasure. On the other hand, on the days of battle the men had their revenge when the regular word of command rang out: 'Les ânes et les savants au centre!' Even Bonaparte, sick of life as he fancied himself, still found some pleasure in it. Madame Fourès, the wife of an officer, had found favour in his eyes, and he had rather taken possession of her than paid his court. The husband was dispatched to France, but the English captured him, and with, let us hope, unconscious cruelty, landed him again in Egypt—a most unpleasant incident. I have already mentioned the boyish joke by which Bonaparte had made Berthier climb, but even in his sports he was ready to apply results to graver purposes. One day, mounting two of his staff on camels, he amused himself by chasing them, but when he found that, lash his horse as he might, he could not overtake the 'ships of the desert', he determined on the formation of a Dromedary Corps. This was a great success, though

for some reason the work destroyed the health of the men so employed, almost all, according to Marmont, dying of chest disease. These, too, were picked men, described by Wilson as of the finest in form and countenance and most beautifully appointed.¹

Of the men we are concerned with, only Berthier accompanied Bonaparte when he started from Cairo for Suez on the 24th December 1798, Bessières being left behind to forward information, especially bad news, which alone his commander thought could be urgent. Kléber might have been of the party, but preferred to remain and prepare for Syria, so he was left in charge of Cairo. The Guides furnished the escort, 100 of the cavalry and 200 of the infantry. There had been some friction between the two arms of the Guides, which had been united as one corps under Bessières on the 6th July, Dupas, commanding the infantry, having complained of Bessières's requirements, a very common complaint when men of a dismounted corps are placed under the commander of a mounted one. Berthier suggested a little toleration on both sides, whereupon Bessières, in a pet, wished not to have the *Guides-à-pied* under him. These men probably were not well treated, for Bonaparte in September had complained of their clothing: 'Les Guides-à-pied font peur.' Bonaparte refused Bessières's request, but, liking the angry Colonel, he soothed him by declaring that his confidence in him was proportioned to his knowledge of his military talents, bravery, and love of order and discipline, a deluge of compliments, much in the style in which we shall find him in later years calming the angry General Walther of his Guards. However, both General and Guides had very different habits at this time to those of the Emperor and his Guards. At Suez Bonaparte rode day and night on his explorations, taking with him neither cook, bed, nor tent, and for food carrying three roast fowl wrapped up in paper. The men had still less, each carrying a loaf stuck on the point of his bayonet and eating a piece day by day. They had learnt the necessity of having a leather water-bottle, which was slung from the neck. His engineers began taking the levels across the Isthmus, and made the Red Sea some thirty feet higher than the Mediterranean, an error not corrected until 1847.²

¹ Carbuccia, *Le Régiment des dromadaires à l'Armée d'Orient*; Wilson, *Life*, i. 186.

² Villiers du Terrage, *Journal*, 227-33.

Bonaparte was preparing for the expedition to Syria, but before that started he determined to clear the ever-recurring Mourad Bey out of Upper Egypt. Desaix, whose division had already been pushed south and who was described in battle as 'ten degrees cooler than steel', was chosen for this work. Hitherto he had had no cavalry and so had been unable to follow up his victory of Sediman. All the time the division had been detached Davout had been employed in organizing a body of horse at Cairo, and on the 6th December he was sent south with it to join Desaix. Annoyed at having been inactive so many months, Davout was longing to distinguish himself. He had been a General of Brigade for five years, not counting the rank of General of Division which he had held for a moment in 1793.¹ Now he was given a thousand horse, and this force was so large that he feared Dumas, the commander of the cavalry of the army, might go himself. Nothing would have been so natural: indeed, one wonders why so little mention of the fighting General should be found in the history of the army. The distribution of saddles, for instance, was entrusted to Bessières.² The explanation seems to be that he, a mulatto, suffered more even than his white comrades from *maladie du pays*, and was longing for France. As I have said, he had been prominent amongst the disaffected Generals and had offended Bonaparte by his mutinous ravings. It is said that he had reconciled himself with his commander by his conduct during the insurrection at Cairo. Jumping half dressed on his horse, he had dashed against the insurgents, laying around him with his marvellous strength. When the great Mosque had to be stormed he had forced his charger into the building, where, foaming all over and with nostrils dropping blood, the furious beast reared up with its forelegs on a raised piece of masonry, whilst its colossal rider, bare-breasted, whirled his bloody sabre above his head. Small wonder if the insurgents, gazing on Dumas's black face, believed him the very Angel of Death and fled shrieking. The fit of fury passed, and again black melancholy fell on him. All Bonaparte's efforts to retain him failed, and, half angry, half contemptuous, the commander on the 22nd January 1799 gave him leave to return to France. This was one of the desertions Bonaparte never forgot and the

¹ Phipps, i.

² For one instance where Dumas was sent on an expedition see Miot, 94-7.

Emperor Napoleon never forgave. Falling into the hands of the Neapolitan Bourbons, and believing himself poisoned by them, Dumas reached France a wreck; he could never obtain the slightest favour from the commander he had abandoned, and, retiring to Villers-Cotterets, he died in 1806. His departure not only secured Davout in his command of the cavalry in Upper Egypt, but also had the more important effect of throwing the command of the cavalry in Syria into the hands of Murat, who now, whether in name or not, became henceforward the head of the cavalry in Egypt.

To return to Davout, that General did not disguise his ambition. He wanted to gain the rank of General of Division, and spoke of blowing out his brains if he were beaten by the Mamelukes. Of course, the arm was a new one to him and the regimental officers may not have cared to have an infantry officer, and a short-sighted one, set over them; one of these regimental officers was the rough, hard-swearing, hard-smoking, hard-fighting Lasalle, who had distinguished himself at Rivoli. 'When Lasalle gives up swearing and smoking,' said Napoleon once, 'I will make him one of the Guard', whereupon Lasalle asked for command of a frigate, getting not a rebuff but a compliment, that good officers of cavalry were not for such posts. If the men Davout was to command were old troopers, the horses were still raw; indeed, at some manœuvres so many fell that great loss in the field was feared by the spectators. It is rather curious that amongst the infantry officers in the division with which Davout was to serve were Friant and Morand, two of his future Generals of Division when he was Marshal.

Davout soon had opportunities enough of measuring himself against the enemy. On the 3rd January 1799 he was sent out from Girgeh and came on 4,000 armed countrymen, of whom he sabred some 1,500. Rejoining Desaix at Girgeh, he was then sent back with most of his cavalry to join the flotilla, which was lagging behind. Meeting some 2,000 horse and a mass of insurgents, he attacked and routed the mounted men; here, as elsewhere, the fire of the Dragoons, delivered with admirable order, told heavily on the enemy. Then, falling on the body of the insurgents, who were on foot, he cut down some 2,000. Again rejoining Desaix, the division marched up the Nile to Samhud, where on the 22nd January they met Mourad Bey with some

14,000 men, including not only Mamelukes but also a band of fine fighters from Mecca, men who in each action fought to the death. The force formed three squares, Friant on the right, Belliard, the future Chief of the Staff to Murat when he commanded the cavalry of the Grande Armée, on the left, Davout with his cavalry in the centre. The mass of the enemy's horse threw themselves on Friant, but when beaten off by his guns they fled so fast that Davout and the cavalry could not catch them. Rapp was wounded, according to his custom, but he won his promotion to Colonel. It is well to remember that another A.D.C. present all this time with the division was Savary, who, considering himself a smart cavalry and staff officer, little thought he would be remembered as one of the two Police Ministers of Napoleon. In his report Desaix said Friant and Belliard were full of zeal, and described Davout as desiring to do well; then, perhaps struck by some awkwardness in the phrase, he continued, 'He manœuvred perfectly at Samhud.'

Desaix, his cavalry leading, now pushed up the left of the Nile, always in pursuit of the elusive Mourad Bey, until he reached Syene or Assuan, the farthest point reached by the French. Mourad had retired beyond the cataracts, so, leaving on the 4th February 1799, Desaix fell back down the Nile on Esneh. Belliard was left at Syene, and with some difficulty took the island of Philae. As Osman Bey, driven off by the late advance, had appeared with a force on the right bank opposite Edfu, Desaix sent Davout back up that bank to strike him. Leading one Dragoon and one Chasseur regiment (that of Lasalle), Davout met the enemy at Redesieh on the 11th February. He himself was in front with the advanced guard when his column was charged by the Mamelukes. He joined in the action, which became, he said, one of the most violent he had yet seen, and in which his men were thrown into some confusion not only by the attack, but by a violent sandstorm.¹ In the gloom Osman threw himself into the midst of the Dragoons, when Davout pushed the Chasseurs to the right so as to get the enemy between them and the Dragoons, whose fire this time had been delivered too close. The struggle, which sometimes stopped and then started again, lasted half an hour, when, order being

¹ See Miot, 61-5, 233, on the inability of the French cavalry to face the Mamelukes. Miot was the friend and companion of Murat.

restored amongst the French, the Mamelukes fled and Davout turned his attention to the peasants, who, assembling on the field, were killing any man who fell from his horse. Davout praised his men and said he had killed forty-one of the enemy and wounded some fifty others, amongst them Osman himself. He had, however, lost heavily, having thirty-seven killed and forty-four wounded.

Whilst Davout was satisfied with himself, and also applauded the way in which Lasalle had carried out the manœuvre he had ordered, Lasalle himself privately attributed the heavy loss his regiment had sustained to the blundering and inexpert ambition of Davout. The two men were bound to come into collision, and Davout had already more than once stirred the bile of the Colonel. Lasalle, it is true, may have been out of temper at this affair, for, having thrown himself into the centre of the *mêlée*, his sword had broken in his hand, and though he returned to the fight with the sword of a Dragoon, he may have been put out at having to leave his men even for a moment, especially as they had fallen back on his disappearance. However, the terms in which Davout praises Lasalle and Lasalle blames Davout show that there can be no truth in the story that the Colonel had saved the life of the General by cutting off with one sweep of his sword both hands of a Mameluke who was attacking Davout. I fear that Davout is the officer whom Villiers describes as detested by all the cavalry, who called him 'capon' and an ignoramus, and declared that he had committed atrocious follies; but much allowance must be made for cavalry officers who had just met opponents who were most difficult to deal with, and had been led by a strange commander. The cavalry now rejoined Desaix, who descended the Nile and, after admiring the ruins of Thebes, halted at Kus on the 17th February.

It is unnecessary to follow further the operations of the troops of Desaix in Upper Egypt. Constant marches were undertaken against Mourad and other leaders, and the operations were made difficult by the capture of the flotilla with most of the stores by the enemy on the 3rd March. It was the loss of one vessel, *L'Italie*, which Bonaparte, when he heard of it, insisted on taking as an omen that Italy had also fallen into the hands of the enemy. One important point was gained, for on the 29th May, Belliard, who had marched from Kaneh, succeeded in

occupying Kosseir, on the Red Sea. Desaix had heard with surprise that Bonaparte had started for an expedition into Syria, so that his own isolation seemed the greater. He had also lost the support of Davout. On the 5th March Desaix had sent the General with a small column, one regiment^s of Hussars, an infantry battalion of some 400 men, and two guns, from Kaneh down the right of the Nile to suppress the bands which were giving trouble. Reaching Siut on the 16th April and joining the troops in support in the lower provinces, he relieved Minieh, and then reached Beni-Suef on the 1st May. Here he received orders from Dugua, who had been left by Bonaparte in Cairo, to march down to the Capital, which was considered to be in danger. He complied, and entered Cairo. He then pursued Mourad Bey till he threw him into the Syrian desert, a proceeding which naturally was vexatious to Desaix, who complained that he had lost all the troops at his disposal for such work. He had meant Davout to leave the troops sent with him at Minieh, and to push on with the local garrisons. Now Davout had stripped him and had disorganized all the garrisons. The security of the Capital was, however, all-important, and Bonaparte later approved what had been done. When the army returned from Syria, Davout moved out to re-open communications and re-entered Cairo with it on the 14th June. Then he was ordered to hold the provinces of Beni-Suef, Minieh, and Fayum, but a fresh attack of dysentery kept him at Cairo.

Whilst Desaix had thus been clearing Upper Egypt, Bonaparte had begun to prepare for an expedition to Syria in October 1798, although he did not start until February 1799. This was not the wild scheme it is often represented to have been. For long the farce had been kept up of professing that the expedition to Egypt had nothing hostile to the Porte but was only directed against the Mamelukes; and Talleyrand, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, was to have gone to Constantinople to represent matters there in the proper light. Too wise to trust himself to the Turks, Talleyrand instructed the French Minister at Constantinople to assure the Porte, after Malta had been taken, that no other conquest was to be made by the army. As if his conscience gave him some twinge, for he was comparatively fresh to diplomacy, he pointed out privately to the Minister the difference between a conquest and what was to be carried out in

Egypt, which was an occupation. After some perplexity, the Porte had joined the English in opposing the French and were preparing a force to attack the army in Egypt. In Syria, Djeddar, the Pasha of Acre, was to be used, and he was collecting troops. Whatever wider plans Bonaparte may have conceived afterwards, there can be little doubt that his first plan was the perfectly sane one of forestalling the blow which he believed was preparing in Syria by destroying the army of Djeddar, marching to Damascus, and entrusting part, at least, of Syria to the Christian and other friendly tribes, after which he would return to Egypt in time to meet any attack by sea. As events were to show, this was perfectly practicable had Acre been properly besieged, or had it been ignored when its defences were found so formidable and the advance on Damascus continued.¹ However wildly Bonaparte may have talked or written later about schemes for an Eastern Empire, no one knew better than he when he started for Syria that he had not sufficient forces for any greater plan than that which I have described.

Four of the five divisions were to be used: Reynier, from Salihiyeh, formed the advanced guard, followed by Kléber from Damietta, and then by Bon and Lannes from Cairo. Kléber had on the 23rd January at Damietta retaken command of his own former division from his substitute Dugua, who went to command at Cairo. Murat, so long employed with movable columns of both arms, was now given command of the cavalry of the expedition, some 900 strong and made up of detachments from all the cavalry regiments. This number does not include 88 of the new Camel Corps nor the 400 Guides under Bessières. This was an important appointment for Murat, and showed that Bonaparte was satisfied with the constant work he had done, but it was the approaching departure of the real cavalry commander, Dumas, which gave him this opening which led him so high, whilst the absence of Davout with Desaix in Upper Egypt prevented any competition between the two. Leclerc, as I have said, had not, I think, fully maintained his character. Berthier, and Bessières with his Guides, of course accompanied Bonaparte. Another of the 'Italie' group, the former A.D.C. Junot, was also taken. Promoted General of Brigade on the 9th January 1799, he had been sent to command at Suez, but was recalled for the

¹ Compare Doguereau, 199-200; La Jonquière, iv. 7-16.

expedition, which he joined at Gaza. The force for the expedition, the Armée de Syrie, was some 13,000 strong. Bonaparte had not been well seconded by the Supply Departments, and the proper preparations had not been fully made when the army started; but the troops actually taken were the best of the four divisions in Lower Egypt. Some 16,000 men, including Desaix's division, were left to hold Egypt.

XVIII

SYRIA

(February to May 1799)

El-Arish and Jaffa. Siege of Acre. Kléber and Bonaparte. Retreat from Acre.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

1799 18th March. Battle of Ostrach.
21st March. Battle of Stockach.

THE details of the expedition to Syria, with all the hard fighting which took place, need not detain us long. Reynier, starting from Salihiyeh on the 6th February 1799, led the way, followed by Kléber, who brought his division across Lake Menzaleh. Bon's division from Cairo came next, and on the 10th February Bonaparte left Cairo and marched with Berthier, Bessières, the division of Lannes, and the cavalry of Murat. On the 16th February he was at Mesoudiah. Here, according to his Secretary, Bourrienne, who was with him, occurred the conversation with Junot, who informed him, always according to the Secretary, of the infidelity of Joséphine. Now, as we shall see, Junot was not yet with the army, which he only joined from Suez at Gaza on the 25th February. Besides, Bonaparte seems to have already learnt his misfortune.¹ By the 17th February the whole army was concentrated round the fort at Kaalat El-Arish, which Kléber had already attacked with his own and Reynier's divisions and which capitulated on favourable terms on the 19th February. Reynier, who had routed the covering force of the enemy, considered the services of his men had not been properly recognized by Bonaparte, who on his side resented the General's remonstrance. The ill feeling between the two took years to remove. On the 21st February Kléber started with Murat's cavalry and his own division, as advanced guard, followed by Bon and Lannes at a day's interval, whilst Reynier remained in rear till the 27th.

¹ *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. ii. 210-11; Eng. ed. i. 168-70; *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, i. 4; La Jonquière, *Égypte*, ii, iv. 183, note 1; D'Abrantès, ii. 105-6. See *ante*, p. 372.

As we have seen, Desaix was left to hold Upper Egypt with his division and the cavalry of Davout, although he did not keep that General all the time of Bonaparte's absence. The rest of the country was to be garrisoned by the third battalions of the regiments taken to Syria, the *Légion nautique*, or the sailors, the *Légion Maltaise* (troops raised at and brought from Malta), one whole infantry regiment, and the cavalry depots. Dugua was given command at Cairo, whither we have seen him call Davout, and the extraordinary Menou, who ought to have gone to Cairo, chose to remain at Rosetta. Two of the future Marshals were left behind by Bonaparte, Davout in Upper Egypt and Marmont in command at Alexandria. Marmont at first looked at the appointment to this post and not being taken with Bonaparte, in the regular spirit of the group which hung round the leader, as a sort of disgrace, but in time more sensibly he learnt to consider it as a proof of confidence. So it doubtless was, for the English might make a descent at any moment, and it was suspected that the Turks were preparing an army for an attack. Berthier accompanied his commander, but most unwillingly. Drawn by a love for his mistress such as romancers attribute only to young men, he had felt he could no longer bear separation from her. To go to Syria was indeed to drag a lengthening chain and he had demanded leave to return to France. Even in September 1798 this had been spoken of, when rumour, surely wrongly, gave him Menou, of all men, as successor. Now all the remonstrances and sneers of Bonaparte could not restrain him, and his passage had been taken when at the last moment his heart failed him and he decided to remain. Had he gone we may be sure he would never have been forgiven and his name would never have appeared in history. Reynier, who had been Chief of the Staff to Moreau, would seem to have been his natural successor; certainly not the eccentric Menou, but I know of no authority on the point.

Orders had been given, as I have already said, that the men should carry water-bottles, but this and other matters of supply were not properly attended to. The artillery were to have their own provision of water. Believing he might meet large bodies of cavalry, Bonaparte had ordered each man to be supplied with a pike about five feet long to which two chains were attached. These pikes were to be driven into the ground

between the heels of each man, when required, and then to be connected right and left by the chains. This new defence would seem to have been only actually used at night, and, as was to be expected, the men found the pikes cumbersome to carry on the march, and even to be dangerous in storming houses or works when 'nos maudites lances' stuck in the doorways, and in the end the pikes were used for firewood. Needless to say, their introduction had led to the promulgation of a new and detailed drill for their use.¹ Under every sky and in every army the heart of the soldier is still the same.

The march through the desert both to and after El-Arish was most trying. Reynier's division, for instance, moving in two squares, suffered much from want of water, and on one day, the 8th February, left a hundred dead round the wells at which they had halted, whilst some men, unable to reach so far, blew out their own brains. From Salihyeh the division, not having any landmark amidst the moving sand, had marched by compass. Kléber now got off the track, and Bonaparte, following behind as he imagined, with only his staff, the Guides, and some of the Camel Corps, came on a body of the enemy instead of his own troops. His staff proposed to retire, but, realizing the danger, he wisely moved forward and the enemy withdrew, thinking his party was the advanced guard. In time Kléber, having shot his guide, arrived with the other divisions whom he had led astray, and Lannes for a time took the lead. The men, tried beyond endurance, murmured and gave trouble; a little later some even came to the commander's tent to complain of want of food. Bonaparte, who had already told them they had imitated but not yet equalled the Roman Legions, now declared they would never rise to that level: the Romans would have eaten their goat-skin knapsacks. 'General,' replied the orator of the day, 'your Romans did not carry such things', and a roar of laughter saved a dangerous situation. Indeed, throughout the march to Acre the army's subsistence practically depended on the supplies foolishly left by the enemy, and the half-famished men were in such temper that the officers of the Supply Departments thought it prudent to keep clear of the columns on the march, for the troops even resented seeing them on horse-back.

¹ *Corr. Nap.* v. 3789; La Jonquière, *Égypte*, iii. 478-9, 710-18, iv. 83-4; François, 254, 258.

On the 25th February the enemy were found near Gaza, when the three divisions up, Lannes, Kléber, and Bon, each in square, advanced in line, with Murat's cavalry in front. 'We charged the enemy near the height looking on Hebron, and where Samson carried the gates of Gaza.'¹ The two forces, however, hardly came in contact, for the enemy retreated so hurriedly that Murat could not reach them, and Gaza was occupied without resistance. Marching still northwards, with Kléber and Murat leading, Jaffa was reached on the 3rd March, when Murat closely reconnoitred it. Then, whilst Lannes and Bon attacked the place, Kléber, with his division and Murat's cavalry, moved on to cover the siege on the north and Reynier did the same on the south. At daylight on the 7th March the siege batteries, only twelve-pounders, opened, and by 4 p.m. Bonaparte believed the breach to be practicable, and Lannes's troops assaulted. They were stoutly met, but Bon's men found an opening in the sea wall and got in, when both divisions thoroughly pillaged the town, not sparing the lives of men or the honour of women. Bonaparte, sitting with Lannes on a three-pounder opposite the breach, received and questioned the prisoners brought in, doing nothing to stop the sack of the town, 'given up to pillage and to all the horrors of war, which have never seemed so hideous to me', as he himself wrote. He would have done better to intervene, for though the plague had already struck the army, after this close contact with the inhabitants it got a firm hold. Most probably the men were completely out of hand; indeed, the party sent to bring in the French wounded left their comrades on the breach and joined in the pillage. Jaffa took its own revenge, for, besides giving the plague to its plunderers, the ease with which it was taken led to fatal over-confidence before Acre.

On the 9th March Berthier was ordered to send twenty of the principal officers of the Turkish artillery with a battalion to Gaza, whence part of the Camel Corps was to escort them to Cairo. All the other Turkish gunners and troops captured at Jaffa were to be taken to the sea-shore and shot, Berthier taking precautions that none escaped. As a French work charitably says, 'Let us throw a funeral veil over the fate of the Syrian prisoners at Jaffa and over the treatment of the French

¹ *Corr. Nap.* v. 360.

prisoners in England. Let us lament the atrocities of war and the crimes of policy.¹

The army now advanced on Acre, Kléber and Murat leading, followed by Bon and then Lannes; Reynier was still in rear and Junot was detached on Caesarea. On the 15th March the enemy was met in force. The divisions of Kléber and Bon, formed in two squares with the cavalry in the centre, marched on the Turkish cavalry from Acre in their front, whilst Lannes manœuvred on the right to cut off from the Turks a body of armed peasants from Nablus. The Turkish cavalry was easily put to flight and Lannes threw back the force from Nablus, but, irritated at their resistance, he pursued them into their mountains, contrary to orders. Once safe in their hills, the peasants turned: knowing every inch of ground, they held their own and Lannes's men had to retreat, losing heavily. This check took away much of the effect of the victory elsewhere, and Bonaparte bitterly reproached Lannes for having sacrificed so many brave men uselessly. Lannes excused himself on the ground that the Nablus men had defied him and that he had wished to chastise such *canaille*. 'We are not in a position to indulge in bravadoes', replied the commander, who was himself soon to be blamed for want of economy of his men. One wonders if it was now that Bonaparte prophesied that Lannes would never do anything great because he could not control his temper. Wherever this criticism was made, it was well founded, and Lannes, hearing it, took it to heart and tried with some success to control himself, although we shall find him after Aboukir getting himself repulsed and wounded unnecessarily. Circling round Mount Carmel and bridging the ancient river Kishon, Bessières and his Guides led over the next river, and by the 18th March Bonaparte was before Acre. Reynier came up from Jaffa, and his division, with those of Lannes and Bon, prepared for the siege, which was covered by Kléber's division and Murat's cavalry. One ominous circumstance was that two English men-of-war had been found off Acre, and their boats had fired on the troops coming round Mount Carmel's shore.

The operations before Acre lasted from the 18th March to the 16th May 1799 and may be divided into two parts. The actual siege work was conducted by the divisions of Reynier, Lannes,

¹ *Vict. et Conq.* x. 104, note.

and Bon, although Bon's division was taken into the country for the battle of Mount Tabor, and Kléber, with one of his brigades of the covering force, was brought up for the final assault. In the siege, fierce assault after assault was delivered on the walls of the place by men who had never known real defeat. Of the eleven infantry regiments in Syria, seven had fought under Masséna or Joubert at Rivoli. All Bon's regiments had been at that battle, and no one, least of all the men themselves, believed that such troops could fail before the walls of the antiquated fortress which seemed crumbling before them. In the brutal way in which it was conducted the siege resembled those of Wellington in Spain; but here the men were brought up time after time to the breach, and came on day after day as confidently as ever. Special companies of *éclaireurs* were formed for the most dangerous work, and although these companies were frequently almost entirely destroyed, yet the men disputed for the honour of entering into them. 'I have seen men weeping whilst saying to the Colonels of regiments, "Am not I as good a soldier and as brave as So-and-so, who goes in front?"' To calm them the Colonels were obliged to promise them their time should come.'

After the failure of the first assault the grenadiers of the 25th Regiment begged to be permitted to lead another attack. Their commander, speaking to his friend Murat, said, 'If Acre be not taken this evening, be sure that Venoux is dead'; and that night his headless body lay on the breach. The grenadiers of each regiment considered themselves bound to undertake any dangerous work. In the sortie of the 17th April the English Major Oldfield was killed whilst bravely leading the Turks, and Bonaparte wanted to get the body, which lay in the open, to see if any letters or information were on it, especially as it was believed to be that of the *émigré* Phélippeaux. General Rampon, himself soon to fall, asked for six grenadiers to volunteer. 'That concerns the seniors with the grenade', said their Captain, stepping out of the trench with five men. Half of the party were shot down, but the others brought in the corpse. 'In this regiment as in all others, la grenade obligeait.'¹ The body which had cost so many lives was buried by Bonaparte with due military honours.

¹ Pelleport, i. 149.

With a proper siege train Acre would have fallen at once, but it had been so hard to collect transport and the country was expected to be so difficult that Bonaparte had determined to send his heavy pieces by sea. Thus, besides its field artillery with the divisions, the army only brought four twelve-pounders, four eight-pounders, four howitzers, and four six-inch mortars. Two siege trains had been ordered from Egypt, and although these had been countermanded when Bonaparte realized the danger from the English ships, both convoys started, not knowing of the change of intention. From Damietta Captain Stendlet sailed with a convoy carrying four twenty-four-pounders, four sixteen-pounders, and four eight-inch mortars, which would soon have reduced the place. Arriving off Jaffa on the 16th March, Stendlet there received orders to go on to Haifa, a small port on the south of the Bay of Acre only some nine miles from the fortress, which the French had taken, and next day he sailed again. Bonaparte says that when he himself drew near Acre and saw the English ships then off that place, he sent back some cavalry to warn Stendlet and to inform him of the occupation of Haifa. According to Bonaparte, the cavalry succeeded in communicating with Stendlet, but that officer does not mention the receipt of the warning. Then, when rounding Mount Carmel on the 18th March in misty weather, Stendlet came on the English ships. Sidney Smith, guessing that the siege train would come by sea, was on the look-out, and though Stendlet himself got off and eventually reached France, all the convoy carrying the guns was captured. This loss forced Bonaparte to begin the siege with only the guns he had brought by land and two carronades, one a thirty-two-pounder taken from an English launch and the other a twenty-four-pounder taken with a Turkish boat, both captured at Haifa. What was most disastrous was that not merely were the siege guns lost to the French but they were mounted on the fortifications of Acre and bore down the lighter pieces of the army.

Bonaparte's over-confidence had caused this disaster, for the guns could have been landed at Jaffa, as the second lot were, but he assumed that the English would be absorbed off Alexandria. Lavalette tried to make Stendlet responsible, alleging that he had not gone into Jaffa, being misled by the fact that the Turkish flag had been kept flying there in order to entrap

vessels of the enemy. This trick was tried, with success as far as the Turks were concerned, but Stendlet spent twelve hours at anchor at Jaffa, and the orders for Haifa, which he says he got there, are the same as those Bonaparte acknowledges he sent him by the cavalry. Bonaparte, of course, laid the blame on Stendlet, arguing that the convoy could have entered Haifa on the 19th March.¹ I presume he means that when Stendlet saw the ships of the enemy he ought to have ordered his convoy to run for Haifa, trusting to some getting in. As Stendlet describes one of the two English frigates, apparently the *Tiger*, as chasing him till it got close up and then abandoning the pursuit as it saw the convoy would escape, there is something in this. Some time had been lost by Stendlet in chasing and capturing a small French vessel of which the English had made a prize.

As a second string, Rear-Admiral Perrée had been ordered from Alexandria with three frigates carrying another siege train. Oddly enough Marmont, who must have supplied this train, describes it as having been captured,² but in reality it reached the army safely. Perrée arrived off Jaffa on the 15th April, bringing two twenty-four-pounders, two eighteen-pounders, and two mortars, which he landed there, together with four of his own eighteen-pounders. It was, however, only by chance that he escaped a contest with the English, who sighted him off Caesarea, but as the *Theseus* frigate prepared to attack, an explosion of French shells on board of her set fire to her and disabled her for the time. The pieces brought by Perrée did good service but arrived too late. At the time Bonaparte wrote of them as having been landed at Jaffa, as no doubt they were, but by a curious mistake in his later account he describes Perrée as landing them at Tanturah, a port some twenty-four miles south of Acre.³ The explanation would seem to be that the ammunition and some, if not all, of the pieces were brought up, presumably in small craft, from Jaffa to Tanturah, and four eighteen-pounders were certainly sent for to Tanturah.⁴

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 37-8. See Savary, i, part i, 103, to same effect, but he was not present.

² Marmont, ii. 10, perhaps thinking of some ammunition-ships captured. La Jonquière, iv. 302.

³ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 51, as does Colbert, i. 382.

⁴ *Corr. Nap.* v, Nos. 4095, 4102, and Perrée's report in La Jonquière, *Égypte*, iv. 429-33, 506-12.

A mention by an officer of having met them *en route* might apply to either port. Bonaparte's correspondence at the time does not read as if he had been very anxious to receive his train; indeed, as I have said, both convoys had been countermanded, the easy capture of Jaffa probably being responsible for this as well as the danger from the English.

In one affair the English were met on land. On the 23rd March 1799 Sidney Smith sent his boats to attack the port of Haifa, where the French let them land and then fell on them, taking some and driving the rest into their boats. The launch of the *Tiger* was captured and with it a thirty-two-pounder carronade. Then on the 1st April a Turkish frigate anchored off Haifa before daybreak. Misled by the French hoisting the Turkish colours, the Captain landed, when the French made him and his boat's crew prisoners, capturing a twenty-four-pounder carronade.¹ These two pieces were used for the siege, so that whilst the French supplied, all unwillingly, some of the heaviest pieces used in the defence, the English and Turks supplied the largest calibres used in the attack.² It was partly the difficulty of getting projectiles for the English carronade which made Bonaparte resort to the quaint plan of offering a reward for the shot fired from the place and from the ships. The men wanted money to buy food from the few peasants who brought provisions to the camp, and consequently exposed themselves on the beach to the fire which the English, unconscious of the trick, poured on them and which often enough caused loss of life.

Hitherto all the operations in Syria, the march and the siege, had taken place on a narrow strip of land by the sea, and not even the temptation to see Jerusalem had drawn Bonaparte from the coast; the Holy City, as he afterwards explained, was not on his line of operations, and he did not want to be entangled in the hill country. Now the news that an army of relief was advancing from Damascus altered all this. Three small forces were pushed out, one northwards on Tyre, and two others, under Murat and Junot, inland into the Jordan valley, north and south

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 38; Miot, 161-2; Doguereau, 202-5. I presume the seventeen English prisoners sent to Cairo on the 26th April were taken on this occasion. La Jonquière, *Égypte*, iv. 668.

² For list of guns see La Jonquière, iv. 675-6.

of the Sea of Galilee. On the 30th March Murat, with 200 cavalry and 500 infantry and two guns, moved north-east over the great range of hills between the sea and the Jordan. He had to leave his guns, but he found the fort at Safed on the eastern slope abandoned by the enemy. Then, dipping down through difficult country into the Jordan valley, between the waters of Marom and the Sea of Galilee, to the Jisr Benat Yakub, or Bridge of Jacob's Daughters, where one of the roads from Damascus crossed the river, he found no signs of any enemy. He was now only some fifty to sixty miles from Damascus. Bonaparte seems to have believed that Safed commanded either the road or the bridge, and, finding this not the case, he recalled the column, which left a garrison at Safed and rejoined the army on the 4th April. This was premature, for, just as Murat withdrew, the Damascus army came across the Jordan, part, under the son of the Pasha, over the Jacob Bridge, and the main body under the Pasha of Damascus himself, by the bridge at Jisr El-Majaliyeh, to the south of the Sea of Galilee. Ascending from the Jordan valley, the Pasha advanced westwards to the north of Mount Tabor, where he came on Junot.¹

The selection of Junot to lead a column was one of the cases where Bonaparte gave men who had been on his staff opportunities for distinguishing themselves. We have already seen Murat treated in this way, being first given small columns, and Marmont had also been started on the road to high promotion. Now came the turn of Junot, who, but for his own failings, would, like them, have won the baton. Coming to Egypt as Colonel and A.D.C., on the 9th January 1799 he had been promoted General of Brigade and on the 15th of that month he had been given the command at Suez, then an important post, to hold against the English. Called up for the expedition to Syria, he had joined the force *en route*, and on the 10th March was sent to command one of the brigades of Kléber's division. Some persons fancied he was meant to act as a sort of check on Kléber, whose discontent was suspected, but I take it that it was only later Kléber became troublesome; and, in any case, the impulsive Junot was not the man for such work. Now, on the 30th March Junot was sent with 300 infantry and 150 cavalry on Shefa, or Chafa, Amr, and Nazareth, to clear the country south of

¹ La Jonquière, iv. 358, for map.

Murat's march and to ascertain if there were any signs of a collection of the enemy at Nablus. At Nazareth he learnt from friendly natives that a strong force of the enemy was near. On the 8th April he advanced by Cana of Galilee on the road to Lubieh, to the south-west of Tiberias (Tubariya or Tabarieh), when he was surrounded by a mass of the enemy's cavalry some 3,000 strong. By prodigies of bravery his small party cut their way back along the crests of the hills to Cana and then to Nazareth; the credit of this exploit was officially attributed to him, but Kléber ascribed it to Colonel Desnoyers.¹

I have already spoken of the way in which some of Bonaparte's acts, especially his rewards, seem an anticipation of the Empire. Here is a curious instance. Pleased with the exploit performed by one of his personal adherents, he, though commanding some 13,000 men engaged in the hitherto unsuccessful siege of a Syrian fortress, and completely cut off from France, ordered that a medal worth 500 louis should be offered for a competition for the best picture to commemorate this feat. The staff were to get the artists brought with the army to Egypt to sketch the many dresses of the tribes who had fought and to send these to the Minister of the Interior at Paris, asking him to send copies to the chief painters of Paris, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples, and to fix the date of the competition. Reading this, one imagines one has turned over too many leaves and come into the full time of the Empire, yet the order was really given on the 21st April 1799. Berthier had his moments of doubt, and one would like to have seen his face on receipt of such instructions. However, in due time came the Consulate, and Gros was selected as the artist, but the picture was never completed. When dukedoms were distributed under the Empire Junot would have been Duc de Nazareth, instead of Duc d'Abrantès, had not Napoleon feared lest the General might be familiarly called 'Junot of Nazareth', recalling a sacred phrase.

Bonaparte now sent Kléber with the rest of his division on the 9th April to join Junot and to cover the army from the Damascus force. Joining Junot at Nazareth, Kléber fought a large body of the Turks on the 11th April near the same ground where Junot had distinguished himself, but he withdrew again

¹ *Corr. Nap.* v, Nos. 4064, 4071; *Vict. et Conq.* x. 188-93; D'Abrantès, ix. 500, note; La Jonquière, iv. 361-83, and map p. 358, or Bartholomew's map.

to Nazareth. Then, as the Pasha, disregarding him, came down into the plain of Esdraelon to join a force from Nablus, leaving his communications exposed, Kléber determined to throw himself between the river Jordan and the Pasha, whom he hoped to crush by such a night attack as Reynier had tried successfully at El-Arish. Bonaparte, with his usual good sense, in his later work criticizes this plan, forgetting that he himself had recommended it to Kléber.¹ Certainly that commander placed himself in great peril when his surprise of the enemy's camp failed and he found his division surrounded in the plain below Mount Tabor on the 16th April by an enormous mass of the enemy, who could inevitably have overwhelmed him had they been sufficiently disciplined to make a combined and sustained attack. Just when Kléber was deliberating whether to stand firm or to spike his guns and try to break through to the hills, the report of a gun rang out and a line of bayonets shone on the crest of the heights to the north. Realizing Kléber's danger, Bonaparte had marched from Acre on the 15th April with Bon's division, his Guides, the cavalry, and eight guns. Kléber's division, originally formed in two squares under Junot and Verdier, had now been welded into one. Forming his troops in two squares, which with that of Kléber made an enormous triangle, Bonaparte crushed the mass of undisciplined troops he had to deal with and they took to flight, part for the Jordan and part for Nablus. 'General, you are as great as the world!' exclaimed Kléber, for once surprised out of his ill humour.

Of the men we are concerned with, only Kléber and Junot, with the future Marshals Bessières and most probably Berthier, were engaged at Mount Tabor. It is true that the day after the battle Berthier was issuing orders before Acre at noon, whilst Bonaparte only arrived there in the evening: still, the Chief of the Staff may have preceded the General in his return. Bonaparte did not mention either him or Bessières, apparently treating the battle as mainly Kléber's. Little is said about the cavalry. With a strange confidence in his success, Bonaparte, before diving with his infantry into the seething mass of enemy before him, sent his cavalry on a wide sweep to the right where, two hours off, near Ellegoun, at the foot of the hills, they came on the deserted camp of the Mamelukes. As for the Guides,

¹ Compare *Corr. Nap.* v, Nos. 4088, 4089, with *ibid.* xxx. 47.

their infantry at the end of the battle marched towards Genin, far south of the field, to cut off the retreat of that part of the enemy which had come from Nablus. I presume that Bessières and his *Guides-à-cheval* remained with Bonaparte during the day.

Murat is often described as having been engaged at Mount Tabor. In reality he was not there, but he played a very important part in the operation. When Bonaparte understood that Kléber had to deal with a great army to the south of the Sea of Galilee, he sent Murat again to the Jacob Bridge to the north of the Sea, to threaten the rear, or communications, of the force from Damascus. Early on the 14th April Murat started with some 1,000 infantry and a gun, but with only about fifty Dragoons. The command of the cavalry left before Acre was for the moment handed over to Andréossi. Repeating his march by Safed, Murat again came down on the Jacob Bridge, but this time he found the enemy there. Fortunately for his small force, the son of the Pasha, who commanded here, had made such large detachments that only part of his force was available, and Murat had no difficulty in driving the Turks over the Jordan on the 15th April, the same day that Bonaparte was marching to succour Kléber. The enemy fled, and the Turkish camp on the left bank and much plunder fell into the hands of Murat's force, the men enjoying the mass of sweetmeats brought from Damascus. Returning to the right bank and burning the enemy's camp, the force carried off its booty. Marching down the western side of the Sea of Galilee, which was swept by a storm, on the 17th Murat reached Tiberias, or Tubariyah, which he found abandoned by the enemy but full of stores, especially of grain. Murat had sent on his A.D.C., Augustus Colbert, with the Dragoons to push southwards for the Mujamiyeh Bridge below the southern end of the Sea of Galilee, and to get in touch with Kléber. Reaching the bridge probably on the 17th April, Colbert found the enemy had been put to flight, and on the 18th he was with Bonaparte at Nazareth.

While Bonaparte returned to Acre, Kléber pursued the flying enemy. Then, coming back over the Jordan, he went on the 18th April to Tiberias, where he found Murat and his column. Next day Murat returned to the cavalry camp before Acre, where he arrived on the 22nd April. He had been in a position of great

danger, for, as indeed Bonaparte had foreseen, it was quite possible that the mass of the enemy might have retired northwards from in front of Kléber for the Jacob Bridge. Kléber was directed in such case to follow the enemy, but that would hardly have saved Murat. As it was, Murat's attack had confused the enemy and had added to the wildness of their flight; the mass of grain he had seized supplied the army during the time it still remained before Acre. Kléber left Junot's brigade by Tiberias, himself encamping below Mount Tabor. On the 8th May Bonaparte, preparing for a final assault, called up Verdier's brigade of Kléber's division to Acre, leaving it to Kléber either to remain with Junot or to join the besiegers. On the 9th May Kléber was at Acre and next day, the 10th, his division led an assault. Coming comparatively fresh, it was hoped their dash would succeed. It was as if the Highlanders had been brought up from Balaklava against the Redan after the failure of the worn regiments of the besieging force. Kléber was prominent in urging his men up the breach and some even got into the place, only to find new entrenchments. After this there were no more fresh troops to use; even the *Guides-à-pied* had been in the trenches: indeed, on the 8th May, when Lannes attacked, they had led an assault of their own.

The main stress of the siege had fallen on the divisions of Reynier, Lannes, and Bon, although, as we have seen, all corps had taken a part in the work and in the assaults. Junot's brigade, which had started for Nazareth on the 30th March, did not rejoin until the retreat began. Kléber himself, after the first assault had been beaten back, had prophesied the failure of the siege, very justly blaming the hasty and faulty construction of the siege works and the want of agreement between the artillery and the engineers. It must be remembered that he had seen more of siege work than Bonaparte.¹ But what struck him most was the reckless way in which Bonaparte time after time threw his men on the breach. On the Rhine they had to be more economical of their troops, and, anticipating later blame of the Emperor as a 'mangeur des hommes', he styled him 'a General at ten thousand men a week'. His rough tongue made his criticisms rankle. At the beginning of the siege he had sneered at the slight construction of the trenches, the parapet

¹ With the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' on the Rhine. Phipps, ii.

of which, he told Bonaparte, might cover *him*, but did not come up to his own stomach. Now, no short man likes being looked down on by a tall one. Then, finding the staff echoing most subserviently Bonaparte's declaration that the breach was practicable, Kléber joined in with suspicious alacrity: it was so—for a cat.

Kléber's attitude toward his commander throughout the expedition was a curious one, for he had come rather as an inquirer into the secret of Bonaparte's success than as his lieutenant. On starting he had written: 'I do not yet know him; he appeared so unexpectedly on the scene, he surrounded himself immediately with so much prestige, and his ascent was so rapid, that from the distance where I found myself it has been impossible for me to observe and follow him.' This being so, it was by following him that he hoped to ascertain the difference between himself, the worthy Jourdan and other commanders he had known, and the winner of Rivoli. Such an intention was hardly likely to lead to much affection between two such very different men. Talleyrand, when asked why a certain widow had married the very dull but very close friend of her late husband, suggested that it was to find out what her husband had seen to admire in him, and even in the case of a hero too close inspection is not advisable. From the first, Kléber considered the expedition had not been seriously enough prepared, and now he saw some of Bonaparte's personal faults. 'Never a fixed plan; everything goes by leaps and starts; the day rules the affairs of the day. He professes to believe in Fate.' There was much truth in this, for Napoleon rather prided himself on not having any settled plan in some circumstances.

But Kléber, though critical, felt the ascendancy of his chief. 'What then is his great quality?—for still he is an extraordinary man. To dare and still to dare, and he carries this art beyond rashness.' Saint-Cyr was to say much the same after many years of experience. Kléber half ironically styles Bonaparte the 'Tout-Puissant', a phrase he was to repeat when, himself then in command, he described his late commander as 'la toute-puissance irritée'. However, neither the man he had to deal with nor the place enabled Kléber to act as he had done towards Jourdan in the dark days of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', and, to do him justice, on the breach he had done his best to falsify

his own prophesies of failure. He was not alone in his irritation against the commander. Lannes, when wounded, had declaimed loudly against the unmeasured ambition of his chief, as indeed at least one other officer had done to the General's very face.¹ Bonaparte himself wisely passed over such ravings, and Lannes, interrupted in his denunciation by the entry of Bonaparte, suddenly changed his language and assured him that whatever might happen he was consoled, since he had the happiness of seeing and receiving the evidence of his full friendship.

All the Generals had taken part in the siege, and Bonaparte himself had been slightly wounded and had run great risks. On the 1st April in the trenches a falling shell buried him in the hole it made, but two Corporals of his Guides covered him with their bodies, one of them being wounded in consequence when the shell burst. A bullet which grazed the General's hat struck young Arrighi in the throat, cutting the artery, so that Larrey, who himself attended him, was astonished at being able to save his life. Bonaparte also had a horse shot under him. We have seen Lannes seriously wounded, and so was Duroc, who was lamed by a splinter of a shell. Murat was probably one of the best off. Scouring the country, he was able to obtain both food and wine, so that invitations to his table were welcome amongst the less fortunate officers. It was to him that Bonaparte said, pointing to Acre, 'The fate of the East is in this little barn; the fall of the town is the object of my expedition: Damascus should be its fruits.' Murat, for the most part, lay in front, ready to dash at any troublesome tribe, but he rather horrified his companion Miot by undressing at night, explaining that if called out he would mount in his shirt and be all the better seen in the dark. Though ready to take his ease, he would not have been the Murat we know had he not volunteered for the assault. On the 9th and 10th April he headed the grenadiers of the 69th in repulsing sorties. On the 9th May he was ordered to occupy the crest of the second tower, touching that of the breach. Next day, the 10th May, he is said to have gone forward attracting attention by the plume he was so fond of. A ball which grazed his neck went through his cravat, while to his grief his plume was shot off and fell into the hands of Djezzar himself, who showed it as a trophy. On this or on another occasion, when he

¹ La Jonquière, *Égypte*, iv. 456, note 1, 554.

was in the thick of the mêlée, his life was saved by his A.D.C., Colbert, who cut down a Turk threatening his General and fell himself by a bullet from another Turk.

Lannes had been especially unfortunate. On the 24th April he was looking through a loop-hole in the parapet of the trench when a ball went through both cheeks, taking away several teeth. In the assault of the 8th May, when he took part with his division and when Sidney Smith noticed his bravery in encouraging his men, he fell on the breach, shot through the neck. His men were beaten back and he would have shared the fate of the other wounded who were decapitated by the Turks had not a Captain returned with some grenadiers to carry him off. All these men were shot down in succession, but the Captain in desperation caught him by one leg and dragged him down the slope some distance to the trenches. This rough transit covered his head and neck with bruises, but Larrey dressed his wounds and he recovered, although when the army retired he had to be carried in a litter. In after-life the loss of teeth and his wound caused some difficulty in speaking and made him carry his head a little on one side. In better days, when a Marshal, he did not forget the Captain who had saved his life at such great risk. Bonaparte, in a eulogistic order of the 10th May 1799, announced Lannes's nomination to the rank of General of Division, a post which, as we have seen, he had really held since the 27th July 1798. We shall find Lannes wounded again before he returned to France. Another General of Division, Bon, had been mortally wounded in leading his men to the assault, and he died as the retreat began. His division was given to Rampon.

I have called the siege more a brutal than a scientific one, rather resembling those of Wellington in Spain. Jaffa had fallen so easily that sufficient care and labour were not given to the construction of the siege works; indeed, the Chief Engineer, Caffarelli, owed the loss of his life to the low height of the parapet thrown up. Marmont, who, although left in Alexandria, still as an artillery officer would probably be well informed on such a point, speaks of the 'lutte scandaleuse' between the artillery and the engineers, a matter on which Kléber also remarked.¹

¹ Marmont, ii. 11; Villiers de Terrage, 218-20; *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 41; Miot, 209; La Jonquière, *Égypte*, iv. 637.

Marmont's assertion that Bonaparte pressed assaults when the breach was impracticable, an opinion held also by Kléber, would seem supported by the fact that such fine troops failed, but the men themselves were apparently always anxious for a fresh trial. Certainly the troops behaved splendidly. Scourged by the plague, they got little if any meat; they were too thinly clothed for the Syrian climate, and were badly off for all supplies. They fought under the most dispiriting circumstances, for it was impossible to remove the bodies of the dead and each sortie of the garrison covered the trenches with corpses. These had to be built into the parapets, where they lay decomposing and the stench was fearful. It was intense pain to the troops of the *Armée d'Italie* to acknowledge they could fail, but we who know how splendidly the Turks can fight, especially behind walls and in hand-to-hand combats with the sword, can see no dishonour in the repulse from Acre.

Not only were the garrison past-masters in defending works, but whilst the numbers of the assailants dwindled, a Turkish fleet brought large reinforcements to the defenders. If assaults were continually delivered, in like spirit the Turks sallied out in sortie after sortie, sword in hand, neither giving nor expecting quarter—indeed not understanding the term, especially after the massacre at Jaffa. Also, after each assault they poured out to cut off the heads of the dead and wounded. When the French had to leave their comrades in the ditch, they shuddered as they heard them call for the help which could not be given. The bleeding trophies were carried to the Pasha, old Djezzar, the 'Butcher of Acre'. The French generally acknowledged that Sir Sidney Smith shrank with horror from such trophies, but one writer is sceptical: 'Mais je n'en crois rien, ce Smith est Anglais.'¹

Bonaparte at last determined to raise the siege, wishing, he wrote later, to get the army back to Egypt and then himself to leave for France as the advance of the French under Championnet to Rome spelt danger. There were other reasons. Egypt had been left with only just enough troops to hold down the population; Marmont for one was asking for reinforcements for Alexandria, and there were rumours of the dispatch of a Turkish army against Egypt by sea. Some of the guns were destroyed

¹ François, 296.

or buried, and on the 20th May Lannes's division, followed by that of Bon, soon under Rampon, led the march; Reynier then withdrew from the trenches, and Kléber, covered by Murat's cavalry, formed the rear-guard. Junot's brigade, at last called in from the Jordan valley, covered the inner flank. Lannes and Duroc, not yet recovered from their wounds, were carried in litters, as was Bon, but he soon died. These officers, duly escorted, started two days before the army. On arrival at Tanturah some of the guns brought thus far seem to have been embarked. On the 23rd May, after passing Caesarea, the men of Nablus, who had given so much trouble on the advance, again attacked, when Murat and his cavalry were launched on them and all the country near the line of march was devastated by the retreating troops. It seems probable that from twenty-five to fifty men, plague-stricken and certain to die, were given laudanum by direction of Bonaparte to save them from the cruelty they were certain to receive from the Turks; Berthier, biting his nails, as usual disapproved, but few men would not have preferred such a death.¹ Certainly Bonaparte did all he could to remove those sick whom it was possible to transport, but the dread of the plague made this difficult. For instance, his personal orders to one of his Guides to give up his horse to a smitten man were disobeyed, and Bessières had privately to promise the Guide money before he would comply; even then it was only the strict supervision of Bessières which got the sick man to El-Arish.

Marching again by compass, with the cavalry leading, the army crossed what even Bonaparte described as the cruel desert, for the sand was burning and the rays of the sun almost insupportable. A garrison was left to hold El-Arish, the one remaining conquest of the campaign, and the army at last reached Egypt. At Katieh, Menou, who should have gone to Syria as Governor long before, met the army. Kléber's division was now sent to Damietta, and on the 14th June the rest of the army made a triumphant entry into Cairo, Davout's column having moved towards it as it approached. Lannes, Duroc, and other wounded had been sent on from Jaffa so that Lannes now got the rest he required. Berthier, Bessières, Davout, Lannes, and Murat, with Bourrienne, Duroc, and Lavalette, were

¹ La Jonquière, *Égypte*, iv. 556-7, 574-83.

now for a time in the Capital. In his accounts of the campaign Bonaparte has minimized his losses, which really were some 2,200 dead (1,200 by wounds and 1,000 from disease), besides 2,300 sick and wounded, of whom a hundred who had had limbs amputated were unfit for further service. Mere figures, however, cannot represent the loss, for the best of the whole Armée de l'Orient had been taken to Syria, and it was amongst the bravest and most ardent of this picked body that Death had made the heaviest ravages. To the Directory Bonaparte acknowledged that since landing the army had lost 5,344 men. Such truths were not for the public, and to conceal the diminution of strength the amount allotted for the clothing of the troops was announced as double what really was required.

XIX

EGYPT ABANDONED

(June 1799 to September 1801)

Battle of Aboukir. Bonaparte's return to France. Kléber in command. Convention of El-Arish. Capitulation of Cairo and Alexandria. Effect of Egyptian campaign on future Marshals.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

- 1799 4th June. First battle of Zürich.
17th to 19th June. Battle of the Trebbia.
30th July. Capitulation of Mantua.
15th August. Battle of Novi.
9th to 10th November. *Coup d'état* of Brumaire.
1800 14th June. Battle of Marengo.
3rd December. Battle of Hohenlinden.
1801 9th February. Treaty of Lunéville.

MURAT and Davout were now the two chief cavalry leaders in Egypt, and chance now again favoured Murat. If Murat had done much in Syria, Davout had fought in Upper Egypt and had pleased Bonaparte by his readiness to succour Cairo. Besides, at this moment Bonaparte wished to reward the services of the men left in Egypt. Accordingly, on the 14th June 1799 the cavalry was divided into two brigades of three regiments each, under Davout and Murat. No commander of the whole cavalry was appointed, the brigades remaining independent and each corresponding direct with head-quarters. Then Davout, as I have already said, was given the command of a province, to which he was to have gone with two of his regiments and the depots of Desaix's division. At this moment he fell ill again, and so when Murat was sent north on the 30th June to put down some revolts, that General was given all the disposable cavalry of both brigades, as well as the command over Marmont in Alexandria whilst he was in the Bahari province.¹ The cavalry were now so weak that Bonaparte considered that two three-pounders were enough artillery for each brigade.

News now came from Marmont at Alexandria that a large Turkish fleet had appeared off that port on the 11th July and

¹ *Corr. Nap.* v. 4233, 4246. For this expedition, see Miot, 241-5.

had landed an army in Aboukir Bay. A fort and redoubt had been raised to cover the shore, but during the absence of Bonaparte in Syria Marmont had taken it on himself to stop the works ordered for strengthening these fortifications, which were now assailed. Marmont had only some 1,300 men available, and, sensibly enough one would have thought, having a large city to hold he considered it would be rash for him to go out and meet the enemy, so that the redoubt and fort soon fell. Bonaparte at once ordered a concentration on Alexandria. Kléber was to march from Damietta, and he himself started from Cairo with Berthier, his Guides under Bessières, the cavalry under Murat, and the divisions of Lannes and Rampon (late Bon) so hurriedly that Rampon himself was left behind for the moment. Davout, ill, stayed for a time at Cairo. Desaix was ordered from Upper Egypt on Cairo to hold the Capital, whilst Reynier at Belbeis watched against any movement from Syria. Reaching Alexandria on the 22nd July, Bonaparte was satisfied with the state of its fortifications but blamed Marmont for not having opposed the landing and for not having supported the garrisons of the works at Aboukir. When Marmont pleaded that he had only had 1,200 men against 22,000 Bonaparte replied: 'Well, with 1,200 men I would have gone to Constantinople.' To be fair, he might have remembered that he had offered the Directory to go there if they sent him an extra 21,000 men.

Fortunately, the Turks had not advanced from the peninsula on which they had landed; entrenching themselves there, with their flanks supported by the fire from their vessels, they awaited reinforcements, especially their cavalry, as they only had infantry. As Kléber's division did not come up in time Bonaparte only had some 8,000 men, but with these he attacked on the 25th July 1799. Murat with his cavalry brigade and an infantry brigade under Destaing, drawn from Alexandria, formed the advanced guard; behind him came Lannes on the right and Lanusse, commanding Rampon's troops, in the second line. Menou, from Rosetta, with a small force, was on the farther side of the bay, and Marmont was left in Alexandria, much to his disgust. He was not the only discontented man, for Davout, who had just joined from Cairo, expected a good command but was only given two squadrons and 100 of the Dromedary Corps,

with which he was to link the attacking force with Alexandria and to keep off the Arabs. He complained of this, but only brought down on himself a severe reprimand; indeed, confident as Bonaparte seemed, it was no time for quibbles about rank. Kléber's division was to form the reserve when it arrived from Damietta. Without waiting for it, the attack was begun. Murat threw his cavalry brigade in rear of the first line of the enemy, which occupied two mounds, whilst Destaing and Lannes attacked in front. The Turks could not stand, and this first line was either cut down or driven into the sea.

Now came the last and most difficult phase of the fight. Advancing farther into the peninsula, Bonaparte had to deal with the mass of the enemy, entrenched and jammed together, with their flanks covered by the fire of the vessels. Murat's cavalry was now on the right, Lannes's division in the centre, and that of Lanusse, hitherto untouched,¹ on the left, with Destaing in rear. Murat again pressed forward, but his repeated charges were thrown back by the fire of the gunboats. Bessières led the Guides up to the ditches of the works but could not cross, and the French were held in front of the serried foe until a check to them tempted the Turks from their strong position. In Lanusse's division Colonel Fugières led the 18th Regiment, one of the finest regiments of the Armée d'Italie, which, with Suchet in its ranks, had swept in fine array on to the field of Rivoli. Bringing up his men against the works at the double, Fugières found that they were getting too much strung out, and just as they were close to the ditch he made the head of the column mark time. Like a horse pulled at a fence, the regiment failed to throw themselves on the redoubt and drew back. Out poured the Turks to cut off the heads of the wounded and so earn the rewards offered by their chiefs. Murat, with his fine eye for a field of battle, saw the chance and threw his cavalry in rear of the Turks; the 18th rallied, and, with the rest of Lanusse's division, came on again, while Bonaparte sent Lannes forward. Then came a confused carnage of the Turkish mass, which unbroken had been so formidable. In the midst of the throng Murat, who had already had a horse shot under him, made his way towards the Turkish commander, the Seraskier of Roumelia; and like Herminius and Manilius, the two chiefs

¹ Pelleport (who belonged to it), i. 160.

of pride, in all their brilliant panoply of war, spurred at one another. With a pistol shot the Turk shot the Frenchman through the face, but Murat with his sabre cut off two fingers of the right hand of his adversary, and, thus maiming him, made him a prisoner and took him to Bonaparte. As for the rest, the sea received what the sword had not gleaned.

This battle of Aboukir was a complete reversal of the tactics of that of the Pyramids. There the weak French cavalry had to shelter themselves within the squares, leaving the infantry to decide the day: now it ruled the field. Hitherto the French horse had been unable to distinguish itself on the field except by sheer bravery against the skilful Mamelukes. In Upper Egypt, as we have seen, the blame had been thrown on Davout, but it is significant that Miot, a friend and companion of Murat in this campaign, assumes the inferiority of the French horse. Here the Seraskier had no cavalry; indeed, the main reason for his inaction was his wish to await the arrival of the body which should have been with him. It did not arrive, and the plume of Murat led the way behind and into the mass of the infantry. Murat himself had appreciated beforehand the advantage he possessed. When, to his astonishment, Bonaparte had assured him that the coming battle would decide the fate of the world, he replied that at least every soldier felt the necessity for conquering. 'And we shall win. The enemy have no cavalry, yours is brave, and I answer for it to you that if ever infantry should be charged by cavalry, the Turks shall be by mine.' He kept his word, and with the three regiments which alone he had, one of Hussars and two of Dragoons, he did wonders.

Although Murat had been, as he said, 'cruellement blessé' in the battle with what he called the 'armée hotomane', still he had been very fortunate, for the pistol ball, entering his face near the ear, had gone straight out on the other side without touching the jaw or the tongue and without breaking any tooth. Writing to his family, in bed, with Bessières by his side, he assured them he would not be disfigured, and he asked that 'ces belles' might be told that Murat, even if less handsome, would not be less brave in love. He hoped to be in the field again in a fortnight.

Murat got full credit for his feats. 'Has the cavalry sworn to do everything to-day?' asked the delighted Bonaparte on the

field, and after the victory he heaped praise on the wounded General, who had to enter the hospital in Alexandria. Jealous as he is said to have been, he told the Directory that 'The gain of this battle . . . is principally due to General Murat. I ask for the rank of General of Division for this General. His cavalry brigade has achieved the impossible.' Indeed, he took it on himself to give the promotion at once, and, in his Imperial way, had the names of the three regiments, with those of Murat and his Adjutant-General Roize, and the words 'Bataille d'Aboukir' engraved on the chases of two English field pieces taken from the Turks, and presented the guns to the brigade. Bessières, with due justice, was mentioned as having, at the head of his Guides, sustained the reputation of the corps. Junot was mentioned as having had his coat riddled with bullets, whilst Berthier was presented in the name of the Directory with a richly chased poniard as 'a mark of satisfaction for the services he has not ceased to render during the campaign'. The French loss had been very heavy. Colonel Fugières, whose arm had been shattered and who believed himself to be mortally wounded, exclaimed to Bonaparte: 'General, perhaps one day you will envy my fate. I die on the field of Honour.'¹ Better indeed so than the long agony of St. Helena, hope gone and but the wreck of past glory to remember.

Anxiety was over, but some 2,000 or 3,000 Turks still held out in the fort of Aboukir, without water or food but too barbarous to understand the possibility of obtaining terms by a surrender. Lannes was sent to reduce them with his own division and that of Rampon, who on coming up had taken over command from Lanusse. Junot was still commanding a brigade under Lannes. Davout with the 15th Dragoons was also part of this force, and the future Postmaster-General of the Empire, Lavalette, one of Bonaparte's A.D.C.s, remained with Lannes. Too impatient to wait for siege works, Lannes was led into assault on the 28th July, and received a ball in his left leg, which, striking the tibia, was flattened (as it was said his bones had the power of doing to missiles) and, turning round the limb, lodged in the calf, so that he had to join Murat in hospital in Alexandria. Menou was ordered to replace him, and, arriving on the 29th July, he asked Bonaparte to trust more to his zeal

¹ Pelleport, i. 161. He lived till 1812.

than to his capacity, and insisted that his troops must have brandy. In the great battle of Aboukir Davout had only had to keep off swarms of Arabs. Whether in punishment for his remonstrance, or, more probably, to give him an opportunity for distinction, Bonaparte ordered Menou to employ him, a cavalry General, be it remembered, in the trench-work which now had to be undertaken. On the 30th July 1799, being that day General in command of the trenches, Davout attacked the enemy in the houses they occupied and drove them into the fort. Having neither food nor water, these unhappy men, or rather so many spectres, came out on the 2nd August, so exhausted that almost all died from the very food given to save them; of all the large army landed, hardly one man survived.

The final result Menou modestly ascribed to Rampon, Junot, Robin, and Davout: he himself had only followed their lead. Davout, he said, had conducted himself with the greatest distinction. According to his plan made before Aboukir, Bonaparte meant after this to send Davout to hold the provinces of Beni-Suef, Minieh, and Fayum with cavalry and some infantry. Whether the General went or not, we next find him, after Bonaparte had left, at Belbeis in January 1800 with a cavalry brigade and some infantry, watching for the approaching army of the Grand Vizier which was advancing from Syria.

Bonaparte by now, through the skill of Marmont, had obtained from Sir Sidney Smith news of the defeat of both Schérer and Moreau in Italy and of Jourdan in Germany, and he determined to return to France. The question whether he had been recalled by the Directory, and how far he knew of their scheme to bring him and his army back to France, does not concern me here, but originally he had believed his absence from France would only last for a few months. Before leaving he had promised the Directory to be back in October 1798, and, if wider horizons had since seemed to open to him, his repulse from Acre and the weakness of his army had brought him to a more reasonable state of mind. The question of his successor had to be considered. At first he thought of taking both Desaix and Kléber back with him, but it was obvious that one or other of these two Generals must be given the heavy responsibility

of the Armée de l'Orient. He had been angry with Desaix, who had not obeyed his order to move down on Cairo as soon as the landing of the Turks was known, so as to replace the troops sent on Alexandria, and he had written sharply to the General on that and on other points, but his displeasure soon passed and he gave Desaix a finely worked sabre on which was engraved 'Conquête de la Haute Égypte'. It was natural to take the more willing and trustful of his two lieutenants, and there was a special reason for leaving Kléber. Always discontented, jealous of any one above him, and after the failure at Acre free from his momentary subjection to the spell of Bonaparte, Kléber was the last man to be used for such a stroke as Bonaparte already dreamt of in France.

It might have been a question whether Kléber would accept the command, for, with all his wish for power, he disliked its burdens and responsibility. He was directed to be at Rosetta¹ on the 24th August but when he arrived there he found, as he complained, that 'the bird had flown'. On the night of the 22nd August 1799 Bonaparte had embarked for France. One might be tempted to believe that Bonaparte had intentionally avoided the meeting, for in writing to Kléber he had said that if the absence of that General from Damietta were inconvenient, an aide-de-camp was to be sent to Rosetta instead; but most likely he was only actuated by a wise desire to seize the opportunity of a momentary absence of the English ships blockading the coast. His choice of companions was significant. Had he only gone to serve the Republic in the field, it would have been natural enough to take his staff, Berthier, Bessières with the Guides, his A.D.C. Duroc, and of course his Secretary, Bourrienne. He really wanted men willing and able to help him in the seizure of power which he contemplated, and for this several Generals were chosen. Murat and Lannes were both called from the hospital in Alexandria where their wounds were being treated. Lannes indeed was still on crutches, and must have gone with very mingled feelings, for he had just heard that his wife had given birth to a child which could not be his, consequently he, like Bonaparte, went determined to divorce his wife.

¹ *Corr. Nap.* v, No. 4369; *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. ii. 313, Eng. ed. i. 208; Rousseau, 1; not Alexandria, as stated in *Corr. Nap.* v. 580 and xxx. 94. I can find no order to Desaix as stated in the last authority.

Marmont was also selected, but his departure depended on his relief in the important command of Alexandria by Menou. For once in his life that General, stirred by a most peremptory order, was punctual, and met Bonaparte by Aboukir at 5 p.m. on the 22nd August. There in a short interview he was given the papers for Kléber, and was directed to take command of Alexandria, so Marmont now was able to go. One trusty follower had to be left: Junot was back at Suez, too far away to be taken, but he was not forgotten and was told that Kléber was ordered to send him back to France in October.

As far, then, as Bonaparte could arrange, he took with him to France the staff he had had in Italy. Berthier, Chief of the Staff, Bessières commanding his Guides, Duroc and Lavalette, both A.D.C.s, Bourrienne, his Secretary, all serving in the same capacity as in Italy, with Marmont and Murat, now Generals but formerly A.D.C.s, besides Lannes, who in Italy had practically been on the staff when not selected for special missions. This faithful band started, at 5 a.m. on the 23rd August 1799,¹ on a dangerous voyage which would probably end in an English port, and with the most uncertain fate if they succeeded in reaching France, where indeed the acclamations of the people did not prevent the word 'deserter' being applied to their leader. Sidney Smith had expected such an enterprise but had believed he had time to water at Cyprus before it was attempted. Bonaparte, Berthier, Bourrienne, Duroc, and Lavalette, with, I suppose, Bessières, embarked in the frigate *Muiron*; Lannes, Marmont, and Murat in the *Carrère*, one hundred of the Guides being in each frigate. Two smaller vessels accompanied them. The *Carrère* almost led them on to the rocks of Lampedusa, but after touching at Corsica all arrived safely at Fréjus on the 9th October. The enthusiasm with which Bonaparte was met by the people on landing enabled him to avoid quarantine, which he had dreaded all the voyage, for he had some wild idea of putting himself at once at the head of the Armée d'Italie. The cry, 'Rather the plague than the Austrians', saved him this, and the same afternoon he started for Paris with Berthier, Bourrienne, Duroc, and Lavalette. At Lyons, some suspicion that the Directory might attempt to prevent his arrival at Paris made him take the western route by the Bourbonnais instead of

¹ See Marmont, ii. 37, for hour, with mistake as to date.

the more usual one by Burgundy,¹ and he thus missed meeting Joséphine, perhaps a fortunate thing for her.

Bonaparte's companions only escaped the dreaded quarantine by a stratagem of Admiral Ganteaume, who threw himself into the arms of the quarantine officer, a personal friend of his, who had come from Toulon to confine the party but was now forced either to let them pass or to undergo quarantine with them. Thus freed, Lannes, Marmont, and Murat, who before embarking for Egypt had left their carriages at Toulon, went there to get them and then started for Paris. Bessières is not mentioned as landing with either party of officers and I presume he landed with the 200 Guides who marched on foot to Paris, where they arrived on the 17th December, too late for Brumaire. Bessières, however, had preceded them and himself was present during Brumaire. It would almost seem as if the Guides, together with the vessels and their crews, had to go to Toulon to undergo quarantine. Part of the Guides had remained in Egypt, where they figured in the ceremonials of which Kléber was so fond, and they were within hearing when he was assassinated. Next to escaping the English, the greatest piece of good fortune of Bonaparte's in this voyage was the happy chance by which, in avoiding some ships of the enemy, he came into Fréjus instead of Toulon, the port he had been making for. At the great naval station all would have been done according to routine, on which the officials were so strong that even after the free landing of so many persons, and the long time they had been at sea, the crews, who were taken to Toulon, were confined for thirty days. Much might have happened in the Capital prejudicial to Bonaparte had he been so treated. As it was, he had seized power thirty-three days after landing.

The departure of Bonaparte's party left only one future Marshal in Egypt, Davout, and he soon followed them. Still, it will be well to give the fortunes of the Armée de l'Orient to the end, especially as we have some interest in Kléber and Desaix and the two A.D.C.s of the last General, Rapp and Savary, who were all left behind. At first Kléber was satisfied with his own appointment to the command, but he soon passed into his usual state of discontent and complaint. 'Brave de cœur

¹ *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 305; *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. iii. 24, Eng. ed. i. 219. Lavalette, i, part ii, 135, makes him wish to avoid Maçon, where the Republicans had irritated their opponents.

mais poltron d'esprit', he felt the responsibility, from which he could not escape, as on the Rhine, by pleading his curious health, and he was irritated by the way in which, as he thought, he had been entrapped into holding a command whose rank he liked but whose work grated on him. The urgency with which some officers, such as Junot and Lasalle, applied to follow Bonaparte, Lasalle, with his rough humour, even proposing to go as scullion to General Dugua, who was being sent to France, was naturally not pleasing to him. He intended to send Junot in September, but this departure, as we shall see, was delayed. Then Kléber passed into a state of active opposition to Bonaparte. He complained bitterly to the Directory of the condition in which the army had been left,¹ and in sending this dispatch to France, probably in more than duplicate, by different vessels, he forgot the probability of what actually did occur, the seizure of it by the English, who were proportionately encouraged by the gloomy view taken by the new commander.

Bonaparte was not a man to leave no enemies behind, and Tallien for one encouraged Kléber, suggesting that the time the late commander would have to spend in quarantine could be used to damage him with the Government and the country: the first embarkation sent to France should be of the maim, the halt, and the sick. Landing at Toulon, these would make Bonaparte seem escorted by the wreck of his army, and the hot-headed population of Toulon would blame the author of the expedition and bless the man who put an end to such calamities—by the evacuation of which Kléber was already thinking. Striking as it were into space, and made the more angry by the distance of the object of his accusations, Kléber became violent in his language. 'If Bonaparte has arrived in France under circumstances which do not force him to betray the truth', is one phrase in a letter to a Director, and this a week after the man he denounced, taken to the hearts of the hot-headed men of the south, who already spoke of his being King, had become the Chief Consul of France.

Kléber had many advantages, for as well as being trusted by the soldiers he was admired by the Egyptians, who preferred

¹ See Bonaparte's detailed reply to Kléber in Montholon, i. 85-112, and *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 515-24. For the period after the departure of Bonaparte, see Rousseau, *Kléber et Menou*, and Pajol, *Kléber*, 337-495.

his lofty stature, grave manners, and love of ceremony to the little restless General who even in his days as Emperor could with difficulty be kept still during a defile of the courtiers, and now in these joyous days shocked the solemn Mussulmen by his laughter. However, menaced by a Turkish army declared to be 80,000 strong, which was advancing from Syria under the Grand Vizier, Kléber began to treat both with Sir Sidney Smith and with the Vizier. A maritime expedition of the Turks was easily met, for when some 4,000 of them landed at the mouth of the Nile on the 1st November they were simply crushed by Verdier, who had but a thousand men, and this too though he had to deal with Janissaries, all picked men. Still, Kléber thought himself not strong enough to hold the country, and he considered that the army would be more useful in France, a point on which obviously his Government should have been consulted. Desaix, who had been hurried down, unnecessarily as it turned out, to meet the landing of the Janissaries and had then been given the command at Cairo, was sent with the civilian official Pousielgue to negotiate with Sidney Smith and the Grand Vizier for an evacuation of the country.

Desaix, taking Savary, first met Sidney Smith off Damietta, and going on board the *Tiger* frigate, he and Pousielgue negotiated with the English officer, but never called on him to show that he had powers to treat from the English Government. Sidney Smith professed always to have been anxious to let the army return to France and even to have intentionally given free passage to Bonaparte so that he might take command of the Armée d'Italie, a curious way of assisting one's allies. Only let the French go, and a general peace would be near. After being kept on board some thirty days by bad weather, Desaix was landed at Gaza and then met the Grand Vizier in his camp at El-Arish, the fort of which had just been taken from the French. At first the Turks would hear of nothing but surrender; but at last Sidney Smith induced them to agree to a Convention by which Egypt was to be evacuated and the Armée de l'Orient conveyed to France with its artillery. A suspension of arms for three months was concluded. But when the Convention was ready Desaix recoiled from signing it. He had never been in favour of the evacuation, and although he did not observe one fatal blot, that, while the carrying out of the transport of the

army to France must depend on the goodwill of the English, Sidney Smith had not signed, still he saw in the very eagerness of the English officer for the evacuation a reason for doubting its wisdom. As for the Turks, he made light of their power, though so presumptuous were they that he told Kléber that there would be no treating with the Grand Vizier until he was beaten. Desaix had urged Kléber not to evacuate before he had heard from France, and he now protested more than ever against the evacuation. Calling Savary into his tent, he sent him to Salihiyeh, where Kléber had assembled his army, to say that what Kléber had wished was done, but before he signed Kléber must read the Convention and give him orders to do so. As Savary left, he heard that Bonaparte had arrived in France. News of fresh disasters in France had made Kléber more anxious for the evacuation, in which he seemed almost to see a revenge against Bonaparte. It is fair to say that the spirit of the army did not appear to be good, for the garrison of El-Arish had lost their lives by mutinying and foolishly surrendering to the Turks, who at once slew them. Another whole regiment had mutinied and Kléber had at first ordered it to be broken up. Still, it was not creditable to him that he tried to justify himself by asserting that Bonaparte was intentionally abandoning the army, and that if his late commander had found 10,000 men at Toulon ready to embark, he would have stopped them. Egypt was extraordinarily dear to Bonaparte. On landing in France he had at once asked the Commandant at Toulon to send news of the last six months to Kléber, and one of his first acts when in power was to send stores and troops—although one can fancy Kléber's indignation if he had known that a troupe of actors was to form part of the reinforcement.

At heart Kléber was uncertain of himself, and he acknowledged his own variations: every evening he went to bed determined to fight the Turks, but each morning brought a change. To shift the responsibility he called a Council at Salihiyeh on the 20th January 1800, of nine Generals, three of whom, Damas, Friant, and Reynier, had divisional rank. These, after hearing the reasons of Kléber, who seems to have dwelt most on the absence of dispatches from France, agreed that a battle would be useless and that it was impossible to retain Egypt. Another General of Division, Dugua, to whom he referred, agreed;

another, Lanusse, one of the best, would say neither yes nor no. The opposition of Menou was probably too well known for reference to him. The proceedings of the Council must have been prolonged for they were only signed at midnight on the 21st January. Then arrived Savary, when the Council was either still sitting or was reassembled, and the same conclusion was reached: the Convention was to be signed. Unanimous as the vote professed to be, it was not really so, for Davout had opposed it and had only signed with open reluctance, nor does he seem to have been alone even in the Council itself,¹ whilst the hostility of Desaix was known. Taking Savary aside, Davout asked him to tell Desaix that they had only signed from deference to Kléber, who had overborne them, and that if Desaix would not sign the Convention, all the Generals of the army would be on his side. Savary knew Davout too well to doubt his word, but naturally he replied that this was too grave a matter to be transmitted verbally, and that he ought to have a written communication, which, equally naturally, Davout did not give him.

Savary returned to Desaix at El-Arish and the Convention was immediately signed, on the 24th January 1800, with Sidney Smith present. Davout's message had been given to Desaix, who exclaimed against Davout saying such a thing when his name was signed to the proceedings of the Council; he would be a fool to count on such men; the dice were thrown; he had had enough annoyance but it was not his fault. An officer will readily understand the conduct of both Desaix and Davout, who really were each acting in the same manner, signing what they did not approve. When a Commander-in-Chief is bent on a certain course, the success or failure of which mainly depends on himself, few men would be found to insist on his doing something that he declared would be disastrous, and that his want of goodwill might well make so. Had the Duke of Wellington at a Council on the 15th June 1815 declared that it would be ruin to fight at Waterloo, his Generals would have been wise to agree, and in this case it was not one battle but a campaign which might be a matter of years that had to be decided. If either of the remonstrating Generals were to blame, Desaix, whose high and independent position, almost equal to Kléber's, would have made his refusal to sign most important, was the

¹ Savary, i, part i, 134, calls him one of the opponents.

culprit. Kléber had professed to offer him the command if he thought he could do better. Davout was a mere Brigadier, separated by his past from most of the Generals, and it was asking too much of him to lead an open opposition to a commander of such standing as Kléber, supported as that General was by a band of malcontents and backed by the longing of almost all the troops to return to France. Menou, with a high position, used his tongue, but though he gave his views he made no formal resistance, contenting himself with ignoring the order to come to Cairo for an important mission. Kléber had originally intended to send him as negotiator with the Turks.

As soon as the Convention was signed Desaix returned to the army. No doubt the mass of the troops welcomed the prospect of an honourable return to France, Lasalle for one hoping that the champagne of Marseilles would warm his stomach, chilled by the water of the Nile; but many officers saw the mistake Kléber had made in not adhering to the instructions left by Bonaparte, by which the evacuation would not be carried out till a general peace had been concluded, and in not communicating with France before carrying out the Convention. Desaix, Menou, and Davout, with many others, openly signified their disapproval, and a division began amongst the officers which lasted a long time, for Bonaparte never forgot the conduct of those who had opposed and those who had supported the evacuation. Kléber did what he could to allay the dissatisfaction. Menou was ignored. Davout was given the command of the cavalry and was offered the rank of General of Division, which he wisely refused. As for Desaix, Kléber fully acknowledged the cruel position in which he had placed him, but he begged him, in order to dissipate his anger, to put Desaix for a moment in the place of Kléber and Kléber in the place of Desaix, and ask himself what Desaix would have done. Then he did all he could to please the General by facilitating his return to France, where Bonaparte had directed he should be sent in the previous November. Indeed, he hoped that Desaix would plead his cause at Paris before the 'toute-puissance irritée', a curious phrase, as he did not yet know of Brumaire, but showing that he realized that his late commander would now rule in France.¹

¹ Rousseau, *Kléber et Menou*, 204-5. On the 27th January 1800, while he only knew of Brumaire on the 14th February; Rousseau, 222.

This Desaix could hardly have promised, for in a letter meant to precede his arrival in France he had foreseen Bonaparte's surprise at finding the Convention signed by him, who had always been in favour of the preservation of Egypt, and assured the First Consul that he had spared nothing to gain time to enable him to send reinforcements, and that he had only obeyed the most precise orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

It now became the object of the Bonapartist group to get out of Egypt as soon as they could. One had already gone. Kléber had been instructed to send Junot back to France in October, and was about to do this in September but delayed the General at Alexandria, apparently because he was only sending invalids, whom the English might let pass. Junot seems to have eventually sailed about the 17th December in the merchant ship *America*. With him, perhaps with some malice, Kléber sent Madame Fourès, the mistress of Bonaparte, and Menou rather chuckled over what would be said in France.

The dangerous temper of the army at this time was shown by the men of the garrison of Alexandria trying to stop the sailing of the vessel, saying that it was carrying away the cash which ought to go towards the pay they had not received, and that thieves were taking the place of the wounded. So suspicious were they that they declared Junot was carrying off the treasures of Bonaparte, and they began breaking open one very heavy case, until the indignant ship's carpenter showed them it only contained his tools. Junot at last sailed, bearing off a splendid sabre which Captain Desvernois had taken from a Mameluke at the battle of the Pyramids, and for which that much tried officer says he received nothing. Captured by the English frigate *Theseus* the same day he sailed, Junot was taken into Palermo and then to Port Mahon. The English, it is said, sent Madame Fourès back to Egypt, thus saving Bonaparte, now reconciled to Joséphine, some embarrassment; but she eventually found her way to France. Junot was only exchanged on the 19th January 1801, so that he missed the Marengo campaign.

As for Desaix, the chief of the malcontents, Bonaparte had directed that he should be sent back in November, as I have said, and Kléber acknowledged that had he done so Desaix might have spent a pleasant time in Paris. Kléber ascribed to Desaix a preference for useful rather than agreeable employ-

ment, but certainly Desaix did not consider signing the Convention as coming under either head. However, once the Convention was ratified Kléber immediately granted the vessels asked for by the General, who was anxious to be off to serve again under Bonaparte and who grieved at seeing the preparations for the evacuation. Desaix took with him his two A.D.C.s, Savary and Rapp, and he asked besides for Davout. That General, as I have said, had been loud in opposition to Kléber. He had originally joined the army under the influence of Desaix so that he now had a strong claim to Desaix's support in his resolution to leave Egypt. Having therefore refused the rank of General of Division offered by Kléber, with the command of the cavalry, he pleaded ill health as a reason for leaving, and Kléber, probably not anxious to keep a discontented General, let him go. The two Generals first went to Cairo. It was here, on the 14th February 1800, that Kléber learnt by foreign papers of the results of Brumaire; but, committed as he was, he professed not to fear the judgement of Bonaparte, or that Desaix would not plead in his defence. Travelling by Rosetta, Desaix and Davout saw Menou, who was furious against the evacuation. Then, going to Alexandria, they met on their way Colonel Victor de Latour-Maubourg, who had landed with official news of Brumaire. On the 3rd March 1800 Desaix, Savary, and Rapp sailed from Alexandria in a Ragusian merchantman, the *Santa Maria delle Grazie*, whilst Davout accompanied them in the packet *L'Étoile*.

The voyage of Desaix and Davout to France is worth recording, for it really seemed as if two powers were at work, one trying to ensure and the other to prevent the presence of Desaix at Marengo. First came a stroke of luck. The Captain of the blockading frigate, the *Theseus*, knew unofficially that fresh orders were on their way to Sidney Smith, annulling the Convention and insisting that the French could only leave as prisoners; still he gave the Generals a pass, probably influenced by a feeling that good faith authorized him to do so. He even sent an officer with the vessels to ensure their safety. This was sweet to Desaix, who was in dread lest Kléber should give way to this fresh pretension of the enemy. Sailing, therefore, as I have said, on the 3rd March, with some 200 wounded and maimed soldiers, they were driven by winds, and, mistaking

their course, they got as far north as Rhodes, and then made for the south of Greece. A leak, and the wish to give Desaix some relief from his paroxysms of sea-sickness, sent them into Korona in Greece. Next they made Sciacca in Sicily, where they were most inhospitably received. This extraordinary course had kept them out of the way of English ships, and passing to the westward of Sardinia and Corsica, they came in sight of France. Here the favouring power failed and they were fallen on by an English frigate, the *Dorothy*, which took them to Leghorn, where the officers of the Austrian garrison showed every civility to Desaix, who was much discontented with his treatment by the English. The party was now submitted to quarantine for thirty days. Davout proposed to escape to Corsica in a boat, and Desaix liked the plan, but he could not have taken his staff and these represented how they would suffer from the reprisals of the English, so that it was abandoned.

Released at last, the two Generals sailed from Leghorn in the same ships as before, and, pushed by the favouring power, again saw the coast of France, near Fréjus, when three vessels appeared in their chase. The two nearest came up and turned out to be Barbary corsairs, who turned their guns on the French ships and threatened to take them into Tunis. This threw the Generals into despair, when, by a turn of Fortune, one of the Barbary commanders was found to be a friend of the Captain of *L'Étoile*, and giving him a cup of chocolate, for pirates have their courtesies, he let the French proceed. Wild with delight, they pressed sail, when a shot was heard from the third chasing vessel, which had now come up, and which was an English brig. Fresh delay seemed to await them, but the English Captain, seeing the corsairs closing on them, had sunk a small French prize which embarrassed him and had hurried to rescue them. The passports held good, the favouring power now was triumphant, and on the 4th May 1800 they entered Toulon.¹

Safe at last in France, wild with excitement at the news that the campaign had begun both in Germany and Italy, but tied by another hateful quarantine, both Generals wrote to the First Consul, who replied from Lausanne in the most complimentary

¹ Miot, 309-47; Savary, i, part i, 138-43; *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. iv. 172-5. Miot, 347, gives the 24th April as the date of landing, but see Bonnal, *Desaix*, 229 and 347; *Corr. Nap.* vi, No. 4786; and especially Colbert, i. 498.

manner. On the 14th May he informed the two other Consuls, not yet completely eclipsed, of the arrival of 'two excellent Generals', who were to join him by the shortest route as soon as their quarantine was finished, whilst a special paragraph of the *Moniteur* of the 19th May described them in the highest terms of praise. It is alleged that Bonaparte wrote severely to Desaix on the part that General had taken in the Convention of El-Arish, but this seems contradicted by a very amicable letter of the 14th May in which, expressing his surprise that 16,000 or 18,000 Frenchmen should dread 30,000 Turks, he said he made no remark as Desaix had signed it. 'But say no more; come as quickly as you can to join me wherever I may be', and from Lausanne he announced his descent into Italy. All this almost turned the brains of Desaix's companions, who for the first three days could not keep still a moment, and he found it difficult to get them to copy his dispatches. At last the quarantine was finished, and on the 27th May Desaix set off with Rapp and Savary, complaining that Bonaparte would leave them nothing to do. Travelling by Chambéry and the Little St. Bernard, he reached Bonaparte near Stradella on the 11th June 1800. Here his explanation of what had occurred in Egypt removed any resentment the First Consul may still have felt, and they had a long conversation which lasted till daylight; when Desaix got back to his quarters, he found Savary, who had been waiting for him, sunk in sleep from exhaustion. Desaix was now given a corps of two divisions, at the head of which we shall find him with the Armée de Réserve.

As for Desaix's companion, Davout, Bonaparte had replied to his letter, telling him he had learnt of his arrival with pleasure. The campaign had only just begun and men of his merit were necessary. It was the cue of the First Consul now to please every one, and it was evidently with a remembrance of the reprimand in Egypt that he asked Davout to believe he had not forgotten the services he had rendered at Aboukir and in Upper Egypt. The General was to go to Paris when his quarantine was finished. Indeed Davout's health was too bad for him to join at once as Desaix had done, and he went for a time to Burgundy to rest with his family. He was in Paris when Bonaparte arrived from Italy on the night of the 2nd July, and saw him almost at once. The First Consul was especially pleased

with all who had opposed the Convention of El-Arish, and he knew the part Davout had taken against it. On the 3rd July he not only promoted Davout General of Division but also gave him the command of the cavalry of the *Armée d'Italie* under Brune, a curious appointment for a General almost all of whose service had been in the infantry. At Paris Davout must have seen Berthier, Bessières, and Marmont, all fresh from Marengo, and probably Mortier, both the last being now Generals of Division. He certainly saw the old Lefebvre, now a Senator, and no doubt firm in his belief that his war days were over. Davout had intended to ask for a sabre of honour for his former comrade Oudinot, a man of many friends, who had been distinguishing himself in Italy as Chief of the Staff to Masséna, but Bonaparte was too busy to be seen again. On the 10th July 1800 Davout started for Italy.

I now return to Egypt, where the army no longer contained any future Marshal, but the fate of Kléber has to be recounted. Besides, the events there had a certain effect which I cannot pass over entirely. During the negotiations the army of the Grand Vizier had advanced and Kléber had begun handing over the country to it. Suddenly he learnt that Admiral Lord Keith, the English Admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, had refused to permit the French to leave except as prisoners. This really was owing to a misunderstanding, for the Admiral, under instructions from England, had written from Minorca on the 8th January 1800—that is sixteen days before the Convention had been signed—and no sooner was its conclusion known in England than the Government, considering that Kléber had relied on the word of Sidney Smith, sent instructions to have the terms carried out. Sidney Smith in this crisis acted loyally and at once sent information to Kléber, just in time to prevent the handing over of Cairo. This the Turks bitterly resented, and when they were acting with the English next year in Egypt they insisted on Sidney Smith being removed from command of any of the troops on land. Kléber was being punished for his own sins. In his wrath against Bonaparte he had sent to France, intending it for the Directors, the most alarming and exaggerated account of the difficulties of the army and of its diminution. The English, as might have been expected, had captured the vessel carrying the original dispatch. The bearer had time

to throw it into the sea but it had been weighted so clumsily that it escaped from the handkerchief in which it was wrapped and was seen and recovered by the English. Under such circumstances, believing the state of the army was as bad as it was represented to be, nothing was so natural as that the English Government should warn Keith against permitting its return to France. If Kléber by this brought a check on himself now, it nearly saved the army later for he misled the English into attacking it in 1801, as we shall see, with far too inferior a force.

On the receipt of Keith's letter the half-hearted negotiator became in a moment the Kléber of the battle-field. 'Soldiers,' he announced to his army, 'such insolence is only answered by victory! Prepare to fight.' On the 20th March 1800 he defeated the Grand Vizier at Heliopolis, and in a series of combats, in which he himself chanced to be wounded, he drove the Turks back into the desert through which they had come from Syria. This was easy work, but during the struggle, fought so near Cairo, the Turks had made their way into the town. The garrison, reinforced from the battle-field, held the citadel, but still, when Kléber was free to deal with the Capital, in which also the inhabitants had revolted, it was only after severe fighting, in which Bulak was reduced to ruins, that he once more regained Cairo, by a capitulation under which the Turkish force returned to Syria. Upper Egypt, nominally handed over to the redoubtable Mourad Bey, was really lost, although Siut, Minieh, and Beni-Suef were still lightly held, whilst Suez was recovered from the English who had taken it. The struggle had envenomed the relations between the French and the inhabitants, whilst the ease with which the Turks had been crushed in the field showed the mistake Kléber had made in permitting them to pass the desert and enter Egypt before he had full security for the evacuation. On the other hand, could he have waited longer before striking, the English, as I have explained, would have carried out the capitulation; but his anger was natural, and as he had to deal with an uncivilized foe he cannot be blamed for not trusting them to refrain from taking advantage of the hold they had got on the country by his partial evacuation.

It is doubtful what Kléber would have done had he lived.

His position was very delicate, for he had had to submit for the approval of his army the new Consular Constitution of France, under which he understood that Bonaparte would have the chief power; and he also knew that his denunciatory dispatches were in the hands of the very man he had attacked and whose credit he had hoped to ruin. He was trying to play the English against the Turks, but although he could now have obtained the carrying-out of the Convention, he would not have dared to proceed with it before referring to France. Had he lived there can be small doubt that Egypt would have been held long enough to have been a valuable asset in the negotiations at Amiens, but on the 14th June 1800 he was assassinated by a fanatic at Cairo, in the sight and within the hearing of the Guides left by Bonaparte, with whom he used to grace his processions. The shock to the army brought out that strange vein of cruelty which exists in the French character. François, a brave cavalry officer, describes how he and his comrades, going through the streets to their quarters, cut down with their sabres and daggers the men and children they met. The assassin, whose confession had been obtained by the bastonnade and a promise of pardon, was impaled after having had the hand which struck the blow burnt over a brazier. From his stake for some four or five hours he hurled abuse at the French, but he was spared part of his agony as an ignorant or merciful sentry at last let him be given water, when, as happens in such cases, the drink killed him. His body remained for months on the stake, but the skeleton was eventually lodged in the *Muséum d'histoire naturelle du Jardin des Plantes* at Paris.

After Kléber, Menou was the senior General, and after a contest of self-renunciation with Reynier he took the command. This General, who was to decide the fate of the Armée de l'Orient, was, as seen by English eyes, 'a little fat man, very eloquent'.¹ He had fought in La Vendée and with the armies of 'Alpes' and 'Italie', but when placed in command at Paris in 1795 he had failed in dealing with the mob just before Bonaparte showed how that should be done at Vendémiaire. A *ci-devant* noble, he had joined the Revolutionary party but had

¹ Wilson, *Life*, i. 211. Général-Comte Jacques-François de Menou-Boussay (1756-1810). *Fastes*, iii. 389-94; Phipps, iii. iv. For his character see Marmont, i. 409-12; for his correspondence see Rousseau, *Kléber et Menou*.

shown some sense in the Assembly, where, in the discussion on the departure of the aunts of the King for Rome, he had exclaimed how astonished Europe would be that so much should be said on the question of three old women preferring to hear mass at Rome instead of at Paris. A clever, fantastic, unpractical man, though fit for some administrative positions he was utterly unsuited for command in the field. He had put a climax to many absurdities by becoming a Mussulman (his age freeing him from some of the ceremonies), and espousing a native woman, said to have been a descendant of the Prophet, but whom his enemies described as his washerwoman. Clear-sighted on some points, he realized the value of Egypt and he had from the first opposed Kléber's policy of evacuation, taking care to let Bonaparte and Berthier know his opinions. He had opposed a passive resistance to Kléber, refusing even the command at Cairo, on the pleasant ground that he was an enemy to intrigue, until Kléber, irritated at his perpetual rejection of appointments, ironically suggested that nothing remained but to give him the command of the army.

Menou now became the head of what I may call the Bonapartist faction, which insisted on the permanent value of Egypt, whilst Reynier succeeded Kléber as the chief of the party of those in favour of immediate evacuation. Bonaparte, when he heard of Kléber's death, thought of recalling both Menou and Reynier and giving the command to Lanusse, one of the *Armée d'Italie*, but the difficulty of communicating with the army and the awkwardness which would be caused if the dispatch fell into the hands of the English prevented this being done, and Menou was left to display his incapacity. At first an intimation, apparently not well founded, that he had returned to his original religion, reassured the army, who, not knowing much about Christianity, still despised a renegade. In all matters of supply, pay, &c., the new chief did well; but by fussiness, moving his men uselessly, and changing all the staff to get rid of the partisans of Kléber's policy, he caused such discontent that at one time there was a serious intention amongst some of the officers to arrest him. His confirmation by Bonaparte stopped this plot, although it may have been revived later after his first disasters. Let him paint himself. 'Remember,' he said to one officer, 'and you are too young not to be able some day or other to

profit by my warning, remember that in a revolution you must never put yourself on the side of the honest men: they are always swept away.'¹ This is worse than de Mornay, who in 1849 declared that in the event of a *coup d'état* he would be on the side of the broom-handle. It is only fair to Menou to say that when he left Egypt both French and English acknowledged that he did so with clean hands. Kléber, against whom also no charge on that ground is made, apparently left some six thousand pounds, doubtless from his pay,² whilst Menou went back a poor man. It might be ungracious to say this came from his carelessness in money matters.

Misled by Kléber's allegations, the English believed they would only have to deal with a weak and dispirited army, and they prepared to attack Menou on an extraordinary plan. A force of some 15,000 troops, chiefly English, with some foreign regiments in English pay, was to land by Alexandria, whilst the Grand Vizier's army, some 15,000 badly trained men, was again to advance from Syria, and some 6,000 men, English and Sepoy regiments under Baird, were to be brought from India up the Red Sea to Suez, whence they were to march for the Nile. Now Menou really had some 32,000 men, well armed and fully supplied, and at last properly paid, whilst Bonaparte was succeeding in throwing in drafts of troops from France, reinforcements the more valuable not from mere numbers but as removing the sense of separation which told on the army. Only one regret occurred to Menou as he informed the First Consul of the state of his troops. For the moment the proper colour could not be provided for the uniforms of the regiments, so that whilst the cavalry, and, let us hope, the artillery, retained their blue, the infantry shone in all the hues, red, brown, green, crimson, and sky blue; but this was soon to be remedied. Remembering that this army was a picked detachment from the Armée d'Italie, and that the English, copying the Austrian strategy of 1796, were offering three separate corps, each weaker than Menou's force, to the strokes which the French commander could deliver against each in succession from his central position, nothing but disaster could be anticipated from the English plan.

¹ Pelleport, i. 173.

² Wilson, *Egypt*, 91. Reynier, 245, calls the sum, whatever it was, 'la modique succession de Kléber'.

What chance, for instance, had Baird of crossing the desert to meet the Grand Vizier, with whom he was to act, when the French held Cairo and when Kléber had shown that the Vizier's army was but chaff before French valour and discipline? One important point was that after October the English fleet could not remain on the coast. Also Admiral Ganteaume with a strong French fleet was expected to arrive. Everything pointed to a repetition of the victories of 1796, but Menou, not Bonaparte, commanded, and that General succeeded in throwing success into the hands of his opponents.¹

Sir Ralph Abercromby, who commanded the force sent against Alexandria, knew well the inadequacy of his means although he did not yet suspect the full superiority of the French.² Still, on the 8th March 1801 he threw his men on the shore of Aboukir Bay with a skill, regularity, and rapidity which Nelson praised highly and which even that harsh critic Napoleon describes as 'one of the most vigorous actions which could be imagined'. Friant, with the garrison of Alexandria, who attempted to hinder the landing, was driven back into the town. Menou, in Cairo, on hearing of this disregarded its seriousness. He who in Kléber's time had described the Grand Vizier's army as pitiable, was now absorbed in watching it. Abercromby's operation he considered a mere demonstration, and, paying no attention to the remonstrances of Reynier and other Generals, he sent troops to oppose the Vizier whilst but a small reinforcement went to Alexandria under Lanusse. That fiery General, unable to remain quiet during the slow advance of the English, threw himself on them on the 13th March, with disastrous results for the French.

At last Menou himself arrived, but even now he did not fully concentrate for his attack, which was delivered on the 21st March with 9,710 cavalry and infantry. The English army, some 10,000 strong, well posted and covered by works, asked for no better luck than to be attacked, and the battle of Canopus was fiercely fought. Advancing with great gallantry, the French got right into the English line so that the regiments were strangely intermingled, but the heavy English fire told on them. The French had no real commander. Menou had felt himself incapable of even preparing a plan and had had recourse to

¹ See Napoleon's comments, *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 166-7.

² Moore, *Diary*, ii. 12, 54-5; Bunbury, 82, 84, 86, 88-89; Wilson, 6, 8.

Reynier and Lanusse. Now he was walking backwards and forwards in rear of the strife, gesticulating wildly, more as if he were a spectator than the Commander-in-Chief. At last in an evil moment he remembered Murat's successful charge at Aboukir, and ordered the cavalry to charge. Roize, who led the horse, a capable officer and lately the chief of Murat's staff, remonstrated in vain, and then delivered his charge with great gallantry. Boussart led the first line and when that was repulsed Roize himself advanced. The cavalry got right amongst the English and overwhelmed one regiment, a Dragoon even having a hand-to-hand struggle with Abercromby himself, but they were not supported by infantry. The force of their charge had been broken by their getting amongst the English tents and kitchens, and after losing heavily under the English fire they had to retreat. Roize and Lanusse had been killed and other Generals had fallen. There was no one to rally and direct the army, which retired at last, leaving the flag of the 21st Light Infantry and two guns, one an Austrian piece. Almost the whole brunt of the battle had been borne by the English right; on the French right the Camel Corps had done good service.

Abercromby had been wounded, and he died on the 28th March 1801. His body was eventually taken to Malta and placed in one of the *guérites* or watch-towers projecting from the salient of a bastion in St. Elmo. Thence it was moved to the terreplein of the bastion, and still later it was again moved when the works were strengthened; but it now lies in the sunny bastion facing Sicily, while the name of the patriotic, unselfish General is unforgotten in the English army. The command devolved on his friend Hutchinson, a General of unprepossessing appearance, ungracious manners, and a violent temper, who was practically unknown to the army, but who must have possessed talent and considerable daring. The French sneered at the caution with which he advanced, but they were as much deceived as to the strength of the English as these had been as to theirs. Menou had collected a force at Er-Rahmanieh, sending there almost all the division of Reynier but keeping that General, more discontented than ever, with him in Alexandria. Hutchinson, reinforced by some 6,000 Turks under the Capitan Pasha, better organized than those of the Grand Vizier, marched on Er-Rahmanieh with part of his army, whereupon Lagrange, who

commanded there, instead of rejoining Menou, to the surprise of the English marched rapidly south and joined Belliard in Cairo. This decided the campaign. The Grand Vizier, led by his own army, was marching on Cairo, and Hutchinson, alarmed lest Belliard should crush the Turks and thus isolate Baird, determined to move on Cairo also.

This was a most daring move, for though he had been reinforced by some 3,000 troops, still he could only leave some 6,500 men under Coote to block Menou's 10,000 or so in Alexandria, whilst he himself with only 5,300, not including the Capitan Pasha's 6,000 Turks, moved against Belliard's 13,000 in Cairo; indeed one would call it foolhardy had not Moore¹ agreed to it, neither probably realizing the force of the enemy. Moore, however, was at this moment laid up with a wound, and Hutchinson was alone without any General of position by his side when he took this resolution. Its danger was so apparent, and so unwilling were many of the Generals to advance farther into the country, that, like Bonaparte's Generals, they attempted to organize formal resistance to their commander, an extraordinary thing in an English army, but so formidable that it was only stopped by the stern refusal of Moore, to whom and to Coote the would-be mutineers had written. The mutineers were nearly justified, for Belliard, seeing the opportunity presented him by the Grand Vizier having advanced against him notwithstanding the remonstrances of Hutchinson, came out of Cairo to attack him. Had he crushed the Turks he could then have fallen upon the English. He did not, however, bring out his whole strength, while the Turks were induced by the English officers with them to break up into a long skirmishing line against which the French, cooped in columns for fear of the cavalry, toiled in vain. At last Belliard saw part of the enemy streaming past his right flank, and dreading that they might, as in Kléber's battle of Heliopolis, get past him into Cairo, he drew back into the Capital, leaving the Turks with all the prestige of victory. Hutchinson now came up, and Belliard capitulated on the 27th June 1801, getting most favourable terms. His troops, with arms and artillery, were to be conveyed to France, without any reservation to prevent their serving again. This relieved Hutchinson from all anxiety for Baird's

¹ Sir John Moore (1761-1809). We have seen him in Holland.

force, and also from the fear lest Belliard should withdraw into Upper Egypt, as indeed had been proposed by some of the Council of War held in the town, when pursuit by the English would have been almost impracticable on account of the sickly state of their troops.

The English were now able to concentrate against Menou in Alexandria, which could have been held for some time had it not been for the dissensions amongst the French, the extent of which is shown by one extraordinary incident. As I have said, Menou had taken from Reynier almost all the troops of that General's division and kept him practically unemployed in Alexandria. Reynier, thoroughly disgusted with all the proceedings, had not resisted this interference with his proper position, but he had vexed Menou by his constant remonstrances and advice on the conduct of affairs. Also Menou probably suspected some renewal of the plot to deprive him of the command in favour of Reynier, who acknowledges that he feared events might lead him to take command. In consequence Menou determined on what Reynier bitterly styles the only military expedition throughout the campaign which had been well combined. On the night of the 13th April 1801 General Destaing was sent with 300 infantry, fifty cavalry, some sappers, and a gun, to surround Reynier's house. Reynier had with him General Damas, formerly Chief of the Staff to Kléber, whom Menou had replaced by Lagrange, the *Ordonnateur-en-Chef* Daure, and other officers hostile to Menou's policy, whom Menou intended to arrest. There had been a rumour of such a stroke, and the doors were closed on the appearance of this force. Menou had his hot partisans, and Novel, the Commandant of Alexandria, broke into the room where Reynier and Damas were and summoned them roughly to give up their swords. They remonstrated, whereupon Novel, who had brought in some of the *Guides-à-pied* left by Bonaparte, called on them to 'Bourrez-moices b——'. The *aides-de-camp* of the Generals drew their swords; Reynier, levelling a pistol at Novel, threatened to kill him if he moved a step, and a regular combat, disgraceful to Menou, would have taken place had it not been for the officer commanding the Guides, Lieut.-Colonel Meunier, who, ordering his men out of the room in defiance of Novel, politely asked the Generals to submit to the order of the Commander-in-Chief.

This they did at once, when they were taken on board ship for France, Reynier being embarked on the brig *Lodi*, which reached Nice safely on the 28th June 1801.

Either Menou was ashamed at what had been done or his extraordinary brain made him satisfied with getting rid of the leaders of the opposition, for instead of sending them back as dangerous prisoners they were to be allowed to retain their swords and to go where they liked when they reached Europe. To the First Consul he justified his conduct by describing the Generals as friends neither of the Republic, of its Government, nor of the Colony. It might, he thought, have been better to have done this some months before, but he had believed his moderation would have brought these men back to the principles of honour and restraint. Probably he had better ground for his action than he chose to say, but we shall see that the matter, as far as Reynier's resentment was concerned, did not end here.¹

Long and stern resistance to an enemy known to be ready to give the most generous terms could not be expected from a force whose leaders were at such open war, and on the 30th August 1801 Menou, in tears, capitulated on practically the same conditions as granted to Belliard in Cairo, and his troops were taken to France, free to serve again. At first sight it seems strange that the English should have been so ready to give the same terms after their success as had been offered at El-Arish before any fighting; but in reality they were anxious to get the French out of Egypt on any terms before the negotiations for peace which were going on at Amiens were concluded. Also, as peace with France was now almost certain, the restoration to her of an army able to serve again was not so important a point as before the successes of Moreau and of Bonaparte had thrown back the Austrians. Menou, as was certain to be the case with such a leader, had been ill supported; Belliard, for instance, in the opinion of Moore could have held out another fortnight or three weeks, as, indeed, could Menou himself. Still, such resistance as he made had been useful to France, for the news of his capitulation only reached the English Ministers after the preliminaries of peace had been signed.

Once the capitulation was signed both sides became excellent friends, and the French from Cairo, escorted by the English

¹ For Reynier's remonstrance see Wilson, 304-6.

and Turks under Moore, marched cheerfully for the ships which took them to France. The truth was that the men were longing for home. When the Camel Corps had been summoned to surrender, their commander acknowledged that a thrill ran through them when the English officer uttered the words 'revenir en France'. As the Israelites had borne off the bones of Joseph, so the French carried away the body of Kléber, and when the procession with it came out from Cairo, the minute-guns of the French were answered by those fired by the English in chivalrous sympathy. So across the Rhine the French and Austrian guns had sounded the knell for Marceau. Most of the regiments gradually landed in France during September and October 1801, fortunately for themselves too late to share in the expedition to San Domingo. They were very weak: the 18th, for example, who had left Toulon 2,100 strong, had lost 52 officers and 667 men, Acre alone costing them 21 officers killed. The regiment was inspected at Lyons by one of its former officers, Suchet, now Inspector-General of Infantry, and when he had sent the maimed to the Invalides and cleared the ranks of those unfit for service, only some 540 remained. The unlucky Menou only left Alexandria on the 17th October 1801, and just before embarkation was struck by the plague, from which Larrey's skill saved him. His wife, Zébedée el Bahouad, went with him. She had fled before the invaders into Cairo, and the Turks were most anxious on the capitulation to get hold of her, as one of the Prophet's blood. They wanted to present her to the Sultan at Constantinople, but the English sent her, with her son, born in 1800, into Cairo under the flag of truce. The son was made a Count by Napoleon in 1811.

The English Ministers had based their plan on the belief that Menou had only some 13,000 or 14,000, or less, of effective troops.¹ General Reynier admits 15,033 infantry and cavalry fit for the field and 6,771 fit for garrison work, besides 348 field artillery, 751 drivers, &c., and 1,961 officers, say some 24,886, whilst other additions make some 26,000. Now 13,672 surrendered in Cairo and 11,066 in Alexandria, besides all the small garrisons and parties taken and the killed and prisoners, the last item amounting to 3,500. Wilson, therefore, cannot be far wrong in estimating the whole French army, including the local

¹ Moore, i. 398, but Bunbury, 82, says 9,000.

corps serving in their ranks, as 32,180 or more—indeed Napoleon acknowledged that 26,192 men landed in France. It is not easy to compare the English strength as they did not include officers, &c., in their tables, but, roughly speaking, Abercromby brought 18,000 men; 3,000 more landed in April, and 1,800 at the beginning of July: say 22,800 were employed besides Baird's 5,191 from India, who had but an indirect influence upon the campaign. We thus get 28,719 English, including foreign troops in their pay and the Sepoys. The Capitan Pasha had from 6,000 to 7,000 Turkish soldiers, fairly disciplined, and the Grand Vizier led a rabble some 15,000 strong. The once formidable Mameluke cavalry, now represented by 1,200 horse, marched with the invaders, who may be said eventually to have had some 50,000 men.

Actually, had Menou but chosen really to concentrate his men he might have had a great superiority at first. At the battle of Canopus, or Alexandria, he should have had 19,000 men, according to Napoleon, with which force obviously he ought to have thrown Abercromby into the sea. In the same way Belliard, when he marched out from Cairo to attack the Turks, took 6,000 men instead of 10,000, and ended by capitulating with 13,000 to an English force of 5,300, supported by the Turkish rabble, whilst Menou with 11,000 was caged in Alexandria by some 6,500 English. Moore, who directed the extraordinary march of French, English, and Turks from Cairo to the sea, estimated Belliard's force in fighting trim at 10,000, 'very fine stout fellows, and in good spirits'. The English had fought splendidly, and the French, the regiments of the *Armée d'Italie*, acknowledged they had 'never been fought till now; that the actions in Italy were nothing to those they have fought since we' (the English) 'landed';¹ but the plan of the English expedition had been absurd. Success came only from the dissensions and discontent amongst the French and from the boldness of the English Generals as opposed to the incapacity of Menou.

The France which received the army was a very different one to that it had left. Marengo had been fought and Bonaparte was now in full power as First Consul, whilst the officers who had gone home with him held high rank. Berthier was Minister of War, Murat in command of the *Armée d'Observation* in Italy,

¹ Moore, ii. 16.

Lannes commanding the Consular Guard, and Bessières at the head of the cavalry of that body. Davout had been commanding the cavalry, and Marmont, now with divisional rank, the artillery, of a new army of Italy in the 1801 campaign. The First Consul reviewed the regiments from Egypt on the 25th January 1802 at Lyons, where Berthier, Bessières, Jourdan (come from Piedmont), Murat, and Suchet also were. Some of the officers must have been doubtful of their reception, but the cue of the new ruler was to be gracious and the troops were welcomed warmly. In name the regiments had taken part in the Marengo campaign, for their depots left in France had been organized into four regiments which formed Chabran's division.¹ These in time joined their regiments, which were placed in garrisons for re-equipment and rest.²

Arrival in France did not put an end to the quarrels which the question of the evacuation had raised in Egypt. Reynier, for instance, published his memoirs in which he criticized Menou and other Generals. He also challenged General Destaing, who had carried out Menou's order to arrest him, and killed that officer in a duel. This brought down on him the wrath of the First Consul, who had learnt much during his stay at Lyons, and he was in disgrace for a long time, the old feud at El-Arish perhaps reviving. Rapp's rough attempt at reconciling the two only brought his own temporary disfavour, and it was not till 1806 that Reynier was again employed. Menou, always behind-hand, only presented himself to the First Consul at Paris on the 8th May 1802, when he was well received and was provided for, but he was never given another active command.

The force, however, was too small for its return to France to tell in any way, and the regiments were gradually dispersed, some going to Italy but most to different corps of what was to be the Grande Armée. The five Dragoon regiments which formed most of its cavalry were part of the cavalry reserve under Murat in 1805, so that regiments which had fought under him at Aboukir followed him again in Germany. The Guides, horse and foot, joined the Consular Guard, the cavalry thus coming again under Bessières. The local corps formed in Egypt were reorganized. The *Légion nautique* went back to the navy; the *Légion Maltaise* joined the *Légion expéditionnaire*; whilst

¹ De Cugnac, i. 49-50, 657. ² See Pelleport, i. 192-9, for the 18th Regiment.

the *Légion Copte* and the *Légion Grecque* became the Chasseurs d'Orient, a body which existed till 1814. The Régiment des Dromadaires was incorporated in the Gendarmerie. Lastly, a squadron, which became a company, of Mamelukes was formed under Rapp. This body was organized from the Mamelukes, from some of the Copts, and from the remains of the two companies of Syrian horse brought back with the army, and it became part of the Consular and then of the Imperial Guard. Retaining their skill in swordsmanship—witness the way in which they sliced off heads at Madrid in 1808—and made conspicuous by their Eastern dress, this body, until it disappeared in 1814, was the only visible remains of the Armée de l'Orient.

If Egypt had linked these Marshals with Napoleon, it had sown dissension amongst them themselves. Davout, meeting Marmont at Alexandria after Aboukir, was much taken with him and professed a friendship the termination of which in later days Marmont resented with the natural bitterness of a man who has betrayed his patron towards one who has remained faithful; but in other cases life-long feuds had begun. Davout, as we have seen, had been indignant at the preference given to Murat at Aboukir; the ill feeling thus caused was believed to have come to a head when the two had to act together during the advance into Russia in 1812, although the character of the two men was so different that it is hard to imagine their ever agreeing. But it was Lannes and Murat who had become the worst enemies. After the conversation in which Bonaparte told Murat he knew of his mutinous speeches, at the beginning of the campaign, Murat had said to his A.D.C., Colbert, 'Je suis sûr que c'est ce b—— de Lannes qui a vendu la calebasse', that is, who had betrayed him to the Commander-in-Chief. From this belief he never varied, and the rage of Lannes against him after Eylau was partly caused by this long hatred. How Egypt affected Bonaparte himself would be an interesting study. In 1796 his head-quarters at Milan had been described as a court. There had been nothing of that in Egypt, but events had been so marvellous there that they led him more than ever to believe that Destiny itself was leading him on to a yet higher future.¹

¹ On its turning his attention to great works see *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. iv. 38-9, 53, Eng. ed. i. 357, 361.

This campaign is interesting to study, partly because of the peculiar nature of the experiences which bound the future Marshals engaged in it closely to Bonaparte, and partly because neither French nor English accounts are quite fair to one another, or perhaps to themselves: the French not allowing for the inferiority in numbers of their enemy, nor the English for the dissensions amongst the French, which, with the incapacity of Menou, gave them success. I have but mentioned the extraordinary achievement of Baird in bringing his men up the Red Sea and across the desert from Kosseir to the Nile, without the help of steamers, condensers, railways, or any of the thousand requirements of modern armies. One of the first recollections of the present writer was hearing many details of this expedition from his father, one of the officers of the H.E.I. Company Service, and one of the now forgotten Knights of the Crescent, who took part in it.¹ Few things are more curious than the way in which that desert march, and indeed the whole campaign, has been neglected by writers in quest of a picturesque subject, for it lends itself to word-painting. Take, for example, the march under Moore from Cairo to the sea: the excitable French, satisfied with themselves and as delighted to get home from exile as so many schoolboys, dropping a tear for Kléber and amusing themselves with a laugh at Menou, escorted by the stolid English, perplexed as to whether they had done right in accepting Belliard's capitulation, but taking desert and Nile as all in the day's work, whilst round them surged the wild devilry of the Turkish host, an unruly mob who, when dissatisfied with any order from the Grand Vizier, sent a few shots through his tent—a message understood by their commander. With these marched the Mamelukes, hopeful of the English, distrustful, with good cause, of the Turks, and anxious as to their own fate. The dead body of Kléber formed a sort of centre for the moving mass. The mingling of English and Turks worked smoothly enough.

The expedition to Egypt had greatly and permanently affected the fortunes of those future Marshals who had taken part in it. Davout, Lannes, and Murat had risen from mere Generals of Brigade to divisional rank, whilst Marmont had become a General of Brigade; but these promotions were but fore-

¹ Colonel Pownoll Phipps (1780-1858).

tastes of the final results of the full tide of favour which was to carry them on. Henceforward all the 'Egyptians' who had not joined the party of Kléber were looked on with special consideration by the new ruler throughout their lives. Besides Berthier, Bessières, and Marmont, who had been his personal following, Davout, Lannes, and Murat were now closely linked with him, and not even the violent outbursts of Lannes nor the treachery of Marmont quite broke the tie he acknowledged. This, of course, was intensified, except in the case of Davout, by the events of Brumaire, when, as we shall see, the band from Egypt played so great a part. Suchet had missed his fortune when he had remained with Brune in 1798. It is true that the positions of Berthier and Bessières had not altered much, and that although Davout had come forward, he had not held high command. It was Lannes, Marmont, and Murat who had risen most, and this was continued in the Marengo campaign, where all were given important posts. When Davout did return, he too was highly placed in the next campaign, taking the head of the cavalry in Italy, the post which would have fallen to Murat had that General not gone higher again to the head of the Armée d'Observation. It was indeed Murat who had risen most of all, for his marriage with Bonaparte's sister Caroline would never have taken place had it not been for his service in Egypt. On the other hand it took long to win favour for those who had wished for the evacuation. Kléber would never have been forgiven had he carried it out, and the care taken of the incompetent but better-sighted Menou proves how fondly Bonaparte had clung to his conquest. As Junot well said, the resentful feelings still existing in his mind prevented the Commander-in-Chief of the army of Egypt from disappearing in the First Consul.

XX

BRUMAIRE

(November to December 1799)

Government of the Directory. Generals in Paris. Preparations for a *coup*. Bonaparte on the 18th and 19th Brumaire. Attitude of armies and future Marshals.

CONTEMPORARY EVENTS

None.

THE period of the *coup d'état* of the 18th–19th Brumaire (the 9th–10th November 1799) is one in which so many of the future Marshals were concerned that it is important to give here a general account of their conduct and motives: what, in fact, I may call the military history of the event. The government of the Directory had been weak and corrupt. The Directory had lived in danger from the growth of the Royalist and what we may call the Constitutional parties, and so early as 1797 the sword of Augereau had been used to ‘purge’ the Directory and the Councils. Now, all was in confusion at home, while instead of threatening Vienna as in 1797, the French armies were back on the frontier and the land was exposed to invasion. It is true that Masséna had just been victorious in Switzerland and Brune in Holland, and to this day these successes form the boast of the Republicans and their proof that the *coup d'état* of Brumaire was unnecessary; but the nation, with true insight for once, saw that these victories had been won, not by, but in despite of, the Directory. The troops with which Schérer might have faced the enemy in the north of Italy had been detached far south to Naples. Jourdan had had to march against the Archduke with an insufficient force because the Directory could not spare troops from the Interior. It was Masséna’s firm resistance to the Directory and to their Minister Bernadotte that had kept the Armée du Danube safe until it swept forward to take advantage of the false step of the Allies in sending the Archduke down the Rhine. Holland had been left insufficiently protected, and though Brune had at last been reinforced to beat off the Duke of York, yet the English had carried away the Dutch fleet. Besides

all this, Bonaparte had accustomed the nation to victory in Italy, and the long crash of the disasters there now drowned the rejoicings for victories elsewhere.

One sign of the times, an ominous one for the Directory, was a tendency to look to Generals as candidates for power. Both Masséna and Lefebvre had received votes when places on the Directory were to be filled; and this without any canvassing on their part. Lefebvre was wisely counselled by his wife, a woman vulgar perhaps, but with a heart of gold, to refuse the nomination. 'They must be in a bad way', said she, 'when they want to make a dolt like you a King!'¹ Masséna in like manner preferred the command of the army with which he saved France from invasion. Still, the prominence of the Generals was marked: Bernadotte became Minister of War, and a General, Moulin, was actually elected a Director.

If these nominations, however platonic, were a sign of the times, still more significant was the attitude of the Generals in the Capital. At the end of 1793 Jourdan, just removed from command of the Armée du Nord after winning an important battle, was in Paris, listening to the tumbrils which might at any moment carry him also to the scaffold. At the end of 1799, after leaving his army beaten in the field, he was taking a most active and prominent part in the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents* against the Government. At the *coup* of Prairial (in July) he had demanded the resignation of two Directors, and after it he, Augereau, and Bernadotte, the leading Generals of the Jacobins, thought they were entering into their kingdom. When the Directory began to take measures against the Jacobins, Jourdan would seem to have been satisfied by the appointment of his former lieutenant, Lefebvre, to command at Paris, thinking that General was safe, although one of his first acts was to close the Jacobin club at the *Manège*. But, whilst even his opponents in the Directory esteemed Jourdan, it was a very different matter with his colleague in the *Cinq-Cents*, Augereau, who was scarcely taken seriously.

Masséna had been the best General of Division in Italy, and had shown himself a brilliant commander in Switzerland. He must have stood high in popular estimation; but although it

¹ Lieut.-Colonel Picard in *Revue des questions historiques*, 1^{er} Avril 1910, p. 495; Wirth, *Lefebvre*, 120-1, 478-9.

was to the interest of the Directory to magnify his victories, still they probably were influenced by his opposition to them. Perhaps a certain belief in his plundering propensity, and his own indifference to politics, made him not so prominent as one would have expected.

As for Bernadotte, the rising tide of Jacobinism carried him to the Ministry of War on the 2nd July 1799. We hear a good deal of praise of his work in this office from Barras, rather a suspect witness, whose aim apparently was, when he wrote his memoirs, to glorify Bernadotte and to depreciate Bonaparte. However, we may believe that Bernadotte was a good and active Minister. He, like Jourdan, had returned from his campaign on the Rhine indignant at the neglect of the armies by the Directory, and no doubt he did his best to improve matters. One good thing certainly he did, he got the Directory to send to the active armies a great part of the forces they had kept in the Interior for their own defence, though the new Directors were wise enough to reserve a good garrison in Paris. This perhaps was the reason why there was no attempt to use the mob of the Capital during the Brumaire period. He worked hard at the creation of the new battalions ordered in accordance with the proposal of Jourdan's Commission, but here the negligence of the Departments hindered him. He obtained the release of General Championnet, as we have seen, and of the other Generals arrested in Italy. His address at the time of Prairial to the Generals of Division attributed the recent want of success to the 'false and hypocritical moderation' which had disappeared at Prairial. All this was to teach Generals to look to *coups d'état* for their fortunes.

But, whatever the merits of Bernadotte as a Minister of War, his political opinions alarmed Sieyès and the party that was now opposing the Jacobins. Fearing he might be working with Jourdan, who was urging the *Cinq-Cents* to declare that the 'country was in danger', they determined to strike the Minister. Whether Barras induced Bernadotte to resign, or whether Sieyès adroitly drew from him the sentiment that his highest reward for organizing his department would be the order to rejoin his former companions in arms, it is certain that on the 14th September the Directory decreed that his resignation was accepted. In acknowledgement of the Directors' letter to him, Bernadotte

noted that they had 'accepted the resignation which I have not given', and he remained in Paris on the retired list, waiting on events. The dismissal, for that is what it really was, alarmed and horrified the Jacobins, and fear was expressed by Jourdan that a *coup d'état* would follow, while the Augereau of Fructidor caused a shout of laughter by announcing that the Directory had not the right to make one. But Jourdan's proposition to declare the country in danger was defeated, and a heavy blow had been dealt to the Jacobins in that Council in which they were strongest. The fact is that the Jacobins, powerful as they might seem and loud as their clamours were, were being faced by men of a different stamp from those over whom they had won their first triumphs; also Barras and Sieyès had got in Lefebvre, as Commandant of Paris, a most trustworthy and valuable instrument for suppressing any attempt at mob violence.

Jourdan really had the best record among the commanders of the Republic then in Paris. In the bad times when the army was disorganized he had stopped the flood of invasion at Wattignies, and if then he had Carnot by his side, he was alone at Fleurus and Aldenhoven and when he carried his army to the Rhine. This was a fine record for a former Private. He had been much sinned against in the later campaigns, suffering for the faults of Pichegru and Moreau. The public forgot his early triumphs and remembered his disastrous retreat in 1796, and that of his Chief of the Staff in 1799. Consequently he had lost almost all the credit he should have possessed. However, whatever the actual standing of Augereau, Bernadotte, and Jourdan might be, still their engagement in politics and their presence in Paris made them more prominent than, say, Masséna, who stuck to his army.

It is well to resume the situation at this moment. All parties wanted a change in the Government, and there was small scruple about using force for that purpose. In 1797 Hoche had been appealed to for a sword to cut the knot, and when he had shrunk from the task, Augereau had been used. His incompetence had enabled the Directory to shelve him, but the stroke he had made had done little to invigorate the Government. Again, on the 30^me Prairial (18th June) 1799, three Directors had been removed, Joubert being in military command. Whilst all desired

a change, they differed as to what they hoped for. Jourdan and his party sought to transfer power to an assembly, the *Cinq-Cents* for choice; on the other hand the Director Sieyès and his supporters meant to diminish the number of persons holding executive power, considering that five Directors were too many. Each party required a leader, daring enough to execute a *coup d'état* and with enough reputation to obtain sufficient following and ascendancy. The Jacobin Generals were too weak to strike. Joubert, sent to Italy to win a victory and then to place his sword at the disposal of Sieyès, had fallen at Novi, and no one was disposed to take his place. Macdonald certainly, and Moreau possibly, had refused to act. At this moment, borne by a miracle of Fortune through the fleets of the enemy, Bonaparte landed in France on the 9th October 1799, and on the 16th he was in Paris. A leader was found, of boundless ambition, restrained by no scruples, of proved administrative ability, whose very name meant Victory to the armies, Safety to the nation.

Once landed, Bonaparte found the situation made for him. While the armies were discontented with the strategy and the administration of the Directory, the civilians were no less disgusted by its corruption and incapacity. Reform by the Councils without change in the Constitution was hopeless, and gradually what we may call a conspiracy was formed for a fresh *coup d'état*, joined by men with very different aims. Into this plan Bonaparte now entered. Sieyès was the very spirit of the movement; he was the Director that Bonaparte had most disliked, but, pressed by his brother Lucien, Cambacérès, Talleyrand, and others, he joined him. Of the other Directors, Roger Ducos was at one with Sieyès, and Barras ended by allowing himself to be bought off; Gohier and Moulin were impossible to work with and they remained outside the plan. Now by the Constitution the Directory could not deliberate unless three members were present: if, therefore, Sieyès and Roger Ducos were to resign, and Barras to be persuaded or bribed to do the same, the Directory would be powerless. To replace it three *Consuls Provisoires*, Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger Ducos, would be nominated by the *Conseil des Anciens*, in which there was a majority for a change in the Constitution. It was proposed to use the perfectly legal power of the *Anciens* to shift the seat of the two Councils from Paris to Saint-Cloud and to appoint

Bonaparte to execute the decree, placing under him (a proceeding of more uncertain legality) the division of Paris, under Lefebvre, the Guard of the *Corps Législatif*, the National Guard of Paris, and all the troops in the district. As for the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents*, its opinion was doubtful, but Lucien had just been elected its President, and he hoped that the Council, taken by surprise and overawed by the troops, would vote for the proposal without much discussion. The Directorial Constitution was full of ingenious safeguards, and any one wishing to upset a Constitution will find it interesting to note in this case how each safeguard was used against that which it was meant to protect.¹

At this moment the following future Marshals and other military chiefs were in Paris: the sturdy Lefebvre, holding the military command of the Capital; Augereau and Jourdan, members of the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents*; Bernadotte, late Minister of War; Moncey, restored to active service; Sérurier, released *en parole* by the Austrians; Macdonald, sore in mind and body from the Trebbia; Moreau, recalled from Italy, who arrived just before Bonaparte. Kellermann may have been here, but more probably was in or near Holland, where he was Inspector of the French troops. General Clarke was, I think, also in Paris, but now unemployed. Bonaparte had brought with him Generals of Division Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, General of Brigade Marmont, the A.D.C. Lavalette and, I presume, Duroc, and the Secretary, Bourrienne. Colonel Bessières, the commander of the Guides, perhaps followed later. Thus, whilst all the other Generals in the Capital were isolated (except that Jourdan and Bernadotte had served together), Bonaparte was at the head of a group of officers devoted to him and ready to obey any order from him.

That the action of most of the other Generals in Paris should be in favour of Bonaparte was inevitable. Sérurier, who had known long success under him, and nothing but disaster after he had left Italy, was, like those that had come back from Egypt with him, his man in every sense of the word. Moncey could have had no love for the Directory, which had not treated him well. The old Kellermann probably looked on the whole affair

¹ The Constitution is given in full in Gohier, *Méms.* ii. 383-451. An abstract is given in Thiers, *Rév.* iii. 303-4.

with disgust; he could have no kindly feelings towards either the man that had put him in the shade in 1796 or the Directory that had shelved him. The views of Lefebvre are easily understood. He had originally come to Paris in March to get his wound attended to, but it took long to heal. Like all the Generals of 'Danube', he was furious at the neglect of the Government, and it was especially against the clothing contractors that he vowed vengeance, describing them as 'our most implacable enemies', an epithet that will commend itself to officers of all nations. He had received his appointment in the most perfect good faith, being proud to command in the Capital, where he had been a Sergeant. Still, a feeling in favour of military interference was in the air, and Lefebvre had no sense of the majesty of the Directors or of the *Corps Législatif*. After the *coup* of Prairial this very year he had written of his pleasure at the removal of three of the Directors—three jackdaws, as he called them, whose chatter was not at all to his taste. The conspirators understood the nature of the man and felt sure of being able to use him at the critical moment. He was certain to protect the Directory against any unlawful movement, but he was equally certain to obey any proper command; and it would have been a poor conspiracy that could not produce an order to meet the case. It is impossible to see anything but good faith in all his acts. Naturally he consulted with his former colleague, Jourdan, and when he believed there was a misunderstanding between the General and Barras, he did his best to put an end to it. At the wish of the Directory he closed the clubs that were agitating Paris and he kept the Capital quiet. When Bonaparte arrived, Lefebvre, knowing nothing of him, seemed unchanged, and, when the first whisper of the plot reached him, the honest man asked, 'What does Barras think of this?' On the 8th November, the day before the stroke, he saw Gohier, then President of the Directory, and clasped him in his arms, assuring him he would make a rampart of his body for the President if the Republic were attacked. 'Obey orders, shoot the first man who stirs', was his simple faith, but—if he got orders, and was assured that the Republic was going to be saved? I have dwelt on his position for its importance is never recognized. He was the ideal man for the post, honestly reassuring those Directors that were not in the plot, and offering a

ready tool to the Bonapartists or to any one who could seize the guiding power.

All these, Sérurier, Moncey, Kellermann, and Lefebvre, were sure to approve of a blow at the Directory: most of them, of course, never dreamt but that Bonaparte, having struck, would fall back into the ranks. As for Macdonald, he believed that his defeat at the Trebbia had been due to his abandonment by Moreau, and he had been hurt by the cool reception the Directory had given him. Not yet cured of his wounds, and living on milk and sago, he was well enough to accept an invitation from Bonaparte to a dinner, where he met Moreau and where Bonaparte professed to be anxious to learn what had happened in Italy, needless to say making Macdonald believe he decided in his favour. As he says, when Brumaire arrived, 'J'y pris franchise part.' He may have believed the stroke to be inevitable and preferred that it should not be dealt by Moreau. He, like Moreau, had turned a deaf ear to overtures made to him before the arrival of Bonaparte. Although he had not known Bonaparte previously, he had seen a good deal of Joséphine and of some of the General's brothers and sisters. It is permissible to believe that he understood he would receive a command under the new Government.

As for Moreau, he affords an instance of the isolation of most of the Generals, of which I have spoken. He was on bad terms with the Directory, which had suspected him of complicity with Pichegru, had given him only the very minor post of Inspector-General in Italy, and had then superseded him in the command of the army in Italy, first by Joubert and then by Championnet. When he reached Paris he was not on good terms with Macdonald, and between him and Jourdan there could have been no good feeling, for that commander attributed his reverse in 1796 to the selfishness of Moreau, who had abandoned the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' as lately he had abandoned the Armée de Naples. (On this point Macdonald probably sympathized with Jourdan.) Still, if there was no bond of union between him and the other Generals attacking the Government, no one had more reason for desiring a change, for no one had more knowledge of the culpable neglect of the armies by the Directory. Overwhelmed by Bonaparte with civilities, receiving from him a Damascus blade brought from Egypt, studded with diamonds

and worth £400, having held out to him perhaps the prospect of a marriage into the Bonaparte family, but no doubt above everything else influenced by the general feeling in favour of a *coup d'état* to be conducted by Bonaparte, Moreau at last took his part and told Joseph Bonaparte to bring him to the General's house. 'Tired', he said, 'of the yoke of the lawyers who are ruining the Republic, I come to offer you my support to save it.' And he told Bonaparte he might dispose of his A.D.C.s and of the officers who had served under him and were now in Paris. Then, breaking from Bonaparte, who was replying, he withdrew.

Different reasons have been given for this act of Moreau, one being that he believed that when Bonaparte should become a Director or should be absorbed in the Government he himself would be without such a competitor for command. Later, he thought that he had believed that six weeks after the *coup* Bonaparte would be crushed. This would have been looking too far ahead. Moreau would not and could not have defended the Directory: nothing was more natural than that he should have joined in the attack.

It must always be remembered that no one, not even Bonaparte himself in all probability, in preparing the *coup* of Brumaire intended its actual results. Sieyès, we know, had his own Constitution prepared, others had their own dreams, and no doubt Bonaparte meant to place himself in as commanding a position as possible. When he had dreamt of such a stroke before going to Egypt, he had concluded, wisely enough, that the pear was not yet ripe.¹ Now it was at least so ripe that any General successful in the field could have carried out the *coup* as well as he: probably better, for few men would have committed the folly of appearing before the Councils and so almost ruining the whole plan. Nothing was so easy at this moment as for any General to place himself at the head of the Government: only one man could have performed the miracle of maintaining himself there.

There remained three Generals in Paris opposed to Bonaparte: Augereau, Bernadotte, and Jourdan. Augereau was ready to oppose him, or indeed any General who should attempt to

¹ Mathieu Dumas, iii. 157; *Bourrienne*, French ed. of 1829, ii. 54; Eng. ed. of 1883, i. 119; Lanfrey, i. 363. This is denied by Lucien; see Jung, i. 154, and Thiers, *Rév.* v. 257.

repeat his own work, still more any one who grasped at a power for which he himself was so unfit. Augereau, however, had neither following nor credit; his personal character did not stand high; he was always the 'fier brigand' of Carnot, and his opposition was little more than personal spite, for he could have had no love for the Directory, which, having used him as its tool at Fructidor, had then so promptly flung him away. The opposition of Jourdan and Bernadotte was more serious. Jourdan had no personal ambition and his aims were only for the good of the nation. Bernadotte, on the other hand, had plenty of ambition, but it was combined with so much caution that he was unlikely to take any irrevocable step. Allied to Bonaparte by his marriage with the sister-in-law of Joseph Bonaparte,¹ he had served in the glorious campaign of 1797 in Italy, and so he partly belonged to the Bonaparte group. Still, his former training in what was almost a hostile army, the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', and the separate and independent career he had led since Bonaparte had gone to Egypt, had stiffened his neck, and he had no wish to be obscured by the rise of another General, however momentary that might be. We may give him some credit for Republican principles, at least at this moment, and his connexion with Joseph Bonaparte might make him feel safe in opposing his former commander.

Several things were fatal to the chances of success of these Generals. Jourdan, indignant at the treatment of his army by the Directory, and supported by Augereau, had just been leading an active and bitter campaign in the Councils against the Directors; and Bernadotte, evicted from the Ministry of War, had been assisting in this. Now it is difficult to rally any one to the support of a Government which you have just been proving to be the worst possible one. As for expecting the nation to rise with all its energy, as in its first days of freedom, France had been jaded and disappointed by the effect of the burst of Revolutionary eloquence; she had first been satiated by victory and then dispirited by defeat. She was now a worn nation, suspicious of high-flown sentiments and seeking a strong hand to guide her. One cannot expect a strong government from a committee of five. Further, to meet such a conspiracy as was gradually being formed, it was almost necessary to break the

¹ Désirée Clary.

law and to meet illegality by illegality. For this Jourdan was too conscientious and Bernadotte too cautious: neither would go beyond the legal limits. What was worse, neither had any hold on the troops in the Capital, where part at least of the garrison had belonged to the *Armée d'Italie*. What was to be said to draw them from Bonaparte? Jourdan, who laid all the sufferings of the soldiers at the door of the Directory, and Bernadotte, rankling at his removal from the Ministry of War, could not appeal to the troops in favour of the evil-doers at the head of the Government.

Jourdan, later, in describing his own conduct, represented himself as 'revolted by the incapacity of the Directory and the vexations and peculations of its agents; and I shared the opinion of those who thought it necessary to drive away the men without talent and without morality and to carry out some modifications in the Constitution of the Year III'.¹ Napoleon declared that Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte, with Marbot (who was not in Paris),² offered him a military dictatorship and recognition as chief of the Republic, provided that he supported the principles of the Jacobins. There may be a certain amount of truth in this, for we shall find Jourdan offering the support of himself and his friends on condition that they should know Bonaparte's plans, the last thing that General intended they should know, for there was always this fundamental difference between them, that they wished to enlarge, he to reduce, the number of the holders of power. The game had to be played in Paris and at once, while by a curious chance there was no other commander to whom the three Generals of the opposition could appeal against Bonaparte. Moreau, perhaps, would have been the man to whom they could naturally have looked, but Jourdan was not even on speaking terms with him. If any application was made by others to Moreau—and in 1804 he asserted that Sieyès had offered him the dictatorship—it was received coldly, as was that certainly made to Macdonald. Both these Generals would have had enormous difficulties to surmount had they placed themselves at the head of the opposition, and both smelt of defeat, a scent the hounds of war are slow to follow.

¹ Picard, *Bonaparte et Moreau*, quoting Jourdan.

² Marbot, i. 45-51. Bonaparte on his way to Paris saw Marbot at Lyons, but that General, according to his son, eluded all his questions.

Had time permitted the calling up of one of the commanders of armies, even then little could have been done. True that neither Masséna nor Brune approved of the stroke as dealt by Bonaparte, but neither could have moved on mere suspicion. Also, Masséna's time of command in Switzerland had been a struggle between him and Bernadotte, then Minister of War, who had disapproved of his strategy, and who, it was believed, had tried to replace him. Masséna would not have supported Bernadotte, nor is it likely that he had any high opinion of either Jourdan or Augereau. In the beginning of the 1799 campaign he had jarred with Jourdan when partly subordinated to him, and then he had replaced him in command, so that little love could have been lost between them. Above all, Masséna was too apathetic in such matters as politics to move, unless for some special reason. Brune might have seemed more hopeful a subject: indeed, we have found him almost ready to march on Paris after the stroke; but he had small hold on his army, which was partly Dutch, and that nation had no affection for the Jacobins. In any case, suppose either Brune or Masséna in Paris, how could they, both Generals of Italy, have appealed to the troops of that army in the Capital against their former commander? After all, what were their victories against those of Bonaparte? There remained Championnet, who led the Armée d'Italie, but he was in dire straits with his starving troops and was especially ready to turn to Bonaparte, although I know of no former connexion between them. Further, there was the difficulty of any commander leaving the frontier he guarded. Only a General could oppose Bonaparte, and none was to be found. With extraordinary and far-seeing ingenuity, the Constitution had been framed to provide against any attempt to hold it against such a blow as was threatened. For instance, the Directors were prohibited from commanding in person, either individually or collectively.

Had Kléber been in France: had Hoche been alive! cry some. If Kléber had been in Paris he certainly would have disliked the attempt of Bonaparte to seize power, if he so understood the stroke; but then, he would have disliked the opposition equally, and here, as at Fructidor, he would have been neutralized by his wish to fire on both sides. Had his former friendship with Jourdan still existed, the two might have acted together,

but now that link was broken, and if Fructidor did not bring Kléber into action, still less would Brumaire. As for Hoche, he would have had no dislike for such a *coup*: he had approved of Fructidor and had been ready to act himself. Though he quailed then, he might have anticipated Brumaire on his own account. There was no reason to suspect that any General or any army would object to a clean sweep at Paris. Had Hoche been in Paris, almost certainly he too would have been cajoled till too late. Fresh fields would have been shown him and another expedition to Ireland would have been organized for him, when he might have realized his day-dream of seeing Dublin and London, in what capacity it is needless to inquire. To me it is conclusive that two such different men as Soult and Saint-Cyr both thought that Hoche would have failed in any opposition, Soult thinking that if he had not forestalled Brumaire he would have taken the part of Pompey against the new Caesar. This is to assume that he would have realized at once the seizure of power by Bonaparte: but we know the end of Pompey.

There was one General in exile, Pichegru. His name did not recall a single clear victory in the field, and he stood convicted of having been in correspondence with the enemy while in command of an army of the Republic. This was the man whom the Royalists fatuously believed would have been followed by troops who looked on Moreau as too doubtful a patriot. It may safely be said that amongst the Generals that carried out Brumaire there was not one, with the possible exception of Moreau, who would not have shrunk from any connexion with this shiftless traitor.

Meanwhile the conspirators were active and each had his part allotted to him. The officers of Bonaparte's staff did their work, each in his own arm, Berthier looking after the general officers, Murat the cavalry, Marmont the artillery, and Lannes the infantry. Little persuasion was required and soon the troops could be relied on. Two of the cavalry regiments of the garrison, the 8th and the 9th Dragoons, and, I think, at least two of the infantry regiments, had belonged to the Armée d'Italie; another cavalry regiment, the 21st Chasseurs, had had Murat in its ranks from 1793 to 1795 and had been employed by Bonaparte at the *émeute* of Vendémiaire 1795. On the 6th November took place the dinner offered by the *Corps Législatif* to Bonaparte

and Moreau; at this function neither Jourdan nor Augereau was present, but Jourdan dined quietly with Bonaparte the next night, and, according to his own account, gave his opinion that, if they did not get rid of the men that were governing so badly, the safety of the country must be despaired of. Acknowledging that modifications in their institutions were necessary, he said that nothing must be done against the essential principles of representative government. He and his friends were ready to join with Bonaparte if he would let them know his plans. This Bonaparte would not do. 'I am convinced', said he, 'of your good intentions, and of those of your friends, but on this occasion I cannot work with you. However, do not be alarmed, everything shall be done in the interest of the Republic.' Jourdan had had his warning: one wonders why he took no active part against the plotters.¹

On the morning of the 18^{me} Brumaire (9th November), the first day of the *coup d'état*, Bonaparte and his staff were astir from an early hour. Lefebvre, summoned to come at 6 a.m., arrived in ignorance of the plot; Moreau and Macdonald were asked to come on horseback at 7 a.m. Troops had been distributed to prevent any surprise or counterstroke. Berthier, Lannes, Murat, and Marmont each had a breakfast party of officers. Jourdan and Augereau were not summoned, but they might be supposed to be at the *Cinq-Cents*. Bernadotte arrived with Joseph Bonaparte, but when he found the staff assembled he understood and drew back. 'I go elsewhere', said he to Joseph, 'where perhaps I am destined to save you, for you will not succeed. At the worst I shall always find in you a brother and a friend.' I put aside the story that Bernadotte told Bonaparte he would remain quiet as a citizen but would march against all disturbers if the Directory gave him orders to act.² I believe that if he had uttered such a threat he would not have been allowed to leave the house. Meanwhile the three cavalry regiments, which had requested that they might be reviewed by

¹ Vandal, *Avènement*, i. 293-4, quoting an unpublished note by Jourdan.

² *Bourrienne*, Fr. ed. iii. 68-71, 80-1; *ibid.*, Eng. ed. of 1885, i. 239-41; Barras, iv. 69-72. But see *Bourrienne et ses erreurs*, i. 251-2, where Joseph denies the interview. It will be seen that the withdrawal of Bernadotte, mentioned in *Méms. Nap.* vi. 79, is not given in *Corr. Nap.* xxx. 313. Ségur, *Hist.* iv. 41, and Pingaud, *Bernadotte, Napoléon, et les Bourbons*, 45, adopt the story of the interview, but I do not think they are authorities on this point.

Bonaparte, were to parade at 7 a.m., and their officers, with the forty Adjutants of the National Guard who wanted to see him, were received at 6 a.m. At last arrived the expected decree from the *Anciens*, giving him the command and transferring the Councils to Saint-Cloud. Everything in the Councils had moved as by clockwork. As for the Directory, Sieyès and Roger Ducos had resigned. Later, Barras, by an adroit mixture of promises and threats, was induced to follow their example.

Bonaparte, according to his own account, when he announced the decree to the crowd of enthusiastic officers, turned to Lefebvre and asked him if he wished to remain with him or to return to the Directory. Lefebvre, though much agitated, did not hesitate. In a more florid, but still characteristic, account, Bonaparte asked him, as one of the supporters of the Republic, if he wished to let it perish in the hands of these lawyers. 'Unite with me and aid me to save it! Here,' he added, taking a sabre, 'here is the sabre which I wore at the Pyramids. I give it you as a pledge of my esteem and confidence.' The bait was irresistible. 'Yes,' cried the worthy soldier, 'let us throw the lawyers into the river', and with this excellent sentiment he joined Bonaparte.

Bonaparte had to take an oath before the *Anciens*, and mounting his horse, he rode to the Tuileries, where that Council sat. By this time he had a large body of officers round him, for, besides all the Generals he had summoned, his staff, Berthier, Lannes, Murat, and Marmont had joined him with most, if not all, the parties of officers they had met for breakfast; though some of each group, even of those who had come to Bonaparte's house, may have held back. With Bonaparte were his A.D.C.s Duroc and Lavalette. I presume Colonel Bessières also was there; the Guides, whom he commanded, only arrived at Paris on foot about the 18th December, that is, after Brumaire, but he may have preceded them. His name is not given amongst the officers present, but neither is that of Lavalette, who certainly was there.

Entering the Council, Bonaparte addressed the *Anciens*, promising them the support of all the Generals who surrounded him and naming Lefebvre as his Lieutenant. He was now in command of all the military force in the Capital except the tiny Guard of the Directors, which, however, seems to have assumed

that it also was under him. First he reviewed the troops placed in the garden of the Palace, and then the different commands for that and the next day were distributed. Lannes was placed in command of the troops at the Tuileries and in Paris, with Marmont in charge of his artillery. Macdonald was sent to Versailles and Murat was given the important command of the troops at Saint-Cloud, where the Councils were to go. Ponsard, no doubt a man to be relied on, was kept in command of the battalion of the Guard of the *Corps Législatif*. Sérurier had a reserve at Point-du-Jour, which was to be brought eventually to Saint-Cloud. No special post is stated to have been given to Moncey, who, however, is mentioned as assisting the movement.¹ Lefebvre was flattered by his appointment as Lieutenant, which I take as rather nullifying him: he was not a clear-headed man and this was not a time for mistakes. Kellermann is not mentioned: he may have been in Holland.

Moreau had condescended to play a curious part for a General of his rank, that of jailer of the two recalcitrant Directors in the Luxembourg. Bonaparte sent him with 500 men of the 86th Regiment to guard the Directorial Palace, but at first the troops refused to march under him; they had no confidence in him and they declared he was not a patriot. Bonaparte had to harangue them before they would move. Then Moreau proceeded to the Luxembourg and kept the two Directors still there, Gohier and General Moulins, in strict custody, preventing all communication with the outside world. His reception was not pleasant. General Moulins saw him and told him that as he was doing the work of a *gendarme* his proper place was the antechamber. The two simple-minded Directors had taken no steps to ensure the fidelity of their own Guard, which marched off cheerfully to join Bonaparte!

Any opposition to the *coup* on this day was confined to unfruitful discussions and suggestions. Jourdan and Augereau saw Bonaparte and were advised not to go to Saint-Cloud next day. Then these Generals conferred with Bernadotte and with some members of the *Cinq-Cents*; if Barras is to be believed, Bernadotte and Moreau were in communication as to what action could be taken, and indeed it is certain that Moreau

¹ Jung, *Lucien*, i. 483. Moncey did little or nothing; see Chénier, *Éloge du Maréchal Moncey*, note p. 34.

wavered from the first in his support of Bonaparte, but either fear of the consequences or expectation of high command in the future kept them from any definite action.

On the next day, the 19^{me} Brumaire (10th November), occurred a mistake which nearly led the conspiracy to disaster. All the military arrangements were perfect, but the halls at Saint-Cloud were not ready for the Councils, and so for nearly two hours the members were mixing and discussing matters, while the more fiery spirits in the opposition had time to make their influence felt. In a room of the Palace waited Bonaparte with the prospective Consuls and others; Berthier was there, suffering from a boil but refusing to leave his chief even for the pains of hell. Lannes had been refused leave to come owing to his wounds; Lavalette was busy watching the situation in the Councils, where debates continued. Now Bonaparte possessed most military virtues except patience, and suddenly he decided to enter the Councils and finish matters. The result is well known. He left the *Anciens* bewildered at his address and had to be rescued from the *Cinq-Cents* by the grenadiers who accompanied him. Once outside, he mounted his horse and rode among the troops, but all seemed ended, for the fatal words 'Hors la loi!' rang through the hall. Had the well-known dread decree been passed and had it reached the troops, Bonaparte might have been as powerless as Hanriot at Thermidor. The *Cinq-Cents*, however, wasted the precious moments. What the Jacobins required was a leader to keep them to the point: what the conspirators had to fear was the nomination of another General to command; but neither Jourdan nor Augereau was in the hall, though, to add to the anxiety, they were wandering about outside, in civil costume, but, it was rumoured, with their uniforms underneath. Augereau had already been to see Bonaparte and, as the latter thought, to sound him.

Then the situation was saved, and by Lucien. Sending for an escort from the Guard of the Councils, he got it to conduct him from the hall. Outside he found the troops uncertain and motionless: immediately he mounted the horse of a Dragoon and harangued them, telling them the Council was overawed by a small number of its members armed with daggers. Who could disbelieve the President of the Council, while behind him the tumult in the hall roared in proof of his words? Bonaparte

ordered the troops forward, and, while the drums of the regiments rolled, the guard of the Councils advanced and cleared the hall of the *Cinq-Cents*. Ponsard,¹ who commanded the battalion of grenadiers of the *Cinq-Cents* Guard, thought he was using his Guard to protect the Council, and the honest man's only preoccupation was what to do in case of resistance. 'Employ force, and even your bayonets', said Bonaparte, and thus another safeguard of the Constitution was used to destroy it. No doubt Murat and many other officers followed and were ready enough to claim credit afterwards, but the Guard knew and cared nothing for Murat, and, had any other troops led the advance, it would have been mortally offended. It may be taken as a rule that in overturning any assembly it is safest to use its own Guard, which has seen much of it and probably has little respect for the members. A monarch with, and an assembly without, a special Guard are always safer from a military *coup d'état*.

There are many accounts by spectators of this day, but all must be looked on with suspicion, as it was a time of great excitement. I follow the account of Savary, who, though in Egypt at the time, was later head of the *gendarmérie d'élite* and then Minister of Police, and so was likely to learn the real, unprejudiced history of the stroke.² As regards the political side of the *coup*, the affair was completed on the night of the 19^{me} Brumaire by Lucien Bonaparte, who throughout acted with great skill and courage. He collected a sufficient number of members of the *Cinq-Cents* to ensure some show of a Council, and the Consuls were appointed provisionally.

The Generals on the side of Bonaparte had done what little was required of them. Lannes at the Tuileries with Marmont, Moreau at the Luxembourg, Macdonald at Versailles, had no disturbances to meet, although Macdonald, remembering all he had suffered from the Jacobins when with the *Armée du Nord*, must have had some pleasure when he closed 'pour jamais' a club of that party at Versailles. At Saint-Cloud Berthier, with Lavalette and Duroc and possibly Bessières, had remained with

¹ Général-Baron Jean Ponsard (1747-1814). Vandal, *Avènement*, i. 579; Révérend, *Armorial*, iv. 67, makes him only a Colonel at his death. His son, Jean-Marie Ponsard (1782-1853), married Agatha Savary, perhaps a relation of Savary, duc de Rovigo, but not a daughter.

² Savary, i, part i, 154.

Bonaparte during all the trying scene. Murat, known to the soldiers of 'Italie', apparently had gone into the *Cinq-Cents*, a proceeding which seems to have passed unobserved by them in the wild uproar, although he had been conspicuous enough amongst the troops. Sérurier, who had come up from Point-du-Jour during the interval between the return of Bonaparte from the *Cinq-Cents* and the entry of the grenadiers (for there was much time intervening), kept on walking up and down, with his sword drawn, in front of his men, saying, 'The wretches! They wished to kill General Bonaparte. Do not stir, soldiers' (who showed no sign of moving); 'wait till you get orders.' There was one little touch very characteristic of Bonaparte: Brune, then in command in Holland, really was opposed to the stroke, but as his A.D.C., Colonel Moulins, had just arrived, Bonaparte used him to set the drummers to work, so as to make it appear he came specially from Brune to assist.

As for Lefebvre, both now and afterwards Bonaparte was very grateful for the services he had rendered to him. In the declaration that certain Generals had deserved well of the country his name followed immediately on that of Bonaparte, and he was appointed Lieutenant to him. Lefebvre's real feelings and beliefs were expressed in the speech he made to the garrison of Paris on the 17th December, in which he announced that the Revolution was terminated. In his eyes a time had at last come in which there would be no more civilian rows and disturbances; no more executions, except, of course, of commissariat officers, contractors, and other such foes of the human race; uniform was to be of real cloth, boots were not to have paper soles, ammunition was to abound, and every one was to be happy in the state of peace which Bonaparte would ensure. Years afterwards, on entering a German town, he assured the inhabitants in his half-German French, 'My friends, I bring you complete liberty; but be prudent: I'll shoot the first man that stirs.' Could one sum up the principles, or at least the practice, of the Revolution more happily?

Of the three opposing Generals, Jourdan was the only one who suffered in any way, and that but for a short time. When Bonaparte's success was assured, Jourdan took refuge in Paris at Lefebvre's house. The act was honourable to both men: Lefebvre was on the winning side, but he was not the man to

turn against his old commander. Jourdan's name was actually on the list of those proposed for deportation, but Bonaparte had it removed and wrote kindly to him, telling him not to doubt his friendship; undoubtedly he was at this time sincere, for on the 24th July 1800 Jourdan was made special Minister for the administration of Piedmont.

The successful Generals in Paris had gone farther in support of Bonaparte than the armies from which they had come would have done. Probably in the Capital it was believed that the fact that two of Bonaparte's lieutenants, Masséna and Brune, were at the head of armies, would tell in his favour, but neither of these commanders really was his supporter. Indeed, the Republican simplicity of Brune had been already shocked by a letter in which Bonaparte spoke of his pleasure at finding 'one of my lieutenants' at the head of a victorious army. On the arrival of the news of Brumaire in Holland, Brune stopped the march of some of his regiments who were returning to France, and, perhaps remembering that in 1795 Barras, with whom he was then serving, had prepared to march on the Capital at the news of Prairial, he got ready to act; he even attempted to get support from the Batavian Republic. The Dutch, however, had been dreading a fresh stroke from the Jacobins and now believed themselves safe: indeed, they hoped to get rid of Brune. The object of Brune's intended action is not quite clear, but on further news from Paris of the complete success of the Generals, he protested his devotion to Bonaparte and fully accepted the new Government. The Dutch took the opportunity of withdrawing from him the command of their troops, and he was recalled and replaced by Augereau. However, Brune was in no disgrace; he became President of the War section of the *Conseil d'État* and in January 1800 he was given the command of the Armée de l'Ouest, an important post as he had to finish with La Vendée.

In Switzerland the Armée du Danube heard the news with some alarm. Masséna was not a man to interfere in politics, but his letter to Bonaparte was cold, and in it he took occasion to speak of his fidelity to the Republic. However, as it became known that the new Government was taking a moderate course, confidence in it grew. The Generals that had belonged to the 'Rhin-et-Moselle' under Moreau probably had been thought of

when the first telegraphs, by semaphore, were sent to Strasbourg. '18^{me} Brumaire. The Legislative body has moved to Saint-Cloud. Bonaparte is nominated commandant of Paris. All is tranquil and contented.' '19^{me} Brumaire, noon. The Directory has given in its resignation. Moreau, General, commands at the Palace of the Directory.' On the 26th November General Colaud was writing to Ney, then ill, that Moreau was to command an army and to marry a relation of Bonaparte. Indeed, Moreau soon came to replace Masséna in command of 'Danube', which became the Armée du Rhin, shown in my tables as 'Rhin D'. He sent his A.D.C., Rapatel, on in advance to influence the officers, but the mission failed.¹

As for those Generals, now with the Armée du Danube, that had belonged to the 'Sambre-et-Meuse' under Jourdan, they might have been influenced by the opposition of their old commander; but under Hoche they had welcomed Fructidor, and now they were soon reassured by Lefebvre, whose part in the stroke spoke well for Bonaparte. The army wanted a firm but moderate Government, and there could be no chance of any more Jacobin fury with such a man as Lefebvre, who, as I have said, had been appointed Lieutenant to Bonaparte. Then Mortier was appointed to a command at Paris, obviously to please the former troops of the 'Sambre-et-Meuse', for he does not seem to have been in the Capital, and was unknown there.² A letter to him from Lefebvre, of the 15th November 1799, shows the state of mind of the participators in the stroke of Brumaire: 'This astonishing and salutary revolution has been made without any shock; it was urgently required.' Lefebvre goes on to describe the general joy, the return of confidence, and the rise in the Funds. 'We must gain infinitely by this change. The soldier will no longer be the puppet of a lot of factious men who mock at his privations and at his just complaints.' To Ney, who had poured out his fears to him, he wrote on the 16th April 1800: 'Times are much changed, my dear Ney. Places are no longer given through intrigue: every consideration yields to the public interest. Do not then believe all they tell

¹ Saint-Cyr, *Consulat*, ii. 101-2. See *Fastes*, iii. 434, for the proclamation of Moreau to his army.

² *Fastes*, i. 408, make Mortier command the 15th and 16th Military Divisions, whose head-quarters were at Paris, and Lefebvre seems to have continued in chief command there.

you about the Government, and be assured that it is entirely with those who, like you, have done so much for the country. You see it by the confidence that I have obtained here; the nomination of Mortier, who was absolutely unknown here, to the command of the 17th Division proves it still more.' Lefebvre himself had not been known to Bonaparte previously, and his appointment may therefore have tended to reassure the Generals of the eastern frontier as to their fate. Bernadotte also, now reconciled to Bonaparte, wrote to calm Ney, with whom he had been on friendly terms since their recent campaign in the *Armée d'Observation*. All the armies gradually realized that the old woes were passed; indeed, except in Italy, an immediate change in their circumstances took place. 'The happy effect of this change' (*Brumaire*), says Soult, then with Masséna in Switzerland, 'and the solicitude of the First Consul, were not long in making themselves felt. Soon supplies reached the armies, the issue of pay, long interrupted, was recommenced, and a special levy filled up the ranks.'

In Italy the troops had suffered so much that one would have thought they would have welcomed the accession to power of the General who had been successful there; but, as we have seen, it was not so, partly because the main portion of Bonaparte's *Armée d'Italie* was in Egypt. Though Championnet, in despair at the state of his troops, turned at once to the rising sun, there was a strong opposition to Bonaparte, and Victor, one of his former Generals, with Lemoine and Miollis, also of '*Italie*', were open in their hostility. Richepanse, of the '*Sambre-et-Meuse*', was more moderate. When Championnet died, Masséna came from the *Armée du Danube* to replace him, and before joining he was induced to write a proclamation in favour of the new Government. The proclamation could hardly be called a very cordial one, but Bonaparte was so anxious for support that he published it at once, although Masséna had requested that this might not be done until he had actually taken command. It was, according to Saint-Cyr, the troops that had belonged to the original *Armée d'Italie* that were the most violent against their former General. These men may have resented being left behind when Bonaparte chose his regiments for Egypt, but '*Italie*' had always been the most Republican of the armies, so that possibly it may have been as well for Bonaparte that so

much of that force *was* in Egypt. However, there was little enthusiasm in any of the armies until after Marengo.

The military chiefs employed in the *coup d'état* were rewarded, and the change of Government altered the position of most of the future Marshals and of Moreau. Berthier became Minister of War on the 11th November 1799, replacing Dubois-Crancé, too patriotic (Bonaparte would have said too inefficient) for that important post. Lefebvre was confirmed in his appointment as Lieutenant-General to Bonaparte and was put in command of the 14th, 15th, and 17th Military Divisions, becoming Senator on the 1st April 1800. Moreau received command of the great army formed on the Rhine frontier. Macdonald, Moncey, and Sérurier seem to have been put on a commission of general officers, on the 15th November, to consider the best method of employment for the auxiliary battalions. This must have been a temporary appointment, and on the 27th December Sérurier, old and ill, was made a Senator, while Macdonald was appointed Inspector-General of Infantry, and then on the 7th December Lieutenant-General to Moreau with the Armée du Rhin. This annoyed him very much and he complained angrily to Bonaparte, who said that he had acted at the instance of Moreau and had understood that the Generals had agreed on Macdonald's appointment. Then, saying that Macdonald's health was not yet restored, he promised to fulfil his agreement later. Accordingly, on the 24th August 1800 Macdonald was given command of the 2nd Armée de Réserve. Moncey was nominated at first to command again the 11th Military Division at Bayonne, and then on the 30th November to command the 12th Division at Nantes, but he actually went to the 19th Division at Lyons, where he was amusingly indignant at the style in which Fouché and the Police authorities wrote to him. On the 24th March 1800 he was appointed Lieutenant to Moreau with the Armée du Rhin. Moreau, remarking that he had not asked for him, said he had a great esteem for him, and first employed him in Switzerland.

The formation of the Guard of the Consuls gave opportunities for fresh appointments. On the 30th November 1799 Murat became *Commandant-en-chef* and Inspector. Bessières was Colonel commanding the cavalry, and it is an error which gives him the Guard of the *Corps Législatif*. On the 20th January 1800

Murat married Caroline, sister of Bonaparte. On the 12th November 1799 Lannes was sent to command the 9th and 10th Military Divisions at Toulouse and Perpignan, where there had been some insurrectionary movements which he suppressed. Now he visited his native place, Lectoure, and the wise friend who had advised him to join the army. I presume it was now he divorced his first wife.¹ Nominated on the 18th March 1800 to command the 4th Division of the Armée de Réserve, he did not join, but, returning to Paris on the 16th April, he replaced Murat as Commandant and Inspector of the Consular Guard. Murat was appointed Commandant of the cavalry of the Armée de Réserve and Lieutenant-General to the Commander-in-Chief of the army. All these, except Marmont and Colonel Bessières, were Generals of Division. General of Brigade Marmont was offered by Bonaparte the choice between the command of the artillery of the Guard and the post of one of the Councillors of State. Not wishing to be under Lannes, he chose the Councillorship, in the section for War, in which capacity he did the valuable work of getting the drivers of the artillery made soldiers. At first he put their companies under *sous-officiers* to make them junior to the battery officers; later on Lieutenants had these posts, but eventually the drivers were merged in the batteries. A similar change in the English army put an end to the routs which had taken place with civilian drivers.

The commanders of the active armies were changed, as I have said. Masséna had done well in Switzerland, but a place had to be found for Moreau, so Masséna was sent to Italy, where, as Bonaparte said, he knew every lane. He took with him Soult and his Chief of the Staff, Oudinot, and meeting Suchet on the road to France, he induced him to turn back with him. The next change is hard to understand. Brune, whose conduct had been doubtful, was recalled, and on the 28th December 1799 Augereau, whose conduct one would have thought had been more objectionable, was appointed to command the French army in Holland, with an assurance that if Bonaparte were obliged to make war himself he would not leave him in Holland, nor would he ever forget the great day of Castiglione. I presume the First Consul had no dread of any ambition of Augereau.

¹ Révérend, *Armorial*, iii. 38, dates the divorce the 26th August 1799, when Lannes was in Egypt.

Saint-Cyr in Italy had been so praised by his commander, Championnet, that Bonaparte appointed him first Lieutenant in the army of Italy, sending him the first Sword of Honour issued, with a letter which Saint-Cyr rather ungratefully sniffed at, as we have seen.¹ Moreau then claimed him and he went to the Armée du Rhin. Victor remained in Italy. Mortier was given the command of the 15th and 16th Military Divisions, I think under Lefebvre. Grouchy was not released by the Austrians till after March 1800, getting his exchange effected at the end of June and eventually joining the Armée du Rhin in October in time for Hohenlinden. Ney was still on the Rhine. Pérignon, like Grouchy, was not released by the Austrians for some time; he became a Senator on the 15th April 1801. General Clarke was employed in his former post as *chef du bureau topographique* in the War Office, from which he had been removed at Fructidor. It would be curious to know if Bonaparte had any idea of recalling Pichegru. On the 5th January 1800 he wrote to Bacher at Hanau, asking what the General's conduct had been in foreign countries since Fructidor. 'It is the truth that one wishes to know, not calumny.'

No precedence had been given to any of the three provisional Consuls, although Bonaparte acted as head. His rule nominally began on the 25th December 1799, under the Constitution of the year VIII, by which, of the three Consuls elected for ten years, he became First Consul. The Second Consul, Cambacères, and the Third, Lebrun, only had a consultative voice in affairs. With the rest of this Constitution we have nothing to do in this period. Suffice it to say here that the army, so long maltreated by the Jacobins, now, deftly handled, had crushed that body and placed a soldier at the head of the Government. That result was intended by few who took part in the stroke; indeed, it was only owing to the marvellous abilities of Bonaparte that instead of being merely 'the sword' of the movement he became the ruler of France. One military result was as unforeseen as were many of the consequences. The army was victor, but under the strong hand of Bonaparte it ceased at once to have any power in the government of France, and its influence was not felt again until it carried Napoleon to the Tuileries in 1815.

I have used the term 'conspiracy' to describe the *coup d'état* of

¹ *Ante*, p. 346.

Brumaire, for so it was technically; such a conspiracy, in which it was the nation that conspired, brought William of Orange to England, and it is impossible not to sympathize with the actors in this stroke. The nation was sick of the Jacobin rule and longed for at least internal peace and sound government. Something of the misery of the armies hitherto will have been seen from my account, and the condition of the country was deplorable. Weak as the government of the Directory had been, it was not merciful; the 'dry guillotine' or deportation to murderous climates had been largely and cruelly used, and what had befallen Pichegru, Barbé-Marbois, and other Deputies after Fructidor was but a specimen of the way in which the Directors handled their opponents.¹ Nor need Englishmen have any constitutional scruples as to the force used towards the *Corps Législatif*. No English officer could have any feeling but contempt for the language of Carlyle when he seemed to wish for a military movement against 'the Mother of Parliaments'. For good or evil, constitutional government is part of our national life; but there are Parliaments and Parliaments, and no one wails over the end of the 'Rump' Parliament. Here the Councils had been packed from their birth, the guns of Bonaparte at Vendémiaire had made possible the trick of forcing one-third of the Convention onto them for successors, and time after time threats, or the actual use of force, had obtained a majority either in the Directory or in the Councils.

It had been the same with the Assemblies: the gloomy Convention itself had quailed before the guns of Hanriot.² Now at last the Jacobins had been met with some spirit and resolution, and when one considers how little was required to check that party, say at the assault on the Tuileries, one can but bitterly regret that France was not saved from those bloody pages of her history which the Revolution caused, by the ordinary resolution to be expected from the party of order, and left with only the bright side of that great movement with its burst of energy and national pride. Now at last land seemed in sight, and the general sigh of relief which passed over France was only tempered by the fear lest the new government should be but one more disappointment. The fear was groundless: the

¹ See Sciout, *Directoire*, iv. 349-428, for the religious persecutions.

² Thiers, *Rév.* iv. 450.

new ruler was to bring victory, peace, and happiness to the distracted country, and to endow her with a permanent frame of government which, with little change except for the abolition of the Concordat, has lasted till our time.¹ Under Bonaparte Paris became peaceful and no mob stirred as long as he held power. Had the politicians of France and the sovereigns of the Continent been less servile to him the new government might have had a career as long as it was to be magnificent.

¹ See Bodley, *France* (Macmillan, 2 vols., 1878) and his *The Church in France*, p. 114.

INDEX

- Abercromby, Sir Ralph, 195, 196, 201-2, 203, 204, 433-4, 439.
- Ambert, General, 8.
- Auffenberg, General, 35, 75, 142, 144, 145, 146, 149, 154, 157, 162, 187.
- Augereau, future Marshal, 7, 12, 353, 354, 356, 445, 447, 449, 452-4, 457, 459-60, 463, 467.
- Arrighi, future Duke of Padua, 376, 405.
- Bachmann, General, 107, 159.
- Bagratiou, General, 154, 157, 288, 292-3.
- Baird, General, 432, 433, 435, 439, 442.
- Baraguey d'Hilliers, General, 113, 117, 122, 126-7, 165-6, 168-70, 175, 177, 178, 190, 354, 355, 358, 360-1.
- Barras, Director, 19, 79, 120, 138-9, 226, 228, 229, 232, 234, 235, 236-7, 238, 248, 303, 312, 446, 447-8, 458.
- Bellegarde, General, 35, 74, 82-4, 92, 94, 109, 182, 270, 287, 295, 296, 297.
- Belliard, General, 370, 385, 386-7, 435-6, 437, 439.
- Bernadotte, future Marshal, with 'Mayence', 9; to Paris, 9, 25; appointed to 'Angleterre', 12; commands 'Observation', 22, 26-8; characteristics, 27; crosses Rhine, 32-3; weakness of army, 35, 53-4; leaves 'Observation', 63-4; refuses Italian command, 88; Minister of War, 60, 88, 89, 194-5, 317, 343, 445, 446-7; forms 'Rhin C', 112, 115, 182; intrigues against Masséna, 119; ambassador to Vienna, 13, 215-16; and Italian command, 226, 235, 236-7; 30^{me} Prairial, 313-14, 317; criticism of Championnet, 336-7; not chosen for Egypt, 354; before Brumaire, 449, 452-4; Brumaire, 457, 459-60.
- Berthier, future Marshal, appointed to 'Angleterre', 12; command in Italy, 215; occupies Rome, 217; and Masséna, 219-20; leaves Italy, 225-6; chosen for Egypt, 356, 357, 358; love affair, 357, 378, 391; at Malta, 361-2; at Alexandria, 363; march on Cairo, 364; battle of the Pyramids, 368, 370; in Egypt, 376, 378, 382; Syrian expedition, 388, 390-1; at Jaffa, 393; at Mt. Tabor, 401; at Cairo, 408-9; battle of Aboukir, 411, 414; return to France, 416-17; effect of Egypt on, 443; before Brumaire, 449; at Brumaire, 458-8, 460-2; Minister of War, 344, 466.
- Bessières, future Marshal, appointed to 'Angleterre', 12; Colonel commanding *Guides-à-cheval*, 357; chosen for Egypt, 357, 358; at Malta, 361-2; at Alexandria, 363; march on Cairo, 364; battle of Pyramids, 368, 370; against Mamelukes, 376; at Cairo, 378; command of *Guides-à-pied* added, 382; Syrian expedition, 388, 390, 394, 401-2; retreat from Syria, 408; at Cairo, 408-9; battle of Aboukir, 411-12; return to France, 416-18; effect of Egypt on, 443; before Brumaire, 449; Brumaire, 458, 461-2; command of Consular Guard cavalry, 466.
- Boivin, General, 97, 109.
- Bon, General, 354, 355, 357-8, 360-1, 362-4, 368-71, 376, 378, 388, 390, 393-4, 395, 401, 403, 406, 408.
- Bonaparte, Joseph, 452, 453, 457.
- Bonaparte, Joséphine, 358, 372-3, 418.
- Bonaparte, Lucien, 448-9, 460-1.
- Bonaparte, Napoleon, commander of 'Angleterre', 11; choice of Generals for Egypt, 13-14, 70; criticism of Swiss operations, 84, 95-6; on Masséna, 119-20; on 'Rhin C', 181; on Dutch campaign, 196-7, 202, 207-8; and Bernadotte, 215, 226; and Desaix, 224; and Brune, 226; on Cisalpine Republic, 228; on Schérer, 258-9; on Moreau, 265, 268-9; on Suvárof, 270; on Macdonald, 279-81; on battle of Novi, 330; on Championnet, 336-7, 341; on Saint-Cyr, 346; l'Armée de l'Orient, 353-7; embarks at Toulon, 358-9; at Malta, 359-62; at Alexandria, 362-4; march on Cairo, 364-7; disaffection in army, 366-7; battle of Pyramids, 368-72; unfaithfulness of Joséphine, 372-3, 390; and Marmont, 374; creates 'Institut', 375-6; fights Mamelukes, 376-7; at the Pyramids, 378; treatment of Generals, 379-80; and Kléber, 380;

- treatment of army, 380-2; a mistress, 381; to Suez, 382; and Dumas, 383-4; Syrian expedition, 387-9, 390-3; and Reynier, 390; at Jaffa, 393-4; siege of Acre, 394-8, 406-7; in Jordan valley, 398-400; battle of Mt. Tabor, 401-2; criticized by Kléber and others, 403-5; wounded, 405; retreat from Syria, 407-8; entry into Cairo, 408-9; battle of Aboukir, 411-15; return to France, 415-18; care for Egypt, 421; welcome to Desaix and Davout, 426-8; and Menou, 431; effect of Egypt on, 441-2; plan for Brumaire, 448-9; attitude of Generals to, 449-56; Brumaire, 456-62; its reception, 463-6; rewards and appointments, 466-8; First Consul, 468-70.
- Boulart, future General, 249-50, 285, 295, 301, 325-6.
- Bourrienne, Secretary to Bonaparte, 356, 358, 390, 408, 416, 417, 449.
- Brune, future Marshal, command in Holland, 9; appointed to 'Angleterre', 12, 13; invasion of Switzerland, 68, 215; command of 'Helvétie', 69-71; political organization of Switzerland, 71-2; C.-in-C. in Holland, 194; criticized by Bonaparte, 196-7; unsuccessful attack, 199-200; battle of Bergen, 201-3; fighting, 203-4; battle of Kastrikum, 204-5; Convention of Alkmaar, 205-7; quality as commander, 208; Brumaire and after, 208; in Italy, 215, 216, 226-30, 231; Larévellière-Lépeaux's views on, 228-9; not chosen for Egypt, 354; attitude before Brumaire, 455, 462; after Brumaire, 463; recalled from Holland, 467.
- Brunet, General, 110, 151, 152, 159-60, 162.
- Broussier, General, 248, 309.
- Caffarelli, General, 16, 355, 363, 376, 378-9, 380, 406.
- Calvin, General, 301, 338.
- Cambacérés, future Minister, 448, 468.
- Capitan Pasha, the, 434, 435, 439.
- Carnot, late Director, 110-11, 353.
- Chabran, General, 84, 87, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 101, 104, 105, 110-11, 129.
- Championnet, General, with 'Mayence', 9, 10; with 'Angleterre', 13, 14; back to 'Mayence', 17; to 'Italie', 18, 216, 224, 225; commands 'Rome', 230; career and character, 239-40; at Rome, 240-3; Naples campaign, 243-6; break with Macdonald, 244-6; organization of Naples district, 246-7, 249; removal and arrest, 247-8; commands 'Alpes B', 317-18, 335-6; commands 'Italie', 333-4, 337-8; criticized by Napoleon, 336-7, 341; last campaign, 338-41; misery of army, 342-3; resigns, 343, 345; death, 346; general opinions on, 349-50; before Brumaire, 455; after Brumaire, 465.
- Charles, Archduke, military ability, 20, 38, 45, 99; campaign of 1799, 31, 34, 35, 80; battle of Ostrach, 36-8; battle of Stockach, 49-50; health, 49; criticizes Jourdan, 52-3; and 'Observation', 54; and 'Helvétie', 61, 64, 97; crosses Rhine, 97-8; first battle of Zürich, 102-3; further fighting, 105-8; attacked by Soult, 110-11; on the Aar, 117-19; leaves Switzerland, 121-2; and 'Rhin C', 123-7, 139, 159, 161, 163, 166-7, 171, 173, 176, 178, 180-2; conduct of campaign, 187-9; criticisms on, 192.
- Châteauneuf-Randon, General, 17, 31.
- Chérin, General, 63, 64, 87, 100, 101, 104, 105.
- Clausel, General, 315, 328.
- Clinton, Lt.-Colonel, 142, 155.
- Colaoud, General, 63, 64, 87, 89, 97, 106, 114, 116, 122, 123, 125, 164, 174-5, 176-7, 190.
- Colbert, Captain, 376, 402, 406, 441.
- Colli, General, 327-9, 332-3.
- Compère, Colonel, 162, 185.
- Condé, Prince de, 128, 139, 159-61, 163.
- Constantine, Grand Duke, 149, 154, 155, 156-7, 158, 163, 184, 266, 329.
- Coote, General, 435.
- Daendels, General, 195, 196, 199-200, 313.
- Dallemagne, General, 25, 26, 219, 223.
- Damas, Count Roger de, 242, 243.
- Damas, General, 421, 436.
- Damascus, Pasha of, 399-401, 402-3.
- D'André, Baron, 174.
- Davout, future Marshal, with 'Allemagne', 8; appointed to 'Angleterre', 12, 13, 14; chosen for Egypt, 355, 356; commands cavalry brigade, 358; at Malta, 361-2; at Alexandria, 363; march on Cairo, 364; battle of Pyramids, 368-70; at Cairo, 376, 377-8; in Upper

- Egypt, 383-7; in Cairo, 387, 391, 408-9; illness, 410, 411; battle of Aboukir, 411-12, 415; at Balbeis, 415; left behind by Bonaparte, 418; opposes evacuation, 422-3; refuses promotion, 423; return to France, 425-6; at Paris, 427-8; in Italy, 428; effect of Egypt on, 441, 442-3.
- Decaen, General, 42, 56-7, 57-9, 59-60, 63, 114, 116, 125, 127, 172, 175-8, 190-1.
- Delaborde, General, 60, 89, 113, 122, 171, 176.
- Delaroche, General, 89, 97, 123, 125-6, 127, 165.
- Dellard, 136-8.
- Delmas, General, 227, 236, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 259.
- De Précý, Count, 174.
- Desaix, General, in 1798, 8; second-in-command of 'Angleterre', 11, 12, 13; in Paris, 16; at Rome with Saint-Cyr, 223-4, 358; chosen for Egypt, 354-5, 356; sails from Civita Vecchia, 359; at Malta, 359-62; march on Cairo, 364; battle of Pyramids, 368-72; commands at Cairo, 376; in Upper Egypt, 377-8, 383-7, 389, 391; at Cairo, 411; left behind by Bonaparte, 415-16, 418; negotiations for evacuation, 420-3; return to France, 423-6; in Italy in 1800, 427.
- De Sémonville, Marquis, 312, 317-8, 324.
- Desmont, General, 75, 76, 77, 83-4.
- Dessoles, General, 74, 77-8, 82-4, 252, 253, 259, 265, 271, 296, 316, 320, 326, 349.
- Destaing, General, 411-12, 436, 440.
- D'Hautpoul, General, 26, 36-7, 42, 46, 55-6, 59, 60, 63, 115, 123, 125, 171, 175-7.
- Dombrowski, General, 253, 275, 276, 281, 285-6, 289, 291-4, 315, 319-20, 323, 326, 328, 333, 338, 340.
- Drouet, General, 10, 16, 25, 51.
- Dubois-Crancé, politician, 30-1, 170, 180, 182, 206, 337-8, 466.
- Ducos, Roger, Director, 312, 448, 458.
- Dufour, General, 60, 89.
- Dufresse, General, 248, 309.
- Dugua, General, 16, 364, 368-70, 376, 377, 387, 388, 391, 419, 421.
- Duhesme, General, 240, 243-4, 248, 253, 309, 337, 338, 340-1.
- Dumas, General, 13, 355, 361-2, 363, 366-7, 377, 383-4, 388.
- Dumonceau, General, 195, 199-200, 206.
- Dundas, General, 201, 204.
- Durasoff, General, 132, 134.
- Duroc, future *Grand Maréchal du Palais*, 357, 358, 376, 405, 408-9, 416-17, 449, 458, 461-2.
- Ernouf, General, 25, 34, 55, 56-61, 57-9, 64.
- Essen, General, 198-9, 202, 203, 204, 205.
- Faipoult, politician, 247.
- Ferino, General, 18, 25, 26, 28, 31, 36, 38, 39, 42, 52, 55, 60, 62, 64, 80, 82, 87, 97, 101, 106.
- Fouché, future Minister, 98, 221, 229-30, 231.
- Fourès, Madame, 381, 424.
- Freytag, General, 15, 17.
- Friant, General, 384, 385, 421, 433.
- Ganteaume, Admiral, 418, 433.
- Gardanne, General, 229, 267.
- Gaultier, General, 251-2, 253, 258, 269, 274-5.
- Gazan, General, 98-9, 101-2, 108, 110, 132, 149, 151, 155-6, 158-60, 184.
- Gohier, Director, 312, 448, 450, 459.
- Goullus, General, 57, 63, 105, 108.
- Grandjean, General, 294, 329, 333.
- Grenier, General, 10, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 259, 262-3, 264, 266, 268, 296-7, 334, 338, 340-1.
- Grouchy, future Marshal, General of Division, 9; to 'Angleterre', 12; with 'Mayence', 14, 17; with 'Italie', 216, 230; at Turin, 231-2, 250; in Moreau's retreat, 265, 268, 269; in May 1799, 271; second battle of Marengo, 296-7; in August 1799, 310, 315, 319-20; battle of Novi, 323, 325, 327-8; taken prisoner, 328-9; criticized by Thiébault, 332; in September 1799, 338; effect of campaign on reputation, 347-8; not chosen for Egypt, 356; after Brumaire, 468.
- Gudin, General, 109-10, 114, 140, 143, 145-6, 150, 151, 158, 159, 170, 184.
- Hacquin, General, 15, 17.
- Haddick, General, 94-5, 188.
- Hardy, General, 10, 11, 15, 16, 63, 120.
- Hatry, General, 8-9, 10, 17, 194, 252, 253, 255-6, 259.
- Hédouville, General, 15.
- Hermann, General, 198-9, 200-2, 329.
- Hiller, General, 103, 134.
- Hohenzollern, General, 269, 281-2, 300-1.

- Hotze, General, 35, 75-6, 80, 92, 97-8, 103, 128, 130, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 147-8.
- Humbert, General, 14-15, 106, 129, 132, 133.
- Hutchinson, General, 434-6.
- Ibrahim Bey, 376-7.
- Jellachich, General, 101, 110-11, 117, 128, 147, 149, 153-5, 184.
- Joubert, General, in Holland, 9, 194; commands 'Mayence', 9, 17; commands 'Italie', 17; and Suchet, 39; first and second Italian commands, 216, 230-1; occupation of Piedmont and Lucca, 231-2; resignation, 233-5, 236; Prairial, 235, second command in Italy, 302, 311, 314; character and politics, 311-14, 318; and Moreau, 311, 316; and 'Alpes B', 318, 321-2, 366-7; position before Novi, 318-23; battle of Novi and death, 323-4; effect of last campaign on reputation, 347; not taken to Egypt, 354.
- Jourdan, future Marshal, commander of 'Danube A', 8; not in 'Angleterre', 12; commands 'Mayence', 18, 19, 25, 26; career and character, 19-20, 24; plan for campaign, 20-1, 23; popularity in army, 24, 37; and 'Observation', 27-8, 54-5; crosses Rhine, 28; crosses Danube, 29, 30-1, 33-5, 74-5, 80; battle of Ostrach, 36-8; retires, 39, 40, 81; plans for attack, 41-3; battle of Stockach, 43-50, 51; further retreat, 51-3; leaves army as ill, 55-6; criticized by Decaen, 59; disgrace, 61-2, 65; in *Cinq-Cents*, 62; not suitable for Egypt, 356; before Brumaire, 445; policy, 446-8, 449, 452-4; Brumaire, 457, 459-60; results of Brumaire, 462-3.
- Junot, General, A.D.C. to Bonaparte for Egypt, 357; duel with Lanusse, 367; in Cairo, 378; General of Brigade, 388; Syrian expedition, 388-9; in Jordan valley, 398; action at Nazareth, 399-400; battle of Mt. Tabor, 401; at Tiberias, 403; retreat from Syria, 408; battle of Aboukir, 414-15; at Suez, 417, 419; return to France, 424.
- Kellermann, Colonel, 217, 240, 242.
- Kellermann, future Marshal, 12, 356, 449-50, 451, 459.
- Kilmaine, General, 13, 15.
- Kléber, General, with 'Angleterre', 11, 12, 13; praises Mortier and Dubois-Grancé, 11; in Paris, 16; character, 19; chosen for Egypt, 354-5, 356; division at Toulon, 357; at Malta, 360-1; landing at Alexandria, 362-3; wounded and made Governor of Alexandria, 363, 374; 'frondeur', 366-7, 379-80, 399; gives up command, 375, 378, 380; at Cairo, 382; Syrian expedition, 388, 390, 392; capture of Jaffa, 393-4; action before Acre, 394; siege of Acre, 395; battle of Mt. Tabor, 400-3; on Bonaparte and the siege, 403-5, 406-7; retreat from Syria, 408; at Damietta, 408; at Alexandria, 411-12; Commander-in-Chief, 415-17, 418-20; negotiations for evacuation, 420-3; news of Brumaire, 425; begins evacuating, 428; battle of Heliopolis, 429; assassinated, 430; honesty, 432; body taken to France, 438; probable action had he been present at Brumaire, 455-6.
- Klein, General, 62, 97, 106, 129, 132, 133, 159.
- Klenau, General, 259, 269, 338-9.
- Korsakoff, General, arrival in Switzerland, 121, 127-8; character and relations with Austria, 128; plan of attack, 130; battle of Zürich, 131-5, 139-40, 148, 149; correspondence lost, 138; fighting round L. Constance, 159-61; joins Suvárof, 163; lack of tenacity, 192.
- Kray, General, 254-7, 281-2, 338-40.
- Laboissière, General, 253, 265, 315, 319-20, 323, 325, 333.
- Laborde, General, 26, 33, 35.
- Lacombe-Saint-Michel, General, 113, 165, 175.
- Lagrange, General, 434-5, 436.
- Lahure, Colonel, 242, 248, 289, 291, 293-4, 349-50.
- Lannes, future Marshal, appointed to 'Angleterre', 12; at Lyons, 70; chosen for Egypt, 356; marriage, 357; before embarkation, 358; at Malta, 360-1; at Alexandria, 363-4; disaffection, 366-7; battle of Pyramids, 368, 370; commands division, 375; fights Mamelukes, 376; at Cairo, 378; given land, 379; Syrian expedition, 388, 390, 392; at Jaffa, 393-4; action before Acre, 394; siege of Acre, 394, 403; and Bonaparte, 405; wounded, 406; General of Division, 406; retreat from

- Syria, 408; at Cairo, 408-9; battle of Aboukir, 411-12, 414; return to France with Bonaparte, 416-18; effect of Egypt on, 441, 442-3; before Brumaire, 449; Brumaire, 456-61; commands Consular Guard, 467.
- Lanusse, General, 367, 411-12, 414, 421-2, 431, 433-4.
- Larévellière-Lépeaux, Director, 19, 20, 67-8, 71; criticizes Brune and Suchet, 228-9, 230; against Joubert and Suchet, 234; Prairial, 235, 312; supports Moreau, 236; against Schérer's appointment, 238; against Championnet, 248; favours Moreau and Macdonald against Jourdan and Schérer, 277.
- Larrey, surgeon, 405, 406.
- Lasalle, Colonel, 364, 376, 384, 385-6, 419, 423.
- Lavalette, future Minister, A.D.C. to Bonaparte for Egypt, 357; marriage, 357; embarks at Toulon, 358; at Malta, 359; at Acre, 396; at Cairo, 408-9; battle of Aboukir, 414; returns to France with Bonaparte, 417; before Brumaire, 449; Brumaire, 458, 460-2.
- Lavater, Jean-Gaspar, 135.
- Lebrun, Consul, 468.
- Leclerc, General, 226, 264, 376-7, 388.
- Lecourbe, General, with 'Allemagne', 8; to 'Angleterre', 11; as General of Division to 'Helvétie', 74; Engadine campaign, 77-8, 80, 81, 82-4; in 'Danube B', 89, 91, 92; retreats from St. Gotthard, 93-5; qualities, 96; in May-June 1799, 97, 101, 105, 106; retakes St. Gotthard, 108-10, 115; in September 1799, 129; retreat before Suvárof, 131, 140-1, 143-51; appointed to command 'Rhin C', 113, 149, 151, 161, 164, 166; takes command, 167-73; and Brumaire, 175; end of campaign, 175-8; ill and inactive, 176-8, 191; Swiss command, 178, 179; tactics in Germany and Switzerland, 180-1, 183, 184-7, 190-1; attachment to Moreau, 191.
- Lefebvre, future Marshal, with 'Mayence', 9; in December 1797, 10, 11; to 'Angleterre', 12, 13; return to 'Mayence', 14; applies to retire, 15-16; January-June 1798, 16, 17; ill and dissatisfied, 17-18; praises Jourdan, 24; commands *avant-garde*, 25, 26, 28, 31; character, 26; battle of Ostrach, 36-7; wounded, 37, 40, 63; in Paris, 165; Brumaire, 175, 179; not chosen for Egypt, 356; command of Paris, 445, 447, 449, 450-1; Brumaire, 457-9; after Brumaire, 462, 464-5, 466.
- Legrand, General, 87, 97, 104, 106, 114, 122, 171, 175.
- Lemoine, General, 240, 243, 244; 253, 259, 265, 268, 315, 319-20, 323, 325, 327, 333, 338, 340-1, 342, 344, 365.
- Leval, General, 113, 122, 123, 125.
- Liechtenstein, Prince de, 294.
- Lincken, General, 141, 147, 149, 153-5, 157, 163, 184.
- Loison, General, 76, 77-8, 83-4, 94, 95, 143-4, 145-7, 150-2, 153, 156, 158, 162-3, 179, 184, 186.
- Lorcet, General, 114, 170.
- Lorge, General, 76, 89, 97, 101, 105, 129, 131-3, 134, 159, 161.
- Loudon, Marshal, 77, 78.
- Lusignan, General, 326, 329, 331.
- Macdonald, future Marshal, in January 1798, 12, 194; with 'Italie', 14, 217; temporary command of 'Rome', 225, 227; under Championnet, 240; at Rome, 240-2; hatred of Championnet, 241, 244-6, 248; commands 'Naples', 248-9; called to N. Italy, 250, 264, 265, 268, 269-70, 271; preparation, 271-3; march north, 274-5; contact with Moreau, 275-8; strategy, 278-81; crosses Apennines, 281-2; accident, 282-3; advance to Piacenza, 284-5; battle of the Trebbia, 285-96; retreat on Genoa, 296, 298-302; to Paris, 302-3, 314; and Moreau, 303-6; criticizes his Generals, 306-9; marriage, 312; in September 1799, 338; effect of campaign on, 347; not chosen for Egypt, 356; before Brumaire, 448, 449, 451, 454; Brumaire, 457, 459, 461; in 1800, 466.
- Mack, General, 240-1, 242, 246.
- Manscourt, General, 355, 375, 380.
- Marbot, General, 344, 345-6, 347, 454.
- Marmont, future Marshal, appointed to 'Angleterre', 12; A.D.C. to Bonaparte for Egypt, 357; marriage, 357; embarkation, 358; at Malta, 360-1; General of Brigade, 361; at Alexandria, 363-4; battle of Pyramids, 368, 370-1; in August 1798, 374-5; Governor of Alexandria, 375; in October 1798, 378; not in Syrian expedition, 391, 408; comment on siege of Acre, 406;

- attacked by Turks, 410-11; return to France with Bonaparte, 417-18; effect of Egypt on, 441, 442-3; before Brumaire, 449; Brumaire, 456-9, 461; Councillor of State, 467.
- Masséna, future Marshal, commander of 'Danube B', 8; with 'Mayence', 12, 13, 18-19; in disgrace, 19; appointed to command 'Helvétie', 22; and 'Danube A', 62, 64-5, 82; commands 'Helvétie', 73-5; campaign in Grisons and Engadine, 75-8; subordinated to Jourdan, 78-80; attack on Feldkirch, 80-1, 85; criticized by Soult, 82; C.-in-C. 'Danube B', 87-90; suppresses insurrection, 91-2; draws back to Zürich, 93, 96-100; first battle of Zürich, 100-4; position after battle, 105, 107-9; and 'Rhin C', 112-13, 114-15; repulses Archduke, 117-18; called to Paris, 118-21; position September 1799, 128-9; second battle of Zürich, 130-40; against Suvárof, 149-52; defeats Korsakoff, 159-61; defies Directory, 161-2, 164, 189, 193; and Lecourbe, 173; at Brumaire, 174; Italian command, 179, 345, 467; treatment of Switzerland, 179-80; conduct of campaign, 182-9, 192-3; in Italy 1798, 215, 216; command at Rome, 217-20; removal, 220; unemployed, 226, 236, 354; takes no part in politics, 445-6, 455; attitude to Brumaire, 463, 465.
- Melas, General, 290, 293-4, 297-8, 325, 328, 329, 338, 340.
- Menard, General, 68, 69, 72, 74, 82, 84, 87, 89, 92, 93, 97, 129, 131-2, 149, 159, 160.
- Mengaud, politician, 72, 129.
- Menou, General, 355, 356, 361, 362-3, 367, 374-5, 391, 408, 411, 414-15, 417, 421, 423, 425, 430-2, 432-3, 434-5, 436-7, 437-8, 439, 440, 442.
- Merlin de Douai, Director, 19, 234, 238, 312.
- Miollis, General, 233, 253, 315, 328, 333, 338, 344, 465.
- Mireur, General, 364, 377.
- Molitor, General, 47, 74, 144, 147, 153-9, 184-5, 191-2.
- Moncey, future Marshal, 12, 356, 449, 451, 459, 466.
- Montbrun, General, 115.
- Montchoisy, General, 106, 129.
- Montrichard, General, 252, 253, 255, 259, 269, 275, 276, 281-2, 283, 285, 289, 291-4, 295, 298, 301, 306-7, 315.
- Moore, General, 14, 138, 195, 196, 198, 202, 203, 435, 437-8, 439, 442.
- Moreau, General, in January 1798, 13; in disgrace, 19; command in Italy, 89, 93; appointed to 'Rhin C', 112, 116; to 'Rhin D', 178; attachment of Lecourbe to, 191; Inspector-General in Italy, 217, 230; suggested for command, 236; under Schérer, 250; operations against Verona, 255-7; retreat to Adda, 258-9; C.-in-C. of 'Italie', 260-1; retreat, 263, 264-6; first battle of Marengo, 266-7; retreat on Genoa, 267-70; relations with Macdonald, 275, 277, 279, 283-4, 303-6; tries to co-operate, 296; second battle of Marengo, 296-8; appointed to 'Rhin C', 302, 310-11; stays in Italy with Joubert, 303, 315-16; before Novi, 319-20; battle of Novi, 324-7; after Novi, 333-4; to Paris, 334; advice to Directory, 337-8, 349; effect of Italian campaign on, 348-9; hostile to Egyptian expedition, 356; before Brumaire, 448, 449, 451-2, 454, 456; Brumaire, 457, 459-61; command on Rhine, 464, 466.
- Mortier, future Marshal, with 'Mayence', 9, 16; at head-quarters, 10; to 'Angleterre', 11, 12, 13; return to 'Mayence', 14, 29; General of Brigade, 39; battle of Stockach, 43, 45-6; in retreat, 52; in 'Danube B', 64, 87; qualities, 65; General of Division, 87; in May 1799, 97; first battle of Zürich, 104; in Soult's division, 105, 110; in September 1799, 129; second battle of Zürich, 131-3, 140; against Suvárof's rear-guard, 149-52, 155-6, 158, 159, 184; defeat of Austrians, 162; Paris command, 179; effect of campaign on, 190; not chosen for Egypt, 356; after Brumaire, 464, 468.
- Moulins, General, 312, 445, 448, 459.
- Mourad Bey, 377-8, 383, 384-7, 429.
- Muller, General, 116-17, 122-7, 164-5, 180-1.
- Murat, future Marshal, does not join 'Angleterre', 12; in January 1798, 13, 215; in march on Rome, 217, 219; and Egypt expedition, 223, 226, 227, 356-7; embarks, 358, 359; at Malta, 359-62; discouragement, 361; at Alexandria, 363; with Nile flotilla, 364; disaffection, 366-7; battle of Pyramids, 368-70; Governor of Kelioub, 374; with cavalry,

- 376-7, 378; given land, 379; succeeds Dumas as cavalry leader, 384; Syrian expedition, 388, 390; capture of Jaffa, 393-4; action before Acre, 394; in Jordan valley, 398-400; routs Turks, 402-3; at siege of Acre, 405-6; retreat from Syria, 408; at Cairo, 408-9; expedition to N. Egypt, 410; battle of Aboukir, 411-14; wounded, 413; General of Division, 414; return to France with Bonaparte, 416-18; effect of Egypt on, 441, 442-3; before Brumaire, 449; Brumaire, 456-9, 461-2; Consular Guard command, 466; marriage to Caroline Bonaparte, 466-7; in 1800, 467.
- Nansouty, General, 115.
- Naples, King of, 240, 243, 246, 249.
- Nauendorf, General, 45, 97-8, 128, 139, 159.
- Ney, future Marshal, in 'Mayence', 9, 10; to 'Angleterre', 11, 12, 13; back to 'Mayence', 14; cavalry command, 17, 25; to 'Observation', 27, 29; campaign of March 1799, 32-3, 35; General of Division, 65-6; to 'Danube B', 66, 86; varied posts, 86-7; character, 88, 100, 182, 190; with Lecourbe's division, 92, 93-4; commands *avant-garde*, 94, 97-9; wounded, 99, 103; ill feeling with Soult, 100; in 'Rhin C', 113-14, 116, 118, 122-3, 125-6, 127; temporary C.-in-C., 164-7; anger with Lecourbe, 168-70; end of 1799 campaign, 171-2, 175-8; at Brumaire, 175; effect of campaign on, 189-90; not chosen for Egypt, 356; after Brumaire, 464-5, 468.
- Ochs, politician, 72.
- Olivier, General, 10, 253, 274, 275, 276, 281-2, 285, 289, 291, 294.
- Osman Bey, 385-6.
- Ott, General, 269, 282, 284, 286-8, 294, 300.
- Oudinot, future Marshal, in 'Allemagne', 8, 9; to 'Angleterre', 11, 12; to 'Mayence', 14; in 'Helvétie' reserve, 73, 74; Grisons campaign, 75-6; attack on Feldkirch, 80-1; General of Division, 82, 86; in 'Danube B', 88, 89; commands *avant-garde*, 97-9; first battle of Zürich, 101-3; wounded, 103, 104-5; Chief of the Staff, 105, 118, 129, 131; second battle of Zürich, 133-5; and Lecourbe, 144; in October 1799, 159, 160; to Italy with Masséna, 179, 347, 467; effect of Swiss campaign on, 189-90; not chosen for Egypt, 356.
- Paillard, General, 97, 98.
- Pajol, Colonel, 29, 56, 57, 99.
- Paul I, Tsar of Russia, 199, 206.
- Pérignon, future Marshal, in January 1798, 12; with 'Italie', 216; at Genoa, 271, 275, 279, 284, 294, 298, 300; in August 1799, 310; commands left wing of 'Italie', 315, 319-23; battle of Novi, 323-4, 327-8; taken prisoner, 328-9; later career, 329-30; criticized by Thiébault, 332; in September 1799, 338; effect of campaign on, 347-8; not chosen for Egypt, 356; Senator, 468.
- Petrash, General, 137-9.
- Pichegru, General, 110-11, 138, 174, 456, 468.
- Pius VI, Pope, 217.
- Ponsard, General, 459, 461.
- Préval, General, 331.
- Pulteney, General, 201, 202.
- Quétard, General, 131-2.
- Rampon, General, 370, 395, 406, 408, 411, 412, 414, 415.
- Rapinat, politician, 71, 74.
- Rapp, Colonel, 224, 357, 359, 385, 418, 425, 427, 440, 441.
- Reille, Colonel, 18, 152.
- Rewbell, Director, 19, 234, 238.
- Rey, General, 243, 244, 248, 309.
- Reynier, General, 354-5, 357-8, 360-1, 364, 368-9, 371, 376, 377, 388, 390, 392-5, 403, 408, 411, 421, 430-1, 433-4, 436-7, 438, 440.
- Richepanse, General, 253, 272, 315, 317, 325, 344, 348, 465.
- Rivaud, politician, 231, 233-4.
- Roguet, Colonel, 344-5.
- Roize, General, 414, 434.
- Rosenberg, General, 102, 142-3, 152, 154, 155, 157, 163, 266.
- Roumelia, Seraskier of, 412-13.
- Roverea, General, 107, 159.
- Ruby, General, 28, 31, 42, 52, 70, 75, 80, 81, 93, 95.
- Rusca, General, 253, 275, 276, 281, 285-6, 289, 291-4, 307, 309.
- Saint-Cyr, future Marshal, with 'Allemagne', 8, 68; appointed to 'Mayence', 9; does not join 'Angleterre', 11, 12; with 'Italie', 14; with

- 'Mayence', 26; 1799 campaign, 28, 31, 33, 34; battle of Ostrach, 36-8; movements afterwards, 39, 40-1; battle of Stockach, 41, 44-8; opinion of Jourdan's plan, 42-3; as a comrade, 51; retreat, 52-3; dissatisfaction, 55; in Ernouf's retreat, 60; leaves army, 63; effect of campaign on, 65; in Italy, 217; command at Rome, 222-4; and Desaix, 223-4; removed and sent to 'Mayence', 224-5; on Mack, 246; on Schérer's operations, 255, 256; on Macdonald's operations against Suvárof, 280; accused by Macdonald, 306, 308-9; with 'Italie', 310; commands right wing, 315; and Moreau and Joubert, 315-16; before Novi, 318-23; battle of Novi, 323-7; further operations, 328; commands left, 333, 335, 337-8; covers Genoa with right of army, 338-9; defeats Austrians, 339-40; misery of army at end of 1799, 342-3; on army's attitude to Brumaire, 344; personal attitude to Brumaire, 345; praised by Champagnonnet and honoured by Bonaparte, 346, 468; appointed to Moreau's Rhine army, 346, 468; not chosen for Egypt, 356.
- Sainte-Susanne, General, 89.
- Saint-Hilaire, General, 378.
- Salis, General, 107, 159.
- Salm, General, 123, 275-6, 285-6, 288-90, 294, 315.
- Sardinia, King of, 228, 231-2, 268, 270.
- Sarrazin, General, 289, 290, 294.
- Savary, Commodore, 14-15.
- Savary, future Minister, 8, 357, 359, 385, 418, 420-2, 425, 427, 461.
- Schauenbourg, General, 27, 68-9, 71, 72-3, 74.
- Schérer, General, Minister of War, 68, 73, 74, 234, 238; C.-in-C. 'Italie', 78, 79, 83; reasons for appointment and previous career, 237-8; takes up command, 250-4; operations against Verona, 254-7; retreat to Adda, 257-60; calls up 'Naples', 258, 271-2; discouraged and recalled, 260-1; death, 261.
- Schwarzenberg, Prince de, 167, 171.
- Sérurier, future Marshal, to 'Angleterre', 12, 217; return to 'Italie', 14, 215, 216, 217, 230; occupation of Lucca, 233; command at Mantua, 233, 250, 253; operations against Verona, 254-7; position April 1799, 259, 262; surrender at Verderio, 262-4; to Paris, 264, 271; in September 1799, 338; effect of campaign on, 347; not chosen for Egypt, 354; before Brumaire, 449, 451; Brumaire, 459, 462; Senator, 466.
- Sieyès, politician, 311, 312, 446, 447-8, 452, 458.
- Smith, Sydney, 396, 398, 406, 407, 415, 417, 420-2, 425, 428.
- Souham, General, 26, 36, 38, 39, 42, 52, 55, 56-7, 61, 62, 64, 87, 97, 105-6.
- Soult, future Marshal, with 'Mayence', 9, 10; to 'Angleterre', 11, 12, 13, 14; return to 'Mayence', 14, 17; in *avant-garde*, 25, 29, 34; battle of Ostrach, 37-8; position after battle, 39, 40; battle of Stockach, 42-8; position after battle, 51-2; dissatisfaction, 55; in Ernouf's retreat, 58-9, 60, 61, 63; as General of Division to 'Danube B', 64, 86, 89; rapid progress, 65; criticism of Masséna, 82; suppresses Swiss insurrection, 91-2; withdrawal on Zürich, 97, 98; ill feeling with Ney, 100; first battle of Zürich, 101-3; further fighting, 105, 107-8; in September 1799, 129; second battle of Zürich, 135-8; replaces Lecourbe against Suvárof, 149-51, 155-6, 157-9; against Korsakoff, 159; throws Austrians over Rhine, 162; in November 1799, 173; to 'Italie', 179, 347, 467; criticism of Swiss campaign, 187-8; effect of campaign on, 189; criticism of Macdonald, 280; not chosen for Egypt, 356; comment on Brumaire, 456, 465.
- Stendlet, Captain, 396-7.
- Strauch, General, 106, 143, 146, 187, 188.
- Suchet, future Marshal, with 'Mayence', 9; in January 1798, 12, 215; with 'Danube A', 39-40, 41, 59; to 'Danube B', 64; with 'Helvétie', 68-9; to Paris, 70; Chief of Staff to Masséna, 70, 87, 92-3; General of Division, 87, 104; in May 1799, 97; first battle of Zürich, 104; Chief of Staff to Joubert with 'Italie', 129, 131, 148; effect of Swiss campaign on, 190; as Chief of Staff with 'Italie', 216, 226, 227, 229, 230; suspended by Directory, 233-4; second time Chief of Staff to Joubert, 302, 314-15, 319, 320-2;

- battle of Novi, 324, 331; with Moreau, 333; with Championnet, 338, 344; end of 1799 campaign, 342; welcomes Bonaparte's return, 343-4, 345; under Masséna, 346, 467; effect of Italian campaign on, 348; not chosen for Egypt, 356, 443.
- Suvárof, Marshal, commands Russian army, 35; in Italy, 93-5, 109, 121; plan for Swiss campaign, 130-1; over St. Gotthard, September 1799, 139, 140-5, 146-9, 333, 335; relations with Austrians, 141, 147, 149, 157, 163, 295-6; in Switzerland, 149-50; mountain retreat, 155-9; at Lindau, 161; final withdrawal to Germany, 163-4; character and abilities, 183-8, 192-3; arrives in Italy April 1799, 262, 264; advance on Moreau, 266; first battle of Marengo, 266-7; takes Turin, 268-70; political difficulties, 270; position May-June 1799, 278, 279; advance on Macdonald, 287-8; battle of the Trebbia, 288-96; against Moreau, 297-8, 300; against Joubert, 318-21; battle of Novi, 324-5, 328-9; opinion of Schérer and Moreau, 348.
- Sztaray, General, 54, 61, 122-3, 176-8.
- Talleyrand, Minister, 353, 387-8.
- Tchitchagoff, Admiral, 199.
- Tharreau, General, 89, 90, 97, 98, 99-100, 101, 105.
- Thiébault, General, 240, 241, 244, 248, 272, 273, 331, 348.
- Tone, Wolfe, 15.
- Treilhard, Director, 19, 234, 238, 312, 360.
- Turreau, General, 15, 17, 90, 106, 108, 109, 129, 159, 173, 179.
- Vandamme, General, 8, 9, 28-9, 33, 36, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48, 52, 55, 60, 61, 62, 87, 89, 194-5, 199-200, 201, 203.
- Vaubois, General, 354, 355, 358, 360-2.
- Verdier, General, 364, 401, 403, 420.
- Vial, General, 363-4, 368, 370-1, 375.
- Victor, future Marshal, appointed to 'Angleterre', 12, 13; return to 'Italie', 14, 215, 216, 227, 230; occupation of Turin, 232; in March 1799, 250, 252, 253; operations against Verona, 255-7; in April 1799, 259, 262-3; retreat on Turin, 265, 266; first battle of Marengo, 266-7; to Genoa, 267, 268; at Alessandria, 269; in May 1799, 271; joins 'Naples', 275-7; crosses Apennines, 281; refuses command, 283; to Piacenza, 285; battle of the Trebbia, 285-6, 289, 291-4; retreat, 298-300, 301; criticized by Macdonald, 306-8; ill in rear, 315, 330-1; false criticism from Thiébault, 331-2; retakes division, 333-4, 335, 338; battle of Fossano, 340-1; end of campaign, 342; attitude to Brumaire, 344, 345; to France, 347; effect of campaign on reputation, 348; not chosen for Egypt, 354; after Brumaire, 465, 468.
- Vizier, Grand, 415, 420-1, 428, 429, 432, 433, 435, 439, 442.
- Wallis, General, 36, 103.
- Watrin, General, 253, 275-6, 281, 289-93, 315, 319-20, 323-6, 328, 331, 333, 338, 343.
- Williams, 106, 130, 133, 136-7, 141, 147.
- Willot, General, 110-11, 174.
- Xaintrailles, General, 74, 80, 90, 318.
- York, Duke of, 198, 200-2, 203, 204-5, 205-6.

PRINTED IN
GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
OXFORD
BY
JOHN JOHNSON
PRINTER
TO THE
UNIVERSITY

DC 148 .P5
Phipps, Ramsay Weston, 18
The armies of the first French

v.5
010101000



0 1163 0216063 9
TRENT UNIVERSITY

DC148 .P5 v.5

Phipps, Ramsay Weston

The armies of the first French
Republic.

DATE	ISSUED TO
	37763

37763

DC
148
P5
v.5

Phipps, Ramsay Weston
The armies of the first
French Republic

Trent
University

